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
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

Emery Walker Ph. sc.

John Stuart Mill

from a Daguerreotype

THE LETTERS OF JOHN STUART MILL

70613

EDITED, WITH AN INTRODUCTION, BY

HUGH S. R. ELLIOT

WITH A NOTE ON MILL'S PRIVATE LIFE, BY

MARY TAYLOR

VOL. I

WITH PORTRAITS

LONGMANS, GREEN AND CO
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PREFACE

On Mill's death in 1873, he left behind him an almost complete record of his correspondence over a large period of his life. Painstaking and assiduous to a unique degree, he rarely wrote a letter even on unimportant matters without a liberal sprinkling of erasures and interlineations, which often made its deciphering a task of some difficulty. He therefore formed the habit of transcribing every letter he wrote after he had revised it; the transcribed letter he despatched to his correspondent, while he himself carefully preserved the rough draft. These rough drafts accumulated in the course of years to many thousands, and it is from them that the bulk of the present book is taken. It was clearly Mill's intention that a selection of them should be published after his death, for across many of them he had written—"For publication. J. S. Mill." While I have included in the present collection all those so marked by Mill, even though in some cases their interest at the present day hardly seemed to justify it, I have inserted in addition a large number which he had not marked, but which appeared to me to possess an interest, either on account of modern developments in political and philosophical speculation, or on some other grounds.

The first three chapters of the book are derived from a different source. With the exception of one letter to Gustave d'Eichthal, they consist exclusively of letters to Carlyle, John Sterling, and Lytton Bulwer (afterwards Lord Lytton). The letters to Sterling are printed from the letters actually sent by Mill, which were apparently returned by Sterling's relatives after his death. In the case of the letters to Carlyle and Bulwer, I have not had

access to the originals, but only to copies. The Carlyle side of the correspondence is preserved with the Mill papers ; but I have failed to obtain permission to print it.

I have generally excluded from the present collection such letters as have already been published in other works—those for instance appearing in Mrs. Grote's Life of her husband, in Duncan's "Life of Herbert Spencer," in the "Memories" of Caroline Fox, in the Letters of Kingsley, of Gustave d'Eichthal, the "Lettres inédites de Mill à Comte," &c., &c.

Miss Helen Taylor, to whom the letters passed when Mill died, took no steps towards their publication. Her death took place on 29th January 1907, and the letters then became the property of Miss Mary Taylor, daughter of Algernon Taylor, and grand-daughter of Mrs. Mill. She decided that the time had come for the publication of the letters, which are accordingly now presented to the public.

Among the various portraits included in the book, I wish to draw special attention to that of James Mill. Like the portrait published in Bain's "Life of James Mill," it is from a drawing that originally belonged to Mrs. Grote. It is the portrait of which Bain wrote in his preface to that biography: "A still better likeness was at one time in her possession, but I cannot learn what became of it." It may therefore be considered as the best existing likeness of James Mill. The frontispiece of vol. ii. is from the well-known Watts portrait hanging in the National Portrait Gallery. This is not the portrait for which Mill actually sat, but is a copy of it made by Watts from his original, which is now in the possession of Sir Charles Dilke.

The index is the work of Mr. Richard Gurney, B.A.

HUGH ELLIOT.

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INTRODUCTION

In the brief sketch of Mill's life and character that I am about to give, I propose to make very slight reference to his home life and domestic surroundings. I have been so fortunate as to secure from Miss Mary Taylor a short paper on this subject, embodying the information which she acquired from her father Mr. Algernon Taylor, and from her aunt Miss Helen Taylor, with whom she lived for a few years.

The family of Mill[1] sprang from a part of Scotland, on the slopes of the Grampian chain, that is famous for the production of metaphysical talent. James Mill, the father of John Stuart Mill, was the eldest son of a small shoemaker, who appears to have been an honest and intelligent man, but not notably different from his neighbours. The shoemaker's wife was believed to have been brought up in better circumstances, her descent in the world being due to the fact of her father joining in the Stuart rising of 1745. At all events, she set her heart from an early date on bringing up her eldest son as a gentleman. In this ambition she was greatly encouraged by the marvellous precocity that young James soon displayed. From the parish school of Logie Pert he passed to Montrose Academy, where he stayed till nearly eighteen. During the whole of his youth he was never once called upon to assist in his father's trade, or to work in the fields, or to do any other manual labour. His parents succeeded, not only in dispensing with his assistance, but in finding the money to carry him through a continuous

[1] The name Mill is the same as the common Scotch name of Milne. In James Mill's birth register, indeed, his father's name is spelt Milne. For this and other statements concerning James Mill, the authority is Bain's "Life of James Mill."

course of education. That he can have had no superfluous luxuries is obvious; his weekly board while at Montrose Academy is set down at half-a-crown. On leaving the Academy, he was appointed tutor to the daughter of Sir John Stuart of Fettercairn, the young lady who afterwards became the heroine of Scott's passion; and being taken in this capacity to Edinburgh, was able to avail himself of the courses of study at Edinburgh University. It was probably while studying at Edinburgh University that he laid the foundation of many of his friendships in later life; for his fellow-students included Thomas M'Crie, John Leyden, Thomas Thomson the chemist, David Brewster, William Wallace, and Brougham.

The incidents of his life at this time and during the next ten or twelve years, are involved in obscurity. It is believed that he acted as tutor in various families; but it was not till he had reached the age of twenty-nine that he went up to London, and commenced his literary career. At this time he is described as being strikingly handsome and well-proportioned, exceedingly attractive in conversation, and charming in manner. I need not trace the various stages of his literary progress. Suffice it to say that he was quickly appointed to two editorships, bringing in over £500 a year, and that two years after his arrival in London he married Harriet Burrow, a young woman of Yorkshire family, daughter of a widow who kept an establishment for lunatics at Hoxton. The marriage was never happy. From the letters of hers which I have had the opportunity of examining, I have no doubt that she was of a kind and loving disposition, but not competent to enter into the exalted intellectual occupations of her husband. Almost immediately after his marriage Mill lost both his editorships, and thereafter appears to have been thrown for his support wholly upon what he could earn with his pen. The difficulties which beset him may easily be imagined, when I mention that his family went on increasing until he ultimately had no fewer than nine children.

It is with the eldest of this numerous family that we have here specially to deal. John Stuart Mill was born on 20th May 1806, and from the earliest age was subjected to that remarkable experiment in education which I shall shortly describe. The remainder of James Mill's career need not detain us long. It was during the period of his greatest poverty that he wrote the "History of British India," the most famous of all his writings. His labours at this time were enormous. He told Francis Place that his working day was from 5 A.M. to 11 P.M.[1] The work took him ten years to execute, hampered as he was by the necessity of writing for his living and educating his children. Soon after its completion, the influence of his friends procured him an appointment to the India House. Here his immense ability and energy gradually brought him to the highest post; and on his death from consumption in 1836, he was in the enjoyment of a salary of £2000 a year. The best known of his later writings was his "Analysis of the Human Mind"; a very able, though, from a modern standpoint, a very incomplete exposition of Psychology; being largely devoted to an attempt to analyse complex emotions into elementary sensations, under the law of Association.

During his lifetime he was best known as the lieutenant and fervent disciple of Jeremy Bentham. His friendship with Bentham was, indeed, one of the most important factors in his career. At the time when his fortunes were at their lowest ebb, Bentham assisted him, not only by letting him a house in London at half the normal rent, but by entertaining him at his place, Ford Abbey in Devonshire, for many months together, year after year. Mill accepted Bentham's principles in their entirety, and drove them everywhere to their logical conclusions. On Bentham's death he fell naturally into the position of leader of the Utilitarians; and the standard expression of the views of the school at that time were summed up succinctly in his famous article on "Government" written for the supplement to the third edition of

[1] "The English Utilitarians," by Leslie Stephen, vol. ii. p. 23.

the *Encyclopædia Britannica*. But we are here more nearly concerned with another article he wrote for the same publication—that, namely, on "Education." The theory underlying the two articles is in reality the same. In each Mill assumes the indefinite modifiability of human nature by education and environment. Just as in the article "Government" he assumes that a sound political organisation will remove all evils from the body politic, so, in the article "Education," he assumes that a sound system of education will remove all the evils in human nature. He adopts the theory of Helvetius that mankind are all born alike, that a child's mind is *tabula rasa*, on which may be indelibly stamped any impression it is desired to make, and that all human differences are solely due to differences in education. To believe in a principle was with Mill to apply it in every situation where there seemed any room whatever for its application; and he was not slow to put his theories into practice in the education of his son.

During his early years, John Mill was subjected to so vehement and strenuous an education, as perhaps had never been seen before, and never will be seen again. James Mill was a man of iron will, of energy almost miraculous; he was largely indifferent to pleasure or pain, and inaccessible to the softer sides of human existence. From the moment that John was born, he had decided what John should be. The details of the education are fully set forth in the "Autobiography," but may be recapitulated here. He started learning to read when he was two years old.[1] He began the study of Greek when he was three; and when he was still only seven, he had read the whole of Herodotus, and of Xenophon's "Cyropædia" and "Memorials of Socrates"; some of the lives of the philosophers by Diogenes Laertius; part of Lucian, and Isocrates ad Demonicum and Ad Nicoclem. When he was eight, he read the first six dialogues of Plato, from the Euthyphron to the Theoctetus inclusive. Mill observes: "My father demanded of me not only the utmost that I

[1] "John Stuart Mill," by Alexander Bain, p. 1.

could do, but much that I could by no possibility have done." At this age Mill had undergone in addition an extended course of English reading, including Robertson's histories, Hume, Gibbon, Watson's "Philip the Second and Third," Hooke's "History of Rome," two or three volumes of a translation of Rollin's "Ancient History of Greece," Langhorne's translation of Plutarch, Burnet's "History of His Own Time," the historical part of the "Annual Register" from the beginning down to about 1788, Millar's "Historical View of the English Government," Mosheim's "Ecclesiastical History," M'Crie's "Life of John Knox," Sewell and Rutty's Histories of the Quakers, and a number of other books besides. Thoroughly characteristic of James Mill's stern philosophy was his fondness for putting into his son's hands "books which exhibited men of energy and resource in unusual circumstances, struggling against difficulties and overcoming them."

That Mill continued to flourish under this severe treatment must be attributed partly to the vigour of his own constitution, and partly to the fact that his father was one of the most brilliant men, and the leading psychologist of the age. Under less able guidance, Mill's youthful mind would assuredly have been crushed and maimed; but in the hands of James Mill that fatality was avoided, and the precise result which he desired was achieved. When John was six years old, and his father's health seemed very precarious, Bentham wrote one of his characteristic letters, offering to undertake the guardianship of the child. It is addressed to James Mill from Queen's Square Place, dated Saturday, 25th July 1812, and runs as follows:—

"If in the meantime any such thing as dying should happen to you (for we are all mortal!!!!), you having however between the act of such dying as aforesaid and the act of receiving these presents, time to make your *will* (which to the purpose in question may be done by word of mouth, but if you cannot write it yourself better have it set down in writing and read to you), if you will appoint me guardian to Mr. John Stuart Mill, I will, in the event of his father's being disposed of elsewhere, take

were deeply stirred; the first ray of sunshine fell upon that germ in his character which afterwards sprang up, leading him to rebel against his father's creed and throw over the crabbed doctrines of the early utilitarians.

His studies, however, were not discontinued during his residence in France. Chemistry, zoology, metaphysics, logic, were a few of the subjects to which he then devoted himself; while he acquired at the same time a thorough acquaintance with the French language, his proficiency in which appears in the letters to distinguished Frenchmen scattered through the present volumes. He returned to England in 1821, and thereafter the course of his former studies was resumed. Psychology now occupied a great share of his attention. He studied Roman law with John Austin, and at the age of fifteen a mental revolution was wrought in him by the reading of Dumont's "Traité de Législation," in which work the principal speculations of Bentham were interpreted to the world. This book supplied to Mill a system of philosophy; it focussed his opinions, and gave him a creed, not drily maintained by the intellect, but enthusiastically supported by the whole mind. This doubtless marks the stage at which he first began to think for himself, to rely upon his own opinions, to take the first and most arduous step in his emancipation from the bondage of authority. With many persons this stage has been reached, as it was in Mill, by a sudden revolution, which is often delayed till comparatively late in life; with others it is a slow growth; while with the great majority it is never reached at all.

From this time forward Mill's intellectual cultivation was carried on by writing even more than by reading. He committed to paper various essays on political or historical subjects, which, besides the educative effect of preparing them, led to instructive conversations with his father. From this time also he commenced to converse with the able men collected round his father. He formed a small society of young men who, like himself, had fallen

under the influence of Bentham and James Mill. To this society he gave the name of the Utilitarian Society ; and the label thus selected gradually became adopted into the language to designate the system of views held by these thinkers. At the age of seventeen he entered upon his professional career with an appointment from the East India Company immediately under his father; in which service he was destined to remain for thirty-five years, until the abolition of the Company in 1858.

The commencement of Mill's literary activities dates from the foundation of the *Westminster Review* in 1824. Before that time he had written a few short articles in one or two newspapers, but they were of little importance. In 1823 Bentham formed the project of starting a review which should act as a vehicle for the expression of the views held by him and his disciples. At the same period, there happened to be projected a scheme for the foundation of a purely literary journal ; and the two projects were amalgamated, resulting in the issue of the first number of the *Westminster Review* in April 1824. It attracted immediate notice, mainly on account of an article by James Mill criticising the *Edinburgh Review* since its foundation. The attack on the *Edinburgh* was continued by the son in the second number ; and thenceforward he continued to be closely associated with the *Review*, which took its place as the special organ of "Philosophic Radicalism."

About the beginning of 1825 a new work was undertaken by Mill—that of editing and preparing for the press Bentham's book on Evidence. Bentham had commenced the execution of this work no less than three times, but on each occasion had failed to complete it. His papers had already been used by Dumont as a foundation for his "Traité des Preuves Judiciaires"; and he now entrusted Mill with the task of condensing the masses of manuscript into a single treatise. The chief value to Mill of this work was undoubtedly the opportunity which it afforded of cultivating his powers of composition. The practice which he derived from it

benefited him to such an extent that he was able to say, "Everything which I wrote subsequently to this editorial employment was markedly superior to anything that I had written before it."

It was about this time that Mill tells us he passed through a critical period of nervous depression and mental inertia. He seems to have been troubled with all sorts of curious fancies. He was, for instance, "seriously tormented by the thought of the exhaustibility of musical combinations. The octave consists only of five tones and two semi-tones, which can be put together in only a limited number of ways, of which but a small proportion are beautiful: most of these, it seemed to me, must have been already discovered, and there could not be room for a long succession of Mozarts and Webers to strike out, as these had done, entirely new and surprisingly rich veins of musical beauty." He awoke from this condition to a reaction from the fervent Benthamism which had till then possessed him. The reaction was instituted by his chancing to open a copy of Wordsworth, and deriving great enjoyment from it. Thereupon his mind was opened to new ideas from all quarters; he scandalised his former friends by studying Coleridge, Goethe, and Carlyle. He was greatly influenced by the theories of the St. Simonians, who were then beginning to attract attention in France; and he very soon came under the spell of Auguste Comte.

From this time onward the "Letters" supply a tolerably connected history of Mill's life; and I need only touch lightly on the more important events of his career. In 1830 he was introduced to Mrs. Taylor, and thus commenced the great affection of his life. After twenty years of the closest intimacy, the death of Mrs. Taylor's husband left her free to marry Mill. But during this time Mill's reputation suffered greatly through his connection with her. His father "taxed him with being in love with another man's wife," and expressed "his strong disapproval of the affair."[1] Mill's

[1] "John Stuart Mill," by A. Bain, p. 163.

affection was intense, and when they ultimately married, they withdrew almost entirely from society. The dedication to the "Liberty," the inscription on her tomb at Avignon, the "Autobiography," indicate the intensity of feeling.

In 1835 Sir William Molesworth founded the *London Review*, on the understanding that Mill should act as editor. Soon afterwards Molesworth bought the *Westminster Review* and united it with the *London*, which was conducted by Mill till 1840 under the title of the *London and Westminster Review*. It was of course used to propagate the views of the Philosophic Radicals; but Mill had no intention of confining it to one narrow school of thought, and admitted articles by such men as Carlyle and John Sterling. The *Review* never paid its way; after two or three years Molesworth determined to part with it, and it was acquired by Mill himself. He kept it till 1840, when he passed it on to one of the most regular of its contributors. The "Logic" was published in the spring of 1843. It was offered to Murray but refused by him, and was finally published by the firm of Parker. On the completion of the "Logic," he turned his thoughts to a work on "Ethology," or the science of character; but, failing to make anything of it, turned his attention to writing the "Political Economy," which was published in 1848. All this time he continued his career at the India House, and in 1856 reached the highest place in the office. He only enjoyed that position for two years; on the abolition of the East India Company in 1858, he retired on a pension of £1500 a year. In the same year he suffered the crowning calamity of his life, namely, his wife's death at Avignon, while on their way to the South of France.

The shock was, indeed, terrible. Mill took a cottage in the district of St. Véran, near Avignon, close to her tomb, and for most of the remainder of his life made this his home, spending only a short part of each year at his house at Blackheath. Miss Helen Taylor, Mrs. Mill's daughter, now kept house for her stepfather;

and the tranquillity of his subsequent life was only interrupted during the three years (1865–1868) that he represented Westminster in the House of Commons. The story of his election and subsequent defeat are recorded in detail in the "Letters," and I need do no more than allude to it.

During his retirement he wrote several works. The most important is that on "Liberty," which he believed was "likely to survive longer than anything else that I have written (with the possible exception of the 'Logic')." It was the joint product, he tells us, of himself and his wife, and was published immediately after her death. Among his other productions were the "Utilitarianism," the "Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy," the "Representative Government," the "Subjection of Women." He died on 8th May 1873. During his life he had suffered from pulmonary tuberculosis, which profoundly injured one lung, but proceeded no further. A few days before his death he went on a botanical excursion with some friends; and after a long walk, feeling tired, he adopted the unusual course of taking a carriage home. The unaccustomed drive at night in his overfatigued condition gave him a chill, which developed into erysipelas—a disease endemic around Avignon in consequence of the marshes in the neighbourhood. The disease soon attacked the brain, and killed him in a day or two.

Mill's education was so remarkable that we turn with interest to an analysis of his character. We find it to be, indeed, very different from anything that his published works would suggest. So far from being a mere "logic-chopping machine," Mill was a man of such intensity and depth of feeling as is rarely to be met with. In vain do we search in his character for those weaknesses, whether of emotion or of will, that are so often found to accompany transcendent intellectual power. Mill's superiority of intellect was not derived from any sapping of other departments of his mind. He was not, like Herbert Spencer, deficient in power of application to

disagreeable subjects, nor in the active and volitional side of mind; nor was he, like Jeremy Bentham, or James Mill, or Alexander Bain, a man of low emotional susceptibility. Mill's emotional history is perhaps the most remarkable element of a remarkable personality. His upbringing, as we have seen, was carried out without the smallest reference to emotional cultivation. From the earliest years he was absorbed in intellectual pursuits; there was no outlet for the natural affections of his childhood. True, he had brothers and sisters; but his relation to them was rather that of teacher than of playmate. "I never was a boy," he wrote sadly;[1] for almost his entire waking hours were applied to study, and relaxation would have brought down upon him the austere censure of his father. That he was bound to his father by strong ties there can be no question. But the ties were not the ties of love; they were constituted by the cold sentiments of respect and awe, and the enthralling influence of a powerful personality upon the unformed mind of a child. Yet the large endowment of feeling which Nature had implanted in his youthful mind was not extirpated by this radical treatment. It was perhaps overlaid and rendered latent for a time. But as the boy grew older it gradually asserted itself with increasing insistence. I have already pointed out how profoundly he was affected by the mountain scenery of the Pyrenees. Even in the most sectarian period of his Benthamism, a chance reading of Pope's "Essay on Man," promulgating views in every respect contrary to his own, wrought a vivid effect upon his imagination. Later still, his admiration of Wordsworth heralded and symbolised the breach which was shortly to take place with his father's views. And then there came the warm friendships with Carlyle and with John Sterling, friendships cemented by true affection, and not owing their strength to mere intellectual community. But the culminating point of his increasing emotional fervour was reached when he became acquainted

[1] "Journals of Caroline Fox," quoted by W. L. Courtney in his "Life of John Stuart Mill."

with Mrs. Taylor. Then, indeed, the pent-up emotions burst the bonds which a cramped education had set to them ; then indeed did they break forth with a torrent of irresistible force which carried all before it. Let me not here be misunderstood. The passion which Mill conceived for Mrs. Taylor had in it nothing that was vulgar or inclined to sensuality. It is obvious, in fact, from his published writings, that Mill greatly under-estimated the power of sensual passion in the motives of the average of mankind. In his views on the question of population, he proposed as a remedial measure a continence between married couples which betokened little conception of the power of the lower feelings in human nature. Close students of Mill, such as Leslie Stephen, Alexander Bain, and Professor Ashley, have remarked on the low degree of sensuality which inspired Mill. And I am able to add to the weight of their opinion the evidence which I have had before me, in the whole series of letters written by Mill to his wife. They are letters inspired by the most intense emotion ; in them Mill pours out his whole soul with the most absolute unreservedness ; the uncertain flicker of feeling which had survived his education has blazed out into a roaring flame ; but from beginning to end there is nowhere a suggestion of anything but the highest and noblest sentiments. The truth is, that he set her up as an idol and worshipped her. Had the affair descended to the commonplace level of a guilty intrigue, the spiritual aspect on which his mind so deeply dwelt would have been dissipated—the idol would have fallen shattered at his feet.

Mill's emotional bent appears in other dressings besides his love for his wife. His sympathy with persons was so keen that he was often led to express, in communication with them, a greater degree of agreement than he actually felt. Of this several instances will be noticed in the " Letters." Emotional fervour, again, was the origin of his social and political interests. A disinterested desire for the improvement of the condition of humanity was one

of the fundamental sentiments of Mill's mind. He was a humanitarian of the highest type. His political and economic studies were only in part prompted by the truly scientific spirit whose sole purpose is the discovery of truth. Far more were they undertaken to satisfy his restless desire to improve the lot of mankind. As I have already observed, Mill's life shows a steady expansion of the emotional sphere, following on the artificial constriction caused by his education. In 1843, when he was a comparatively young man, he published the "Logic," the most purely scientific and the least affected by emotion of any of his works. From there he advanced to "Ethology," or a science of character; but abandoning this, advanced again to the "Political Economy," which was published in 1848. In the "Political Economy" the love of scientific truth is still the dominant note; but it has more emotional colouring than the "Logic." The "Letters" show how, as time went on, Mill's interests were more and more monopolised by his desire for human welfare. I discern here a great difference between Mill and his father. James Mill, vehement Radical as he was, cared less for humanity than his son. Bentham said of him that his political opinions resulted less from love of the many than from hatred of the few;[1] and however indignantly his son may have repudiated the suggestion, I suspect that it contains some measure of truth. However this may be, I think I have said sufficient to show how largely John Stuart Mill's life was inspired by feeling and emotion.

We are apt to imagine, as indeed we have some grounds for doing, that the emotional temperament carries with it a dreamy and inactive disposition in the practical affairs of life. But here, as so often in the study of Mill's character, we find our *à priori* anticipations altogether off the mark. For Mill possessed an endowment of practical energy to a degree far higher than the average. His life throughout was intense; his output of literary work was astonishing; he scarcely ever appeared to require rest.

[1] Bowring's "Life of Bentham," in Bentham's Works.

The diary which he kept while staying with Sir Samuel Bentham in France serves to illustrate the strenuous manner in which his days were spent. I quote from Bain :[1]—

"5*th*.—Rose at 5; too rainy for bathing. Five chapters of Voltaire; from 7½ till 8½, Mr. G. corrects his French exercises, which had got into arrears as regards correction; Music-master came; at 9½ began new exercises (French); puts his room in order; at 11¼ took out Lucian and finished Necyomantia; five propositions of Legendre, renewed expressions of his superiority to all other geometers; practises music-lessons; Thomson's Chemistry, makes out various Chemical Tables, the drift not explained; at 3¼, tries several propositions in West (Algebra), and made out two that he had formerly failed in; begins a table of 58 rivers in France, to show what departments each passes through, and the chief towns on their banks; 4, dined; finishes Chemical Table; dancing lesson; supped. . . . 6*th*.—Rose at 6; no bathing; five chapters of Voltaire; a quarter of an hour to West's problems; lesson in Music (Principes); problems resumed; breakfasted, and tried problem again till 10¼; French exercises till 11; began to correct his Dialogue, formerly mentioned, till 12¼; summoned to dress for going out to call; has found a French master; at 1¼, returned and corrected Dialogue till 3¼; Thomson till 4 (dinner), resumed till 6; Mr. G. corrects his French exercises; went out for his French lesson, but the master did not teach on Sundays and Thursdays; back to Thomson till 8; repeated fables to Mr. G.; miscellaneous affairs; supped; journal always written just before going to bed. 7*th*.—Rose 5¾; five chapters Voltaire till 7; till 7¼, 46 lines of Virgil; till 8, Lucian's Jupiter Confutatus; goes on a family errand; Music-lesson till 9 (Principes); Lucian continued till 9½, and finished after breakfast at 10¼; a call required him to dress; read Thomson and made tables till 12¼; seven propositions of Legendre . . .; till 1½, wrote exercises and various miscellanies; till 2½, the treatise

[1] "John Stuart Mill," p. 18.

on Adverbs; till 3¾, Thomson; Livre Géographique and Miscellanies till 5. . . . 9*th*.—Rose at 5; five chapters of Voltaire; 6¾, Adverbs; 7¾, the Prometheus of Lucian; 8½ till 9, first lesson of Solféges, together with Principes; continued Prometheus till breakfast. . . ."

Perhaps the most interesting side of Mill's character is reached when we come to estimate his intellectual qualities. By far the most striking intellectual peculiarity which he exhibited was his marvellous receptivity. It is often the case that men who have been distinguished for originality and power of synthetic or analytic reasoning show little aptitude for absorbing the ideas of others. Their mind appears to run so strongly on its own course that in general it is little affected by what other people may be thinking or doing. The intense natural concentration of an original thinker upon his own line of thought often cannot be diverted to aspects foreign to that line of thought, even by a conscious effort on his own part. Let us compare, for instance, Mill's method of going to work with the profoundly different method of Herbert Spencer. Mill was, as I have said, receptive to an extraordinary degree; he was for ever studying the works of others, reading on an enormous scale, a scholar in the truest sense of the word. Spencer, on the other hand, was almost completely inaccessible to ideas out of harmony with his natural modes of thought. He scarcely read at all; when he did it was usually novels; for many years of his life he never succeeded in reading a serious book for a longer period than an hour at a stretch. Spencer, in fact, never studied; his philosophy welled up of its own accord from the depths of his mind; it was a spontaneous outgrowth from his experience of life. He had a natural facility for attracting from every quarter facts which bore upon any theory he was promulgating, though without any effort to himself. It follows from this habit of mind that Spencer, though he could accumulate great stores of knowledge on any subject on which he had theorised, was plunged in abysmal ignorance on subjects on which he had formed no theory. Of history he knew nothing, of English literature

very little, of German literature not a word. The difference between him and Mill could scarcely be more marked.

A further difference in their manner of going to work is of great interest. When George Eliot asked Spencer how it was that he had no wrinkles on his forehead, as might be expected in one who had thought deeply, he replied that it was because he was never puzzled. His inactive disposition recoiled from the notion of wrestling with a problem in an attempt to solve it. Whenever he was confronted with a problem whose solution was not obvious to him he would push it aside, and abandon all conscious effort to solve it. But the matter would not usually be entirely lost sight of; it would stick in the back of his mind, and by-and-by, very likely while thinking of something else, a little inward flash would occur, rendering the solution somewhat less obscure than it was before. With the lapse of time other flashes would follow; and after several years, maybe, the solution of that problem would be set forth with the marvellous lucidity that Spencer commanded, as an integral portion of his system of philosophy. This is what we describe as true genius; no puzzling, no conscious effort, no weary drudgery or labour, nothing that education can ever supply; simply a succession of sudden inward flashes illuminating the whole of the darkened field.

How does this method compare with the method of John Stuart Mill? The contrast is indeed great. Mill describes how he acquired "the mental habit to which I attribute all that I have ever done, or ever shall do, in speculation; that of never abandoning a puzzle, but again and again returning to it until it was cleared up; never allowing obscure corners of a subject to remain unexplored because they did not appear important; never thinking that I perfectly understood any part of a subject until I understood the whole." In short, Mill's method was that of conscious and vehement effort directed towards the end he had in view. He solved his problems by laborious application and study;

the very reverse of the brilliant and facile methods of Spencer.

A further characteristic difference between the two men is found when we inquire how each came by his literary style. Both had styles of exceptional lucidity and ease, but they were acquired in totally opposite ways. Spencer, after his manner, never studied style at all from the practical point of view, though he propounded a philosophic theory of it ("Essays," vol. ii.). In "Facts and Comments," pp. 78, 79, he says: "I have never studied style." "It never occurred to me . . . to take any author as a model. Indeed, the thought of moulding my style upon the style of any one else is utterly incongruous with my constitutional disregard of authority." "I may fitly say of my own style that from the beginning it has been unpremeditated. The thought of style, considered as an end in itself, has rarely if ever been present." Mill, on the other hand, cultivated his style "by the assiduous reading of other writers, both French and English, who combined, in a remarkable degree, ease with force, such as Goldsmith, Fielding, Pascal, Voltaire, and Courier."[1] Bain remarks of him:[2] "The undoubted excellence of his mature style was arrived at by a series of efforts that may well be celebrated among triumphs of perseverance."

The education supplied to the two in their youth was just such as happened to be adapted to the qualities of each. Mill's education was, as we have seen, an interminable round of study and effort. Not a moment was wasted; and he ascribes his own success to the fact that he entered on life with a knowledge that was a quarter of a century in advance of his competitors. Spencer, idle as a man, was idle also as a boy. He learnt very little, and nothing but what he liked; he could not go up to a university on account of the impossibility of his passing the entrance examinations. He entered life with a knowledge far inferior to that of

[1] "Autobiography," p. 117.
[2] "John Stuart Mill," p. 142.

his competitors; but he had what they had not, for Nature had endowed him with an ability and self-confidence which far more than compensated for his lack of learning and education.

These observations bring me to the proposition that I now wish to lay down; namely, that Mill's success was due far more to the rigour of his father's education than to any inborn genius of his own. That he would probably have admitted this himself may be inferred from the following passage in the "Autobiography":—

"If I had been by nature extremely quick of apprehension, or had possessed a very active and retentive memory, or were of a remarkably active and energetic character, the trial would not be conclusive; but in all these natural gifts I am rather below than above par; what I could do, could assuredly be done by any boy or girl of average capacity and healthy physical constitution; and if I have accomplished anything, I owe it, among other fortunate circumstances, to the fact that through the early training bestowed on me by my father, I started, I may fairly say, with an advantage of a quarter of a century over my contemporaries."

Mill, then, himself admits that he was not by nature highly endowed with respect to those qualities for which he afterwards became famous. Their development in him was due to the continual forcing to which he had been subjected in early life, and to the habits of abnegation and concentration thus acquired. Without his education, he would have done little or nothing. He lacked the characteristic of inborn genius, which shines out independently of education or acquirements. Though I should not accept Mill's belief that what he could do could be done by any boy or girl of average capacity and healthy physical constitution, still there seems to me no doubt that Mill's success was grounded on the marvellous extent of his acquirements and painstaking industry.

Summing up this estimate of Mill's character, we find that he greatly excelled the average of mankind in all the higher qualities of mind—in intellectual power, in con-

centration, in emotional strength, in will-power, and in active energy. That a man of so high a nervous development should be lacking on other sides is inevitable. I have already pointed out the low development of sensuality as compared with the average of mankind. That lack of sensuality is betrayed, not only in his estimate of the force of sexual passion, but in his indifference to luxuries of every kind. Bain observes:[1]—

"He was exceedingly temperate as regarded the table; there was nothing of the gourmand superadded to his healthy appetite. To have seen his simple breakfast at the India House, and to couple with that his entire abstinence from eating or drinking till his plain dinner at six o'clock,—would be decisive of his moderation in the pleasures of the palate."

A further deficiency, that is no doubt to be correlated with his intense mental development, was his poor physical development. He must have been born into the world with the constitution of a giant. Had he not been developed intellectually, he would probably have grown up with high muscular and athletic powers. But all the strength of his constitution was drafted off to the nervous system;[2] and we find him throughout life threatened by consumption. He suffered also from a ceaseless twitching of the eyelid over one eye—evidence enough how great was the strain which that overwhelming intellectual burden cast upon his physical constitution.

I have attempted to set forth the powers of mind and body which made Mill a great man. I am aware that, in doing so, I have only dealt with one half of the case. The achievement of greatness does not depend on the individual alone, but to at least an equal extent upon the environment in which he is placed.

[1] "John Stuart Mill," by A. Bain, p. 149.

[2] Or, as Bain characteristically puts it in his biography of James Mill: "His [John's] nervous energy was so completely absorbed in his unremitted intellectual application, as to be unavailable for establishing the co-ordinations of muscular dexterity."

We have, then, to inquire what sort of an environment and what sort of times they were into which Mill was born. I think that much light is thrown on his success by such an inquiry. For he came in, so to speak, on the crest of a wave of democratic sentiment. Parliamentary Reform and the rights of the people, as against the aristocracy, were the chief political cries ; and the Liberal party was slowly coming into existence to enforce the claims of the people against the two older parties which had hitherto monopolised the government of the country. Mill had inherited from his father an intense belief in democratic institutions, with no small share of his father's detestation of the governing classes. Besides being deeply imbued with the sentiments that prevailed at the time, he had, as we have seen, the advantage of an education which enabled him to give scientific expression to the Radical spirit growing up about him. No wonder that he soon became the accepted champion and philosopher of the new school of thought.

It is unnecessary to state in detail what were the chief maxims espoused by this new school. Mill's politics differed widely in method from those of his father, though the conclusions were not dissimilar. James Mill's politics were wholly the product of a few general principles, which he received from Bentham and pushed to their extreme logical conclusions. John Mill's driving energy, on the contrary, was derived from his intense desire to ameliorate the lot of the working classes. It was this that he had constantly before his mind, rather than any general principles; and this is to a great extent the cause of his apparent changeability with regard to various fundamental principles. There has been much discussion as to Mill's attitude towards Socialism ; but the letters herewith published make the matter perfectly clear. He was not in principle opposed to Socialism. As he says in his "Autobiography": "The social problem of the future we considered to be, how to unite the greatest individual liberty of action, with a common ownership in the raw material of the globe, and an equal participation of all

in the benefits of combined labour." But he recognised that Socialism demanded from the working classes a higher type of character than they possessed at the time. So long as their political beliefs continued to be actuated by their individual interests, rather than by the welfare of the State, he held that they were not fitted for Socialism. He looked to education as the chief means of raising them to take a wider view of politics than their private interests ; and once they had been educated up to that higher level, he believed that Socialism would be both practicable and desirable. In this view he never wavered throughout his life. But his opinion differed greatly at different periods of his life as to when this desirable consummation would be reached. At one time, sharing in the extravagant hopes that were widely entertained as to the result of free education, he appeared to think that the goal was but a short distance off. Towards the end of his life, he formed a less sanguine estimate of the time that must elapse before the working classes were ripe for the change.[1]

It is not my purpose to attempt a criticism of Mill's various works in the light of modern knowledge. They no longer occupy, of course, the position of unassailable authority which they once occupied. But they have stood the test of time with extraordinary success. When we remember that the last half-century has witnessed an advance in knowledge, on almost every side, of unparalleled rapidity ; when we reflect that the scientific books published to-day are usually out-of-date in two or three years' time, we have reason to be astonished, not that Mill's writings have been to some extent superseded by later works, but that they still retain so large—so justifiably large—a portion of authority as they actually do. Every one of them, at the time of its first publication, was an immense advance on anything that had gone

[1] James Mill, on the other hand, was strongly opposed to Socialism. In a letter to Lord Brougham, dated 3rd September 1832, at the height of the Reform struggle, he wrote with reference to Socialism : "These opinions, if they were to spread, would be the subversion of civilised society ; worse than the overwhelming deluge of Huns and Tartars."

before. Many of them were held to be dangerously Radical in their expressions of opinion. An indication of the abhorrence in which he was held in some quarters may still be gathered by turning over the numerous pages devoted to his works in the Catalogue of Printed Books at the British Museum. One of these pages is headed by the entry "Mill (John Stuart); see Antichrist."

Probably the most serious deficiency in Mill's ideas, is due to the fact that they belong to the pre-evolutionary era. Nowadays the doctrine of organic evolution enters into all our thought, and colours our conclusions on almost every subject. We regard humanity as being on the move, not as a stationary manifestation of the immutable order of the Universe. We take a dynamical rather than a statical view of society. On such matters, Mill occupies a position half-way between modern views and the views of the early Utilitarians. The Utilitarians lived in an age when biology was in its infancy, and when its conclusions had neither the certainty nor the importance that would entitle them to be taken into consideration. They assumed that all men were born alike, and that education alone could mould them into any desired form. Bentham thought that the Panopticon would soon root out dishonesty. James Mill argued that the means by which the "grand objects of desire may be attained, depend almost wholly upon the political machine." And correlated with this one-sided notion of humanity, was their belief that political economy covered the whole sphere of government, that deductions from the principle of the "Greatest happiness of the greatest number" sufficed to provide universal guidance in all political concerns. John Mill made a great advance on his predecessors. Though still believing that differences of character were traceable to differences of environment, to a far greater extent than would now be admitted, he yet perceived that this was not the whole story. He was not so convinced as his predecessors had been, that the millennium would attend upon suitable manipulations of the political machine. He saw that other considera-

tions, besides those of political economy, were necessary to govern the activity of the State. But he had no conception, such as we now have, of a positive antithesis between the interests of the individual and the interests of the race. His philosophy did not extend beyond the attempt to promote the happiness of the population by means of supplying an apt environment. It did not occur to him to inquire what might be the effects of such action upon the fundamental qualities of the race. He perceived, as Malthus had perceived, that most social evils are consequent upon the existence of a population whose needs were greater than could be met by the existing fertility of the earth's surface. He also perceived, as Malthus also had perceived, that for every increment of productive capacity there was a further increase of population, so that the expansion of industry effected no alteration in the permanent ratio between supply and demand. And he inferred, as Malthus had inferred, that restriction of the population was the panacea for the majority of human evils.

In the days when these propositions were first enunciated, the discovery of "Natural Selection" had not been made. Men were in the deepest ignorance of Nature's ways in all that appertained to inheritance or the philosophy of life. A corner, at least, of the veil has now been lifted; and behold! we find Nature taking bypaths which earlier philosophers never suspected for an instant, and which vitiate, or at any rate call for careful modifications of Malthus' conclusion. For it is now known that individuals born into the world are not all of one pattern, but of extreme diversity in physical, mental, and moral development. It is known that newly-born individuals diverge from the average type, sometimes for the better, but often for the worse. So long as there are many more individuals born than there can possibly be room for (which is the normal condition), many have to die out. It is obvious that the victims are mainly the weak and imperfect. It is the strong, those most suited to the world into which they are born, who survive

and carry on the race to future generations. So that Nature exercises a selective action upon new-born individuals, casting off the weak and maintaining only the fittest. Nature works, that is to say, not by producing a quantity of individuals, any one of whom is as fitted to survive as any other, but by producing a larger quantity of mixed individuals than is required, and then picking out the most robust among them. Here then is a serious flaw in Malthus' argument. By limiting the number of births, you doubtless diminish the number of deaths and the sum of contemporary human misery; but, to the precise extent that you are successful in preventing the wastage of human life, you are interfering with Nature's operation of weeding out the unfit. Unfavourable variations, instead of being destroyed on their appearance, are maintained and perpetuated, leading ultimately to race-degeneracy and extinction. In short, the Malthusian philosophy is a philosophy of the individual, and runs counter to the wider philosophy of the race. I need not pursue the argument further. The modern view would not advocate going back to the days of heedless multiplication, bringing with it so much misery to the unfortunate individuals who are in process of elimination. It would, of course, have to admit the principle of selection; but would take that selection out of the cruel hands of Nature, and pass it into human control. By taking measures to prevent multiplication of the unfit, it is believed that limitation of the population may be achieved, without incurring the disastrous effects of degeneracy. It is even suggested that positive improvements in the physique of the race might thus be ensured.

I have no wish to discuss the plausibility of these doctrines. I merely wish to mention some of the new factors brought into view by the rise of biology, to indicate the limitations of Mill's political philosophy. They constitute, in reality, no criticism on Mill himself, but only on the knowledge of the age of which he was the leading spirit. The economic era, in which Mill flourished, is giving place to a biologic era. What, it is

asked, is the use of devoting so much effort to improving individuals by means of the environment, when such improvements perish with them and have to be wrought all over again upon their children? Is it not better to lay out the time and money in the operations of selective breeding, when the improvements that are attained are inherited and become the inalienable property of the race for all time? And back comes the rejoinder from objectors: Are you certain that your biology is correct and complete? Are you aware that your attempt to control human evolution is to take upon yourself a responsibility greater by far than any that has ever before confronted mankind? Have you reflected that, where the consequences of your action for evil or for good will be so infinitely mighty, any flaw in your fundamental principles may entail consequences proportionately disastrous?

It is in these directions that political philosophy is widening out. If Mill lived too early to give us the benefit of his direct advice upon them, he nevertheless has cleared the way indirectly for their solution. And this he has done in two ways: negatively, by helping to dissipate the cloud of ignorance and prejudice in which so many political problems in his time were steeped; positively, by setting a standard of freedom of thought, and earnest seeking after truth, that must for long continue to inspire succeeding thinkers. It may be possible to find philosophers of more powerful genius than Mill; it may be possible to find philosophers of more steady emotional balance; but I believe it would be altogether impossible to name any philosopher who has had the welfare of humanity so deeply at heart, or who has laid himself out so consistently and unsparingly in labouring for the progress of his fellow-men.

HUGH ELLIOT.

SOME NOTES ON THE PRIVATE LIFE OF JOHN STUART MILL

WAS the private life of Mill on the whole praiseworthy, or was much of his conduct in the highest degree reprehensible? This is the kind of question which, where a great man is concerned, must always be of vital interest. We desire in our leaders that they shall be good as well as great, and it is only with a chill that we are able to bear the shock of a contrary impression. We feel that if they whose knowledge and depth or height of thought so far exceeded our own capabilities were yet unable to obey the promptings of conscience, or to keep even as straight a course as the average, their intellectual superiority has not been the boon to the human race that we had fancied it, since it is counterbalanced by an evil example of conduct as far-reaching as was the inspiration of their genius.

When we inquire into the moral life of John Stuart Mill we are faced by these questions: Was he an undutiful and ungrateful son, and was he a treacherous friend? Was John Taylor's life robbed by him of its domestic happiness, and was Mrs. James Mill unjustly deprived of his filial love and kindness?

The writer of this paper has an interest in desiring to defend him from these accusations. Relationship to the individual whose influence was so great upon his domestic life, must make a favourable conclusion highly desirable to her. Perhaps some prejudice may therefore have mixed itself with many anxious thoughts and earnest investigations. She trusts this may not have wholly vitiated their result, and claims at least some patient endurance of her attempt at apology.

John Taylor's wife was the daughter of Thomas Hardy of Birksgate, near Kirkburton, where the Hardys had been lords of the manor for some centuries. In his time the estate became involved and the entail was cut off, and after his death the property was sold to pay the debts of a spendthrift member of the family. It was perhaps on account of these embarrassments that Harriet Hardy was married at eighteen to a wholesale druggist in Mark Lane. As from a letter written by a younger sister of hers their father would appear to have been a man of hard and tyrannical disposition, it is probable that her marriage with Mr. Taylor was merely a matter of obedience, or that she was hurried into it by the desire to escape from an unhappy home.

John Taylor was a man of education and even some culture, and certainly of a kindly disposition. His daughter Helen in her old age—I saw little of her till she was quite old—used to speak of him with the tenderest affection. He seemed to be of all men she had met the one she most loved and admired. She related how in her childhood she used to sit with him while he ate his solitary dinner, and be catechised by him as to her studies, pursued often in solitude during the day, and how he inspired her with an intense love of history which she never afterwards lost.[1]

In spite of John Taylor's amiable character, the unhappy fact must be admitted that he never succeeded in gaining his young wife's heart, though apparently from no fault of his. According to her own statement, she felt a warm affection for him, based on gratitude for his kindness to her. This affection does not appear to have made her altogether happy in being his wife, if we are to believe the writer who says—I know not on what evidence—that she complained to the Rev. W. J. Fox, prior to meeting

[1] In an article that recently appeared in *Munsey's Magazine*, where John Taylor's wife is called Catherine Taylor, we are informed that a drysalter is a man who sells pickled articles, the writer apparently having never heard of that title being applied to a wholesale druggist. Many of the other statements in this article are on a par with the above.

Mill, that she had been married at eighteen, before she had any knowledge of the world. After Mr. Fox introduced her to Mill, she soon became conscious of a feeling towards the philosopher from which her union with Mr. Taylor ought certainly to have preserved her. It was the awakening of her heart, but it was the tragedy of several lives that this awakening came too late. The consequences have hitherto been looked upon chiefly from the man's point of view. The depth and warmth of feeling she evoked in Mill seem a reproach to her, though, as a matter of fact, he appears to have had as great an effect upon her. In 1833 she writes to Mrs. Fox, "Oh this being, seeming as though God had willed to show the type of the possible elevation of humanity. To be with him wholly is my ideal of the noblest fate; for all states of mind and feeling which are lofty and large and fine, he is the companion spirit and heart's desire. We are not alike in trifles, only because I have so much more frivolity than he."

This quotation, lightly read, seems to show that she was deeply in love with him, but her love was merely the recognition that in him she had found a kindred spirit. She may have been less able to resist an affection for so strong and tender a nature as his, than he was to resist loving her. Certainly she ought to have "renounced sight" when she first realised that her heart had gone out to him. But this she had either not resolution to do, or her peculiar views made her feel that to do so would be to live an insincere life. She confessed the truth to her husband, that her love for Mill was a deeper, stronger feeling than her affection for him. In vain she assured Mr. Taylor that this new feeling did not diminish her grateful affection for the husband whose pleasure it was to lavish kindness upon her. He called upon her to "renounce sight." This she declared herself unable to do. What can be said but that she was at least sincere? Her husband insisted that unless she consented to do as he wished she must not live with him. It was then arranged between them that she should spend six months

in Paris. He hoped that this trial of absence would quicken her affection for himself, and when she wrote affectionate letters he began to think the experiment was proving successful. But no real change had been made in her feelings. She could not but love him for his generous kindness to herself, but her unfortunate preference had in no wise lost its power over her. Mill was staying in Paris at the same time, but only for a few weeks, and, as he is careful to explain to Mr. Fox, not so as to compromise her. Finally Mr. Taylor appears to have welcomed her return to live with him as "a friend and companion," writing that her letters proposing this plan have given him delight.

The facts just mentioned I derive from the private letters in my possession. But I have heard many things from my father and my aunt which have seemed to throw a light on the contents of those letters. They never spoke to me as to one who had heard anything discreditable to my grandmother, or as wishing to justify her. The facts I heard from my father dropped from him when I was a child, and, often repeated, impressed my memory. My aunt I only lived with during the last years of her life, when she took a great pleasure in describing over and over again many of the scenes of her childhood and youth. I might have learnt much more, had I not shrunk from asking questions which might have shown that I was aware of anything unusual in her mother's married life. Besides, not having then read the private letters, I did not know what information to desire.

She frequently related to me how, even from childhood, she had been her mother's constant companion, acting as her maid and sleeping with her, Mrs. Taylor's health having been so delicate that it was the robust little girl who took care of the mother rather than receiving attentions from her. Her mother, she sometimes complained, was always travelling, and she, who loved home pleasures, her garden and her books, must for ever be travelling too, during much of her childhood and youth.

She spoke of many journeys when, though still quite young, she had sole charge of the semi-invalid her mother gradually became, and received also charge of the purse from which travelling expenses were paid. Sometimes Mrs. Taylor would be very ill on these journeys, and on several occasions it was the devoted nursing of her daughter, amid strange scenes and faces, which pulled her through. Owing to her weak lungs, Mrs. Taylor was often obliged to winter abroad. Who provided the means for these journeyings? Not my grandmother, whose income was very small, as would appear from the letters, and as seems probable from the then involved state of the Hardy finances. It was her generous-hearted husband, whose affection and respect she still retained, who took a pleasure in providing her with all that the condition of her health could possibly require.

It was in his cottage at Walton that her two boys used to spend their holidays with their mother and sister. Both my father and aunt loved to look back on those days. But Helen and her mother also spent some of their time in my grandfather's house in Kent Terrace, where the boys used to spend their Sundays. Had there been such a separation between Mrs. Taylor and her husband as any wrongdoing on her part would have occasioned, Helen could scarcely have had so many delightful reminiscences of her father. When she spoke of him her eyes glowed and her voice grew tender. Age had not diminished the freshness of her feeling for him. Had not her parents respected each other, could Helen have respected and loved them both as she did? Her affection for her mother was the one other absorbing personal feeling of her life. She often, indeed, complained that in her childhood she had been too much tied to her mother's side. She had wished to go to school, that she might be prepared for taking an active part in life, but this wish was not granted. Her mother was somewhat strict, and this made her sometimes say that she had been hard, yet most of her recollections were full of affectionate admiration. I do not think

she ever realised that she had been unconsciously, but with her father's consent, acting as a protection to her mother from the world's censure.

I regard it as certain that Mrs. Taylor to the last kept her husband's affection and respect. My father, too, always spoke of her in the highest terms. As Helen grew up the affection between her and her mother became as intense as that of Madame de Sévigné for her daughter. It is clear that she was her mother's most intimate and most beloved friend. No letters remaining in Mrs. Taylor's hand are so tender as those addressed to her daughter, when, long after her marriage with Mill, they were separated for a time. It is impossible to read the correspondence between them without feeling one's heart go out to both the writers. The deepest grief of Helen Taylor's life, which could draw tears from her to the end, was her mother's death.

In 1849 John Taylor became alarmingly ill. His sons were with him, but he wrote to his "dear Harry," who was in Italy with their daughter, to inform her of the serious nature of his illness. They returned to England, and we find him for the painful remainder of his days soothed by his wife's affectionate nursing. Meanwhile she kept up a correspondence with Mr. Mill at the India House, and her letters are full of anxiety and grief for her husband. One would suppose she would feel some remorse for the trouble and loneliness she had brought into his life, but she does not confess to more than "acute sadness." If her conscience had been misguided, at any rate she had acted according to its dictates. She mentions in this correspondence the great attention shown her by all her husband's relatives.

Mr. Taylor's disease was of an incurable nature, and he died the same year. A crowning proof of his belief in her loyalty was furnished by his will, in which he left his entire fortune in trust for her sole use during her lifetime.

It was in 1851, two years after his death, that she married John Stuart Mill.

Mrs. James Mill, writing to her son John in 1854, assures him that she had always hoped to be on good terms with Mrs. John Mill and her family, and that she had been much pleased at his marriage, as he had chosen a lady capable of sharing in all his pursuits and appreciating his good qualities.

It is a mistake to suppose, as some of Mill's biographers have done, that his marriage led to a complete estrangement between him and his family. They were not willing to be estranged from him. There was no coldness, no displeasure on their side. His mother used to visit him at the India House, where she always appears to have been kindly received. His letters to her are always respectful, and though somewhat cold, yet express affection and unvarying solicitude for her health. The bitter resentment which some apparent or real omission on their part had roused in him is shown to the other members of his family, but never directly to her. In one letter she confesses to some omission on her part, which from other sources I gather to be that she had not called upon Mrs. Taylor the day after he had announced his intended marriage. His cold and distant manner in making the announcement had discouraged her from doing this, though she would have done anything that she had understood he wished. An invincible reserve sprang up on his side. Hitherto he had been a dutiful and affectionate son and a kind brother—the sunshine of their house. Though his mother is not mentioned in the autobiography, this can scarcely be taken to show that she had not played a considerable part in his life. He could not paint a true picture of all the relations between them, so does not mention her at all. An unconquerable and deplorable resentment keeps him silent. He resented the apparent slight more deeply because he had been so long his mother's right hand, and also because it rested with her to give the lead to others. Yet pride and an almost morbid reserve prevented him at the time from revealing his wish to one so eager to please. Though he continued to receive his

mother at the India House, and writes that he and his wife will always be pleased to see her, yet after his marriage he appears never to have visited her in her own home,[1] unless he may have done so during the last few months of her life, from which we may conjecture that it was some other person that he was unwilling to meet there. In April 1854 he receives information from his sisters that his mother is very seriously ill. He is told that she would be much happier if he would go and see her. No answering letter is to be found, but there is nothing to show that he did not respond. Writing to her in June, he speaks of having seen her the previous week—whether in her own home or elsewhere does not appear. He informs her that his doctor has urgently recommended him to go to the Continent, but that he expects to return in a few weeks. She died during his absence, and writing to her doctor, he speaks of the shock her death has occasioned him. His being abroad at the time arose from a necessity which was fully acknowledged by his sisters.

Mill's letters to his own family are too many of them painful, though strangely interesting, reading. He cannot by the most wounding reproaches shake their faith in him as a "great and good man." He seems to endeavour to do this, but fails. They recognise that he is cruel and insulting to them, and they suffer acutely, but their affection is as invincible as his resentment. On the other hand it may be considered that Mill received very great provocation, arising not from any desire to offend, but from a divergence of judgment and feeling so great and on points on which he was specially sensitive so tactlessly expressed as necessarily to cause such a man great irritation.

MARY TAYLOR.

[1] This is not quite correct. After his marriage he went with his wife to call upon his mother and sisters. He was reproached afterwards with the formality of this visit.

THE LETTERS OF JOHN STUART MILL

CHAPTER I

1829–1832

MANY of Mill's earliest letters were written to John Sterling, who was afterwards made famous by Carlyle's Biography. Sterling is described as possessing a "genius for friendship."

To JOHN STERLING,

in reply to a letter from him, resigning his membership of the London Debating Society.

INDIA HOUSE, *15th April* 1829.

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DEAR STERLING,—I have given a greater number of perusals to your note than I believe I ever gave to any epistle before. I should not, however, have troubled you with any answer to it if you had not seemed to take sufficient interest in what concerns me, to lead me to believe that I might talk to you upon a subject as entirely personal as the state of my own mind, without your considering it a bore or an intrusion. I was unwilling that you should leave the London Debating Society without my telling you how much I should regret that circumstance if it were to deprive me of the chance not only of retaining such portion as I already possess, but of acquiring a still greater portion of your intimacy—which I value highly for this reason among many others, that it appears to me peculiarly

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adapted to the wants of my own mind; since I know no person who possesses more of what I have not, than yourself; nor is this inconsistent with my believing you to be deficient in some of the very few things which I have. But though I feared that this loss to myself would, or at least might, be the consequence of your resignation, I never imputed that resignation to any other cause than those which you have stated, and which are, in good truth, cause sufficient. I am now chiefly anxious to explain to you, more clearly than I fear I did, what I meant when I spoke to you of the comparative loneliness of my probable future lot. Do not suppose me to mean that I am conscious at present of any tendency to misanthropy—although among the very various states of mind, some of them extremely painful ones, through which I have passed during the last three years, something distantly approximating to misanthropy was one. At present I believe that my sympathies with society, which were never strong, are, on the whole, stronger than they ever were. By loneliness I mean the absence of that feeling which has accompanied me through the greater part of my life, that which one fellow-traveller, or one fellow-soldier has towards another—the feeling of being engaged in the pursuit of a common object, and of mutually cheering one another on, and helping one another in an arduous undertaking. This, which after all is one of the strongest ties of individual sympathy, is at present, so far as I am concerned, suspended at least, if not entirely broken off. There is now no human being (with whom I can associate on terms of equality) who acknowledges a common object with me, or with whom I can co-operate even in any practical undertaking, without the feeling that I am only using a man, whose purposes are different, as an instrument for the furtherance of my own. *Idem sentire de republicâ*, was thought, by one of the best men who ever lived, to be the strongest bond of friendship: for *republicâ* I would read "all the great objects of life," where the parties concerned have at heart any great objects at all. I do not see how there can be otherwise that *idem velle*, *idem nolle*, which is necessary to perfect friendship. Being

excluded, therefore, from this, I am resolved hereafter to avoid all occasions for debate, since they cannot now strengthen my sympathies with those who agree with me, and are sure to weaken them with those who differ.—Yours faithfully, J. S. MILL. 1829 — Aetat. 22.

To JOHN STERLING,

shortly after he had departed for the West Indies, to undertake the management of a sugar estate in St. Vincent. Mill was now at the height of his reaction against Benthamism.

INDIA HOUSE,
From the 20th of October to the 22nd, 1831.

DEAR STERLING,—You must have wondered at not hearing from me sooner; and not without good reason. It is true that I have not heard from you *non plus*, so that we seem to have been equally neglectful of one another. But (1) very probably a letter from you is now on its way here. (2) Your silence ought only to be counted from your arrival, and *mine* from your setting out. (3) I have had only my ordinary occupations, while you have had all the trouble of settling in a new place, of commencing an entirely new mode of life and kind of occupation, and when this was just done, you were turned out by a vile hurricane and obliged to begin the whole thing over again. (4) A letter from home is still more precious than even the most interesting letter from abroad. (5) Though you have not written to *me*, you have to others, and I have seen part of what you wrote: now when a man is a great way off, his letter to one of his friends may be taken *mutatis mutandis* as a letter to all, but that cannot be said of *their* letters to him. You see I have stated the case against myself as strongly as I can, in order to leave you nothing to add to it. As I have no excuse to make which will not leave my case worse than it is already, I can only make you the best reparation in my power by writing you an exceedingly long letter this time. I suppose that it is right to 1831 — Aetat. 25.

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suppose that you must desire *en premier lieu* to hear about public affairs, now when they are in so ticklish a state: but really I can tell you little more than you will learn from the newspapers. The rejection of the Reform Bill by the large majority of 41 in the House of Lords, has given an immense impulse to the *mouvement* in this country. All chance that the Bill when passed should prove a healing measure is at an end. The House of Lords is now as much detested as ever the House of Commons was. Nothing less than the creation of from 60 to 100 Liberal Peers, to change the character of the House, can now give it any chance of remaining in existence. It is said that they flinch, and will pass the Bill without any new creation, but that will not now save them. They will come into collision with the Reformed House on some other point, and will certainly go to the wall. You may consider the fate of the Church as sealed. Only two Bishops voted for the Bill; about five more stayed away, the rest voted against it. The hierarchy being thus, as a body, hostile to it, while the temporal Peers were almost equally divided, the first brunt of public indignation has fallen upon the Prelacy. Every voice is raised against allowing them to continue in the House of Lords, and if I do not express my conviction that they will be excluded from it before this day five years, it is only because I doubt whether the House itself will last so long. I cannot say I regret either the approaching downfall of the Peers or that of the Church. I certainly think it desirable that there should be a Conservative branch of the legislature; and that there should be a national clergy or clerisy, like that of which Coleridge traces the outline in his work on Church and State. If therefore I thought that the present Peerage and Clergy would ever consent to become the peerage of a government constituted on anti-jobbing principles and the clergy of a non-sectarian church, I should pray for their continuance. But they never will. Can a Peerage so ignorant as ours is proved to be by its recent vote, of the spirit of the age and the feelings of the people, ever be able to fulfil with judgment the ends of a *checking* body, which are,

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to yield to all steady impulses of opinion which are likely to be permanent, and to resist those which are in their nature temporary and changeable? And as for the clergy, who does not see that they are mainly divisible into two great categories, the worldly-minded and the sectarians? I know that you will not agree with me, but I think that Coleridge would, in thinking that a national clergy ought to be so constituted as to include all who are capable of producing a beneficial effect on their age and country as teachers of the knowledge which fits people to perform their duties and exercise their rights, and as exhorters to the right performance and exercise of them; now I contend that such persons are to be found among all denominations of Christians, nay, even among those who are not Christians at all; provided (which I deem an essential condition in the present stage of human progressiveness) they abstain from either directly attacking, or indirectly undermining Christianity, and even adopt, (as far as without hypocrisy they can) those means of addressing the feelings and the conscience to which a connection with Christianity has given potency. An infidel who attempts to subvert or weaken the belief of mankind in Christianity ought not, in my opinion, to form a part of the national clerisy; not because he may not be performing a conscientious duty in so doing, but because it is to me a proof that he misunderstands the wants and tendencies of his age, and that the effect of his exertions would probably be to make men worse instead of better by shaking the only firm convictions and feelings of duty which they have, without having even a remote chance of furnishing them with any effectual substitute. Accordingly, in France, where Christianity has lost its hold on men's minds, my reasoning would not apply. There, I believe that a Christian would be positively less fit than a St. Simonian (for example) to form part of a national church. These, then, are my ideas of a church establishment; ideas which I shall promulgate to the public in some shape or other when I shall see a good opportunity for their being attended to. But I feel certain that no church, not

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founded on this comprehensive principle, can or ought to stand. I believe that if any clan of Christians, Socinians for example, or even Deists, or Atheists, were excluded, you could not select your clergy from the remainder of mankind without including persons less fit in every respect than some whom you would exclude. Besides, you would then retain that encouragement to hypocrisy, that holding out of worldly motives first to the adoption and next to the obstinate retention of particular creeds, which has disgusted so many high-minded men with church establishments; which has made them to be considered as obstacles to improvement, as the creation of a class with an interest adverse to the progressiveness of the species. In the present age of transition, everything must be subordinate to *freedom of inquiry:* if your opinions, or mine, are right, they will in time be unanimously adopted by the instructed classes, and *then* it will be time to found the national creed upon the assumption of their truth. But what chance is there that the Church, as at present constituted, will consent to undergo, even by the most insensible steps, this transformation? and that, too, at a time when insensible steps will not suffice. If they would, the recent elevation of Whately to the Archbishopric of Dublin, and of Maltby to the Bishopric of Chichester, would greatly encourage me; the former, because I think him one of the fittest men in the country to hold a high station in a national church such as I conceive it should be, the latter for the very reason which makes others disapprove of it, his want of orthodoxy. But all this might do while the people were attached to the Church. At present they are hostile to it; hostile, consequently, to all church establishments, because they know of none better than this; and they would be more likely to accept an entirely new one than one which they considered to be a transformation of this. Why is it almost the natural course of things in politics that destruction must precede renovation? It is because reform is delayed till the whole attachment of the public to the *entire* of the institution is gone, and then they feel a distrust of anything which looks like patching up the old edifice. So

I believe it to be both with Church and State at this moment. You have no doubt seen in the English papers the speeches at public meetings, and the various resolutions which have been agreed to. These are generally very strong, but they were, in every case, the weakest which there was the least chance that the people would have adopted. Almost everywhere, if any person came forward and proposed stronger resolutions, they were carried by acclamation, much to the dissatisfaction of those who called the meeting and prepared the proceedings. I am convinced that we are indebted for the preservation of tranquillity solely to the organisation of the people in political unions. All the other unions look to the Birmingham one, and that looks to its half-dozen leaders, who consequently act under a most intense consciousness of moral responsibility, and are very careful neither to do nor say anything without the most careful deliberation. I conversed the other day with a Warwickshire magistrate, who told me that the meeting of 150,000 men a few days previous would have done *any* thing without exception which their leaders might have proposed. They would have passed any resolutions, marched to any place, or burnt any man's house. The agricultural people are as determined as the manufacturers. The West is as *exalté* as the North. Colonel Napier made a speech at the Devizes meeting the other day for the express purpose (as I hear) of letting the men in the North perceive that the West is ready to join in any popular movement if necessary; and since that speech (which the leaders in vain attempted to prevent him from delivering) he has received numbers of letters from all parts of the country saying that they all look to him as their leader, and are ready to place themselves under his command. If the ministers flinch or the Peers remain obstinate, I am firmly convinced that in six months a national convention, chosen by universal suffrage, will be sitting in London. Should this happen, I have not made up my mind what will be best to do: I incline to think it would be best to lie by and let the tempest blow over, if one could but get a

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shilling a day to live upon meanwhile; for until the whole of the existing institutions of society are levelled with the ground, there will be nothing for a wise man to do which the most pig-headed fool cannot do much better than he. A Turgot even could not do in the present state of England what Turgot himself failed of doing in France—mend the old system. If it goes all at once, let us wait till it is gone; if it goes piece by piece, why, let the blockheads who will compose the first Parliament after the Bill passes do what a blockhead can do, viz. overthrow, and the ground will be cleared and the passion of destruction sated, and a coalition prepared between the wisest Radicals and the wisest anti-Radicals, between all the wiser men who agree in their general views and differ only in their estimate of the present condition of this country. You will perhaps think from this long, prosing, rambling talk about politics that they occupy much of my attention; but, in fact, I am myself often surprised how little I really care about them. The time is not yet come when a calm and impartial person can intermeddle with advantage in the questions and contests of the day. I never write in the *Examiner* now except on France, which nobody else that I know of seems to know anything about; and now and then on some insulated question of political economy. The only thing which I can usefully do at present, and which I am doing more and more every day, is to work out *principles*; which are of use for all times, though to be applied cautiously and circumspectly to any: principles of morals, government, law, education, above all self-education. I am here much more in my element; the only thing that I believe I am really fit for is the investigation of abstract truth, and the more abstract the better. If there is any science which I am capable of promoting, I think it is the science of science itself, the science of investigation—of method. I once heard Maurice say (and, like many things which have dropped from him, its truth did not strike me at first, but it has been a source of endless reflection since) that almost all differences of opinion when analysed were differences of method. But if so, he who can throw most

light on the subject of method will do most to forward that alliance among the most advanced intellects and characters of the age, which is the only definite object I ever have in literature or philosophy, so far as I have any *general* object at all. *Argal*, I have put down upon paper a great many of my ideas on logic, and shall in time bring forth a treatise; but whether it will see the light until the Treaty of Westphalia is signed at the close of another cycle of reformation and antagonism no one can tell, except Messrs. Drummond, M'Niel, Irving, and others, who profess the hidden key to the Interpretation of the Prophecies. I have just put the finishing hand to my part of a work on Political Economy, which Graham and I are writing jointly; our object is to clear up some points which have been left doubtful, to correct some which we consider to be wrong, and to show what the science is and how it should be studied. I have written five essays—four on detached questions and one on the science itself. Graham is to write five more on the same subjects; we are then to compare notes, throw our ideas into a common stock, talk over all disputed points till we agree (which, between us two, we know by experience to be by no means an indefinite postponement), and then one of us is to write a book out of the materials. Graham is to add a sixth essay on a very important part of the subject which is above my reach, and which I am only to criticise when it is done. I am now resting upon my oars. Yesterday I completed my task, and, having reached a sort of landing-place (*vide* the Friend), I have asked myself what recreation I could offer myself by way of reward for past and encouragement to future exertions; and nothing better has yet occurred to me than writing to you. The next thing I shall do will be to complete my speculations on Logic: very likely I shall not get to the end of the subject yet, viewed as I understand it; but I shall at least gather in another harvest of ideas, and then let the ground lie fallow a while longer. After this I shall probably put down upon paper a vast quantity of miscellaneous ideas which are wrought out to a certain extent in my head, but which it would be quite

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premature to publish for a long while to come. I have nothing in view for the public just now, except (when the Reform Bill shall have passed) to resume my series of papers headed "The Spirit of the Age," and to write an article or two for the *Jurist* (now about to be revived) on some abstract questions of general legislation. When I shall have completed all this, then, if the East India Company is abolished, and funded property confiscated, I shall perhaps scrape together the means of paying my passage to St. Vincent's and see whether you will employ me to teach your niggers political economy. I take it for granted that if a Reformed Parliament should begin taking measures for the emancipation of the slaves, you will all join the United States, who, being lovers of liberty, will, I trust, go to war with Republican England to restore you and the other colonists to the inalienable rights of freemen.

I have done nothing in this letter but talk to you about the world in general and about myself. I must now talk to you about other people, and particularly about several new acquaintances of mine that I had not made or had only just begun to make when you left this white world. First of all, I went this summer to the lakes, where I saw much splendid scenery, and also saw a great deal both of Wordsworth and Southey; and I must tell you what I think of them both. In the case of Wordsworth, I was particularly struck by several things. One was, the extensive range of his thoughts and the largeness and expansiveness of his feelings. This does not appear in his writings, especially his poetry, where the contemplative part of his mind is the only part of it that appears; and one would be tempted to infer from the peculiar character of his poetry that real life and the active pursuits of men (except of farmers and other country people) did not interest him. The fact, however, is that these very subjects occupy the greater part of his thoughts, and he talks on no subject more instructively than on states of society and forms of government. Those who best know him seem to be most impressed with the catholic character of his ability. I have been told that Lockhart has said of him that he would have been an

admirable country attorney. Now a man who could have been either Wordsworth or a country attorney could certainly have been anything else which circumstances had led him to desire to be. The next thing that struck me was the extreme comprehensiveness and philosophic spirit which is in him. By these expressions I mean the direct antithesis of what the Germans most expressively call one-sidedness. Wordsworth seems always to know the pros and the cons of every question; and when you think he strikes the balance wrong it is only because you think he estimates erroneously some matter of fact. Hence all my differences with him, or with any other philosophic Tory, would be differences of matter-of-fact or detail, while my differences with the Radicals and Utilitarians are differences of principle; for *these* see generally only one side of the subject, and in order to convince them you must put some entirely new idea into their heads, whereas Wordsworth has all the ideas there already, and you have only to discuss with him the "how much," the more or less of weight which is to be attached to a certain cause or effect as compared with others: thus the difference with him turns upon a question of varying or fluctuating quantities, where what is *plus* in one age or country is *minus* in another, and the whole question is one of observation and testimony, and of the value of particular articles of evidence. I need hardly say to you that if one's own conclusions and his were at variance on every question which a minister or a Parliament could to-morrow be called upon to solve, his is nevertheless the mind with which one would be really in communion; our principles would be the same, and we should be like two travellers pursuing the same course on the opposite banks of a river. Then when you get Wordsworth on the subjects which are peculiarly his, such as the theory of his own art, if it be proper to call poetry an art (that is, if art is to be defined as the expression or embodying in words or forms of the highest and most refined parts of nature), no one can converse with him without feeling that he has advanced that great subject beyond any other man, being

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probably the first person who ever combined, with such eminent success in the practice of the art, such high powers of generalisation and habits of meditation on its principles. Besides all this, he seems to me the best talker I ever heard (and I have heard several first-rate ones); and there is a benignity and kindliness about his whole demeanour which confirms what his poetry would lead one to expect, along with a perfect simplicity of character which is delightful in any one, but most of all in a person of first-rate intellect. You see I am somewhat enthusiastic on the subject of Wordsworth, having found him still more admirable and delightful a person on a nearer view than I had figured to myself from his writings, which is so seldom the case that it is impossible to see it without having one's faith in man greatly increased and being made greatly happier in consequence. I also was very much pleased with Wordsworth's family—at least, the female part of it. I am convinced that the proper place to see him is in his own kingdom—I call the whole of that mountain region his kingdom, as it will certainly be as much thought of hereafter by the people of Natchitoches or of Swan River, as Mœnalus and the Cephissus, or Baiæ and Soracte by ourselves, and this from the fortuitous circumstance that he was born there and lived there. I believe it was not there that you were acquainted with him, and therefore I am not telling you an old story in talking about the little palace or pavilion which he occupies in this poetic region, and which is, perhaps, the most delightful residence in point of situation in the whole country. The different views from it are a sort of abstract or abridgment of the whole Westmoreland side of the mountains, and every spot visible from it has been immortalised in his poems. I was much pleased with the universality of his relish for all good poetry, however dissimilar to his own, and with the freedom and unaffected simplicity with which every person about him seemed to be in the habit of discussing and attacking any passage or poem in his own works which did not please them. I also saw a great deal of Southey, who is a very different

kind of man, very inferior to Wordsworth in the higher powers of intellect, and entirely destitute of his philosophic spirit, but a remarkably pleasing and likeable man. I never could understand him till lately; that is, I never could reconcile the tone of such of his writings as I had read with what his friends said of him: I could only get rid of the notion of his being insincere by supposing him to be extremely fretful and irritable; but when I came to read his "Colloquies," in which he has put forth much more than in any other work, of the natural man, as distinguished from the writer aiming at a particular effect, I found there a kind of connecting link between the two parts of his character, and formed very much the same notion of him which I now have after seeing and conversing with him. He seems to me to be a man of gentle feelings and bitter opinions. His opinions make him think a great many things abominable which are not so; and against which, accordingly, he thinks it would be right and suitable to the fitness of things, to express great indignation; but if he really feels this indignation, it is only by a voluntary act of the imagination that he conjures it up, by representing the thing to his own mind in colours suited to that passion: now, when he knows an individual and feels disposed to like him, although that individual may be placed in one of the condemned categories, he does not conjure up this phantom and feels therefore no principle of repugnance, nor excites any. No one can hold a greater number of the opinions, and few have more of the qualities which he condemns, than some whom he has known intimately and befriended for many years; at the same time he would discuss their faults and weaknesses or vices with the greatest possible freedom in talking about them. It seems to me that Southey is altogether out of place in the existing order of society; his attachment to old institutions, and his condemnation of those who administer them, cut him off from sympathy and communion with both halves of mankind. Had he lived before Radicalism and infidelity became prevalent, he would have been the steady advocate of

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the moral and physical improvement of the poorer classes, and denouncer of the selfishness and supineness of those who ought to have considered the welfare of those classes as confided to their care. Possibly the essential one-sidedness of his mind might then have rendered him a democrat; but now the evils which he expects from increase of the power wielded by the democratic spirit as it now is, have rendered him an aristocrat in principle without inducing him to make the slightest compromise with aristocratic vices and weaknesses. Consequently, he is not liked by the Tories, while the Whigs and Radicals abhor him. And after all, a man cannot complain of being misinterpreted who always puts the worst interpretation upon the words and deeds of other people. As far as I have yet seen, speculative Toryism and practical Toryism are direct contraries. Practical Toryism simply means, being *in* and availing yourself of your comfortable position *inside* the vehicle without minding the poor devils who are freezing *outside*. To be a Tory means either to be a place-hunter and jobber, or else to think that (as Turgot expressed it) "tout va bien, parce que tout va bien pour eux"; to be one "qui ayant leur lit bien fait, ne veulent pas qu'on le remue." Such Toryism is essentially incompatible with any large and generous aspirations; nor could any one who had such aspirations ever have any power of realising them under our system, whatever might be his attachment to the forms of the Constitution, because the inert mass of our sluggish and enervated higher classes can be moved by nothing that does not come from without, and with a vengeance; they cannot be led, but must be driven; the clamour of the "fierce democracy" can alone stir their lazy and feeble minds, and awaken them from the sleep of indifference. What can you do when there is no faith in human improvement, and every glaring, disgusting evil which they cannot deny is set down as the inevitable price we pay for social order, and irremediable by human efforts? "It is all very true, but what can we do?" is the ready answer of everybody who can possibly avoid doing something; and you can say nothing in reply but

this, "Then, if you can do nothing for that society which has hitherto made nobody the happier unless it be yourselves, the rest of mankind must try what they can do to improve their own lot without your assistance, and then, perhaps, you may not like their manner of proceeding." If there were but a few dozens of persons safe (whom you and I could select) to be missionaries of the great truths in which alone there is any well-being for mankind individually or collectively, I should not care though a revolution were to exterminate every person in Great Britain and Ireland who has £500 a year. Many very amiable persons would perish, but what is the world the better for such amiable persons? But among the missionaries whom I would reserve, a large proportion would consist of speculative Tories: for it is an ideal Toryism, an ideal King, Lords, and Commons that they venerate; it is old England as opposed to the new, but it is old England as she might be, not as she is. It seems to me that the Toryism of Wordsworth, of Coleridge (if he can be called a Tory), of Southey even, and of many others whom I could mention, is *tout bonnement* a reverence for *government* in the abstract: it means, that they are duly sensible that it is good for man to be ruled; to submit both his body and mind to the guidance of a higher intelligence and virtue. It is, therefore, the direct antithesis of Liberalism, which is for making every man his own guide and sovereign-master, and letting him think for himself, and do exactly as he judges best for himself, giving other men leave to persuade him if they can by evidence, but forbidding him to give way to authority; and still less allowing them to constrain him more than the existence and tolerable necessity of every man's person and property renders indispensably necessary. It is difficult to conceive a more thorough ignorance of man's nature, and of what is necessary for his happiness, or what degree of happiness and virtue he is capable of attaining, than this system implies. But I cannot help regretting that the men who are best capable of struggling against these narrow views and mischievous heresies should chain themselves, full of life and vigour

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as they are, to the inanimate corpses of dead political and religious systems, never more to be revived. The same ends require altered means; we have no new principles, but we want new machines constructed on the old principles; those we had before are worn out. Instead of cutting a safe channel for the stream of events, these people would dam it up till it breaks down everything and spreads devastation over a whole region.

Another acquaintance which I have recently made is that of Mr. Carlyle, whom I believe you are also acquainted with. I have long had a very keen relish for his articles in the Edinburgh and Foreign Reviews, which I formerly thought to be such consummate nonsense; and I think he improves upon a nearer acquaintance. He does not seem to me so entirely the reflection or shadow of the great German writers as I was inclined to consider him; although undoubtedly his mind has derived from their inspiration whatever breath of life is in it. He seems to me as a man who has had his eyes unsealed, and who now looks round him and sees the aspects of things with his own eyes, but by the light supplied by others; not the pure light of day, but by another light compounded of the same simple rays, but in different proportions. He has by far the widest liberality and tolerance (not in the sense which Coleridge justly disavows, but in the good sense) that I have met with in any one; and he differs from most men, who see as much as he does into the defects of the age, by a circumstance greatly to his advantage in my estimation, that he looks for a safe landing *before* and not *behind*; he sees that if we could replace things as they once were, we should only retard the final issue, as we should in all human probability go on just as we then did, and arrive again at the very place where we now stand. Carlyle intends staying in town all the winter; he has brought his wife up to town (whom I have not seen enough of yet to be able to judge of her at all); his object was to treat with booksellers about a work which he wishes to publish, but he has given up this for the present, finding that no bookseller will publish any-

thing but a political pamphlet in the present state of excitement. In fact, literature is suspended; men neither read nor write. Accordingly, Carlyle means to employ his stay here in improving his knowledge of what is going on in the world, at least in this part of it, I mean in that part of the world of ideas and feelings which corresponds to London. He is a great hunter-out of acquaintances; he hunted me out, or rather hunted out the author of certain papers in the *Examiner* (the first, as he said, which he had ever seen in a newspaper, hinting that the age was not the best of all possible ages): and his acquaintance is the only substantial good I have yet derived from writing those papers, and a much greater one than I expected when I wrote them. He has also, through me, sought the acquaintance of Fonblanque (of the *Examiner*), whom I found him to be an admirer of, and who, though as little of a mystic as most men, reads his writings with pleasure. I expect great good from Fonblanque; he is fashioned for the work of the day, as befits one who works for the day, but he is one of those on whom one may most completely rely for being ready to turn over a new leaf when the old one is read through.

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I have to add yet another new acquaintance to all these, and one who is by no means the least remarkable among them; I mean Stephen,[1] the counsel to the Colonial Office, son of the Master in Chancery. I have only yet seen him two or three times, but I hope to see much more of him, especially as I have now gone to live in his immediate neighbourhood, at Kensington. I have hardly met with any person who seems to me to take such just views of the age and of futurity as he does; to be so free from any exaggeration or one-sidedness, and to combine the speculative and the practical in so just a proportion. He cannot fail to exercise hereafter a great influence over the destinies of his country, not so much perhaps by what he does, as by what he makes other persons do. He is at this moment not only the directing spirit of the Colonial Office, but of several other

[1] [Sir James Stephen.]

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departments of the Government: under great restraints and disadvantages, of course, from the unteachable quality of those placed over him and their dread of anything like a principle, arising from their consciousness of inability to comprehend in one view all that is involved in it, and all the consequences to which it leads. Stephen is reputed a saint: I do not know in what sense he is one, though I know that he carries the observance of the Sabbath to the extent of puritanism. But if all the English evangelicals were like him, I think I should attend their Exeter Hall meetings myself, and subscribe to their societies. I will write to you at greater length about Stephen when I have seen more of him.

As for our common friends and acquaintances here, I have but little to tell you concerning them. Mrs. [John] Austin will, of course, write to you. I do not know whether the subscription for endowing the Jurisprudence chair is yet full, but no doubt is entertained that it will be so. Mr. Austin is still engaged in bringing out his first eight lectures, which are soon to appear. He is in good health and spirits upon the whole. I have not seen or heard anything about Maurice; I hope our separation is not to be everlasting. Wilson has very recently returned from Germany, where he has spent about a year. I have seen very little of Charles Buller; you are probably aware that he is not in this Parliament, but he is sure of being returned for Liskeard when the Bill passes. The greatest change that has occurred in any one since I saw you is in Roebuck; he has pulled off his strait-jacket, and now moves freely; his mental powers are no longer enslaved by fixed forms of words, and phrases strung together syllogistically with the false appearance of Euclidean demonstration. His intellect has greatly expanded, and the asperities of his character are much softened; and though there still remains, and possibly may always remain, much in his mental character which you and I would greatly object to, I have now no doubt of his being a useful, powerful, and constantly improving member of the

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only Church which has now any real existence, namely, that of writers and orators.

The Colonisation scheme is going on prosperously. They have formed a plan for a new colony, to be settled on their principles on the coast of Southern Australia, near the place where the newly discovered navigable river discharges itself into the sea. They are endeavouring to form a land company to settle the country, and have the promise of an excellent charter from Government when the company is formed. The Colonial Office I believe to be heartily with them at present. Our friend Graham has gone into the scheme with his usual vigour, and is now one of their leading minds: he wrote their last two pamphlets. Wakefield now moves openly in the thing, though it is not declared publicly that he was the originator of it; but there is no reason now for keeping his connection with it altogether a secret, as he has made himself very advantageously known to the public by, really, a most remarkable book on the punishment of death, founded on the observations he made while in Newgate. You are aware that our old enemy, Wilmot Horton, has gone to Ceylon as governor, so that he no longer stands in the way of a rational scheme of colonisation. The St. Simonists are making immense progress in France, and are doing great good there; France has nobody comparable to them, on the whole. They talk of sending missionaries *here;* that will do them no good, I think. This letter, I hope, will call forth an equally long one from you. I beg to be duly remembered to Mrs. John Sterling.—Yours faithfully,

J. S. MILL.

To Gustave d'Eichthal.

This letter was found by d'Eichthal among his papers nearly forty years after it had been written; and he was so pleased and surprised by it that he

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copied it on May 14, 1870, and sent the copy to Mill.

30*th Nov.* 1831.

MY DEAR D'EICHTHAL,—I know you too well to write to you of any subject except that of the great and truly apostolic work in which you are engaged, and to which, though I am very far indeed from entirely agreeing with you, I have for some time been accustomed to look as the greatest enterprise now in progress for the regeneration of society.

I am greatly indebted to you and your associates for being thought worthy to receive the *Globe*.[1] If I did not sympathise with you in any other respect, it would still be a noble spectacle to see a body of men standing erect and fronting the world as you do. But the daily reading of the *Globe*, combined with various causes, has brought me much nearer to many of your opinions than I was before ; and I regard you as decidedly *à la tête de la civilisation*.

I am now inclined to think that your social organisation, under some modification or other—which experience will, no doubt, one day suggest to yourselves—is likely to be the final and permanent condition of the human race. I chiefly differ from you in thinking that it will require many, or at least several ages to bring mankind into a state in which they will be capable of it, and that in the meantime they are only capable of approximating to it by that gradual series of changes which are so admirably indicated and discussed in the writings of your body, and every one of which, independently of what it may afterwards lead to, has the advantage of being in itself a great positive good. Your system, therefore, even supposing it to be impracticable, differs from every other system which has ever proposed to itself an unattainable end in this, that many, indeed, almost all attainable goods lie on the road to it.

You, I am aware, think that all who adopt your system prove thereby that they are capable of performing all which it would require of them if it became universal. I think

[1] [Then the organ of the Saint Simonians.]

not. But since you think so, it was your duty to commence, as you have done, the experiment of realising it on such a scale as is permitted to you. I watch the experiment, and watch it with all the solicitude and anxiety of one whose hopes of the very rapid and early improvement of human society are wrapt up in its success. 1831 — Aetat. 25.

If men of such ardent and generous enthusiasm, such strong and penetrating intellect, and such extensive views, are found unable to act up to their own conceptions of duty, what hope is there for the rest of mankind?

If the Saint-Simonian Society holds together without schism and heresy, and continues to propagate its faith and to extend its numbers at the rate it has done for the last two years—if this shall continue for a few years more, then I shall see something like a gleam of light through the darkness. But if not, then what is done will not be of no avail; I shall not despair, nor ought you. But it will be a grievous downfall to our hopes.

Write to me sometimes, my dear friend. Be not afraid that your labour will be lost. I have never yet read a single article in the *Globe* which has not wrought something within me which I have not been in some measure the better for; and if the hour were yet come for England, if it were not as vain to seek a hearing for any *vues organiques* in England now as it would have been for your master Saint-Simon in the height of the Revolution, I know not that I would not renounce everything and become, not one of you, but as you.

But our 10 août, our 20 juin, and perhaps our 10th Brumaire are yet to come; and which of us will be left standing, when the hurricane has blown over, heaven only knows.—Yours ever, J. S. MILL.

To JOHN STERLING,

who was still in the West Indies.

LONDON, *24th May* 1832.

MY DEAR STERLING,—The manner in which time passes over our heads without our perceiving it is quite frightful. 1832 — Aetat. 26.

1832 — Aetat. 26. It is now seven months since I wrote to you, and if I had not referred to a memorandum-book to learn the fact, I should not have thought it was three. Absence! All persons, some few excepted, are sufficiently prone to neglect the absent, not because they forget them, but because there is always something to be done for things or persons near at hand, which, it seems at the moment, will less bear to be put off. But I think this is peculiarly a fault of mine. I neglect almost every person whose daily life is not intermixed with my own. However this may be, accept my confession, and believe that, notwithstanding all appearances, you are as much and as often in my thoughts as when you were in England. It seems to me that there is a very great significance in letter-writing, and that it differs from daily intercourse as the dramatic differs from the epic or narrative. It is the life of man, and above all the chief part of his life, his inner life, not gradually unfolded without break or sudden transition, those changes which *take place* insensibly being also *manifested* insensibly; but exhibited in a series of detached scenes, taken at considerable intervals from one another, showing the completed change of position or feeling, without the process by which it was effected; affording a glimpse or a partial view of the mighty river of life at some few points, and leaving the imagination to trace to itself such figure or scheme as it can of the course of the stream in that far larger portion of space where it winds its way through thickets or impenetrable forests and is invisible: this alone being known to us, that whatever may have been its course through the wilderness, it has had *some* course, and that a continuous one, and which might by human opportunity have been watched and discovered, though to us, too probably, destined to be for ever unknown. What wonder therefore if, when seen at these distant intervals, the stream sometimes seems to run east, sometimes west, and its general direction remains as mysterious as that of the Niger? Yet if such glimpses are numerous some general tendency shall predominate even in the few furlongs of waterway which they may chance

to disclose, and it shall not remain doubtful towards what sea, in the long run, the waters tend to discharge themselves. 1832 — Aetat. 26.

I had no idea when I began this letter that I should yield to the habit of moralising and poetising which has grown upon me. But I meant to say something very simple. When you wrote to me you promised a longer letter, which was to give me some notion of a slave-colony; and glad shall I be to receive it; but after all, that will be, in itself, no more valuable to me, than any other information on the same subject from any person with equal opportunities and deserving of equal reliance: but what I can have only from you, and what would be far more valuable to me, whether resulting from a letter respecting slave-colonies or from anything else, would be a knowledge of you, namely, of what has passed and is passing in your own mind, and how far your views of the world and feelings towards it, and all that constitutes your individuality as a human being, are or are not the same, are or are not changed. That is the knowledge which it is the most proper object of letters between friends to communicate; otherwise, if their separation is prolonged, they cannot help becoming more or less strangers to one another.

As for myself, I doubt not but that I have much to tell you of this kind which you, and even myself eventually, might read with interest. For I know that there never pass seven months of my existence without change, and that not inconsiderable or unimportant; and I really do not recollect what my last letter to you was about (except that part of it was about Wordsworth and Southey) or what was my state of mind when I wrote it; only I remember that I must have had much to say, since my epistle amounted to a quarto volume. It is not of much use to write to you about politics. You of course know from the newspapers and from your other friends through what a sea of troubles "the Bill" [1] has at last been navigated in safety to within sight of land. You know the utter prostration or rather annihilation of the Tory party;

[1] [The Reform Bill.]

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how all the vitality has gone out of them; they having most unwisely chosen to make this the decisive, the final struggle; which accordingly it is. One unspeakable blessing I now believe that we shall owe to the events of the last ten days; to whatever consummation the spirit which is now in the ascendant may conduct us, there is now a probability that we shall accomplish it through other means than anarchy and civil war. The irresistible strength of a unanimous people has been put forth, and has triumphed without bloodshed; it having therefore been proved, once for all, that the people can carry their point by pacific means, the natural and habitual reluctance of mankind to suffer and to inflict wounds and death, yet remains and may yet remain in its pristine strength, being no longer liable to be gradually worn away by the perpetual recurrence of the thought and feeling that these are the necessary though bitter means to some ardently desired end. What will come next it is quite vain to attempt to anticipate. Much grievous disappointment — some consequent moral and intellectual good, some evil; some oversetting of evil and wrong; as yet little setting up of right; but above all a clear field to work in, and a consequent duty on all whose vocation is not different, to address themselves to the work.

With regard to our common acquaintances, most of what I have to tell is, I think, favourable; many, and some from whom it was scarcely to be expected, have become "sadder and wiser men." By sadder, I do not mean gloomier, or more desponding, nor even less susceptible of enjoyment, or even gaiety; but I mean that they look upon all things with far deeper and more serious feelings, and are far more alive to those points in human affairs which excite an interest bordering on melancholy. Their earnestness, if not greater, is of a more solemn kind, and certainly far more unmixed with dreams of personal distinction or other reward. This is also, in a measure, the case with myself; except that, so far as respects the last point, the change had taken place long before. I have long since renounced any hankering for being happier

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than I am, and only since then have I enjoyed anything which can be called well-being. How few are they who have discovered the wisdom of the precept—"Take no thought of the morrow;" when considered as all the sayings of Christ should be, not as laws laid down with strict logical precision for regulating the details of our conduct—since such must be, like all other maxims of prudence, *variable*—but as the bodying forth in words of the *spirit* of all morality, right self-culture, the principles of which cannot change, as man's nature changes not, though surrounding circumstances do. I do not mean, by using the word self-culture, to prejudge anything whether such culture can come from man himself or must come directly from God; all I mean is that it is culture of the man's self, of his feelings and will, fitting him to look abroad and see how he is to act, not imposing on him by express definition a prescribed mode of action; which it is clear to me that many of the precepts of the Gospel were never intended to do, being manifestly unsuited to that end: witness that which I have just cited; or the great one of doing to all men as you desire that they should do to you; or of turning the left cheek, &c., which last the Quakers have made themselves ridiculous by attempting to act upon a very little more literally than other people. All these would be vicious as moral statutes, binding the tribunal, but they are excellent as instruction to the judge in the *forum conscientiæ*, in what spirit he is to look at the evidence, what posture he must assume in order that he may see clearly the moral bearings of the thing which he is looking at.

I have not seen, nor scarcely heard, of Maurice, since you left England. Can you tell me anything of him? Trench I have seen, and had some correspondence with. He seems to me to take a most gloomy view of the prospects of mankind—gloomier even than yours, in your letter to Mrs. Austin; who (*par parenthèse*) has not been very well lately, but is recovering. Carlyle passed the whole of a long winter in London; and rose in my opinion, more than I know how to express, from a

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nearer acquaintance. I do not think that you estimate him half highly enough; but neither did I when I last saw you.

It was worthy of your kindness to think not only of your friend, but of your friend's friends, and to pick up sea-shells for them on the other side of the globe because we had once done so together at Looe. It is one of the things which so few persons would have thought of besides yourself.

I hope and believe that I shall not again allow so long an interval to elapse without writing to you. I had great compunction in not writing to you when we learned the melancholy fate of poor Torrijos—and I should have done so, but that I am little fitted for comforting the afflicted, and I knew not, in that case, of any comfort to administer. It was chiefly with reference to you and to Madame Torrijos that it seemed to me there was ground for sorrow; though the extinction of such a man, even when there was little more for him to do or to enjoy, seemed like the violent blotting out of a star from heaven.

With many kind remembrances to Mrs. Sterling, believe me affectionately yours, J. S. MILL.

To Thomas Carlyle.

INDIA HOUSE, *29th May* 1832.

MY DEAR FRIEND,—To be moderate, I will only thank you twice: once for being the first to write. The good-natured excuse which you make for my silence will not serve me. I always felt that I ought to write first, and not you; but it always seemed that there would be some better time for writing than the present one. In particular, I have had an unusual number of letters to write since I saw you, and to me it appears a very weighty matter to write a letter; there is scarcely anything that we do which requires a more complete possession of our faculties in their greatest freshness and vigour; and all the more so, because if it is elaborate it is good for little. Besides, I knew that I was corresponding with you, in some measure,

through the *Examiner*. All this is not intended as an excuse, but a confession, that you may see what paltry reasons sufficed with me for putting off the discharge of a duty. But it is very idle to complain of my own faults instead of mending them, as every man can, if he will, and as I trust I yet shall, all the less slowly from having known you.

I believe I have fulfilled most of your parting injunctions; some of them, however, less soon than I might and ought. For several weeks after your departure I waited for some time when it would be quite convenient to call upon poor Glen, till finding that no such moment arrived I did at last what I might have done at first, disregarded convenience and did the thing out of hand; and the great joy which it seemed to give him satisfied me not that I had done right, for I was thinking much more of you than of him, but that you had done right in instigating me to call upon him. Since that time we have seen each other frequently, and I have cultivated his acquaintance the more because he has so few persons in London besides me who are at all able to help or encourage him. I have been much struck by the exact manner in which every opinion that you have ever expressed to me about him has been proved true by what I have since seen of him. Mrs. Carlyle's opinion in so far as it differed from yours was, I am satisfied, entirely groundless. I am somewhat doubtful, however, how far he is capable of deriving much advantage of an intellectual kind from the intercourse of others; his mind seems to be always in his own thoughts and in them only, and these not matured but extemporaneous; it seems almost time thrown away to give out thoughts to him, he seems never to lay hold of them. But if any one could teach him to make a proper use of his own materials it would be doing to him an unspeakable service, and to others much good through his means. I do not see my way clearly to being able to assist him in this respect, but I see that our intercourse affords some sort of satisfaction to him, and therefore probably does him some kind of good; what and how much will doubt-

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less in time be made manifest. He talks of writing to you, and I am sure that it would make him extremely happy to hear from you; what he saw of you has evidently made a very deep impression upon him. I have also called upon Fraser—only once, however; but in his case there was not the same strong inducement; I have no doubt that we shall see more of each other.

Your parting gift, the paper on Biography and on Johnson, has been more precious to me than I well know how to state. I have read it over and over till I could almost repeat it by heart, and have derived from it more edification and more comfort than from all else that I have read for years past. I have moreover lent it to various persons, whom I thought likely to reap the same benefits from it, and have in no instance been disappointed; among others to some in whom it has created, or increased, a more earnest desire to see and know you, and who are most worthy that this desire should be gratified, as I trust it one day will be, if possible, through my means, unless an iron necessity, insuperable by the free will of man, should hereafter, as heretofore, prevent.

Thanks for what you tell me respecting your recent occupations. I look forward with very delightful anticipations to your review of the Corn Law Rhymer, and to your paper on Goethe: it was a disappointment to me that the former did not appear in the last *Edinburgh*, though I knew it was scarcely possible. Taylor[1] tells me that Southey is writing an article on the same subject, and is in communication with the author, who is a real working man named Reuben Elliott.[2] I have seen no review of his poems as yet, except in the *Monthly Repository*, the Unitarian periodical edited by Mr. Fox, whom I conjecture to be the author of this particular paper. The tone of it is very good, and there are very few persons who could have written it, but I think it misses the most striking aspect under which the poems can be looked at, viz., as works which will go down to posterity as one of the principal memorials

[1] [Henry Taylor, author of "Philip van Artevelde."]

[2] [His real name was Ebenezer Elliott.]

of this age, from which a large portion of its character will be known which is registered in little else of a permanent nature, being chiefly those melancholy features in the position of the working class towards the other classes and towards the world altogether which have impressed upon so earnest and so loving a heart a character of almost unrelieved gloom, bitterness, and resentment. The poet just shows enough of his natural character to render the portraiture of the artificial one which is superinduced upon it more deeply impressive. I am convinced that these poems, having, as they have, sufficient intrinsic merit to live, will hereafter be a text for annotations, explanations, and commentaries without end, and that future historians (when such worthy of the name shall arise) will build largely upon them. 1832 — Aetat. 26.

With respect to Goethe, there was a short obituary notice of him in the *Examiner*, which you would not like. I could have kept it out if I would have undertaken to write something myself at the instant; but as I knew my own ignorance, and would not write at haphazard, the matter was put into the hands of those who thought they knew, and in reality did know, more, but yet (as seems pretty obvious) not enough. The article was made up of two fragments, written by two different persons. So rare in this country is any, even the most commonplace, knowledge of Germany, that none of the other papers gave any observations at all on the extinction of the greatest man then living in Europe; and Bulwer, in his next number, that is, in the small print, drafted his notice almost entirely from that in the *Examiner*. How yours, in the next number, will square with it he probably cares as little as I dare say you do.

As you see the *Examiner*, you are acquainted with the greater part of what I have been busy about since you left us. To the papers signed "A. B." you must add everything which has been written about France, except the notices of the cholera and a review of a trumpery pamphlet. If you should happen to see the second number of *Tait's Magazine*, you will see in it an article of mine, on

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a book which I have also reviewed in the *Examiner*, by our acquaintance, Cornewall Lewis. If you have not seen it, and will let me know how I may best send you a copy, I will do so, though unless it interest you as being mine, it scarcely will otherwise. On the whole, the opinions I have put forth in these different articles are, I think, rather not inconsistent with yours, than exactly corresponding to them, and are expressed so coldly and unimpressively that I can scarcely bear to look back upon such poor stuff. I have not yet come up even with my friends the Saint-Simonians, and it would be saying very little even if I had.

Apropos of the Saint-Simonians, they have been obliged to give up the *Globe* and everything else which they had in hand. The immediate causes of their stoppage are certain legal obstructions which have been thrown in their way by some of the seceding members, and a demand of 130,000 francs by the Government (very infamously allowed to reach that amount before it was brought forward) for arrears of stamps and penalties for infraction of the stamp laws. In the later numbers of the *Globe* there was, I think, on the whole, some evidence of improvement in their views and feelings. Enfantin and about fifty more, among whom are our two friends D'Eichthal and Duveyrier, have now retired to a place called Menilmontant, at a short distance out of Paris, where they are all living together, and are employed, as they assert, in training themselves to preach to the world by their example, which, they are beginning to find out, is after all the most impressive and in every way profitable aspect of the life even of those whose vocation it is to be the speakers of the Word. This is decidedly *un progrès*, as they would say; and if you believe them, their present state, like everything else which has happened to them or to any son of Adam, is for the best, that is, for the greatest ultimate success of the Saint-Simonian faith. It is difficult to conjecture how far this optimism of theirs is itself a *faith*, or a mere trick of self-deluding vanity, determined to put the best face upon everything, both to themselves and

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others. I do not know many of the particulars of their life at Menilmontant, but it appears that one feature of it is to do without domestic service, which they consider a vestige of slavery, and they take their turns to perform all menial offices for one another. I do not know how they reconcile this with their maxim, *à chacun selon sa capacité*, but I suppose they have some salve or other for it. Their adoration for Enfantin seems to be on the increase rather than on the wane, and it is well to reverence the best man they know, but I wish they had a better still.

With regard to politics, their aspect of things has somewhat changed since you wrote, and the momentary check sustained by Radicalism has been converted into a triumph far more complete than could have been achieved otherwise. The Tory party, at least the present Tory party, is now utterly annihilated. Peace be with it. All its elevated character had long gone out of it, and instead of a Falkland it had but a Croker, instead of a Johnson nothing better than a Phillpotts. Wellington himself found that if he meant to be minister he must be a Whig; and the rest of his party, though in the main Whigs already, did not choose that particular phasis of Whiggery, and determined to be nothing at all; and truly they had no very great step to make into absolute nonentity. There is now nothing definite and determinate in politics except Radicalism, and we shall have nothing but Radicals and Whigs for a long time to come, until society shall have worked itself into some new shape, not to be exactly foreseen and described now.

Mrs. Austin has been very far from well of late, but is nearly recovered. She often talks of Mrs. Carlyle and you. Austin began lecturing immediately after your departure, and part of my occupation since you went away has been in attending his lectures. Buller is now here and in good health; he has written a very pleasant article in the *Foreign Quarterly Review* on Prince Pückler's book,[1] which I think you would like to read.

I do not think I have any more facts to tell you, and

[1] ["Tour of a German Prince."]

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I have filled my letter with nothing else. Another time I shall not wait for such an accumulation of what, after all, is very secondary material for a letter, especially between you and me, so little of whose conversation used ever to turn upon mere incidents. Make my heartiest remembrances to Mrs. Carlyle, and believe me most truly yours (and hers),

J. S. MILL.

To THOMAS CARLYLE.

LONDON, *17th July* 1832.

MY DEAR FRIEND,—Many thanks for your little note. I hope this letter will find all your perplexities at an end, and the paper on Goethe proceeding smoothly, or perhaps long since finished and sent off. I recognise in your account of what was passing in your mind, a very perfect picture of what I often experience in mine; especially if I attempt to give a general view of any great subject, when I feel bound not merely to say *something* true, but to omit nothing which is material to the truth. I also participate in what you call your superstition about never turning back when one has begun. Were it not that imperfect and dim light is yet better than total darkness, there would be little encouragement to attempt enlightening either oneself or the world. But the real encouragement is, that he who does the best he can, always does some good, even when in his direct aim he totally fails. For although the task which we undertake is to speak a certain portion of precious Truth (and instead of speaking any Truth at all, it is possible our light may be nothing but a *feu follet*, and we may leave ourselves and others no wiser than we found them), still, that any one sincere mind, doing all it can to gain insight into a thing, and endeavouring to declare truthfully all it sees, declares this (be it what it may), is itself a truth; no inconsiderable one; which at least it depends upon ourselves to be fully assured of, and which is often not less, sometimes perhaps more, profitable to the hearer or reader, than much sounder doctrine delivered without intensity of conviction; and this is one eternal and inestimable pre-

eminence (even in the productions of pure intellect) which the doings of an honest heart possess over those of men of the strongest and most cultivated powers of mind when directed to any other end in preference to, or even in conjunction with, Truth. He who paints a thing as he actually saw it, though it were only by an optical illusion, teaches us, if nothing else, at least the nature of sight, and of *spectra* and phantasms; but if somebody has not seen, or even believed that he saw, anything at all, but has merely thrown together objects and colours at random or to gain some point, it is all false and hollow, and nobody is the wiser or better, or ever can be so, from what has been done, but may be greatly the more ignorant, more confused, and worse. 1832 — Aetat. 26.

I have read your little paper on Goethe in Bulwer's Magazine. There was little in it which I had not already heard from your lips, otherwise there are passages which would, if they had been entirely new to me, have excited me to much thought, and may therefore do that service to any other mind which is prepared for them. I do not myself, as yet, sufficiently know Goethe, to feel certain that he is the great High Priest and Pontiff you describe him; I know him as yet only as one of the wisest men, and men of greatest genius, whom the world has yet produced; but if *he* be not all that you say he is, certainly no other man has arisen in our times who can even for a moment be suspected of being so. In him alone, of all the celebrated men of this and the last age, does a more familiar knowledge and the growth of our own faculties discover more and more to be admired and less and less to be rejected or even doubted of. Who shall succeed him; or when shall he find even an *unworthy* successor? There is need that the march of mind should raise up new spiritual notabilities; for it seems as though all the old ones with one accord were departing out of the world together. In a few days or weeks the world has lost the three greatest men in it in their several departments—Goethe, Bentham, and Cuvier; and during the same period what a mortality among those second-rate great men, who are generally in

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their own time much more celebrated than the first, because they take pains to be so; such men as Casimir Périer, or Mackintosh, or Sir William Grant, or General Lamarque, or the last of Scotch judges, John Clerk of Eldin, or even (to descend low indeed) Charles Butler, and here is Sir Walter Scott about to follow. I sometimes think that instead of mountains and valleys, the domain of intellect is about to become a dead flat, nothing greatly above the general level, nothing very far below it. It is curious that this particular time, in which there are fewer great intellects above ground and in their vigour than can be remembered for many ages back, should be the precise time at which everybody is cackling about the progress of intelligence and the spread of knowledge. I do believe that intelligence and knowledge are less valued just now, except for purposes of money-making, than at any other period since the Norman Conquest, or possibly since the invasion of the Romans. I mean, in our own country. But even in Germany the great men seem to have died out, though much of their spirit remains after them, and is, we will hope, permanently fixed in the national character.

I have not been idle since my last letter, but have rather read, than either meditated or written: all that I have written, you must have seen in the *Examiner;* it consists of sundry papers on French politics and two long articles on Pledges, which are in very bad odour with some of our Radicals. It is a proof of the honest and brave character of Fonblanque,[1] that he wished to have these articles: everything he ever prints that does not chime in with commonplace Radicalism costs him money; his paper is in a perpetual alternation of slowly working its way upwards by its liveliness and ability and then tumbling plump down all at once by some act of honesty. I do not know that this has happened in the present case, but I have little doubt of it.

I am about to make a short ramble in the country just now, after which I shall return to work, and I hope with more solid and valuable results than I have hitherto

[1] [Albany Fonblanque, editor of the *Examiner*.]

done; so that I may produce something worthy of the title you give me, and in which I rejoice, that of one of your scholars. You also call me one of your teachers; but if I am this, it is as yet only in the sense in which a schoolmaster might speak of his teachers, meaning those who teach under him. I certainly could not now write, and perhaps shall never be able to write, anything from which any person can derive so much edification as I, and several others, have derived in particular from your paper on Johnson. My vocation, as far as I yet see, lies in a humbler sphere; I am rather fitted to be a logical expounder than an artist. You I look upon as an artist, and perhaps the only genuine one now living in this country: the highest destiny of all lies in that direction; for it is the artist alone in whose hands Truth becomes impressive and a living principle of action; yet it is something not inconsiderable (in an age in which the understanding is more cultivated and developed than any of the other faculties, and is the only faculty which men do not habitually distrust), if one could address them through the understanding, and ostensibly with little besides mere logical apparatus, yet in a spirit higher than was ever inspired by mere logic, and in such sort that their understandings shall at least have to be *reconciled* to those truths, which even then will not be *felt* until they shall have been breathed upon by the breath of the artist. For, as far as I have observed, the majority even of those who are capable of receiving Truth into their minds must have the logical side of it turned *first* towards them; then it must be quite turned round before them, that they may see it to be the same Truth in its poetic that it is in its metaphysical aspect. Now this is what I seem to myself qualified for, if for anything, or at least capable of qualifying myself for; and it is thus that I may be, and therefore ought to be, not useless as an auxiliary even to you, though I am sensible that I can never give back to you the value of what I receive from you. 1832 — Aetat. 26.

I have no news worth telling you—scarcely any news of any kind. Mrs. Austin is quite recovered. Charles

1832 — Aetat. 26.

Buller is now in Cornwall; he was a little indisposed when he set out, but is now, I trust, in good health. Pray make my most friendly remembrances to Mrs. Carlyle, and let me hear from you in due season.—Yours ever faithfully,

J. S. MILL.

CHAPTER II

1833

To Thomas Carlyle.

India House, *9th March* 1833.

1833 — Aetat. 26.

My dear Carlyle,—I *ought* to write oftener, though not exactly for the reason you jocularly give. I ought, and I would, if my letters were, or could be, better worth having; yet, even such as they are, not being altogether valueless to you, they shall become more frequent. Truly I do not wonder that you should desiderate more "heartiness" in my letters, and should complain of being told my thoughts only, not my feelings, especially when, as is evident from your last letter, you stand more in need of the consolation and encouragement of sympathy. But, alas! when I give my thoughts I give the best I have. You wonder at "the boundless capacity man has of loving"; boundless indeed it is in *some* natures, immeasurable and inexhaustible; but *I* also wonder, judging from myself, at the limitedness and even narrowness of that capacity in *others*. That seems to me the only really insuperable calamity in life—the only one which is not conquerable by the power of a strong will. It seems the eternal barrier between man and man—the natural and impassable limit both to the happiness and to the spiritual perfection of (I fear) a large majority of our race. But few, whose power of either giving or receiving good in any form through that channel is so scanty as mine, are so painfully conscious of that scantiness as a *want* and an imperfection; and being thus conscious, I am in a higher, though a less happy state, than the self-satisfied *many* who have my wants without my power of appreciation. You speak of obstacles which exist for others but not for me.

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There are many of earth's noblest beings, with boundless capacity of love, whom the falseness and halfness which you speak of have so hemmed round and so filled with distrust and fear that "they *dare* not love." But mine is a trustful nature, and I have an unshakeable faith in others, though not in myself. So my case must be left to nature, I fear; there is no mind-physician who can prescribe for me, not even you, who could help whosoever is helpable; I can do nothing for myself, and others can do nothing for me; all the advice which can be given (and *that* is not easily *taken*) is, not to beat against the bars of my iron cage. It is hard to have no aspiration and no reverence but for an Ideal towards which *striving* is of no use; is there not something very pitiful in *idle* Hoping? but to be without hope were worse.

You see it is cold comfort which I can give to any who need the greatest of comforts, sympathy in moments of dejection; I, who am so far from being in better mental health than yourself, that I need sympathy quite as much, with the added misfortune that if I had it, it could do me no good. When you knew me in London I was in circumstances favourable to your mistaking my character and judging of it far too advantageously; it was a period of fallacious calm, grounded in an extravagant over-estimate of what I had succeeded in accomplishing for myself and an unconscious self-flattery and self-worship. All *that* is at an end, which is a progress surely. I would not now take the greatest human felicity on such terms.

But this is enough for the present in this strain; perhaps I may say more another time. Let me rather think of *you*, and what can be done to improve *your* environment. Your picture of Edinburgh is *triste* enough, and might serve, I fear, *a fortiori*, for all other provincial towns; there is an *odour* of literature and intellect about Edinburgh; at Glasgow, Liverpool, and the like, there is little else than the *stench* of trade. London is better, far better; bad though even *it* be. There are here, in infinitesimal *proportion* indeed, but in absolute *number* more than a very few, actual *believers*; some, whom I and even *you* could call *true* believers; to a

very great extent, or entirely, among whom your thoughts would not fall like hand-grenades and put them to flight, but would at least be caught up and cherished, probably planted and reared into fruit. If you determine to leave Craigenputtock, there is surely no place so good as this, at least in the most important of all good things which locality can bring—kindred companionship. But you will have more things to consider, doubtless, than even that greatest of all, and you will not give *that* less than its proper weight. 1833 — Aetat. 26.

I have no news to tell; the Reformed Parliament has not disappointed me any more than you; it is (as Miss Martineau, I understand, says of Brougham) so ridiculously like what I expected; but some of our Utilitarian Radicals are downcast enough, having deemed that the nation had in it more of wisdom and virtue than they now see it has, and that the vicious state of the representation kept this wisdom and virtue out of Parliament. At least this good will come out of their disappointment, that they will no longer rely upon the infallibility of Constitution-mongering; they admit that we have as good a House of Commons as any mode of election would have given us, in the present state of cultivation of our people. They are digging a little nearer to the root of the evil now, though they have not got to the *tap*-root. Read Roebuck's paper on National Education in *Tait's* last number; while you have the number in your hand, look at the *first* article in it, which is his also. He is narrow still, but the other Parliamentary Radicals are narrower — all but our friend Charles [Buller], who has the finest understanding of the set, but wants strength of *will*. For myself, I have well-nigh ceased to feel interested in politics. The time is not yet come for renovation, and the work of destruction goes on of itself without the aid of hands. If any man of clear insight were in Parliament just now, I hardly know what he could hope or aim at, unless to sow in some few of the more impressible minds the seeds of a renovation which will not be yet, nor soon. The Bad, God wot, is tumbling down quite as fast as is safe where there is nothing of

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Good ready to be put in its place; what need of help in rolling the ball down hill? I was wont to think that the benches of the House of Commons might be as a pulpit, from whence a voice might make itself heard further and more widely than even from *your* pulpit and mine, the Periodical Press. But what sort of a voice must it be which could be heard through all this din? what were a single nightingale amidst the cawing and chattering of 657 rooks and magpies and jackdaws? Truly, if there were not in the world two or three persons who seem placed here only to show that *all* is not hollow and empty and insufficient, one would despair utterly. It is only the knowledge that such persons have an actual existence on the same globe with us which keeps alive any interest in anything besides myself; or even could I but *believe* that the good I see in a few comes not from any peculiarity of nature, but from the more perfect development of capacities and powers common to us all, and that the whole race were destined, at however remote a period either of individual or collective existence, to resemble the best specimens of it whom I have myself known, I verily believe, with that faith, I could be content to remain to eternity the solitary exception.

As for *work*, I have written perhaps of late not less than usual, but (except what has been already mentioned to you) nothing noteworthy that is likely to be soon published, except a notice for *Tait* of that book of Junius Redivivus, which same book you will soon receive in a parcel through Fraser, along with two articles of mine which I have formerly written to you about, sundry Memoirs of the French Revolution, the trial of the Saint-Simonians, and two letters which contain all I know of their subsequent proceedings and present state. (Those former books which miscarried have been traced to this house, though I have not been able to recover them.) My parcel for you at present waits only for William Fraser's permission to send you his copy of Levasseur's Memoirs, a permission too late applied for, and which has not yet reached me. Junius Redivivus will interest you, were it

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only for this, that *he* too is evidently a believer—a true believer, I think it may be said, so far as his faith has yet reached. There is vigour and a capacity of insight in him, and, if we may judge from the quantity he writes (the quality being never positively bad, and often very good), an altogether indomitable power of work. I have seen nothing of *your* writing for a long time. Cochrane,[1] I see, has not yet printed your paper on Diderot. When shall we see it? deeply interesting it is sure to be. You know something of *Fraser's Magazine:* do you know, or can you guess, the authorship of a recent paper on Byron? It looks like the production of some half-fledged pupil of yours.

I have asked an instructed and clever Frenchman now here (one of the editors of the *National*) about the authenticity of those revolutionary portraits, to which I also am no stranger. He tells me that the genuineness of many of them is very doubtful, and without any hint from me he at once instanced Danton, some of whose relations he knows, and has seen authentic portraits. Danton, he says, was ugly, but not ignoble either in mind or feature, and the portrait in the collection wrongs him grievously.

As you conjectured, I have lost sight of poor Glen, only because I am utterly ignorant of his place of abode; at his old lodgings they believe him to be still in Scotland, with his brother and such other relatives as he may have. I therefore know not what to do with your letter. Poor fellow, it would have gladdened him to the very bottom of his soul to have received it, or but to have known that you had written to him; you probably have better means of discovering his whereabouts in Scotland than I have. Of our common friends or acquaintances I have little to tell. Austin is lecturing to fit audience though few, and will, I think, very probably go to live either at Berlin or at Bonn. He is still subject to his fits of illness, but they are, I think, less frequent. Mrs. Austin is very much as usual. Falk[2] is not yet through the press. The Bullers are all in London;

[1] [J. G. Cochrane, editor of the *Foreign Quarterly Review*.]

[2] ["Characteristics of Goethe," from the German of Falk, &c.: translated by Mrs. Austin.]

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I fear they have lost money by failures in India, not enough to impoverish them, but *any* loss falls heavily on people who live up to their income.

I have heard nothing of Detrosier for a long time. I believe he has returned to Manchester with the intention of setting up a school, or else of continuing to go about lecturing on physical subjects, as he did formerly with some success.

Make my best remembrances to Mrs. Carlyle; I sometimes hear of her through Mrs. Austin. I do not say, "write soon," but I know you *will*.—Yours ever faithfully,

J. S. MILL.

To Thomas Carlyle.

INDIA HOUSE, 11*th and* 12*th April* 1833.

MY DEAR CARLYLE,—I write to you again a letter which I could wish were better worth having—*really* an apology for a letter. Your last, which you *called* so, deserved a better name. I would write if it were only to thank you for having a better opinion of me than I have of myself. It is useless discussing which is right; time will disclose that, though I do not think that my nature is one of the many things into which you see "some ten years farther" than I do. At all events I will not, if I can help it, give way to gloom and morbid despondency, of which I have had a large share in my short life, and to which I have been indebted for all the most valuable of such insight as I have into the most important matters, neither will this return of it be without similar fruits, as I hope and almost believe; nevertheless I will and must, though it leaves me little enough of energy, master it, or it will surely master me. Whenever it has come to me it has always lasted many months, and has gone off in most cases very gradually.

I have allowed myself to be paralysed more than I should during the last month or two by these gloomy feelings, though I have had intervals of comparative brightness; but they were short. I have therefore a poor

account to render of work done. Tait has not yet published that paper on Junius Redivivus, but in the meantime I have written another on the same subject for Fox[1] (a much better one, as I think), which has appeared in the April number, and should have been sent if I had got it in time for Fraser's parcel; you shall have it by the first opportunity. With this exception I have written little and read less; but this shall have an end.

You will have received long before this time by Fraser two tracts of mine of very different kinds, a political or rather ethico-political one on Church and Corporation Property, and the one I told you of long ago, in Fox's periodical, on Poetry and Art. That last you promised me a careful examination and criticism of: I need it much, for I have a growing feeling that I have not got quite into the heart of that mystery, and I want you to show me how. If you do not teach me you will do what is better, put me in the way of finding out. But I begin to see a not very far distant boundary to all I am qualified to accomplish in this particular line of speculation. I have also sent the Trial of the Saint-Simonians, a letter from d'Eichthal, and one from Duveyrier. I have lately heard again both from and of the latter. He is now writing in the *Revue des Deux Mondes*, which he says is the first in France in the department of literature and art, and to which a number of their most celebrated writers, so far as any of their writers can be called celebrated, contribute. He writes to me, "je me lance décidément dans le drame et le théâtre. Je fais une grande pièce, mais comme cela ne fait pas vivre pour le moment, je cherche à gagner mon pain courrant par quelques articles de journaux. J'ai quelqu' espoir d'avoir à la *Revue des Deux Mondes* où j'ai beaucoup d'amis, de rediger la chronique de quinzaine politique et théâtrale. En attendant je n'entends plus parler de d'Eichthal, qui est toujours en Italie." What I have heard of Duveyrier is that, being condemned to a year's imprisonment along with Enfantin and Chevalier, he applied through his relations for a pardon from the Government, and obtained

[1] [W. J. Fox, editor of the *Monthly Repository*.]

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it, I suppose by declaring his intention of quitting the Father of Humanity. This I heard from a friend of his. Such part of the Saint-Simonians as remain faithful, or at least a large body of them headed by Barrault, have, as I find from the French newspapers, set out for the East (Constantinople, I was told, was their first destination) *pour chercher la Femme libre.* This seems greater madness than I had imputed to them. It is among the inmates of a harem that they expect to find a woman capable of laying down, or as they say, *revealing* the new moral law which is to regulate the relations between the sexes ! It will be lucky for them if the search is attended with no disagreeable personal consequences to them except only that of not finding. The Saint-Simonians have done so much good that one regrets they were not capable of doing more. One of the seceding members writes of them in the *Revue Encyclopédique* that the Saint-Simonian Society is the only spiritual fruit of the Revolution of 1830. It is literally so ; the excessive levity and barrenness of the French mind has never been so strikingly displayed ; there are such numbers of talkers and writers so full of noise and fury, keeping it up for years and years, and not one new thought, new to *them*, I mean, has been struck out by all the collection since they began attending to these matters, except only those which the Saint-Simonians have set afloat among them. It is no wonder that minds so little *productive* as the French should run wild with an interesting truth when they have had it impressed upon them. Saint-Simon really for a Frenchman was a great man. Enfantin likewise *pourrait bien être aussi une espèce de grand homme*, as Voltaire said ; the others were probably mere redactors and amplifiers of their thoughts, a talent as common in France as the power of original thinking seems to be rare. If you can get hold of it at Edinburgh, read a novel called "Arthur Coningsby," by John Sterling ; he is one of the men who would most interest you among those here, and his book will interest you ; I should much like to know what it looks like when seen from your point of view.

Though I am sick of politics myself, I do not despair of improvement that way; you hear the cackle of the noisy geese who surround the building, I see a little of what is going on inside. I can perfectly sympathise in Bonaparte's contempt of the government of *bavards;* talking is one thing and doing another: but while every corner of the land has sent forth its noisy blockhead to talk, overhead I am near enough to see the real men of *work*, and of head for work, who are quietly getting the working part of the machine into their hands, and will be masters of it as far as anybody can be with that meddling and ignorant assembly lawfully empowered to be their masters. After that let even *one* man come, who with honesty, and intellect to appreciate these *working* men, has the power of leading a mob—no rare combination formerly, though a very rare one now; and there will be as good a government as there *can* be until there shall be a better people. It is a real satisfaction to me to know, and in some cases to have even been able somewhat to help on, several men who are now gaining by dint of real honesty and capacity a considerable and increasing influence, though not an externally visible one, over the underworkings of our government. Some of these are, as I am convinced, among the very fittest persons in the country to have that influence, fit or not as they may be in a greater or less degree for still higher purposes. *A chacun selon sa capacité* is far enough from being realised, to be sure, but the *real* deviation, great as it is, falls far short of the *apparent.* It is much more in their apparent than in their real power, that such men as Brougham and Althorp are exalted above their proper station. 1833 — Aetat. 26.

Fonblanque, you see, goes on hammering at the politics of the day, for better, for worse; I have seen less than usual of him lately. The public mind is coming round to him; the popularity of the Reform Ministry will soon be at as low an ebb as that of the poor Patriot King. How long is this dreary work to last, before a *man* appears? Mrs. Austin is at present laid up with the prevalent influenza, a sort of cold accompanied with fever; she and

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her husband seem to have almost resolved to emigrate into Germany this autumn. The Bullers are here; Charles has gone the Western Circuit this spring, and got some briefs; I have increasing hopes of his steadiness and power of work. I have little to tell of any one else whom you know here. Is De Quincey still in Edinburgh? do you ever see him? and what do you think of him? Your criticism on Miss Martineau is, I think, just; she reduces the *laissez faire* system to absurdity as far as the *principle* goes, by merely carrying it out to all its consequences. In the meantime that principle, like other negative ones, has work to do yet, work namely of a destroying kind, and I am glad to think it has strength left to finish that, after which it must soon expire; peace be with its ashes when it does expire, for I doubt much if it will reach the resurrection. I wish you could see something I have written lately about Bentham and Benthamism—but you can't. My best thanks to Mrs. Carlyle for the few words of kindness she added to your last letter. I keep so little note of time that I know not whether I have redeemed my promise of writing after a less interval than usual—but you will write soon.—Yours ever faithfully, J. S. MILL.

I should have availed myself of the opportunity you afforded me to make acquaintance with Leigh Hunt, did I not find it absolutely necessary, if I mean either to work or to enjoy society, to restrict rather than to extend the number of my acquaintance. He is worth knowing, and a time may come for that among other things. Have you seen Archibald Alison's "History of the French Revolution"?[1] If you have, just tell me whether it is worth reading, or reviewing—I suppose it is wrong, when one has taken the trouble to accumulate knowledge on a subject, not to work it up if one can into some shape useful to others; and if I am to write about the French Revolution, it may as well be while my recollections of the original authorities are fresh. J. S. M.

[1] ["History of Europe during the French Revolution," 1833.]

To Thomas Carlyle

India House, 18*th May* 1833.

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My dear Carlyle,—By this time you are again in your wilds, and have had time to feel yourselves at home and settled there, and you are expecting a letter from me—and I have *two* to acknowledge and, if so might be, to repay. I have many things to say, too; at least they seem many before I begin to say them; they will seem few before I have done. First, then, I have read your paper on Diderot. Of the man, and of his works and of his contemporaries, so far as I think at all, I think very much as you do; yet I have found more to differ from in that article of yours than in anything of *your* writing I commonly do. The subject seems to have carried you, and me as your reader, over a range of topics on which there has always been a considerable extent of undiscussed and unsifted divergence of opinion (pardon this *galimatias* of mixed metaphor) between us two; on some of which, too, I sometimes think that the distance has rather widened than narrowed of late. That may be *my* loss, and my fault; at all events, it seems to me that there has been on my part something like a want of courage in avoiding, or touching only perfunctorily, with you, points on which I thought it likely that we should differ. That was a kind of reaction from the dogmatic disputatiousness of my former narrow and mechanical state. I have not any great notion of the advantage of what the "free discussion" men call the "collision of opinions," it being my creed that Truth is *sown* and germinates in the mind itself, and is not to be struck *out* suddenly like fire from a flint by knocking another hard body against it: so I accustomed myself to *learn* by inducing others to deliver their thoughts, and to teach by scattering my own, and I eschewed occasions of controversy (except occasionally with some of my old Utilitarian associates). I still think I was right in the main, but I have carried both my doctrine and my practice much too far; and this I know by one of

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its consequences, which I suppose would be an agreeable one to most men, viz., that most of those whom I at all esteem and respect, though they may know that I do not agree with them *wholly*, yet, I am afraid, think, each in their several ways, that I am considerably *nearer* to agreeing with them than I actually am. In short, I know that I have been wrong, by finding myself seated in the gig much more firmly than I have any business as an honest man to be. So you see I am only *about* to have, in all its fullness, that sincerity of speech for which you give me credit. I only had it thus far hitherto, that all I have ever spoken, by word of mouth or in writing, I have firmly believed, and have spoken it solely because it was my belief. Yet even that, in these days, was much, but not enough, seeing that it depends upon my own will to make it more. The result of all which is that with you, as well as with several others very unlike you, there will probably be a more frequent and free communication of *dissent* than has hitherto been, even though the consequence should be to be lowered in your opinion; *that*, indeed, if it were to be the result, would be conclusive proof that I have been acting wrongly hitherto, because it would show that for being thought so highly of I had been partly indebted to not being thoroughly known—which I am sure is the case oftener than I like to think of.

You see there will be so much the more to talk over when we meet; and that will be this summer, unless, which is always possible, I should not be in a state of mind in which meeting with *any* one is profitable or delightful to me. I believe I am the least *helpable* of mortals—I have always found that when I am in any difficulty or perplexity of a spiritual kind I must struggle out of it by myself. I believe, if I could, whenever anything is spiritually wrong with me, I should shut myself up from the human race, and not see face of man until I had got firm footing again on some solid basis of conviction, and could turn what comes into me from others into wholesome nutriment. I am often in a state almost of scepticism, and have no theory of Human Life at all, or

seem to have conflicting theories, or a theory which does not amount to a belief. This is only a *recent* state, and, as I well know, a passing one, and my convictions will be firmer and the result of a larger experience when I emerge from this state than before; but I have never found any advantage in communion with others while my own mind was unsettled at its foundations, and if I am not much mended when my vacation time comes round, I will rather postpone a meeting with you until I am. 1833 — Aetat. 26.

I have neither written nor read much since I last wrote you, except one or two trifling things in the *Examiner;* including, however, one of a somewhat more weighty kind (though not much), which you will see in a week or more now, because I begin to see some things a little clearer, though many things which I once thought I understood, I now believe cannot be known with true insight, but by means of faculties which cannot be acquired, and which to me have not been given, save in most scanty measure. Alison's book, which I asked you about, I have procured and read; the man is quite inconceivably stupid and twaddling, I think, beyond anybody who has attempted to write elaborately on the subject. He has no research; the references with which he loads his margin are chiefly to compilations. I could write something about him, or rather about his subject; but I could employ myself better, unless there were some widely-circulated periodical that would publish it: the *Edinburgh Review* perhaps would, were it not that I should wish to show up Macaulay's ignorance of the subject and assumption of knowledge, as shown in that very Review.

The long-missing parcel of books has at length turned up, and I have received intimation that the second is at Longman's. I did not mean you to return those *Repositories,* but they are not, to *you,* worth my sending back again. Keep all I send you henceforth. On learning that my parcel was not in time for Fraser's monthly packet (which I thought I had taken care that it should be), I sent two more numbers of the *Repository* to be added to it, in one of which is the article I told you of, concerning

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Junius Redivivus. The passage you saw quoted about books and men was from that; so there is not evidence therein of "another Mystic": so much the worse. I was much interested by learning that *your* recent thoughts have been so nearly of the same kind; tell me what you have thought since, especially *since* you have thought of the question *practically*, as altering your own future choice of a mode of activity. The difficulty of comparing two magnitudes and distinguishing which is greatest, is, as we all know, vastly enhanced when the magnitudes themselves are of almost infinitesimal smallness, and that unhappily seems to be the case at present with the portion of good, that one can see clearly a prospect of achieving in any course that one can take; yet it seems to me that if one had a proper stage and proper tools, more is to be accomplished just now by the doer of the deed than by the sayer of the word —words are so little listened to now but when they are the prelude or the accompaniment to some deed; *my* word, again, is partly intelligible to many more persons than yours is, because mine is presented in the logical and mechanical form which partakes most of this age and country, yours in the artistical and poetical (at least in one sense of those words, though not the sense I have been recently giving them) which finds *least* entrance into any minds now, except when it comes before them as mere dilettantism and pretends not to make any serious call upon them to change their lines. But then, what career is open to the *doer*, if either in your position or in mine? Write to me what has been passing in you on this matter, whether of a general kind or as affecting yourself individually.

I am sure I have twenty other things to say, but cannot think of them at this instant; I shall write again the sooner. Let me ask you this one question. Have you seen the book published by the Poor Law Commissioners? If you have not, let me send it to you. Often you have complained how little of the state of a people is to be learned from books; *much* is to be learned of it from that book, both as to their physical and their spiritual state. The result is

altogether appalling to the dilettanti, and the gigmen, and the ignorant and timid in high stations ; to me it has been, and will be I think to you, rather consoling, because *we* knew the thing to be unspeakably bad : but this I think shows that it may be considerably mended with a considerably less amount of intellect, courage, and virtue in the higher classes, than had hitherto appeared to me to be necessary. Any way the book cannot fail to interest you, because *any* authentic *information* as to any human thing is interesting to you. I regard this inquiry with satisfaction under another [aspect ?] as great too—that it has been more honestly and more ably performed than anything which has been done under the authority of Government since I remember ; and has, in consequence, been the means of getting some of the best men I know, for such purposes, put into other work of the same kind, and decidedly embarked in the same career. You will find among them my friend John Wilson, whom you have seen ; he is now Secretary to the Factory Commission. Chadwick [1] also, the ablest of them all, may be said to be at the head of that Commission. I know not of any news to tell ; I have seen little of Fonblanque lately. The Austins are still bent upon going to live in Germany after the conclusion of his present course of Lectures. At the Literary Union I can learn no more of Glen than I knew before. Kindest remembrances to Mrs. Carlyle.

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Charles Buller is well, and in spirits, and increasingly disposed to work ; he will not be lost, it were pity he should : his career will be politics, I think ; not the best career, far from that, but he will, I now think, demean himself therein like a true man : his superiority to all those people is even *now*, little as he has yet done, beginning to be *felt*, and he is gaining influence which will enable him to utter such truth as is in him with some certainty of being listened to—he *is* pure-minded, and not a self-seeker, I am sure of that.

[1] [Afterwards Sir Edwin Chadwick.]

To Thomas Carlyle.

London, *5th July* 1833.

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My dear Carlyle,—I wrote a short letter to you intending to send it by your brother when he went to Craigenputtock; but he did not find time to call on me again, and I, having very foolishly mislaid his address, did not find out his place of abode till some hours after he had left town. As the letter was very short and had little in it, I cancelled it, and determined to write a longer and better, which however I have not set about till now. In the meantime I have received your letter, which was welcome on many accounts, on none more than because it recognises in express words what has always been tacitly recognised but seldom spoken or written about by either of us, the *negative* part of the relation between us, the fact that we *still* differ in many of our opinions, perhaps, as you say (though of this I am not sure), throughout the range of a "half-universe." I certainly shall not hesitate to show you "the length and breadth of my dissent." But the truth is, I had persuaded myself for a long time that the difference was next to nothing; was such as counted for little in *my* estimation at least, being rather in some few of our speculative premises than in any of our practical conclusions. When I came to *review* my opinions and ask myself, after a considerable period of fresh thought and fresh experience, the deliberate question, which at some periods assumes a more serious and solemn aspect than at others, what I believed? what were my convictions? I found that they were, and for the present could not but be, more *materially* divergent from yours than I had for a time believed. As soon as I felt quite sure of this I told you so; and though I wrote as if in a sceptical and unsettled state of mind, the very fact that I wrote at all about it proved that I had come into a more settled state. I think that I have obtained something like a firm footing, and additional rather than new light; I can hardly say that I have changed any of my opinions, but I seem to

myself to *know* more, from increased observation of other people, and increased experience of my own feelings. All which is thus acquired *must* be clear gain; it is increased knowledge of the only valuable kind, knowledge of Realities; and it must be for want of intellect or for want of will, if, with additional ground to build upon, I cannot raise my edifice of Thought to a greater height, and so look round and see more of Truth than I could see before. But of all these things we shall both write and speak hereafter. Concerning my journey to Craigenputtock, all I can at present say is, that if I go not thither I shall go nowhere else. However, it will not at all events be in August, for in that month my father will be absent, and it is inconvenient for both of us to be away from the India House at the same time. It cannot be till he return. I had the pleasure of an hour's conversation with Dr. Carlyle on his passing through London, and was glad to learn that he is to be an inmate of Craigenputtock all this summer and autumn. My occupations for some time back have been rather internal than external; I have not been working much, but much has been working in me. I have written little, partly because I was better employed in obtaining whereof to write than in writing, partly also because of press of business at the India House, and of certain temporary domestic occupations in my father's house. I have completed scarcely anything but a poor, flimsy, short paper on that book of Alison's, which I undertook in an evil hour, when the subject was as remote as possible from those which were occupying my thoughts and feelings at the time, and which I accordingly performed exceedingly ill, and was obliged to cancel the part which had cost me most labour; what is left (it is not worth your perusal), will appear in the *Monthly Repository*. Short as the whole is, it has been divided into two parts, of which one has appeared; it had been better to reserve the whole for another number. I shall in future never write on any subject which my mind is not full of when I begin to write, unless the occasion is such that it is better the thing were ill done than not at all, that being the alter-

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native. What you say of that paper of mine on Poetry and Art is exactly what I think respecting it myself. I do not think it contains anything erroneous, but I feel that it is far from going to the bottom of the subject, or even very deep into it; I think I see somewhat further into it now, and shall perhaps understand it in time. I think I mentioned to you that I have carried the investigation (rightly or wrongly, as it may be) one step further in a paper (being a review of a new poem) which I wrote for the *Examiner:* it proved too long for Fonblanque, and it is to appear in *Tait*, after such additions and alterations as I see it absolutely requires, and which I have not yet found time to give it. You say you wish that you could help me in this matter; you *can* and *do* help me in all such matters, not by logical definition, which, as I think I have said or written before, I agree with you in thinking not to be your peculiar walk of usefulness; but in suggesting deep and pregnant thoughts which might never have occurred to me, but which I am quite able, when I have them, to subject to all needful logical manipulation. This brings to my mind that I have never explained what I meant when, writing once before in this strain, I called you a poet and artist. I conceive that most of the highest truths are, to persons endowed by nature in certain ways which I think I could state, intuitive; that is, they need neither explanation nor proof, but if not known before are assented to as soon as stated. Now, it appears to me that the poet or artist is conversant chiefly with *such* truths, and that his office in respect to truth is to declare *them* and to make them *impressive.* This, however, supposes that the reader, hearer, or spectator is a person of the kind to whom those truths *are* intuitive. Such will, of course, receive them at once, and will lay them to heart in proportion to the impressiveness with which the artist delivers and embodies them. But the other and more numerous kind of people will consider them as nothing but dreaming or madness: and the more so, certainly, the more powerful the artist, *as* an artist. The same person may be poet and logician, but he cannot be both in the same

composition : and as heroes have been frustrated of glory "carent quia vate sacro," so I think the *vates* himself has often been misunderstood and successfully cried down for want of a Logician in Ordinary, to supply a logical commentary on his intuitive truths. The artist's is the highest part, for by him alone is real *knowledge* of such truths conveyed ; but it is possible to convince him who never could know the intuitive truths that they are not inconsistent with anything he *does* know, that they are even very *probable*, and that he may have faith in them when higher natures than his own affirm that they are truths. He may then build on them and act on them, or at least act nothing contradictory to them. Now, this humbler part is, I think, that which is most suitable to my faculties as a man of speculation. I am not in the least a poet in any sense, but I can do homage to poetry. I can to a very considerable extent feel it and understand it, and can make others who are my inferiors understand it in proportion to the measure of their capacity. I believe that such a person is more wanted than even the poet himself ; that there are more persons living who approximate to the latter character than to the former. I do not think myself at all fit for the one ; I do for the other : your walk I conceive to be the higher. Now one thing not useless to do would be to exemplify this difference itself ; to make those who are not poets understand that poetry is higher than logic, and that the union of the two is philosophy. I shall write out my thoughts more at length somewhere and somewhen, probably soon.—Yours faithfully,

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J. S. Mill.

5th July 1833.

I am so far from seeing any *intolerance* in your dislike of speculation, unless it be either of the highest kind, or interesting for the sake of its interesting author, that I am exactly in the same case. I shall attend to this in making up my parcels for you hereafter. I have Madame Roland's Memoirs, and will send them with the Poor Law book and what else of interesting I can get together.

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What I said about infinitesimal smallness did not refer to the work itself, but to the effect—no doubt in another sense. All, who do all they can, do *equally*, and that *infinitely*. But when we are to choose *what* we shall do, we must compare the *results*, and the difficulty is how to compare things infinitely small. Tell me what you think about this, for it will perhaps lead to the root of some of the chief differences of opinion between us.

To John Sterling,

condemning the inaction of the Government concerning the education of negroes.

12th July 1833.

. . . So much for these statesmen of ours—they always remind me of what Southey said to me at Keswick; pointing in a little Bible-book for children, in size and shape an inch cube, to a woodcut of Samson with a gate on his back about twenty times his own size, he said, "That is like Lord John Russell carrying away the British Constitution;" and sure enough that is about the proportion between the men and the work they have in hand.

I suppose you have by this time returned from your journey up the Rhine. I shall be much interested by the impression German literature and philosophy make upon you on a nearer acquaintance. That question between Schelling's view and Schleiermacher's is the one great question on the subject of religion. My own views, as far as I have any fixed ones, are much nearer to Schleiermacher's than to Schelling's and Coleridge's. With *them* I do not at all see, as my mind is at present constituted, any chance of my ultimately agreeing. I think I am even further from them than I was—I suspect that your mind and mine have passed that point in their respective orbits where they approximate most—and that our premises are now more nearly the same than our conclusions are likely to be. I think I am becoming *more* a Movement-man than I was, instead of less—I do not mean merely in politics'

but in all things—and that you are becoming more and more inclined to look backward for good. However, I am talking without book, for who in these times knows what he shall think rightest and best six months hence?—Yours faithfully, J. S. MILL. 1833 — Aetat. 27.

To Thomas Carlyle.

[No date. ? *August* 1833.]

MY DEAR CARLYLE,—This note will be given to you by Mr. R. W. Emerson, of Boston (United States), who having been long a reader of your writings, is desirous to take the first opportunity of making your acquaintance. Mr. Emerson met with our friend Gustave d'Eichthal at Rome, and was by him referred to me as one who could give him the introduction to you which he wished for; I have great pleasure in doing so.—Yours faithfully, J. S. MILL.

To Thomas Carlyle.

INDIA HOUSE, *2nd August* 1833.

MY DEAR CARLYLE,—This letter will be, as you desire, extremely biographical; I was conscious myself of a deficiency in that department in my last, which, however, was wholly autobiographic; for what is my life made up of in the main but my thoughts and feelings? I have no actions to relate, except occasionally the promulgation of some thoughts and feelings. But I am now to speak of others rather than of myself. And first, of those in whom you are most interested. You have probably heard that the Austins do not quit England. The Chancellor is to appoint, or has actually appointed, a Commission to digest the Criminal Law, and Austin is to be one of the members. This is work for him of the kind which he most likes, and for which he is best fitted; it is also a provision for him; he is to have £500 a year while it lasts, and it will doubtless lead to other employment in the same line. All his good fortune comes to him at the same time; the four Inns of Court, chiefly at the instiga-

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tion of Bickersteth (the most valuable man in the profession of the law—do you know about him?), have resolved to found two Lectureships, one of English Law, the other of Civil Law and Jurisprudence: this last it is not impossible that Austin may be appointed to; it is compatible with his other employment, and will add £450 to his income. So he is likely to be placed in the best circumstances possible for him, whether we consider his usefulness or his own happiness. There are no fears now but for his health; I have always thought that anxiety was the chief cause of his frequent illnesses; they have been, however, of late considerably *more* frequent than formerly, though less severe—he is ill now; as soon as he is fit to travel they are going out of town, probably to some place on the north coast of Devonshire, where they will remain till October, when he returns to commence his new duties. Mrs. Austin is now overloaded with proposals for translating; her fame as a translator has been, very deservedly, raised much higher by this "Falk."[1] As she will not now be at all dependent on the profits (McCulloch would take me to task—I should say *wages*) of her literary undertakings, she will now be at liberty to consult only her own judgment of what will do most good; she will persevere, I have no doubt, and be useful. You ask me about Grote; I happen to be able to tell you more about him than almost any one, having been intimate with him almost from my boyhood, though less so than formerly in proportion as I have diverged from his opinions: he is a Utilitarian; in one sense I am so too, but *he* is so in rather a narrow sense; has therefore a belief, a firm one, in *him* most deep and conscientious, for which chiefly he lives, and for which he would die. He is a highly instructed man; an excellent scholar; has made great progress in writing a History of Greece, some of the manuscript of which I have seen; it will be a work of great, though not of consummate merit. He was one of the first of his rank and station to proclaim strong Benthamic-Radical opinions; he published a pamphlet

[1] ["Characteristics of Goethe," from the German of Falk, &c.]

of merit in defence thereof against the *Edinburgh Review*, as long ago as 1820, when not so old as I am now, and another two years ago, just before the Reform Bill. He is a man of good, but not first-rate intellect: hard and mechanical; not at all quick; with less *subtlety* than any able and instructed man I ever knew; with much logical and but little æsthetic culture; *narrow* therefore; even narrower than most other Utilitarians of reading and education; more a disciple of my father than of any one else; industrious, brave, *not* very active or spirited; universally beloved for his extreme goodness, his simplicity, uprightness, and gentleness; resembling Ricardo in that particular, though a far inferior man to him in powers of intellect. He is by far the most *considered* of the Radicals in the House of Commons, is more nearly their leader than any one else, and would be so altogether but that he has not the kind of talents which fit a man for a Parliamentary leader; he has not sufficient readiness, decision, and presence of mind. After all I have said of him you will be surprised to learn that he reads German. He will be a man of considerable weight in politics soon. As I am on politics, I will ask you if you have seen, except in the abridgment which the *Examiner* will give, Roebuck's speech on proposing a resolution for the establishment of a national education of the whole people? I should like you to see it, for it is a better exhibition of him than I think you have seen; it has raised him considerably, I think, in most people's estimation, which is seldom matter of praise, but is really so in this instance. It was beginning to be supposed that he *could* do nothing; he has shown now that he can; and we must add him to Grote and Buller to make up the only three among the Radical members who have not disappointed the expectations of their friends. Of these three, and of all the rest, Buller is, as you once said, the only one who possesses even the smallest genius. But several of them may be, and will be, valuable as honest Artisans. I can tell you something of Detrosier. He is again in London, and has some prospect of picking up a living as a lecturer on experimental

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physics; he is, it seems, accustomed to the craft, and qualified for it; he has made the attempt even here with success, and the only doubt about his having several profitable engagements arises from the freshness of his fame as Secretary to the Political Union. Assuredly Radicalism is not, yet, the road to wealth and honours, though its turn I think is coming. In the meantime, Detrosier, poor fellow, with a foolish wife and two or three children, has some difficulty in making the two ends meet; however, he has friends here who will not let him be in want. I had a short note from Gustave d'Eichthal the other day, dated from Rome, merely to introduce an American named Emerson, who had sought an introduction to me as a means of obtaining one to you; this I of course gave him. He is going into Scotland, and may possibly seek you out. He appears to be a reader and admirer of your writings, therefore you might possibly do him some good; but from one or two conversations I have had with him I do not think him a very hopeful subject. Of Fonblanque I have not seen very much lately, except (as you have) through the *Examiner*, in which I myself have written very little of late. Almost the only paper I have sent to him for some time you will see in the next or the next but one. I will let you find it out if you can; there is not much in it—it is all political. I have indeed written less of late than for a long time before; no longer for the reason I formerly mentioned, but literally from the pressure of comparatively trivial occupations, yet which in the particular circumstances were not such. The remainder of my little paper on Alison's book has just appeared; the two numbers of the *Monthly Repository* containing it shall reach you somehow soon. I have sent you no books this month, because I really could not get together enough to make it worth while; I had only the Poor Laws book. I have a promise of a copy of the Factory Commissioners' Report; when it comes, shall I send it? "Madame Roland" I had lent, and it did not return to me till a day or two too late. I have now a copy (borrowed) of one of Babbage's two

books. You once expressed a wish to see them; have you still that wish, or has it been satisfied? *Now* I have also (if you would care to see it) a book of Bulwer's, entitled "England and the English." I have not yet looked into it, but a Frenchman who is now in London said of it to Mrs. Austin that though he had been here only a month that book did not tell him any one thing that was new to him; it must therefore be a very poor book. I told you in one of my letters that I had been writing something about Bentham and his philosophy; it was for Bulwer, at his request, for the purposes of this book. Contrary to my expectation at that time, he has printed part of this paper *ipsissimis verbis* as an appendix to his book, so you will see it; but I do not acknowledge it, nor mean to do so. I furnished him also at his request with a few yet rougher notes concerning my father, which he has not dealt so fairly by, but has cut and mangled and coxcombified the whole thing till its mother would not know it; there are a few sentences of mine in it something like what they were when I wrote them; for the sake of artistic congruity I wish there were not. This I still less own, because it is not mine in any sense. About my going to Craigenputtock there will be some uncertainty till the very time, because the only contingency which would prevent it may happen at any time, and will remain possible to the very last. You will not hear positively that I am coming till immediately preceding my arrival; yes, you will though, for I shall travel rather slowly. I am sorry that your brother's speedy return to Italy will prevent me from meeting him at Craigenputtock, but I shall at all events see him on his passage through London. I have read the first part of your "Cagliostro"; not yet the second: I know not why you should call it "half mad"; it is merely like much of your writing—half-ironical, half-earnest; it may be of use to some people. If human beings would but do thoroughly all they do, I believe with you that Good would be much more forwarded than Evil: *halfness* is the great enemy of spiritual worth; whatever shames any human being out of *that*, is of unspeakable value. I have left little

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room for any of the many things I could willingly say on your last letter, neither is the letter before me, which, however, frequently happens to be the case when I am answering your letters. Do not mistake what I meant when I talked of logic; I did not mean it in the sense in which your answers to Sir William Hamilton (who, I suppose, is the schoolman you allude to) would apply to it. Of logic, as the theory of the processes of intellect, I think not wholly as you, yet nearly: he who has legs can walk without knowledge of anatomy, yet you will allow that such knowledge may be made substantially available for the cure of *lameness*. By logic, however, I meant the antithesis of poetry or art, in which distinction I am learning to perceive a twofold contrast—the *literal* as opposed to the *symbolical*, and *reasoning* as opposed to *intuition;* not the *theory* of reasoning, but the *practice*. In reasoning I include all processes of thought which are processes at all, that is, which proceed by a series of steps or links. What I would say is that my vocation is, I think, chiefly for this last; a more extended and higher one than for any branch of mere "philosophy of mind," though far inferior to that of the artist. We shall talk doubtless of these things, and also of many others, not excepting the one you mention, *Paris;* my notion of it is chiefly taken from its recent literature, which *is* exactly what Goethe called it, the literature of despair, "die Litteratur der Verzweiflung": you will not wonder at that—nor do I.

Buller, who is about to write to you, will put this letter under his cover.—Yours faithfully, J. S. MILL.

Thanks to Mrs. Carlyle for her two lines, and best remembrances to her and to Dr. Carlyle.

To Thomas Carlyle.

INDIA HOUSE, *5th September* 1833.

MY DEAR CARLYLE,—You have probably heard from Dr. Carlyle before this reaches you, that I shall not, after all, see you this autumn. There were about twenty

chances to one that I should, but it is the twenty-first which has taken effect in reality. I was mistaken, too, when I said that if I went not to Craigenputtock I should go nowhere. I am going to Paris ; the same cause which I then thought, if it operated at all, would operate to keep me here, now sends me there. It is a journey entirely of duty ; nothing else, you will do me the justice to believe, would have kept me from Craigenputtock after what I have said and written so often ; it is duty, and duty connected with a person to whom of all persons alive I am under the greatest obligations. If I had not so short a vacation the two journeys would not be incompatible, but alas for him who must abide eleven months of the year at a desk in Leadenhall Street ! All the compensation I can make to you will be to write often and fully, and tell you all I see and hear of Paris that will interest you. You said something in one of your letters about a projected residence of some time at Paris for yourself—it would not, I think, be pleasant to you, but extremely melancholy ; *everywhere*, however, there is food enough for *that*—and I do believe that for observation of realities, at least human spiritual realities, there is no place in the world like Paris in the present age, for the reason you mentioned, that individualities of character are there unchained, not being kept down and fashioned to a model by a common overruling belief—but again, nowhere in Europe, if I am not greatly mistaken, are there so *few* individualities of character as at Paris. I suspect Prussia is the only country *pleasant* to live in for one who loves mankind—but for that very reason not a fit place for one who is capable of being their spiritual benefactor in any, however small degree, unless he was *born* there. 1833 Aetat. 27.

I forgot to ask whether you have seen that "Arthur Coningsby" — it is scarcely worth sending, though decidedly worth reading ; perhaps it may go with other books ; also Bulwer's book.

I have read the latter half of Cagliostro with very great pleasure, greater than the first half : and I look forward to the appearance of Teufelsdröckh with great

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satisfaction: by the impression it makes upon me now, as compared with that which it made on the first reading, I shall have a kind of measure of the space which I have *franchi* (as the French say) in the interval, whether forward, backward, or to *one* side. I have certainly changed much since you knew me; in some things I have become, I think, more like yourself, in others more unlike; I am partly reconciled to not seeing you this year by the thought that next year I shall probably be firmer on my legs, spiritually speaking, and shall have a clearer and more fixed insight into what I am to be and to do than I have at present, and that the relation between us will then be (much more than now) what you once called it, "a relation between two somethings," and not between a something and a nothing.

About that Cagliostro and that Teufelsdröckh, by the way, it has frequently occurred to me of late to ask of myself and also of you whether that mode of writing between sarcasm or irony and earnest be really deserving of so much honour as you give to it by making use of it so frequently. I do not say that it is not good: all modes of writing in the hands of a sincere man are good, provided they are intelligible. But are there many things worth saying and capable of being said in that manner which cannot be as well or better said in a more direct way? The same doubt has occasionally occurred to me respecting much of your phraseology, which fails to bring home your meaning to the comprehension of most readers so well as would perhaps be done by commoner and more familiar phrases: however, this last I say with the most perfect submission, because I am sure that every one speaks and writes best in his own mother tongue, the language in which he thinks.

I have just received a copy of some evidence taken by the Poor Law Commissioners on the subject of education, affording some striking instances of the good effect produced upon the very rabble of London by even such imperfect schooling as they now sometimes receive: shall I send it in my next parcel?

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I am now reading very sedulously Voltaire's Correspondence: I never read it before. It throws much light upon the spiritual character of that time, and especially of its literary men. How strangely Voltaire's own character has been mistaken; and how little does he seem to have been conscious of what he was about, to have had even any settled purpose in it. He certainly had no intention of being the Patriarch of any sect of Destructionists, and if the priests would have let him alone he would have let them alone. In the greater part of his lifetime he seems to have been timid excessively, and would have abstained from almost anything in order to remain quiet at Paris. But after he had found the quiet he sought at a distance it was the revival of persecution—as evinced by the suppression of the Encyclopedia, the condemnation of Helvetius' book, the speech of Le Franc de Pompignan at the Academy denouncing Voltaire himself personally, the success of Palissot's comedy of "Les Philosophes," the abuse of the philosophers by various persons, &c., &c.—it was these things which erected Voltaire after the age of sixty-five into the leader of a crusade against Christianity; and it was then, too, that he seems to have found out that wit and ridicule were capable of being powerful weapons in his hands. He always seems to have despised the French, and thought them incapable of philosophy or even of science; and he continually lamented that they insisted upon taking to speculation which they were unfit for, and neglected the *beaux-arts*. I have no more now.—*Mit Glück und Heil,*

J. S. Mill.

To Thomas Carlyle.

Mickleham, near Dorking, Surrey,
5th October 1833.
(Don't direct hither, though.)

My dear Carlyle,—Two of your letters, both well deserving a better answer than this will be, have been waiting a long time for it; such as it is you shall have

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it now. You ask me to write with abandonment—it is pleasant in many ways to be asked *that*, and by you—doubt not but that I shall do so, more and more. I have not, and have never had, any voluntary or rather intentional reserve with any one whom I value, certainly not with you; but that is not enough—I am sensible in myself of a want of spontaneousness, a self-consciousness even in the act of *confiding*, which is perhaps natural enough in a *born* metaphysician, as I am in the very worst sense, but which I dislike extremely both in myself and wherever else I see it, and which I believe I am getting rid of. There will, I think, be perfect spontaneous confidence, the abandonment you speak of, in the fullest sense, between us two, sometime; I think as soon as we are completely intimate; I was going to say, completely *know* each other, but that is an impossibility, as you well know. In the meantime, it is very grateful to me to find that everything which brings me nearer to you brings you also nearer to me, and that every approach to a closer intimacy is responded to as soon as made. Our friendship is a strong, healthy, young plant, which being in a good soil may be left to itself to grow. So no more of that at present.

Now, I will say that I am going to Paris probably at the end of this week. If I could have another letter from you before I go, well; if not, write when you are moved thereto, and a friend at the India House will forward your letter to Paris, for I do not wish to be five weeks without it. What you wish to be ascertained for you at Paris shall be so; I shall be able to obtain the fullest and exactest information. Touching French dictionaries I am fully as ignorant as yourself; I learnt the language in the country itself, and acquired the colloquial part of it in greater perfection than most English do, so had never an occasion for the sort of dictionary you want: I believe there is none good, none but such as you probably have; but I will inquire about that, too. Before I go I will send a parcel to Fraser's for you containing Bulwer, Coningsby, and more French memoirs, if I can find any more worth sending. I am afraid you have

already had the best of them. With them shall go the October number of the *Monthly Repository*, containing *two* articles of mine—one, a review of a foolish book by a man named Blakey, of Morpeth, called a "History of Moral Science," [1] for writing which he is utterly unfit, being a man who, as you would say, has no eyes, only a pair of glasses, and I will add, almost opaque ones. The other article is the little paper I told you I was writing in further prosecution of, or rather improvement on, the thoughts I published before on Poetry and Art. You will not find much in the first to please you; perhaps rather more in the second, but I fear you will think both of them too much infected by mechanical theories of the mind: yet you will probably in this, as in many other cases, be glad to see that out of my mechanical premises I elicit *dynamical* conclusions; and I have a paragraph at the end of the article on Blakey's book by way of *manifesto* to tell people that I don't care one straw about premises except for the sake of conclusions. I have been very busy and active in writing lately, even on politics; did you detect me in those long-winded answers (in the *Examiner*) to the Ministerial pamphlet? but tell it not to the profane. Your approval of the Alison paper was very gratifying; *I* also am conscious that I write with a greater appearance of *sureness* and strong belief than I did for a year or two before, in that period of *recovery* after the petrifaction of a narrow philosophy, in which one feels *quite sure* of scarcely anything respecting Truth, except that she is many-sided. Did you ever read Schleiermacher's paper on Socrates? I have been reading it in a number of Connop Thirlwall's *Philological Museum*, a Cambridge classical periodical of merit. Schleiermacher's theory of Socrates is that besides "knowing that he knows nothing," he however knew also what knowledge *was*, and how it was to be come at: that was exactly my case and was the faith I also professed and taught for some years, unconscious all the while that I had nothing else to teach: I have now got at something more, all of which, as it becomes clearer to myself,

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[1] ["History of Moral Science." By Robert Blakey, 1833.]

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will be shown to you either in what I publish, or in letters or personal communication. You suggest to me what I have many times thought of, the advisableness of my writing something more elaborate than I have yet written on the French Revolution: it is highly probable I shall do it sometime if you do not, but besides the difficulty of doing it tolerably, there is the far greater difficulty in doing it so as to be read in England, until the time comes when one can speak of Christianity as it may be spoken of in France—as by far the greatest and best thing which has existed on this globe, but which is gone, never to return, only what was best in it to reappear in another and still higher form, sometime (heaven knows when). One could not, *now*, say this openly in England, and be read—at least by the many; yet it is perhaps worth trying. Without *saying out* one's whole belief on that point, it is impossible to write about the French Revolution in any way professing to tell the whole truth. *A propos* I have been reading the New Testament; properly I can never be said to have *read* it before. I am the fitter to read it now; perhaps there is nobody within the four seas so utterly unprejudiced on the subject. I have never believed Christianity as a religion, consequently have no habitual associations of reverence, nor on the other hand any of *contempt*, like so many who have become sceptics after having been taught to believe; nor have I, like so many, been bored or disgusted with it in my youth. As far as I know your impressions about Christ, *mine* from this reading are exactly the same. How strikingly just, for instance, is your contrast in your last letter between the Christ of the Gospels and the namby-pamby Christ of the poor modern Christians. Many things have struck me in reading this book. One is that nearly all the good of the four Gospels is in Matthew alone; and we could almost spare the other three. Mark and Luke, however, do no harm; but John has, I think, been the cause of almost all bad theology: the Christ of that Gospel also strikes me as quite unlike the Christ of the other three; a sort of Edward Irving, one might say. How clearly one can trace in all

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of them the *gradual* rise of his conviction that he was the Messiah; and how much loftier and more self-devoted a tone his whole language and conduct assumed as soon as he felt convinced of that. Reading his history has done me along with much other good this in particular, that it has *completed* my hatred of the Gig. I can hardly feel easy now under the thought that I have one foot in it still. I shall probably dismount altogether from it in time.

It was more than I hoped for that your brother should form any favourable judgment of me from the very little he can have seen, and that not of the best kind. I am persuaded that I owe his good opinion chiefly to your testimony. He appeared to me very like you, though I cannot doubt but that there are differences enough; it was the likeness, too, of a scholar to his master.

Of your friends or acquaintance here I have little to relate; most of them are away from London, and have not written to me. Only Rowland Detrosier is doing exceedingly well as a lecturer on physics—picking up also some money by writing—and he will do something and be of use: a man of clearer or quicker understanding I never saw; only he has had no help, and no materials for his understanding to work on; the most abstract truths when they are presented to him he seizes almost at a glance, and possesses himself of their spirit, not their letter merely. He will thrive best under *my* teaching just now; he is not yet ripe for yours. He is eager, ardent, and indefatigably laborious; and to the extent of his faculties, most *serious* in his purpose of knowing and teaching the truth.

If I had known you as well when you were in London as I do now, how many more persons should I have brought to see you! I now know that *any* human being is interesting to you. Since you were so much pleased with Emerson, I feel encouraged to try you with almost any person whatever who has any sort of good in him; I should have thought *he* was about the last person who would have interested you so much as he seems to have done. But you, yourself, are doubtless in many things changed, and as you have several times intimated chang-

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ing, I greatly desire to know in what, and how much; should be still more gratified if I could in any way aid you, paying back thereby some small part of the good, of that and so many other kinds, which I have received from you. I have done little for *you* yet; perhaps am incapable of doing much; but it was part of my former character, the character I am throwing off, that I seldom wished or ventured to argue with my teachers; I do not mean mere logic-fence, but that I was content to receive without giving, and rather avoided occasions for expressing difference of opinion. In that, however, as in much else, "I will mend," as you said of something far less important.

The Austins are at Boulogne; but I have not heard from them. "Falk," I am sorry to hear, sells but indifferently. I find both from inquiry and observation that the puffing system has worn itself out, even more rapidly than seemed likely, and a united chorus of praise from all the press will scarcely now sell fifty copies of any work. Effingham Wilson the bookseller is so sensible of this, that he has resolved to cease advertising the praises of periodicals, and to sell his wares by *samples*, advertising passages of the works themselves. Thus does all lying contain the seeds of its own destruction; when all human speech has ceased to be believed, it seems as if men must recommence speaking the truth: yet who knows? for how many centuries has the whole East persevered in lying, although the fact that "all men are liars" *there* forms part of all men's knowledge of the world? Bulwer's book is considerably better than I expected; the "tenuity" does not amount to more than semi-transparency. There was one thing in what you said of Madame Roland which I did not quite like—it was, that she was almost rather a man than a woman: I believe that I quite agree in all that you really meant, but *is* there really any distinction between the highest masculine and the highest feminine character? I do not mean the mechanical *acquirements;* those, of course, will very commonly be different. But the women, of all I have known, who possessed the highest measure of what are considered feminine qualities, have combined with them

more of the highest *masculine* qualities than I have ever seen in any but one or two men, and those one or two men were also in many respects almost women. I suspect it is the second-rate people of the two sexes that are unlike. The first-rate are alike in both—except—no, I do not think I can except anything—but then, in this respect, my position has been and is, what you say every human being's is in many respects, "a peculiar one." 1833 — Aetat. 27.

I shall write from Paris—probably more than once.—Yours faithfully, J. S. MILL.

To Thomas Carlyle.

INDIA HOUSE, *25th November* 1833.

MY DEAR CARLYLE,—As might have been anticipated, I found no time while at Paris to write to you, and though I have now been in London a week, I have not been able till now to collect my thoughts for the sort of letter which my conscience tells me I ought to write. Let me dispose of business matters first. I have made the various inquiries you wanted made. First, about the mode of living at Paris. M. Comte, whom you may have heard of as a writer, and who is now *Secrétaire Perpétuel* to the new Academy of Moral and Political Sciences, a man who has tried both countries, and who lived in a very simple style in both, who has lived in both as a man even in narrow circumstances, married and having two or three children, *he* is my first witness, and he says that Paris and London are very much on a par; that you may live luxuriously in Paris for less money than in London, but that for any style of living *not* luxuriously, the expense is nearly the same in both cities, with perhaps a slight advantage in favour of Paris. Tanneguy Duchâtel, who is an economist and statistician, and, I should think, accurate in his facts, says that *un député* may, if he choose, live at Paris during a six months' session of the Chamber for 300 francs (£12) a month if alone, for at most 500 francs (£20) if he have a wife and no children. The chief article of necessary consumption

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which is dearer at Paris than *en province* or in England, seems to be dress; *that*, if you stay only six months or so, you can carry out a supply of for the whole time, I suppose. You can have, in the best quarters of Paris, lodgings which I think would perfectly suit you for 200 francs a month. This would include accommodation for a maid-servant. Your food would be decidedly cheaper than in London. As to other matters, there is the most ample and ready access to many excellent libraries; some difficulty, but not I believe impossibility, in having permission to take books home with you. All persons of all sorts are accessible with the greatest ease to any one who had such introductions as you would have. A little way out of Paris the expenses are decidedly less, viz., house-rent less, food of all sorts cheaper by the cost of conveyance and the very high *octroi*. In executing your smaller commissions at Paris, I have had great assistance from Adolphe d'Eichthal, who is much pleased at the prospect of your going there. The books which I ordered were not ready when I left Paris, and I do not even know what the booksellers whom Adolphe employed had and had not been able to get. I fear there is no *Dictionnaire Néologique* but that appended to the *Dictionnaire de l'Académie*. Adolphe has sent your questions to several people whom he thought likely to be able to give you information, of whom one only has yet given him any answers; a certain Baron Darnay, who was then (viz., during the *procès*) a *conseiller au parlement*. His responses, which do not give much information, I enclose. *A propos*, I find that the parcel I destined for you did not go last month, the cause being that Fraser promised to send for it, and faithlessly neglected to do so. I have ordered no very great number of books, and of those I doubt whether many would interest you much; the works of Ballanche, a sort of palingenetic philosopher now in some repute; Béranger's poems; no memoirs except those of the Abbé Morellet, which I had read before, and know to contain several revolutionary scenes which would interest you. But it seems to me that the writing, buying, and reading of books has come to an end in France as well as here; in

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France it may perhaps revive sooner than here, having been extremely rife only five years ago, and perhaps only temporarily interrupted by the *débordement de la politique et des petits écrits*. Here it has perished by gradual decay, and the causes of its melancholy fate are, I fear, permanent.

But how to attempt to tell you anything about France and Paris! I cannot; one or two personal portraits I think I could give you, and that is the sum of all my personal knowledge. I can only say—go and look; look and you will certainly see: there is abundance to be seen, known, and judged of in six months or a year; little or nothing in one month, especially when the object of one's visit is not exclusively to *see*. Except of some few individuals, I have brought back no impressions but very general ones, and of these scarcely one of which I am quite certain except *this*, that there is an infinity of things to see, and that it requires a less piercing eyesight to see them than here, because the natural signs and expressions of feeling and character are in a much less degree repressed by the ponderous dull atmosphere of custom and *respectability* which weighs upon them here. It really does seem to me that people care infinitely less in Paris about keeping in the *gig;* or, what comes to the same thing, when we are speaking of a *people* the gig is lower, far nearer to the ground, does not so easily break down with you, and it is easy stepping *in* as well as *out*. It does appear to me that it needs little or no courage at Paris to make the openest profession of any kind of opinions or feelings whatever. It is the very place which a speculative man should desire for promulgating his opinions, for you startle nobody, you are sure of an audience, sure of being supported, and, what is perhaps still better, sure of being attacked. How different here. *Littérateurs* and artists there are, I fancy, next to none; those who pass for such I had not time to go amongst, but you easily might; I could, had I stayed longer. I suspect we have been too much impressed, you and I and others, by the Literature of Despair. I was in hopes that *despair* was the necessary consequence of having

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no Belief, in a nation at least, though not always in an individual; but I fear that it is only in the nobler spirits, or at least the young persons of strong feelings and artistic capabilities. In France I see every reason to believe that the mass of the well-to-do classes can make themselves comfortable without either God or Devil either literal or constructive, and are well satisfied to eat their pudding in quiet—those, I mean, who have enough pudding to eat, which is an infinitely larger proportion than in this country. Most of the educated people have enough to make them comfortable, and there is very little of the artificial demand for mere *money* which the striving and straining for respectability occasions here; respectability there does not depend upon money. All agree that any man who can dress decently may dine with or go to the soirées of anybody, and mix on terms of perfect equality with all whom he meets. Then the peasantry commonly have their bit of land, and consider themselves also as lords of the soil. Except, therefore, the ambitious spirits and the working population of Paris and the great towns, people seem to be tolerably content with their lot. The Government has for the last year or two made great efforts to fix the attention of the people on *les intérêts matériels*, on schemes of commercial improvement, railroads and the like; and they are half-mad, many of them, about railroads, in mere unreasoning imitation of England and England's "prosperity." The *trades* of Paris, like the manufacturers and buyers, have formed unions, and are all striking for wages, *i.e.*, the skilled labourers, those who are highly paid already; and impartial people, such as Adolphe d'Eichthal, say that their object is not so much more money as to elevate their rank in society, since at present the gentlemen will not keep company with them, and they will not keep company with the common labourers. The revolutionary part of the republicans have opened a connection with these Trade Societies, and attempt to turn them to purposes of revolution, with what success I know not; they themselves say "the greatest," the other republicans say "not so great," the non-republicans

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say "none at all," from all which I infer that nothing can be known about it. If I had stayed I should have managed to attend some of the meetings of these workmen, though it seems they are jealous of the presence of gentlemen, even gentlemen-republicans. On the whole, politics are for the present very much out of vogue; nor do I know what is *in* vogue, except railroads. Not the theatres, for people are ceasing to go there; not literature, for nothing is written or read except the usual succession of novels which went on even during the Reign of Terror. The newspapers, even, are little read compared with two years ago, and even *la propagande républicaine* has taken refuge in little penny papers which are hawked every Sunday in the streets and on the boulevards. One must be at Paris to know how profoundly irreligious the French are. The higher kind of books and newspapers have got beyond the irreligious state, and are mostly prophesying religion or regretting the impossibility of one, or have at least learnt to recognise a historical value in the religions of the past; but the little *feuilles* which one buys as one goes into a theatre, are the representatives of the Voltairian philosophy at present: the summits of the national intellect have emerged above it, and it has descended to envelop and overshroud the lower regions. Our friends, the St. Simonians, now St. Simonians no longer, have done much good and are still doing some. The *Père*, as you may have seen in the newspapers, having been let out of prison before his sentence was expired, has gone with Fournel and some others of the set to persuade the Pacha of Egypt to let them cut a canal across the Isthmus of Suez—whereby the *deux mondes*, the *orient*, and the *occident* are still to be *réunis* by means of them. What has become of those who went to Constantinople in search of *la femme libre* I do not know. One or two, especially Jules Léchevalier and Abel Franson, have become disciples of Fourier, a sort of Robert Owen, who is to accomplish all things by means of co-operation and of rendering labour agreeable, and under whose system man is to acquire absolute power over the laws of physical nature; among other happy results the sea is to be changed

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into lemonade. Some have become Catholics; but among these are none of the considerable men of the set. The great majority have retained of St. Simonianism about as much as is good and true, dropping the rest. The Bazard portion have mostly become republicans; the Enfantin portion, who were rich, strong partisans of *les moyens pacifiques*, have become *juste milieu* men in politics, endeavouring to work out improvement with the existing machinery. The Government, acting I suppose on the judicious maxim that a Utopian *désenchanté* is very manageable, has restored to most of them who were engineers, miners, or the like, their rank in the service. Michel Chevalier was scarcely out of prison when they selected him to be sent to the United States to study their canals and railways. Flachat is now one of the editors of the *Constitutionnel*, where he writes good articles on Free Trade and such like matters: he seems a sensible man, without much enthusiasm left in him; he stuck to them to the last, and had by his own account a *fièvre cérébrale* from the suffering and anxiety it caused him, after which he was very near becoming a Christian: now he seems to be left with a vague presentiment that there will be a religion sometime or other. Leroux and Reynaud, whom you remember as the protesters against Enfantin (both of whom I saw), go on prophesying a religion in the *Revue Encyclopédique;* their notions are somewhat singular, Reynaud's especially, who thinks that the future religion will not be revealed, nor brought to light at once, but will be evolved gradually by *le progrès de la raison publique*, like a science. They have all sorts of vagaries too about the Orient, and are grubbing into Sanscrit and Chinese literature in hopes of finding something which may help towards raising up this religion which is to be built up, brick after brick. I recollect in a number of the *Revue Encyclopédique* one of them says in express terms that since we know hardly anything of the East except the Bible, and since that is so good, doubtless if we knew more we should find something still better. Among the individuals of another kind whom I saw and formed an acquaintance with, two made a particular

impression upon me ; two perfectly self-subsistent men in the best sense, or I am greatly mistaken in them ; and, in that, honourably distinguished from Frenchmen in general. Both these are republican leaders ; leaders, however, of two very different sorts of republicans ; or rather, not leaders, but men who follow no other person's lead, and whom every one is glad to follow. These are, Carrel, the editor of the *National*, and Cavaignac, whose speech when on trial for a conspiracy two years ago I translated and inserted in the *Examiner*, where you may have seen it. I knew Carrel as the most powerful journalist in France, sole manager of a paper which, while it keeps aloof from all *coterie* influence, and from the actively revolutionary part of the republican body, has for some time been avowedly republican, and I knew that he was considered a vigorous, energetic *man of action*, who would always have courage and conduct in an emergency. Knowing thus much of him, I was ushered into the *National* office, where I found six or seven of the innumerable *rédacteurs* who belong to a French paper, all dark-haired men with formidable moustaches (which many of the republicans have taken to wearing), and looking fiercely republican. Carrel was not there, and after waiting some time I was introduced to a slight, elegant young man, with extremely polished manners, no moustaches at all, and apparently fitter for a drawing-room than a camp ; this was the commander-in-chief of those formidable-looking champions [*i.e.* Carrel]. But it was impossible to be five minutes in his company without perceiving that he was accustomed to *ascendancy*, and so accustomed as not to feel it : instead of that eagerness and impetuosity which one finds in most Frenchmen, his manner is extremely deliberate : without any affectation he speaks in a sort of measured cadence, and in a manner of which your words "quiet emphasis" are more characteristic than of any man I know. There is the same quiet emphasis in his writings ; a man singularly free, if we may trust appearances, from self-consciousness ; simple, graceful, almost *infantinely* playful, as they all say, when he is among his intimates, and indeed I could see that

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myself, and combining perfect self-reliance with the most unaffected modesty; in opinions, and political position, the Fonblanque of France; like Fonblanque, too, standing quite alone ("Je n'aime pas," said he to me one day, "à marcher en troupeau"), occupying a midway position, facing one way towards the supporters of monarchy and an aristocratic limitation of the suffrage, with whom he will have no compromise, on the other towards the extreme republicans, who have anti-property doctrines, and instead of his United States republic, want a republic *de la façon de la Convention*, with something like a dictatorship in their own hands. He calls himself a Conservative Republican (*l'opinion républicaine conservatrice*); not but that he sees plainly that the present constitution of property admits of many improvements, but he thinks they can only take place gradually, or at least that philosophy has not yet matured them, and he would rather hold back than accelerate the revolution which he thinks inevitable, in order to leave time for ripening those great questions, chiefly affecting the constitution of property and the condition of the working classes, which would press for a solution if a revolution were to take place. As for himself, he says that he is not *un homme spécial*, that his *métier de journaliste* engrosses him too much to enable him to study, and that he is profoundly ignorant of much upon which he would have to decide if he were in power, and could do nothing but bring together a body generally representative of the people, and assist in carrying into execution the dictates of their united wisdom. This is modest enough in the man who would certainly be President of the Republic if there were a republic within five years, and the extreme party did not get the upper hand. He seems to know well what he does know: I have met with no such views of the French Revolution in any book as those I have heard from him.

A very different man from Carrel is Cavaignac; he is President of the *Société des droits de l'homme*, who are the active stirring revolutionary party, who look up to Robespierre, and aim at *l'égalité absolue*. He is for taking the

first opportunity for overthrowing the Government by force, and thinks the opportunity must come in six months, or a year at farthest; a man whose name is energy, who cannot ask you the commonest question but in so decided a manner that he makes you start; a man who impresses you with a sense of irresistible power and indomitable will. You might fancy him an incarnation of Satan if he were your enemy and the enemy of your party, and if you had not associated with him, and seen how full of sweetness and amiableness and gentleness he is. Intense in everything, he is the intensest of atheists, and says, "Je n'aime pas ceux qui croient en Dieu," because "it is generally a reason for doing nothing for man"; but his notion of duty is that of a Stoic—he conceives it as something quite infinite, and having nothing whatever to do with happiness, something immeasurably above it. A kind of half-Manichean in his views of the universe, according to him man's life consists of one perennial and intense struggle against the principle of evil, which but for that struggle would wholly overwhelm him: generation after generation carries on this battle, with little success as yet: he believes in perfectibility and progressiveness, but thinks that hitherto progress has consisted only in removing some of the impediments to good, not in realising the good itself; that nevertheless the only satisfaction which man can realise for himself is in battling with this evil principle and overpowering it; that after evils have accumulated for centuries, there sometimes comes one great clearing off on one day of reckoning called a revolution; that it is only on such rare occasions, very rarely indeed on any others, that good men get into power, and then they ought to seize the opportunity for doing all they can; that any government which is boldly attacked by ever so small a minority may be overthrown, and that is his hope with regard to the present government. His notion of *égalité absolue* is rather speculative than practical: he says he does not know whether it should be by an equal division of the *means* of production (land and capital) or by an equal division of the produce. When I stated

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to him the difficulties of both, he felt and acknowledged them; all he had to propose were but a variety of measures *tending towards* an equalisation of property, and he seems to have a strange reliance on events, thinking that, when the end is clearly conceived, the circumstances of the case would, when power is in the right hands, suggest the most appropriate means. Cavaignac is the son of a Conventionalist and regicide. He is a much more accomplished man than most of the political men I saw there; has a wider range of ideas, converses on art and most subjects of general interest, always throwing all he has to say into a few brief, energetic sentences, as if it was contrary to his nature to expend one superfluous word. Just as I was coming away he gave me the first two numbers of a periodical work which a set of republicans have just set up. All of it seems to be rubbish, except the introductory discourse, which is by Cavaignac, and which is an exposition of his philosophy, his idea of the significance of man's life: it contains all that I have just written to you, and much of the same sort; but my impressions were not derived from it, but from his conversation, and the essay appeared to me a complete *résumé* of the man. Such as it is, it made no sensation whatever; it flew over the heads of Carrel and the rest; they all voted it vague, abstract, metaphysical, and the like. You will be struck with it; I send it in Fraser's parcel. I am to correspond with Cavaignac and Carrel and various others, and shall know much more of them, I hope. With Carrel I am to establish an exchange of articles; Carrel is to send some to the *Examiner*, and I am to send some to the *National*, with liberty to publish them here. I could tell you much more of these men, and other men, but this is enough for one letter. Let me hear your remarks and questions, and they will remind me of a hundred things which I have omitted. I have other things to write, too, *not* about Paris, but they must wait. On the whole, I think you will go to Paris next summer, and *I* probably shall pay my visit to you there instead of Craigenputtock. You will find several persons there eager to be friendly; among others, Cousin:

his name reminds me of a hundred things to tell you in my next. Let me hear from you soon. My best remembrances to Mrs. Carlyle.—*Vale mei memor.* 1833 — Aetat. 27.

J. S. MILL.

To Thomas Carlyle.

KENSINGTON, *22nd December* 1833.

MY DEAR CARLYLE,—Your letter had been hoped for and expected, and in one sense waited for, a considerable time, for I had various matters of interest to write to you about, but as I hoped for a letter so soon I delayed writing till I could make my letter answer yours.

One of those matters is the affair of the *Examiner*, of which you have heard somewhat from Hayward. It *is* in difficulties, and those of so serious a kind that if something had not been done or attempted immediately to save it, there was danger of its stopping altogether. The cause is melancholy enough, being less the circumstances of the paper, though it is not prosperous, than those of Fonblanque himself, who, like his father before him, has wanted firmness to restrain his expenses within his means. Since he enlarged the paper in January 1831 it has yielded him little; it allows him nominally £500 a year; reckoning that in addition to its other expenses it has during these three years lost on the average £6 a week, which coming out of his £500 reduced it to below £200. He, meantime, has been living at a rate most needlessly expensive, and is at last so completely drained, and his credit I should think so completely exhausted, that he can go on no longer. Strange that a man who writes so feelingly and powerfully on this same weakness should so act; but not at all strange, only melancholy, that one who so acts, possessing intellect, should so write. If his difficulties do not ruin the paper it is in no danger. For means of retrenchment present themselves to the extent of £8 or £9 a week, by discharging Chadwick, whose work Fonblanque takes upon himself in addition to his own, and by cheaper arrangements for

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printing and paper, which, however, depend upon first paying off an arrear to his printer and stationer. £1000 would do all this and start him fair with £500 a year and an improving property; for advertisements, the great source of profit to a paper, have, as you must have observed with pleasure, multiplied exceedingly in the *Examiner* since the reduction of the duty. The £1000 it were to be wished that some one person of the right disposition should have advanced, become thereby proprietor in place of Fonblanque, whose personal circumstances would then have ceased to compromise the paper, and who would, of course, have been retained as editor. This I would myself have preferred to do, were not my position with regard to the India House, which hampers my freedom of action in a thousand ways, but which shall not hamper it always, in this case an insuperable obstacle. What has been attempted is to raise the money in subscriptions of £10 each from a hundred different persons, each of whom is to receive the paper gratis for ten years. Sixty promises have been obtained, the remaining forty are still to seek: as many as twenty more are, I think, as good as certain—but less than the whole hundred will not do, for the debts on the paper amount to £780, and money to the extent of the remainder will then be wanted to start it fair, or perhaps (for I know not) to keep poor Fonblanque out of the King's Bench. I am doing all I can to interest people in the matter, and should have written to you among the first, had I not known that you could do little if anything in the way either of subscribing or procuring subscriptions. I think we shall succeed, but it will require a vigorous effort. The sale of the *Examiner* does not much exceed 3000 copies. This is, as you say, a scandalous symptom, yet there are many causes that contribute to it besides the scandalous ones that first suggest themselves. Of course it can only expect buyers (*readers* are quite another matter) from Radicals; and of them the more vulgar sort find as much Radicalism in the papers, of a more direct and popular kind, with greater *breadth*, as the painters say: for Fonblanque's genius, fine as it is, goes all into the details, not into the general

mode of treating a subject; he does not go straight to the main point, dwell upon that and make that tell, dropping all little side views, like the *Times*, which with material of no intrinsic value whatever writes powerfully for popular effect, as Fonblanque might do with his powers, though scarcely with his turn of mind. Then Fonblanque's allusions, expressions, style, all the *garb* of his thoughts, is intelligible, or at least impressive, only to persons of literary, one might say almost *classical*, education, and most of them are not Radicals—not to mention that such as do not take a daily paper, require in a weekly one a better abstract of news. That I hope will now, in some degree, be mended. Then the more moderate Radicals are revolted by the tone of hatred in which the paper is written. This feeling extends to many who would have no objection to, but would applaud, the utterance of the bitterest truths, but do not like a perpetual carping at *little* things, honestly indeed, yet often unfairly, and making no personal allowances, sometimes misstating altogether the kind of blame which is deserved, and meting it out in unequal measure to different people, so as to give an appearance of spleen and personal antipathy to individuals—especially to some of the Ministers, and among them, most perhaps to some of those who deserve it rather less than the others. In all this there is much truth; on the other hand, much also is to be said for Fonblanque, but on the whole not enough to acquit him entirely. So he has really no partisans at all, and loses by almost all his excellences and by his faults too. At the very time when he was offending the moderate Radicals by the nature of his attacks on the Ministry, he was losing at the rate of a hundred subscribers every week for some time by resisting the anti-police *furor*. Still, the position of the paper will be a good one if this money can be raised, and raised I hope it will be.

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I have another piece of news to tell you: the principal Radicals in Parliament, and many of those out of it, have a scheme for starting a new quarterly review, and are exerting themselves so much for it that they will probably

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succeed in setting it going.[1] The first promoters of it were Roebuck, Buller, and I; and we shall probably be the surest and most regular contributors, though there will be abundant others. All the educated Radicals to whom the thing has been mentioned enter into it with a degree of warmth unusual with them, and offer both pecuniary and literary assistance. There is but one exception, and that one I regret to say is Grote, who has gradually sunk into a state always too congenial to him, of thinking that no good is to be done, and who therefore will certainly never do any—at most no harm, and scarcely that, for it *is* harm to discourage others. A bookseller is willing to take the risk for two years, provided editorship and writers are found for that period; in order to do so the rich Radicals, Strutt, Warburton, Sir W. Molesworth, the Marshalls of Leeds, and others, are going to raise money of the necessary amount among themselves and their friends in shares of £25 or £50, the same person being allowed to take any number. The plan (Roebuck's and mine, to which all have at once assented) is to drop altogether every kind of lying, the lie of pretending that all the articles are *reviews* when more than half of them are not, and the lie of pretending that all the articles proceed from a *corps* who jointly entertain all the opinions expressed. There is to be no *we*, but each writer is to have a signature, which he may avow or not as he pleases, but which (unless there be special reasons to constitute an exception) is to be the *same* for *all* his articles, thus making him *individually* responsible, and allowing his opinions to derive what light they can from one another, the editor answering only for adequate literary merit, and a general tendency not in contradiction to the objects of the publication. They would, I believe, make *me* editor if I would take it, but I cannot; hampered again! But this time it is of little consequence, for I hope they will have Mr. Fox, who will be quite as fit: if they will not have *him*, there *are* other candidates not *unfit* though not *so* fit. If this scheme goes on, I hope you will write

[1] [It was started as the *London Review* in 1835.]

for the review, or at least *in* it. As an organ of utterance it will be at least more congenial to you than *Fraser's Magazine*. It is true the prejudices of our utilitarians are at least as strong against some of your writings as those of any other persons whatever, though the individual signature would smooth many difficulties. But such an article as that on Johnson they would have delighted in; that on Ebenezer Elliott and various others of yours would have suited them perfectly. In fact, I hardly know one of your *opinions*, as often as you do not feel yourself called upon to make a direct attack upon themselves, which they would have any difficulty in getting on with; and I expect no difficulty in getting a passport for any of *mine*, which, except in mere metaphysics, are quite as unlike theirs as yours are: what revolts them is the combination of opinions new and often strange to them, with a manner to them equally new and still more strange, and which prevents them not only from understanding your meaning but from desiring to understand it. I have never found one of them who, after taking the trouble to read enough of your writings to understand anything of your drift, did not recognise in them much more of what he deemed good than of what he deemed bad; it is true I have found few who would take that trouble, and some of those few would not have done so if they had not had *faith* (derived from my testimony) that it was worth while. I tell you this to let you know how the land lies. There is nothing in what I have said that needs be any obstacle to your writing for this review—it simply shows under what conditions either of subject or else of manner your writings will be acceptable to it. To me your manner, being the natural clothing or rather *skin* of your thoughts, is (whenever I understand *those*) all that it should be; so, however, is Plato's, whom, however, I would not counsel to preach at St. Paul's in good Attic Greek; of course I am exaggerating for the purpose of illustration. Here is a letter neither *menschlich* nor *geistlich* but wholly *dinglich;* you will be, I think, not more than a week

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without another letter, there is so much of the two former kind to be said. I have *not* answered your letter, as you see. As for *your* letters, they are never, I think, more *menschlich* than when they are *geistlich*, nor more *geistlich* than when *menschlich*.—Yours affectionately,

J. S. Mill.

CHAPTER III

1834–1844

To Thomas Carlyle.

Kensington, *12th January* 1834.

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My dear Carlyle,—Your little note dated the 24th was evidently written before you received my letter written I forget when, but which I fear lost the first week's post. I am therefore still expecting an answer to that letter, but shall not wait for it, mindful that I still owe you an answer to your last long letter, and a fuller answer, too, than can be given in any moderate space. I feel that letter a kind of call upon me to a more complete unfolding to you of my opinions and ways of thinking than I have ever yet made; which, however, cannot be all accomplished at once, but must be gradual. In the very fact that there has not been that full explanation, and that I feel *moved* to it now, you may see that there has taken place a great change in my character, and one of which you will wholly approve; a change, not from any kind of insincerity, but *to* a far higher kind of sincerity than belonged to me before. This change has been progressive, and had barely begun to take place when you were in London two years ago. I was then, and had been for one year, in an intermediate state, a state of *reaction* from logical-utilitarian narrowness of the very narrowest kind, out of which after much unhappiness and inward struggling I had emerged, and had taken temporary refuge in its extreme opposite. My first state had been one of intense philosophic intolerance, not arising from the scornfulness of the heart but from the onesidedness of the understanding, seeing nothing myself but the distorted image, thrown back from many most oblique and twisted reflectors, of *one* side only of the truth.

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I felt towards all who saw any other side, not indeed a feeling of disdain, for that never was in my character, but the very utmost excess of intellectual *vilipending*. At that time I was thought to *outrer* the doctrines of utilitarianism even by those who now consider me a lost sheep who has strayed from the flock and been laid hold of by the wolves. That was not wonderful, because even in the narrowest of my then associates, they being older men, their ratiocinative and nicely concatenated dreams were at some point or other, and in some degree or other, corrected and limited by their experience of actual realities, while I, a schoolboy fresh from the logic school, had never conversed with a reality, never seen one, knew not what manner of thing it was, had only spun, first other people's and then my own deductions from assumed premises. Now when I had got out of this state, and saw that my premises were mere generalisations of some of the innumerable aspects of Reality, and that far from being the most important ones; and when I had tried to go *all round* every object which I surveyed, and to place myself at all points of view, so as to have the best chance of seeing all sides, I think it is scarcely surprising that for a time I became catholic and tolerant in an extreme degree, and thought onesidedness almost the one great evil in human affairs, seeing it was the evil which had been the bane of my own teachers, and was also that of those who were warring against my teachers. I never indeed was tolerant of aught but earnest belief; but I saw, or seemed to see, so much of good and of truth in the positive part of the most opposite opinions and practices, could they but be divested of their exclusive pretensions, that I scarcely felt myself called upon to *deny* anything but denial itself. I never made strongly prominent my differences with any sincere, truth-loving person; but held communion with him through our points of agreement, endeavoured in the first place to appropriate to myself whatever was positive in him, and, if he gave me any encouragement, brought before *him* also whatever of positive might be in *me*, which he till then had not. A character most unlike yours, of a quite lower kind,

and which if I had not outgrown, and speedily too, there could have been little worth in me. Do you remember a paper I wrote in an early number of *Tait*, reviewing a book by a Mr. Lewes (a man of considerable worth, of whom I shall have something more to say yet). That paper paints exactly the state of my mind and feelings at that time. It was the truest paper I had ever written, for it was the most completely an outgrowth of my own mind and character; not that what is there taught was the best I even then had to teach, nor perhaps did I even think it so, but it contained what was *uppermost* in me at that time, and differed from most also that I knew in having *emanated from* me, not, with more or less perfect assimilation, merely *worked* itself *into* me. Now, from this my intellectual history, in relating which I have faith that I have not presumed too much upon your interest in me, you will easily see why it is that we two have so rarely canvassed together, or even mentioned to each other, our differences. I never, or rarely, felt myself called upon to come into *collision* with any one, except those to whom I felt myself altogether superior, and with whom, if I had any intellectual communion, it was not for the sake of *learning* but of *teaching*. I have not till lately, and very gradually, found out that this is not honest; that although I have not positively, I have negatively, done much to give to you and to others a false opinion of me, though the deliberation with which you form your opinions, always waiting for sufficient grounds, has, I think, protected *you* from forming an actually false opinion of me, and I have only to accuse myself of not having afforded you sufficient means of forming the true. Whether if you knew me thoroughly I should stand higher, or lower, either in your esteem or in your affection, I know not; in some things you seem to think me *further* from you than I am, in others perhaps I am further from you than you know. On the whole I think if all were told I should stand lower; but there cannot fail, any way, to be much which we shall mutually not only respect but greatly prize in each other; and after all, this, as you and I both know, is altogether of secondary

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importance, the first being, that we, and all persons and all things, should be seen truly, and as they are.

Our differences are indeed of the first importance, and to you must appear of infinite importance, though for reasons which you will feel the force of, they do not, in my feeling, throw me to so great a distance from you as they perhaps will in yours. The first and principal of these differences is that I have only what appears to you much the same thing as, or even worse than, no God at all, namely, a merely probable God. By *probable* I do not mean as you sometimes do, in the sense of the Jesuits, that which has weighty authorities in its favour. I mean that the existence of a Creator is not to me a matter of faith or of intuition; and as a proposition to be proved by evidence, it is but a hypothesis, the proofs of which, as you I know agree with me, do not amount to absolute certainty. As this is my condition in spite of the strongest wish to believe, I fear it is hopeless; the unspeakable good it would be to me to have a *faith* like yours, I mean as firm as yours, on that, to you, fundamental point, I am as strongly conscious of when life is a happiness to me, as when it is, what it has been for long periods now past by, a burthen. But I know that neither you nor any one else can be of any use to me in this, and I content myself with doing no ill by never propagating my uncertainties. The reason why I think I shall never alter in this matter is, that none of the ordinary *difficulties*, as they are called, as the origin of evil, and such like, are any serious obstacles to me; it is not that the logical understanding invading the province of another faculty will not let that other higher faculty do its office—there is wanting something positive in me which exists in others; whether that something be, as sceptics say, an acquired association, or as you say, a natural faculty: so you see I am nearly as proper an object of your pity as Cavaignac; nevertheless I do not feel myself so, having, as I have, other supports, which the want of that one cannot take away. With respect to the immortality of the soul I see no reason to believe that it perishes, nor sufficient ground for complete assurance that

it survives; but if it does there is every reason to think that it continues in another state such as it has made itself here, and no further affected by the change than it would be by any equally great event during its sojourn on earth, were such possible; consequently in all we do here we are working in our hereafter as well as our "now." Now, were you aware that I was in such a state of uncertainty on these main points? I am almost sure that you were not much mistaken in the matter, but yet were not quite certain that you knew. 1834 — Aetat. 27.

Another of our differences is, that I am still, and am likely to remain, a utilitarian, though not one of "the people called utilitarians"; indeed, having scarcely one of my secondary premises in common with them; nor a utilitarian at all, unless in quite another sense from what perhaps any one except myself understands by the word. It would take a whole letter to make it quite clear to you what I mean, and I feel perfectly that I have stated the difference between us in a manner and in terms which give no just idea of what it really is, and that every explanation I shall hereafter make will show that difference to be less than the words I have used seem to import. One of the explanations I have to give, I partly indicate by saying, as I do most fully, that I entirely recognise with you the "infinite nature of Deity." Yet, by this too, if unexplained, I should convey an idea of as much *greater* an agreement with you than the truth warrants, as I do in the *other case* of a *less* agreement. This also must wait till another time for a fuller development. You will see, partly, with what an immense number and variety of explanations my utilitarianism must be taken, and that those explanations affect its essence, not merely its accidental forms, when I tell you that on the very point on which you express your belief so kindly and with so much *ménagement*, and appeal to my future self, and promise not to be angry if I differ from you "even with vehemence," I agree and have long agreed with you, even in the most decided and vehement manner. I have never, at least since I had any convictions of my own, belonged to the benevolentiary, soup-kitchen

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school. Though I hold the good of the species (or rather of its separate units) to be the ultimate end (which is the alpha and omega of my utilitarianism) I believe with the fullest belief that this end can in no other way be forwarded but by the means you speak of, namely, by each taking for his exclusive aim the development of what is best in *himself*. I qualify or explain this doctrine no otherwise than as you yourself do, since you hold that every human creature has an appointed task to perform, which task he is to know and find out for himself; this can only be by discovering in what manner such faculties as he possesses or can acquire may produce most good in the world; meaning by the world a larger or a smaller part of it, as may happen. Thus *you* think it a part of your *duty*, of your *work*, to address yourself, through the press, to the "species" at large. Further than that I do not go, perhaps even less far, and when once I have written down my belief and sent it forth in such manner as happens or seems to be the most effectual within my reach, I harass myself as little as you do with any thought about the consequences, being like yourself perfectly satisfied that what I have done, if done in the spirit of my own creed, will "prove in reality all and the utmost that I was capable of doing" for mankind.

And now do not "take it ill" if I say how much it surprised me that you should think it necessary to say you would not "take it ill" if I differed from you. I never for an instant suspected that you would take ill any difference of opinion while you continue fully assured that the dissentient is sincere, earnest, and truth-loving; and you never allow me to be under a moment's fear that you are unassured of that in my case. Grieved you might be at what you might deem my errors, but *that* feeling you could not mean to disavow, nor would it be any pleasure to me, but the contrary, if you could. In your recent letters you have several times expressed *surprise* at opinions and feelings of mine which you did not expect, and which you have said proved to you how little you yet know me; and which in truth *did* show how small a part of my character I had yet

shown to you, so much smaller a part than I was aware of: truly I begin to think that instead of being, as you thought I was, the most self-conscious person living, I am much less self-conscious *now* (whatever I was once) than almost anybody. But what most shows how little I had afforded you an insight into me, is that the fact of *my* having recently read the New Testament, and what I wrote to you of the impressions it had made upon me, should have formed, as it seems to have done, an era in your opinion and feeling concerning me. In my own history it is no era; it has made no new impression, only strengthened the best of the old; I have for years had the very same idea of Christ, and the same unbounded reverence for him as now; it was because of this reverence that I sought a more perfect acquaintance with the records of his life, that indeed gave new life to the reverence, which in any case was becoming or was closely allied with all that was becoming a living principle in my character. 1834 — Aetat. 27.

Here is a very long letter, yet how little it says of all that is to be said! However, you see that you are likely to know much more of me hereafter than you have known hitherto. Make my kind remembrances to Mrs. Carlyle, and believe me faithfully yours, J. S. MILL.

To Thomas Carlyle

KENSINGTON, *2nd March* 1834.

MY DEAR CARLYLE,—This is going to be a strange miscellaneous kind of a letter. I have a long arrear of little things to bring up, and, for the present, few great ones to say, and am in a mood in which it is impossible for me to say them if I had, for nothing but the most dogged determination not to lose another post could induce me to overcome the extreme aversion which I feel to writing a letter this morning. I must take your two letters as an index of the subjects to be written about. First, to answer your questions as to the projected periodical: on a rough classification of periodicals into Tory, Whig, and Radical, there are, as you truly say,

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various Radical reviews and magazines already; even Radical-utilitarian ones; but the Radical-utilitarians who promote this new project, do not recognise in any of the existing works what they want; they wish to throw the combined strength of the most thoughtful and fertile-minded of the Radicals into one publication, of a more weighty and elaborate character than any magazine can be; allowing itself to treat subjects at greater length than the *Repository* or *Tait;* excluding all things which compromise the Radical cause by *platitude*, or mediocrity, or ignorance, or subservience to any popular delusion; and on the whole representing as favourably as the materials admit, the Radical intellect, which certainly has not, and never has been, fairly represented. *Tait* and the *Westminster* give an altogether exaggerated notion of its poverty and bareness. The "philosophic Radicals" are *narrow* enough, it is true, though few of them are so narrow as Colonel Thompson, the presiding spirit of the *Westminster Review*. But many of them are far from being *empty;* and they are generally much offended by the emptiness of the Radical publications, and have no doubt that this review, if it be started, will be one with which it will be pleasant to be associated; one will have not only more freedom, but far better companionship than in any publication which has yet existed. I have no doubt of its being established, except that which arises from my abundant experience of the incapacity of the Radicals to co-operate. Those of them who have money and station, are mostly impracticably fastidious; men of small objections; men to whom small difficulties appear great ones. They mostly surprised me by taking up this scheme with warmth. Your papers on Knox, and on Authors, would both, I think, be extremely suitable to such a work; suitable both in respect to the subjects, and to the light in which you are likely to place them. You have time before you, however, for as it will not be possible to start the work until the dead time of the year, we think it better to wait for the beginning of the next. Before the time, therefore, when it will be necessary to set about one

or other of your articles, you will have heard more—I hope, seen; for if you come to London you can judge for yourself. 1834 — Aetat. 27.

I greatly commend your project of establishing yourself here; which I have long thought, as far as all circumstances are concerned of which I could judge, would be the best thing you could do. I have thought this much more than ever lately, in proportion as I have seen that you are capable of deriving much pleasure and support from communion with persons who are even a *little* superior to the herd in any of the elements of spiritual worth. I can now promise you, what I had not ventured to promise a year ago, that you will find many more persons than you expect who will be more or less in sympathy with you, and interesting to you. Anyway, you will find many more here than anywhere else. Meantime you may reckon upon my doing all I can to smooth the way to your coming, and when you are come, to your finding all you do or may seek.

What of work I have been doing lately has been chiefly for the day, until something of a more durable kind ripen itself within me. You will have recognised in the *Examiner* the resumption of my papers on French politics. Besides these I have written in the last *Repository*, and mean to continue during the session, "notes on the newspapers," so as to present for once at least a picture of our "statesmen" and of their doings, taken from the point of view of a Radical to whom yet Radicalism in itself is but a small thing. This was worth doing, I think, and I have not been capable of doing much else lately. The *Repository* is also publishing some notes of mine upon Plato, mostly written long ago, which I thought might be of some interest and perhaps use; chiefly because they do not speculate and *talk about* Plato, but show to the reader Plato himself. Copies of these I will speedily send to you through Simpkin & Marshall. I am not at all "amazed" at your reading Homer, and should like very much to hear all you will have to say about him.

I have scarcely heard at all from any of my acquaint-

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ances (*correspondents* I cannot call them) at Paris; except a note from Cousin asking me to do some things for him, and the least, or shortest word of salutation from Cavaignac. His preface to "Paris Révolutionnaire" impressed me much as it did you. It was to me, also, a *résumé* and piecing together of many scattered and fragmentitious notions gathered from his conversation. I have no doubt of the perfect sincerity of the paper; that is, of its containing the genuine views of life and human nature, which have possessed themselves of his convictions, and by which he steers his own course. He is accused, however, of being much influenced by vanity, and the love of popularity; I should have thought, without ground; had not the most keen-sighted and penetrating discerner of character I ever knew, drawn from opportunities of observation at least equal to mine that very inference. I am not much surprised at not hearing from Carrel, as he is in such a state of persecution and harassing from the French Government. This you will have learnt from the *Examiner*.

I would say something in acknowledgment of your so kind answer to my letter of "revelations," but I really *cannot*, just now, say anything of what I would say. I would rather *ask* of you, to speak more and more freely to me on those subjects, and unfold to me more and more your whole mind in regard to them. I will also ask one or two questions more. Is not the distinction between mysticism, the mysticism which is of Truth, and mere dreamery, or the institution of imaginations for realities, exactly this, that mysticism may be "translated into logic"? I mean in the only sense in which I ever endeavour so to translate it. You will understand what I mean. Logic proves nothing, yet points out clearly whether and how all things are proved. This being my creed, of course none of my mysticism, if mysticism it be, rests on logic as its basis, yet I require to see how it looks in the logical dialect before I feel sure of it, and if I have any vocation I think it is exactly this, to translate the mysticism of others into the language of argument. Have not all things two

aspects—an artistic and a scientific — to the former of which the language of mysticism is the most appropriate, to the latter that of logic? The mechanical people, whether theorists or men of the world, find the former unintelligible, and despise it. Through the latter one has a chance of forcing them to respect even what they cannot understand, and that once done, they may be made to *believe* what to many of them must always be in the utmost extent of the term "things unseen." This is the service I should not despair of assisting to render, and I think it is even more needed now than works of art, because it is their most useful precursor, and, one might almost say, in these days their necessary condition. 1834 — Aetat. 27.

Expand to me also more and more the meaning of "Humility" and "Entsagen."

Thiers completely verifies the impression his History makes. Even among French ministers he *stands out* conspicuously unprincipled.—Yours faithfully,

J. S. MILL.

To Thomas Carlyle

INDIA HOUSE, 28*th April* 1834.

MY DEAR CARLYLE,—I received, a week ago, your little note—it had not escaped me that for an unusual length of time I had not heard from you—but I had ascribed it to the very cause you mention, which is also the cause of my not having written for so long a period. The same reason will make this letter an empty one; nor should I write it did I not know that the most intrinsically worthless communication between us two is valuable to both. All that either cares about is so much better spoken than written off. You will find *me*, too, "altered and altering"; perhaps more so than you expect; more, too, than will probably be quite intelligible to you, without my opening up to you many incidents in my spiritual history, of which, on a principle which I have heard you also profess, I like not to speak fully and freely of, until I myself have a sufficiently clear perception of the meaning and bearing of

1834 — Aetat. 27.

them. But I, too, have what for a considerable time was quite suspended in me, the feeling of growth. I feel myself much more *knowing*, more *seeing*, having a far greater experience of *realities*, not abstractions, than ever before; nor do I doubt that this superior knowledge and insight will one day make itself available in the form of greater power, for accomplishing whatever work I may be called to—shall I say also for choosing the work which I may most worthily perform? Every increase of insight carries with it the uncomfortable feeling of being separated more and more widely from almost all other human beings; this one would the less care for, did it not also damp all those feelings which prompt one to exertion through the hope of success, I mean any other success than is constituted by the struggle itself. One feels more and more that one is drifting so far out of the course of other men's navigation as to be altogether below their horizon; not only they will not go with us, but they cannot see whither we are steering, and they believe if they ever catch a glimpse of us, that we are letting ourselves go blindly whither we may. However, this must be, and may be borne with, borne with when one's own path is clear—and mine is always becoming clearer.

On every account which I can judge of, I am convinced that you do wisely in coming to London. Nowhere else, at least nowhere in this country, are there so many realities to be known and communed with; whereof not a few in the shape of true-hearted men and women, who, to the extent of their intellect and experience, believe aright and act according to their belief. There are very few of them in whom there is not wanting something of the very first importance, but still there is in many enough and more than enough of good to give you a stronger interest in them than merely that which you have in all actualities. Some of these I shall have opportunities of making known to you and you to them, to the mutual advantage and pleasure of both.

I should send to you various books if you were not so soon to be here; among others, several numbers of

the *Repository*, with writings of mine in them: but a much more remarkable production than anything of mine is a novel which has lately appeared, entitled "Eustace Conway," written by a far superior man,[1] evidently, to the author of "Arthur Coningsby," but the tone of thinking is much the same. You will read it with great interest, I am sure, though you will probably differ from many of the author's opinions as widely as I do, but you will perhaps agree in a greater number of them. I thought I had told you that the author of "Arthur Coningsby" is John Sterling, who at that time was in the ferment and effervescence of the process of forming his opinions and his character: now he has become as you say compacted and adjusted, and, like all Carlyle's disciples, has become a sort of Conservative and Churchman; he is going into Orders, but will not keep upon terms with any lie notwithstanding; he is able, which it is happy for him that he is, still to believe Christianity without doing violence to his understanding, and *that* therefore not being, to his mind, false in the smallest particle, he can and does denounce all which he recognises as false, in the speculation or practice of those among whom he is about to find himself. I believe there are not a few such persons, and that many of the most earnest and most genially-natured of the youth of the English universities are gone or going into the clerical profession with similar views. If the Church conformed to their ideal of what it should be, I could say to them, "*Ite fausto pede;*" but they will not regenerate it from within so soon as it will be pulled down from without. 1834 — Aetat. 27.

I long to hear all you could say about Homer. I hope you will sometime write and publish it.—Yours faithfully,

J. S. MILL.

[1] [It was written by J. F. D. Maurice.]

To Thomas Carlyle,

on the MS. of the "French Revolution."

India House, *Wednesday* [no date, 1835?].

1835 — Aetat. 28.

My dear Carlyle,—My annotations and proposed alterations in phraseology amount, as you will see, to but little—less than I expected—and you will probably think most of them trifling. My object has been to remove, when it can be done without sacrifice, anything *merely* quaint in the mode of expression, but I have very often not ventured to touch it for fear of spoiling something which I could not replace. The only general remark I have to make on the style is that I think it would often *tell* better on the reader if what is said in an abrupt, exclamatory, and interjectional manner were said in the ordinary grammatical mode of nominative and verb; but in that, as in everything else, I ask nothing but that you will deal with it as you like, disregarding all my observations if you do not think them just, and in any case that you will not make the thing an annoyance to you. It is quite good enough, and too good for us, as it is.—Ever faithfully yours, J. S. Mill.

To Thomas Carlyle,

with reference to the accidental destruction of the MS. of the "French Revolution" while in Mill's possession.

India House, *7th March* [1835].

My dear Carlyle,—I will endeavour, as you advise, to think as little as I can of this misfortune, though I shall not be able to cease thinking of it until it is ascertained how far the loss is capable of being repaired, or rather reduced to a loss of time and labour only. There are hardly any means I would not joyfully take, if any existed, by which I could myself be instrumental to remedying the mischief my carelessness has caused. That, however,

depends not upon me. But there is one part of the evil—though, I fear, the least part—which I could repair: the loss to yourself of time and labour, that is, of income. And I beg of you, with an earnestness with which perhaps I may never again have need to ask anything as long as we live, that you will permit me to do this, little as it is, towards remedying the consequences of my fault and lightening my self-reproach. It is what you would permit as a matter of course if I were a stranger to you, it is what is even *legally* due to you; and to have brought an evil upon a friend instead of a stranger is already a sufficient aggravation of one's regret, without the addition to it of not being allowed to make even the poor amends one would make to a stranger. 1835 — Aetat. 28.

If I could convince you what a relief this would be to me, and what an act of friendship, to say nothing of justice, it would be on your part, I am sure you would not hesitate.—Yours affectionately, J. S. MILL.

To Thomas Carlyle,

in reply to his acceptance of Mill's proposal to make financial recompense for the loss of the MS. of the "French Revolution."

INDIA HOUSE, *Tuesday* [10*th March* 1835].

MY DEAR CARLYLE,—Nothing which could have happened could have been at this time so great a good to me as your note, received this morning. I never thought it probable, and I wonder now how I could have thought it possible, that your answer would be different; it could not be so (gigmanity out of the question); but my anxiety made me exaggerate the chances against me.

Yes, when the thing is again done, and I have realised the feeling of certainty that another volume is there, as true and as beautiful as the former, all *will* be *wholer* than ever. I never before felt so fully the whole amount of the good of having somewhat more than one actually needs

1835 — Aetat. 28.

for urgent wants. That which can buy peace of conscience is precious.

You shall see or hear from me again almost immediately, but I will not take the *Fête des Piques;* not that I believe such a thing could possibly happen again, but for the sake of retributive justice I would wear the badge of my untrustworthiness. If, however, you would give me the pleasure of reading it, give it to Mrs. Taylor—in her custody no harm could come to it—and I can read it aloud to her as I did much of the other, for it had not only the *one* reader you mentioned, but a second as good.

To E. Lytton Bulwer (afterwards Lord Lytton)

India House, 23*rd November* 1836.

1836 — Aetat. 30.

My dear Sir,—I have just returned from an absence of nearly four months on the Continent, rendered necessary by an obstinate though in no way alarming indisposition, which has lasted for more than a twelvemonth, and which, together with another far more melancholy circumstance, had obliged me during that period to put aside all occupations which could be dispensed with, and among other things to leave my friend Molesworth's review[1] very much to shift for itself. Now, when I am sufficiently recovered to be able to revert to my former interests and pursuits, one of the things I am most concerned about is how the greatest value and efficiency may be given to that review—and I am sure that I speak the sentiments of all connected with it when I say that nothing would conduce so much to either end as your hearty co-operation, if we could be so fortunate as to obtain it. I have since my return read your article on Sir Thomas Browne with an admiration I have seldom felt for any English writings on such subjects. I did not know at the time that it was yours, and could not conceive what new accession had come to the *Edinburgh Review.* I first thought it might possibly be Macaulay's, but as I read on I felt it to be far too good for him. It has

[1] [The *London and Westminster Review.*]

JAMES MILL

much of the same brilliancy, but not his affected and anti-thetical style, and above all a perception of truth, which he never seems to have, and a genuine love of the True and the Beautiful, the absence of which in him is the reason why, among his thousands of clever things and brilliant things, there are so few true things and hardly one which is the *whole* truth and nothing but the truth. I could not help saying to myself, who would look for these qualities in the *Edinburgh Review?* How the readers of that review must be puzzled and bewildered by a writer who actually takes decided views, who is positively in earnest, and is capable of downright admiration and even enthusiasm! I am sure your writing must be lost upon them; they are not people who can recognise or care about truth; your beautiful things will be to them merely clever things and amusing things *comme tant d'autres*. Among us, you would at least find both writers and readers who are in earnest. I grant that you, and such writing as yours, would be nearly as much out of place in our review *as it has been*, as in the *Edinburgh;* but not, as I hope it will hereafter be. As good may be drawn out of evil—the event which has deprived the world of the man of the greatest philosophical genius it possessed,[1] and the review (if such little interests may be spoken of by the side of great ones) of its most powerful writer, and the only one to whose opinions the editors were obliged to defer—that same event has made it far easier to do that in the hope of which alone I allowed myself to become connected with the review, namely, to soften the harder and sterner features of its Radicalism and Utilitarianism, both which in the form in which they originally appeared in the *Westminster* were part of the inheritance of the eighteenth century. The review ought to represent not Radicalism but Neo-Radicalism, a Radicalism which is not democracy, not a bigoted adherence to any forms of government or to one kind of institutions, and which is only to be called Radicalism inasmuch as it does not palter nor compromise with evils, but cuts at their roots—and a utilitarianism which takes into

1836 — Aetat. 30.

[1] [James Mill.]

1836 — Aetat. 30.

account the whole of human nature ; not the ratiocinative faculty only, but the utilitarianism which never makes a peculiar figure as such, nor would ever constitute its followers a sect or school—which fraternises with all who hold the same *axiomata media* (as Bacon has it), whether their just principle is the same or not—and which holds in the highest reverence all which the vulgar notion of utilitarianism represents them to despise—which holds feeling at least as valuable as thought, and Poetry not only on a par with, but the necessary condition of, any true and comprehensive Philosophy. I know I am writing very loosely and expressing myself very ill, but *you* will understand me, and as I have, through Molesworth's confidence in me, complete power over that review whenever I choose to exercise it, I hope you will believe that if the review has hitherto been too much in the old style of Radical-utilitarianism with which you cannot possibly sympathise very strongly (nor I either), it is because the only persons who could be depended upon as writers, were those whose writings would not tend to give it any other tone. My object will now be to draw together a body of writers resembling the old school of Radicals only in being on the movement side, in philosophy, morality, and art as well as in politics and socialities—and to keep the remnant of the old school (it is dying out) in their proper place, by letting them write only about the things which they understand. But this attempt must fail unless those who *could* assist it *will*. Why should you not write for us a series of articles on the old English writers, similar to that on Browne? They would be quite invaluable to us ; we have not among our habitual writers any who could be trusted to write on such subjects—those who would have enough of the requisite feelings and talents, have not the requisite reading. We have now, since the junction with the *Westminster*, readers enough to make it worth while ; and readers who are in earnest ; readers by whom what you write would be taken *au sérieux* and not as a mere play of intellect and fancy. Your writing for us need not hinder you from writing for the *Edinburgh* also if you like it ; but I am sure you must often

feel *that* not to be a fitting vehicle for anything not of a *stationary* character either in literature or politics—*passe encore* if you could hope by your writings to modify the character of the work itself—but that is hopeless. Now among us you could. 1836 — Aetat. 30.

Do pray think of it, and tell me the result of your thought. The time is evidently approaching when the Radicals will once more be a distinct party, and when people will look to the *Review* as their organ, and much will depend upon its being an organ which represents the best part of them, and not the narrowest and most repulsive.—Ever yours faithfully. J. S. MILL.

To E. Lytton Bulwer

29th November 1836.

MY DEAR BULWER,—Accept my best thanks for the kind expressions in your letter. Nothing could be more gratifying to me than the whole tone of it, and I could not be so unreasonable as to ask, under the circumstances you mention, for any greater degree of immediate co-operation than that which you so kindly offer. I have been long looking for your work on "Athens," and rejoice in the prospect of its being out so soon. If it be not delayed longer than the time you mention we may perhaps hope for something from you for our April number? Every one who writes criticism worthy the name must write it as you say, "slowly and with great labour," for it is precisely, of all things, that which it is most difficult to write well, and which is least supportable when slovenly; but a greater number and variety of important truths (truths, too, with their application annexed) may be thrown into circulation in that way than in almost any other mode of writing. Though I shall, in common with most people, lose a great deal of pleasure when you leave off writing romances, it is still very good news that you are looking forward to an early time at which your powers will be devoted—I will not say to nobler or more important objects, for politics are not intrinsically nobler,

1836 — Aetat. 30.

and as usually pursued are far less noble than art, but at least to objects of more pressing exigency, and where there is a wider field of usefulness open just at the present time. Nobody can doubt that whenever you do make politics or the things which are to be effected through politics your principal object, and pursue that object with the energy and perseverance which you have so conspicuously shown in the application of the same powers to other objects, there is a place reserved for you in the political history of this country which will not be a humble one.

If you do not find the atmosphere of the *London and Westminster Review* more and more congenial to you it will not be my fault. Even at present, when bad things are put in, it is not because they are liked, but for want of better. Your aid, to whatever degree afforded, much more if (may I saw *when*) it may hereafter be habitually afforded, would of itself supersede and displace much that it would be very desirable to see displaced. It would also conduce extremely to the success of the *Review;* but the great thing is that it would conduce, more than any other literary assistance I can think of, to render the *Review* what it is not now even in the slightest degree, an organ of real literary and social criticism. What you say of the Radicals is too true, but I think they *are* now bestirring themselves in all quarters; and as their jealousy is, I think, chiefly the natural carping of those who do nothing against all which is done, as they grow more active they may shake it off. The most active among them are the least capable of jealousy even now. I think they would all follow a good leader, and would not be jealous of one whose power they felt, and saw it to be exerted in their behalf. They are really sincere men, and would value a man who worked vigorously in the cause.—Ever yours faithfully,

J. S. MILL.

To E. Lytton Bulwer

Wednesday [1837].

1837 — Aetat. 31.

My dear Sir,—I have read your article[1] with great eagerness and delight; it is such as I expected from you, and if we could have one such article in every number I should have no misgivings respecting our critical reputation. I have hardly found a sentence which has not my heartiest concurrence, except perhaps some part of what you say of Shelley, and *there* I am not sure that there is any difference, for all that you say to his disparagement I allow to be true, though not, I think, the whole truth. It seems to me that much, though not most, of Shelley's poetry is full of the truest passion; and it seems to me hardly fair to put Shelley in the same *genus* as Gray, when the imagery of the one, however redundant and occasionally far-fetched, is always true to nature, and that of the other, as you say yourself, drawn from books and false; the one, the exuberant outpouring of a seething fancy, the other elaborately studied and artificial.

But perhaps you think all this as well as I; if so, and only if so, would not some little addition or qualification give a truer impression?

I had not time the other evening to tell you how much I am delighted with "Athens"; the book is *so* good that very few people will see how good.—Ever yours,

J. S. Mill.

To E. Lytton Bulwer

India House, *3rd March* 1838.

1838 — Aetat. 31.

My dear Sir,—I have read the *Monthly Chronicle* with deep interest, and I hasten to make my acknowledgments to you for the feeling which prompted the very complimentary expressions with which you have accompanied your strictures on my article in the *London and Westminster Review*.[2]

[1] [On "The Works of Thomas Gray," published in the *London and Westminster Review* for July 1837.]

[2] ["Lord Durham and the Canadians," in the *London and Westminster Review* for January 1838.]

1838 — Aetat. 31.

I agree entirely in the greater part of the views set forth in the first article of the *Monthly Chronicle*, and especially in the general character you have given of the policy suited to the middle class. On the points in which I differ from you, or perhaps I should rather say, on which I would add to or qualify what you say, there would be much to be discussed between us at a suitable time and place. But I am much more desirous at present to express my great delight at the complete recognition which I find in that article, of its being advisable for the moderate Radicals to form themselves openly and avowedly into a distinct body from the Whigs—to shake off the character of a *tail*—and to act together as an independent body. My only quarrel with the Parliamentary Radicals has hitherto been, that they have not done this, nor seemed to see any advantage in doing it. But whenever I see any moderate Radical who recognises this as his principle of action, any differences which there can be between me and him cannot be fundamental or permanent. We may differ as to the conduct which would be most expedient at some particular crisis, but in the main principles of our political conduct we agree. I have never had any other notion of practical policy since the Radicals were numerous enough to form a party, than that of resting on the *whole body* of Radical opinion, from the Whig-Radicals at one extreme to the more reasonable and practical of the working classes, and the Benthamites, on the other. I have been trying ever since the Reform Bill to stimulate, so far as I had an opportunity, all sections of the Parliamentary Radicals to organise such a union, and such a system of policy: not saying to them—Adopt my views, do as I bid you; but, Adopt *some* views, do *something*. Had I found them acting on any system, aiming at any particular end, I should not have stood upon any peculiar views of my own as to the best way of attaining the common object. The best course for promoting Radicalism is the course which is pursued with most ability, energy, and concert, even if not the most politic, abstractedly considered; and for my own guidance

individually my rule is—whatever power I can bring in aid of the popular cause, to carry it where I see strength—there where I see, along with adequate ability and numbers, a definite purpose consistently pursued. Therefore, if I find all that among you, and if I do not, I am quite aware that I shall find it nowhere else. You will find me quite ready to co-operate with you, if you think my co-operation worth having. I am no "Impracticable," and perhaps the number of such is smaller than you think. As one of many I am ready to merge my own views, whatever they may be, in the average views of any body of persons whom I may choose to ally myself with, but not unless I have full opportunity of bringing my own views before the body, and giving to those views any degree of influence which their own intrinsic character may obtain for them, over its collective deliberations. You cannot wonder that, having always been obliged to act alone, I act in my own way. As long as that is the case, I must struggle on, making mistakes and correcting them, doing the best I can, under all the disadvantages of a person who has to shift for himself, and raising up allies to myself, where and how I can, as I have already done and am doing, with a success that shows that I cannot altogether be in a wrong way. You have seen in Robertson[1] no bad specimen, I think, of my *practicalness* in finding men suitable to my purpose. But enough of this. 1838 — Aetat. 31.

Robertson requests me to put you in mind of his request to you, in which I most heartily join, on the subject of an article for our next number (*à propos* of Knighton,[2] the "Diary," &c.) on the social influence, &c., of the Court. Such an article from you would be a great treasure to us, and specially valuable in our next number, as it is the best time of year for such a subject.—Ever yours truly,

J. S. Mill.

[1] [Mill's sub-editor.]

[2] ["Memoirs of Sir William Knighton," 1838.]

To E. Lytton Bulwer

India House, *5th March* 1838.

1838 — Aetat. 31.

My dear Sir,—In answer to your question, as to what I would be ready to do if my friends, as you call them, will not consent to what I think reasonable, if a party can be formed for the Durham policy, including such men as yourself and those whom you mention, pursuing its objects by means which I think likely to be effectual, even though not exactly those I should myself have preferred, I am ready to give such a party all the aid I can, and as the necessary consequence to throw off, so far as is implied in that, all who persevere in conduct either hostile to the party, or calculated to diminish its strength. But I do not think that any Liberal party, out of office, can be strong enough to beat the Tories, without a degree of popular enthusiasm in its favour which could not be had without the support of some of the men who, in the same proportion as they are thought impracticable, are thought honest. I have a personal knowledge of the men, far exceeding any which I believe you have, and from that knowledge I have no doubt that such a party as I am supposing could carry with it all of those men who are worth having, if in the first place real evidence is afforded them that popular objects to the extent of those to which Lord Durham is pledged are sincerely pursued, and if, secondly, their *amour propre* is not irritated by personal attacks—such, for instance, as that in the *Chronicle* of this morning, or of some recent ones in the *Examiner*. I think such attacks good policy in the Whigs, but in the moderate Radicals bad tactics. Both on public and private grounds, I am not only precluded from joining in such attacks but must defend them against any such, and I must do so all the more in proportion as I separate myself from them in my political course. The October number of the *Review* was the first in which I systematically advocated a moderate policy, and it was consequently the first in which I complimented the extreme politicians. The Canada question then in an evil hour crossed the path

of Radicalism, and my difference of opinion from you on the course of conduct required by Lord John Russell's declarations made me again apparently one of them, which I regretted at the time, but could not help. But I have never swerved from my intention of detaching the *Review* and myself from all coterie or sectarian connection; and making the public see that the *Review* has ceased to be Benthamite; and throwing myself upon the *mass* of Radical opinion in the country. All this I determined to do when I had no hope of a Radical party in Parliament, and if such a party be formed I would of course prefer to ally myself with it, rather than run a race against it for the moderate Radicals. I could only enter into such a party, as a representative in it of opinions more advanced in Radicalism than the average opinions of the party. But, in my idea of the principles on which such a party should be constituted, it cannot do without the support of persons considered *ultra* in opinion, provided they are not impracticable in conduct.

1838 — Aetat. 31.

With regard to Molesworth's motion,[1] we shall so soon know what comes of it, that there is little use in speculating about its probable effects; for the next two days I shall only say, that I neither counselled it, nor knew of it till the notice was given, and when I first heard of it, disapproved of it.

The position I have since taken about it is a sort of neutral one. I feel quite unable to foresee whether in the end its consequences will be good or bad. But one of those consequences, the division in the Radical body, I feel all the evil of, and I regret much that such a union as we are discussing, earlier adopted, did not prevent such a division from arising. In the present state of matters, were I to urge Molesworth to turn back, I should only compromise my influence over him, without attaining the object. The division thus brought to a crisis, some new state of things will arise, which we must work to the best ends we can. Thanks for your kind expressions about the *Westminster*. I need hardly say how much I value your assist-

[1] [To remove Lord Glenelg from the Colonial Secretaryship.]

1838 — Aetat. 31. ance as a contributor, and I shall be much disappointed if an article which would be of peculiar value to the *Review* at present, should, from the engagements you mention, be unavoidably lost to it. I shall set about my political article for the next number the moment I have made up my mind what the relations of the *Review* are likely to be to parties in Parliament.—Ever yours faithfully, J. S. MILL.

To JOHN STERLING,

acknowledging the receipt of his article on Carlyle, written for the *London and Westminster Review*. The article was subsequently republished in Sterling's collected writings.

INDIA HOUSE, *24th July* 1839.

1839 — Aetat. 33. MY DEAR STERLING,—I did not need the arrival of the second packet to know whether the article would suit me or not; and if I could have had any doubts, that packet would have removed them—the contents of that same not being liable to even the minor objections which I might have raised to the first.

There are, as you surmised (but confined almost entirely to the introductory part), many opinions stated in which, speculatively, I do not agree: but the time is long gone by when I considered such differences as there are, matters of first-rate moment; and if I have a fault to find with your introduction, it is a fault only with respect to my readers —viz., that it gives an account of the transcendental part (if I may so call it) of Carlyle's opinions in somewhat too transcendental a manner; and, not interpreting his views in language intelligible to persons of opposite schools, will scarcely serve to recommend him to any (some of the religious excepted) who are not already capable of appreciating him in his own writings. But "I speak as to the wise—judge ye what I say."

In the passage on Superstition, I think you hardly do justice to Carlyle's meaning. When he called Voltaire the destroyer of European superstition, I do not think he

meant by superstition those fears and anxieties respecting the invisible world, which I understand you to mean that nothing but religion can save a meditative and sensitive character from—I think he meant by superstition, all such dogmatic religious belief as is not well grounded, and will not bear a close investigation, and especially, in his view, any religious belief resting on logic, or external evidences. If this be his meaning, what you say on the subject is scarcely in place; and the more commonplace meaning which I suppose him to have had, is perhaps maintainable, viz., that the first acute sceptic whose writings obtained European popularity, was thereby the destroyer for ever in the European mind of the absurdities which had entwined themselves with religion and the groundless arguments which were currently used in its support. 1839 — Aetat. 33.

I have not a word more to say in the way of criticism —I am delighted with the article, and so, I am persuaded, will almost everybody be, whose good opinion is desirable.—Ever truly yours, J. S. MILL.

To John Sterling

INDIA HOUSE, 28*th September* 1839.

MY DEAR STERLING,—I quite think with you that it is no part of my vocation to be a party leader, but at most to give occasional good advice to such as are fitted to be so. Whether I have any better vocation for being a philosopher, or whether you will think so when you see what I am capable of performing in that line, remains for the future to decide. I hope to give materials for the decision before long, as I can hardly fail, I think, to finish my "Logic" in the course of next year. I have endeavoured to keep clear, as far as possible, of the controversy respecting the perception of the highest Realities by direct intuition, confining Logic to the laws of the investigation of truth by means of extrinsic evidence, whether ratiocinative or inductive. Still, I could not avoid conflict with some of the subordinate parts of the supernatural philosophy which, for aught I know, may be as necessary to it as what may

1839 — Aetat. 33.

appear to me its fundamental principles and its only important results. I doubt, therefore, whether I can expect anything but opposition from the only school of metaphysical speculation which has any life or activity at present. But *nous verrons*. I have, at all events, made many things much clearer to myself than they were before —and that is something, even if I am satisfied to be my own only disciple.

I am very far from agreeing, in all things, with the "Analysis,"[1] even on its own ground—though perhaps, from your greater distance, the interval between me and it may appear but trifling. But I can understand your need of something beyond it and deeper than it, and I have often had moods in which I would most gladly postulate, like Kant, a different ultimate foundation, "subjectiver bedürfnisses willen" if I could.

To John Sterling,

on Coleridge.

India House, *2nd October* 1839.

My dear Sterling,— . . . I have read through with great interest the little volume lately published by Pickering, containing the Church and State and the Lay Sermons. In the former I see more and more to admire, though I think, there and elsewhere, he runs riot with the great historical conception of a certain idea of the scope and fitting attributes of some social element, working in the minds of people from age to age without distinct consciousness on their part. This, I am aware, is the natural result of his system of metaphysics, but I, who do not believe in pre-existent ideas, see in as much as is true of this doctrine (and that much of it is true I contend as strongly as he) only the first confused view suggested by our various instincts, of the various wants of society and of the mutual co-relation of these. On the particular doctrines of his political philosophy, it seems to me that he

[1] [James Mill's "Analysis of the Human Mind."]

stands almost alone in having seen that the foundation of the philosophy of the subject is a perception what are those great interests (comprehending all others) each of which must have somebody bound and induced to stand up for it in particular, and between which a balance must be maintained—and I think with him that those great interests are two, permanence and progression. But he seems to me quite wrong in considering the land to be essentially identified with permanence, and commercial wealth with progression. The land has something to do with permanence, but the antithesis, I think, is rather between the contented classes and the aspiring—wealth and hopeful poverty—age and youth—hereditary importance and personal endowments. As I think the Church and State the best, so the Lay Sermons seem to me the worst of Coleridge's writings yet known to me, though there are excellent passages in them. 1839 — Aetat. 33

I think exactly as you do about the doctrine which resolves the pleasure of music into association. I seem to myself to perceive clearly two elements in it, one dependent on association, the other not—and those elements combined in very varying proportions, as, *e.g.*, the former preponderating in Gluck and Beethoven, the latter in Mozart.

As I finish this letter, behold a note from Carlyle. He says: "Sterling's is a splendid article; in spite of its enormous extravagance some will like it, many are sure to talk of it and on the whole be instructed by it. No man in England has been better reviewed than I—if also no one worse." So far so good; and as for the "extravagance," I doubt not his modesty applies that appellation mainly to the praise.

I heard from Mr. Sterling yesterday more than I liked to hear about the state of your health, though I trust not enough to inspire any serious apprehension. *Do* take care of yourself, for you can ill be spared publicly or privately, and by few (out of your own family) so ill as by yours affectionately,

J. S. MILL.

To John Sterling.

East India House, *4th November* 1839.

1839 — Aetat. 33.

. . . Touching your question to me, whether I think that we know a sufficient number of laws of particular phenomena to be able to mount up to the laws of the whole system of which they are a part—if you mean, to such laws as that which Coleridge ascribes to Heraclitus and Giordano Bruno, the essential polarity of all power—I do not think that the time is come for such wide generalisations, though I do not consider the attainment of them hopeless at some future period. I am afraid that the only principles which I should at present recognise as laws of *all* phenomena, are some of those which for that very reason are classed by Kant as laws of our perceptive faculties only—subjective, not objective—as, for instance, the subjection of all phenomena to the laws of time and space. But it would require a good deal of explanation before we could make ourselves understood by each other on this matter, and for my part, I dare say, I may have something to learn on this subject from the German philosophers when I have time to read them. You may think it presumptuous in a man to be finishing a treatise on logic and not to have made up his mind finally on these great matters. But mine professes to be a logic of experience only, and to throw no further light upon the existence of truths not experimental, than is thrown by showing to what extent reasoning from experience will carry us. Above all, mine is a logic of the indicative mood alone—the logic of the imperative, in which the major premiss says not *is* but *ought*, I do not meddle with.

To John Sterling.

India House, *22nd April* 1840.

1840 — Aetat. 33.

My dear Sterling,—Your letter should have been answered when I first received it, which was just before I left Falmouth. The bustle and turmoil of London when

one comes back to it, and the accumulation of different sorts of business which I have had to dispose of, are very uncongenial to the mood in which such a letter is read or in which it should be responded to. 1840 — Aetat. 33.

I rejoice greatly that we met at Falmouth; independently of the good, of many kinds, which your presence did, it is very much to me now, and more than I thought it would be, that my last recollections of Henry[1] are shared with you. If he had lived he would certainly have been an additional bond between us, and now that he is dead his memory will be so, and perhaps, as you say, he is conscious of it. I do feel, as you do, that we have been more to each other lately than ever before, and I think on one side this is easily to be explained, for it is natural to you to feel more affectionately in proportion as you have shown more kindness; that is one of the ways in which acts of love fructify and yield a large increase. On my own side less explanation is needed, for it seems to me that you have at all times been giving more and more to me—though there have been times when the contrary may have seemed to be the case—in consequence partly of constitutional or habitual defect of quickness of sensibility, but much more of the jarring elements both in my own character and in my outward circumstances which I have had to reconcile, as indeed is the case with most people, but I think both in an unusual degree and in an unusual manner with me, and which have made me describe an orbit very different from the direction of any one of the forces which urged me. And even now I am very far from appearing to you as I am, for though there is nothing that I do not desire to show, there is much that I never do show, and much that I think you cannot even guess.

My mother and sisters and George have returned, and George is certainly better, not worse, for his journey. I have much anxious thought about him—to him the loss of Henry is a greater calamity than he can yet feel.

As for me, I have begun to get ready my reprint, but I find some difficulty in finding enough for two volumes.

[1] [Mill's brother.]

1840 — Aetat. 34.

I have softened the asperity of the article on Sedgwick, and cut out whatever seemed to take an unfair advantage against his opinions, of his deficiencies as an advocate of them.—Ever affectionately, J. S. MILL.

To John Sterling.

INDIA HOUSE, *1st October* 1840.

MY DEAR STERLING,— . . . There is much more danger of war than people are aware of. More than one credible testimony of Frenchmen now in Paris, or lately there, assures me that the war feeling there is universal, and has for the time silenced all others; that even those whose personal interests are opposed to it share the feeling, and that there is not now one voice against the fortifying of Paris, which excited such clamour a few years ago. And that this is not from love of war, for they dislike it, but because they feel themselves *blessé* and humiliated as a nation. This is foolish, but who can wonder at it in a people whose country has, within this generation, been twice occupied by foreign armies? If that were our case we should have plenty of the same feeling. But it is melancholy to see the rapid revival of hatred on their side and jealous dislike on ours.

. . . . . .

What you say about the absence of a disinterested and heroic pursuit of Art as the greatest want of England at present has often struck me, but I suspect it will not be otherwise until our social struggles are over. Art needs earnest but quiet times; in ours, I am afraid, Art itself to be powerful must be polemical, Carlylean and Goethian; but "I speak as to the wise—judge ye what I say."—Ever yours, J. S. MILL.

To John Sterling.

3rd December 1840.

MY DEAR STERLING,—I suppose this will reach you although directed only to the Torquay Post Office. I

write only to keep up the thread of our correspondence, as I have nothing very particular to say. 1840 — Aetat. 34.

When I advised you, if you go to Italy, to see Genoa and the Corniche, I forgot that you had not seen Venice and Munich. You certainly ought by no means to miss them. Venice itself is as well worth seeing as Genoa, and the pictures, of course, better than anything you would see there, though I cannot help thinking that the Venetian school is but the Flemish "with a difference"—that difference being chiefly the difference between Italian physique and Belgian or Dutch. But then again some of the sculptures at Munich are among the very first extant—and *you* will be interested in the modern German art; it is probably from knowing nothing of the subject, that what I saw of it appears to me a feeble, hot-house product. But *quære* whether anything so essentially objective as painting and sculpture can thrive in Germany—any more than Shakespeare or Beethoven could have been produced in Italy. This, however, is *sus Minervam*. . . .

I have been considering whether I ought to postpone revising my "Logic" in order to read the German books you mention. On the whole, I think not—their way of looking at such matters is so very different from mine, which is founded on the methods of physical science, and entirely *a posteriori*.—Ever yours faithfully,

J. S. MILL.

To John Sterling.

INDIA HOUSE, 19*th December* 1840.

MY DEAR STERLING,— . . . I think and feel very much as you do on the subject of the bad spirit manifested in France by so many politicians and writers, and unhappily by some from whom better things were to be expected. But this does not appear to me to strengthen Palmerston's justification. I do not believe that Thiers would have acted, in power, in a manner at all like his braggadocio afterwards when he knew that he had only the turbulent part of the population

1840 — Aetat. 34.

to throw himself upon, and no watchword to use but the old ones about making the Mediterranean a French lake, getting rid of the treaties of 1815, &c. I have no doubt that he would have attempted to make such an arrangement as should leave a powerful state at that end of the Mediterranean under French influence, and I think he had a good right to attempt this, and we no right at all to hinder it if the arrangement was not objectionable on any other account. It appears to me very provoking treatment of France that England and Russia should be extending their influence every year till it embraces all Asia, and that we should be so indignant at the bare supposition that France wishes to do a little of what we do on so much larger a scale. It is true we do it almost in spite of ourselves, and rather wish to keep others out than to get ourselves in; but we cannot expect France to think so, or to regard our professing it as anything but attempting to humbug them, and not doing it well. I believe that no harm whatever to Europe would have resulted from French influence with Mehemet Ali, and it would have been easy to *bind* France against any future occupation of the country for herself. We should then have avoided raising this mischievous spirit in France—the least evil of which will be what Lord Palmerston's supporters no doubt think a great one, viz., that in another year France will be in strict alliance as to all Eastern matters with Russia as the only power who will give her anything for her support, and moreover as her only means of retaliating upon England.

No one seems to me to have raised himself by this but Guizot, and he has done what perhaps no other man could have done, and almost certainly none so well.

To John Sterling

India House, *5th January* 1841.

1841 — Aetat. 34.

My dear Sterling,—. . . About the war matters, I suspect we shall not make much of our discussion till we can carry it on by word of mouth. When I spoke

of binding France, I meant engaging her as a party in a general compact of the European powers, which she could not afterwards have ventured to infringe. And the aggressions I meant are the proceedings by which we are gradually conquering all Asia, from Pekin to Herat. I did not mean that they were either aggressions in any bad sense, or provoking to France in themselves, but I do think it provoking that France should see England and Russia adding every year on a large scale to their territory and dependent alliances in the East, and then crying out at the suspicion of her rushing to do something of the same kind, as if it were an enormity never before heard of among the nations of Europe. But you must not think I defend France, or would even excuse or palliate her conduct, except so far as attacked by people themselves liable to the same accusations in all respects, except (so far as Thiers is concerned) that of duplicity. . . .

1841 — Aetat. 34.

I need hardly say how earnestly I feel with you about the Corn Laws, and I therefore think the Anti-Corn-Law League right at Walsall. To let in for a manufacturing town any man not an out-and-out opponent of the Corn Laws would, I think, have been a folly and something worse. . . .

To John Sterling.

India House, *November* 1842.

I have been reading your review of Tennyson for the second time, after an interval of several weeks. I have found more difference than I expected in our judgments of particular poems, and I will not pretend that I think yours the more likely to be right, for I have faith in my own *feelings* of Art; but I have read and reflected so little on the subject compared with you, that I have no doubt you could give many more reasons for your opinions than I should be fully competent to appreciate. Still, I think I could justify my own feelings on grounds of my own, if I took time enough to meditate; but I doubt its being worth while—the thing is not in my *fach*.

1842 — Aetat. 36.

1842 — Aetat. 36.

The preliminary remarks are very delightful reading, and I think they do as much as can be done to render this age, what Carlyle says no age is, romantic to itself. But I think Tennyson, having taken up the same theory, has miserably misunderstood it. Because mechanical things may generate grand results he thinks that there is grandeur in the naked statement of their most mechanical details. Ebenezer Elliott has written a most fiery ode on the Press, which is a mechanical thing like a railroad, but the mechanicality is kept studiously out of sight. Tennyson obtrudes it.—Ever yours, J. S. MILL.

To JOHN STERLING.

INDIA HOUSE, *November* 1842.

MY DEAR STERLING,—I am very glad indeed to hear that you are writing the sort of paper you mention. As to Tennyson, you were right in getting so much praise of him into the *Quarterly* by no greater sacrifice than leaving some of the best of the earlier poems unmentioned. I do not differ from your principle that the highest forms of poetry cannot be built upon obsolete beliefs—although what you say of the "Ancient Mariner" and "Christabel" seems to me true of the "Lady of Shalott," and the objection does not seem to me to lie strongly against the "Lotos-Eaters" or "Œnone." But neither is the idyl one of the *highest* forms of poetry—neither Spenser, Tasso, nor Ovid could have been what they were by means of *that*. And greatly as I admire "Michael" and its compeers, that is not the crowning glory of Wordsworth. And how poor surely is "Dora" compared with some dozen of Wordsworth's poems of that kind.

My remark on mechanical details does not apply to "Burleigh," which seems to me Tennyson's best in that style; not much, if at all, to the "Gardener's Daughter," a good deal to "Dora"—which I do not like; a little to some parts of "Locksley Hall"; but in a most intense degree to such things as "Audley Court," "Walking to the Mail," the introduction to "Morte d'Arthur"; and the *type*

of what I object to is the three lines of introduction to "Godiva," which he has stuck in, as it were, in defiance. But, mind, I do not give my opinion as worth anything, to you especially, and my feeling is only to be reckoned as that of one person, competent in so far as capable of almost any degree of *exalté* feeling from poetry. 1842 — Aetat. 36.

Have you seen Macaulay's old-Roman ballads? If you have not, do not judge of them from extracts, which give you the best passages without the previous preparation. They are in every way better, and nearer to what one might fancy Campbell would have made them, than I thought Macaulay capable of. He has it not in him to be a great poet; there is no real genius in the thing, no revelation from the depths either of thought or feeling; but that being allowed for, there is real *verve*, and much more of the simplicity of ballad poetry than one would at all expect. The latter part of the "Battle of the Lake Regillus," and the whole of "Virginia," seem to me admirable.—Yours ever, J. S. MILL.

To Sir E. Lytton Bulwer,

in reply to a letter from him concerning the "Logic."

INDIA HOUSE, *27th March* 1843.

MY DEAR SIR LYTTON,—You have very much over-praised my rather ambitious attempt, but I am very glad that you find enough in the book to repay the trouble of reading, and I shall be amply satisfied if it is found to deserve half the good you say of it. I hope you may have time to give me the benefit of the doubts and suggestions you speak of. I can say quite sincerely, and I believe from sufficient self-knowledge, that I value the finding out of an error more highly than any amount of praise. 1843 — Aetat. 36.

I am afraid the proposition that Morality is an Art, not a Science, will hardly be found, on closer examination, to have so much in it as you seem to have thought was intended. It follows as a necessary corollary from my particular mode of using the word Art, but at bottom I

1843 — Aetat. 36.

fancy it is merely what everybody thinks, expressed in new language.

You would find Comte well worth your better knowledge. I do not always agree in his opinions, but as far as I know he seems to me by far the first speculative thinker of the age.—Yours very truly, J. S. MILL.

To JOHN STERLING,

condoling with him on the loss of his mother and wife, who died within a few hours of each other, on 18th April 1843.

INDIA HOUSE, *26th April* 1843.

I do not write to you, my dear Sterling, with any such vain notion as of attempting to offer you any comfort under the double blow which has fallen upon you—the first so hard, the last so much harder—though I hardly know, among possible things, any which I would not do or which it would not be the truest joy to me to do if it could help to lighten your burthen either of grief or of care. But it is a kind of mockery to talk of the great things one will never have the power of doing; it is only little things one has the opportunity to be useful in, and little enough in *them*. Heaven knows, there are few things which we here can do for you, and we have little claim to be preferred to others in regard to even those few; but I know how oppressive small cares are when they come on the back of great sufferings, and if any here could assist in relieving you from even the smallest of those, I do not believe you know, or can know, how pleasant it would be to do and how pleasant to think of when done. And with so many young creatures in your charge, and your own health requiring so much care, even we might sometimes, and in some ways, be able to give useful help without intruding into the place of any who might be equally desirous and more capable. If it should be so, it will be real friendship and kindness in you to give us the opportunity. Do not think of writing in answer to this, unless it be to tell us of

something that can be done; but by-and-by, when you are better able, we shall wish very much to hear what your plans are, both for yourself and the children, and, if possible, to be in some, if even the smallest, degree included in them.—Ever most affectionately, J. S. MILL. 1843 — Aetat. 36.

To JOHN STERLING,

about four months before his death took place from consumption.

INDIA HOUSE, *29th May* 1844.

MY DEAR STERLING,—For some time after I heard of your last dreadful attack I was afraid to write to you, your father having given me what seemed strong reasons against doing so, but as these do not seem any longer to exist, I venture to write. I do most earnestly hope that you will not give way to discouragement about your state, although I know, by painful experience, how natural it is to do so, and what mere idle words everything must appear that can be said to you by persons who have so much less means of judging than yourself. But there is a surprising elasticity in your constitution, which has carried you through shocks which would have been fatal to many a stronger person, and that is what we have to rest hope upon. And there is one thing which cannot be said to you too often, because I have seen before that there was real need of saying it. If there should be but little chance of your recovering anything like solid or perfect health, or even of your possessing permanently and safely such a degree of it as you have sometimes had for considerable periods together in the last few years, I am afraid that you will think that anything short of this is not worth having or worth wishing for—that you will be useless and helpless, and that it is better to be dead. I enter most perfectly into such a feeling, and should very likely feel the very same if I were, as I have several times thought I might be, in your circumstances, but I cannot conceive anything more completely mistaken than in your case such a feeling would be. If you were never able to go 1844 — Aetat. 38.

1844 — Aetat. 38.

through any active exertion, or to write a single line, except an occasional letter, or to exercise any influence over mankind except the influence of your thoughts and feelings upon your children and upon those by whom you are personally known and valued, you would still be, I sincerely think, the most useful man I know. It is very little that any of us can do, except doing good to those nearest to us, and of what we *can* do the smallest part in general is that which we calculate upon and to which we can attach our name. There are certainly few persons living who are capable of doing so much good by their indirect and unconscious influence as you are, and I do not believe you have ever had an adequate conception of the extent of influence you possess, and the quantity of good which you produce by it. Even by your mere existence you do more good than many by their laborious exertions. I do not speak of what the loss of you would be, or the blank it would make in life even to those who, like me, have, except for short periods, had little of you except the knowledge of your existence and of your affection. None of us could hope in our lives to meet with your like again, and if we did it would be no compensation; and when I think how many of the best people living are at this moment feeling this, I am sure that you have much to live for.

All connected with me whom you know are feeling deeply interested about you, including Clara, who has repeatedly written most anxiously, wishing to know all that can be known about your health and intentions. She is now at Dresden, and has been much interested and excited by the change of scene and manner of life; her *ἀποδημια* has been a completely successful experiment, and she does not seem at all disposed to return soon. George is now working under me in the India House, to which he has been appointed by the Directors in a way very kind and agreeable to me. He is learning his business very successfully, and is, in other respects, of great promise. I myself have been writing several review articles, one on Guizot's essays and lectures, at the request of Napier,

though I do not know when he will print it, and one on the Currency, which is just coming out in the *Westminster*. I have also been able to get published some Political Economy essays, written fourteen years ago. This is one effect of the success of the "Logic." I think my next book will be a systematic treatise on Political Economy, for none of the existing ones are at all up to the present state of speculation.—Ever, my dear Sterling, yours most affectionately, J. S. MILL.

To JOHN STERLING,

in reply to a letter from him, informing Mill that he was on the point of death.

INDIA HOUSE, 16*th August* 1844.

MY DEAR STERLING,—The trifling thing you ask might have been done without asking—and if there is anything in which I can ever be useful to you or yours, you cannot do me a greater kindness than by telling me of it.

I have never so much wished for another life as I do for the sake of meeting you in it. The chief reason for desiring it has always seemed to me to be that the curtain may not drop altogether on those one loves and honours. Every analogy which favours the idea of a future life leads one to expect that if such a life there be, death will no further change our character than as it is liable to be changed by any other important event in our existence—and I feel most acutely what it would be to have a firm faith that the world to which one is in progress was enriching itself with those by the loss of whom this world is impoverished.

If we lose you, the remembrance of your friendship will be a precious possession to me as long as I remain here, and the thought of you will be often an incitement to me when in time of need, and sometimes a restraint. I shall never think of you but as one of the noblest, and quite the most lovable of all men I have known or ever look to know.

CHAPTER IV

1847–1851

To John Austin, the eminent jurist.

13th April 1847.

1847 — Aetat. 40.

Dear Mr. Austin,—There is no occasion to send anything you may write to me by any circuitous channel. If I did pay postage I should not grudge it for your letters, but in fact I do not. The India House pays all my letters, except penny post letters which everybody pays before sending.

The notice in the *Chronicle*, to which I am indebted for your letter, was, as you supposed, mine. It is really a pity that all the trouble you must have taken with the article on Centralisation should have produced nothing more than a review article.

I am very glad that you should write anything whatever; but I hope, especially now, when your pecuniary affairs are settled in the manner you desire, that you will rather write books than reviews. An entirely unknown person, whose books no one would read, must begin by reviews, but you have written a book which, for the kind of book, has been very successful, and what you write is more likely to be read with your name than without it. A book gives much more scope than a review for your peculiar forte, the analysis of a subject down to its ultimate scientific elements. A review is not a slight thing to you, and you take the same pains with it as you would with a scientific treatise, which, in fact, it is; and all who can be benefited by it at all would prefer to have it in a permanent form. It seems to me that reviews have had their day, and that nothing is now worth much except the two extremes, newspapers for diffusion and books for accurate

thought. Every thinker should make a point of either publishing in his life if possible, or at any rate leaving behind him the most complete expression he can produce of his best thoughts, those which he has no chance of getting into any review. There are two books I have heard you speak of as projects; a continuation of "The Province of Jurisprudence," that is, in fact, a publication and completion of your lectures: this would be the easiest to you, so much of it being already done: the other, which would be more important, is a systematic treatise on morals. This last may wait long for any one with the intellect and the courage to do it as it should be done. And until it is done we cannot expect much improvement in the common standard of moral judgments and sentiments. 1847 — Aetat. 40.

Of the two subjects you mention in your letter, the "Province of Government" is no doubt important in itself, and peculiarly a question of the present time. I have necessarily thought a great deal about it lately for the purposes of a practical treatise on Political Economy, and I have felt the same difficulty which you feel about the *axiomata media*. I suspect there are none which do not vary with time, place, and circumstance. I doubt if much more can be done in a scientific treatment of the question than to point out a certain number of pros and a certain number of cons of a more or less general application, and with some attempt at an estimation of the comparative importance of each, leaving the balance to be struck in each particular case as it arises. But that subject is, I think, tolerably safe as far as theory is concerned, for the thinking minds of the Continent and of England have fairly thought up to it, and it is sure to be amply discussed and meditated upon for the next ten or twenty years. It is hardly a subject for any one who is capable of things much in advance of the time.

On the other subject, "The Antecedents of the Revolution," I much doubt if what you propose to write will do any good to those whom you hope to influence by it. I think with you that the English higher classes (of the

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German I know nothing) mean well, "what little they do mean," as my father said of some person. They have grown good even to goodiness, as they show every year more and more. But also every year shows more and more their *pitoyable* absence of even that very moderate degree of intellect, and that very moderate amount of will and character which are scattered through the other classes, but of which they have certainly much less than the average share owing to the total absence of the habit of exerting their minds for any purpose whatever. I used to hope, as my father did (with all his democratic predilections), that when their political monopoly was taken away they would be induced to exert themselves in order to keep ahead of their competitors, but I have quite ceased to think so. If there is anything of which experience convinces me more and more it is that, beyond a certain point, facilities, as they are called, are hindrances, and that the more the path to any meritorious attainment is made smooth to an individual or a class, from their early youth, the less chance there is of their realising it. Never to have had any difficulties to overcome seems fatal to mental vigour. The doctrine of averting revolutions by wise concessions to the people does not need to be preached to the English aristocracy. They have long acted on it to the best of their capacity, and the fruits it produces are soup-kitchen and tea-house bills.

As far as I see, the influence of democracy on the aristocracy does not operate by giving them any of the strength of the people, but by taking away that which was their own; making them bend with a willing submission to the yoke of bourgeois opinion in all private things, and be the slaves, in public matters, of the newspapers which they dislike and fear. I confess I look less and less to that quarter for anything good. Whatever is valuable in the traditions of gentlemanhood is a *fait acquis* to mankind; as it is really grounded on the combination of good policy in the correct intellectual perceptions, it will always be kept alive by really cultivated persons; the most complete *parvenus* now in this country have as much of it as people

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of family, and for its diffusion must not our real reliance be on the extension and improvement of education? I have even ceased to think that a leisured class, in the ordinary sense of the term, is an essential constituent of the best form of society. What does seem to me essential is that society at large should not be overworked, nor over-anxious about the means of subsistence, for which we must look to the grand source of improvement, repression of population, combined with laws or customs of inheritance which shall favour the diffusion of property instead of its accumulation in masses.

It is, I dare say, very natural that, living in France, you should be much impressed with the unfavourable side of a country that has passed through a series of revolutions. The inordinate impulse given to vulgar ambition, down to even a low class, and the general spirit of adventureship are, I have no doubt, disgusting enough; but may not much of them be ascribed to the mere accident of the brilliant fortune of a certain lieutenant of artillery (as Stendhal says), and much to the habitual over-governing by which power and importance are too exclusively concentrated upon the Government and its functionaries? In England, on the contrary, I often think that a violent revolution is very much needed, in order to give that general shake-up to the torpid mind of the nation which the French Revolution gave to Continental Europe. England has never had any general break-up of old associations, and hence the extreme difficulty of getting any ideas into its stupid head. After all, what country in Europe can be compared with France in the adaptation of its social state to the benefit of the great mass of its people, freed as they are from any tyranny which comes home to the greater number, with justice easily accessible and the strongest inducements to personal prudence and forethought. And would this have been the case without the great changes in the state of property which, even supposing good intentions in the Government, could hardly have been produced by anything less than a revolution?

I judge M. Guizot's conduct in the Spanish affair as you

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do; he is evidently not above low tricks and equivocations, which seem to be quite excused to every Frenchman by their being for the supposed honour and glory of France. Guizot I wished to think better of, but after all, this only brings me back, and that not altogether, to my first opinion of him, which some parts of his public conduct, from 1839 downwards, modified.

Your impression of Comte's delinquencies is a fine instance of the growth of rumour. Your informants must be either ill-informed, or such exaggerators that I wonder you should have believed them. In the first place, Comte (to whom *I* did *not* give money, but Grote and Molesworth did) never wrote to *Grote* anything but what was perfectly *convenable*. He wrote a letter to *me* which he authorised me to show to Grote and Molesworth if I thought fit, and I did think fit; but it contained nothing like reproaches. It contained a theory that, in default of the Government, it is the duty of rich individuals to subscribe their money to enable philosophers to live and carry on their speculations. I do not agree in his theory. I thought it an instance of "the importance of a man to himself," but even with the addition of his not having economised the money previously given to him this is a totally different thing from what you have been told.

The judgment to be passed on this incident would involve the wide subject of law; the degree in which a person should be judged by his own deliberate principles should be combined with one's judgment on the principles themselves, and one's opinion of the causes which made him adopt them.

You ask what I think of the Irish measures. I expect nothing from them but mischief, or if any good, only through excess of evil. If you were here you would, I believe, think as I do. The Government and the public seem, both alike, to have parted company with experience and common sense. There is not one man in the House of Commons, and only two or three in the House of Lords (Whately being one) who seem to have a single sound or rational idea on the whole subject; those from whom we

had most right to expect better are just as bad as the rest. I doubt if outdoor relief would do for Ireland under any mode of administration, but as it is, they are holding out to the people the most unbounded expectations, and if the Poor Law is to be worked without fulfilling them, the life of no guardian and no relieving officer will be worth a week's purchase, and the country will be ungovernable except by military occupation of every village. The only good I expect is that the result *must* produce a strong reaction in the public mind against the present wild notions about the mode of being good to the poor.—Ever sincerely yours,

J. S. MILL.

To J. F. MOLLETT,

with reference to a Mr. Lovett, who had been brought before a magistrate for refusing to serve in the militia. He pleaded that, as he had no vote, he was not acknowledged by the State as a citizen, and there was no compulsion upon him to serve. He took his stand upon the cry, "No vote, no musket."

30th December 1847.

SIR,—Your note of the 30th places Mr. Lovett's refusal to serve in the militia in a different light from that in which I had considered it. Knowing nothing of the fact except from your circular, I had surmised that it might have been founded on such principles as those professed by the Peace Society, principles with which I wholly disagree, as, though I think it an effect of the progress of improvement to put an end to war, I regard war as an infinitely less evil than systematic submission to injustice.

With the principles on which it appears that Mr. Lovett really acted I have much more sympathy, though I do not think, to use your words, that "he would have been false to the principles he professed had he acted otherwise," any more than I think him bound by those principles to refuse the payment of taxes. To resist a social system which one thinks wrong by disobeying the laws in detail

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must, I think, depend for its justification in each particular case on the circumstances and motives which dictated it; but if adopted and acted upon as a principle it would render government impossible under any institutions yet devised, since, in a democracy, minorities might claim and exercise the right of obstructing the execution of all laws which they disapproved.

To Mrs. John Austin,

who was then resident in Paris, immediately after the abdication of Louis Philippe.

27th February 1848.

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Dear Mrs. Austin,—I suppose by this time you are quite convinced that the English at Paris are not in the smallest danger, and that there is no likelihood of any manifestations by the English Government or press which can give umbrage to the French people. I presume the roads are now open, and passports may be had by those who desire them. It was very natural that the Provisional Government should exert its temporary dictatorship to prevent a precipitate flight of foreigners *en masse*, not only because a panic always tends to *spread*, but because a sudden diminution of employment for the population of Paris would have been a great element of disorder.

Next to the admirable conduct of the people and of the new authorities, the most striking thing in these memorable events is the evidence afforded of the complete change of times, the instantaneous and unanimous acquiescence of all France in a republic, while in this country, as far as I can perceive, there is not a particle of the dread and uneasiness which there would have been a few years ago at the idea of a French republic. There is a strong and a very friendly interest felt in the position of France, and in the new and difficult questions which the republican government will have to solve—especially those relating to labour and wages. For my part, I feel the strongest confidence that what will be done or attempted

on that subject will end in good. There will be a good deal of experimental legislation, some of it not very prudent, but there cannot be a better place to try such experiments in than France. I suppose that regulation of industry in behalf of the labourers must go through its various phases of abortive experiment, just as regulation of industry in behalf of the capitalist has done, before it is abandoned, or its proper limits ascertained. 1848 — Aetat. 41.

Who can it be that takes Mr. Austin's name in the *Times* and attempts to imitate his style? I am afraid the letter signed "John Austin" must have been seen by many who never saw the disavowal of it in an obscure corner of the paper—and there were several things in it which it is very disagreeable that Mr. Austin should be supposed to have written, especially the flattery of the *Times*—the meanest, most malicious, and most hypocritical among our very low newspaper press.

To Mrs. Austin,

indicating Mill's difference from John Austin with regard to the French Revolution of 1848.

March (?) 1848.

Dear Mrs. Austin,—I return to you Mr. Austin's letter. I never thought I should have differed from him so widely in feeling on any public event as it appears I do on this. But I cannot think myself unfeeling because I do not attach all the importance which (no doubt from his and your personal relations with some of those concerned) he seems to attach to the effect of the Revolution on individual interests. The monetary crisis in London last October produced quite as much suffering to individuals as has arisen, or, as far as I can see, is likely to arise, from an event which has broken the fetters of all Europe. If it had done no more than emancipate some millions of serfs in Hungary, that, in my eyes, would have been a hundredfold compensation. As for future prospects, nobody, I suppose, is so foolish as not to see that

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there are many unfavourable chances. But to suppose that the unfavourable chances preponderate seems to me, I confess, as much a "dream" as the contrary expectation appears to you. And my hopes rise instead of sinking as the state of things in France unfolds itself.

To Armand Marrast,

then a member of the Provisional Government in France, enclosing a presentation copy of the "Political Economy," which had just been published.

1848.

Mon cher M. Marrast,—Je vous ai adressé un exemplaire d'un traité d'économie politique que je viens de publier, et dans lequel je discute quelques unes des grandes questions sociales dont le gouvernement républicain et l'assemblée nationale auront à s'occuper. Je ne puis espérer qu'au milieu des graves occupations qui vous obsèdent, vous ayez du temps disponible pour la lecture d'un ouvrage théorique. Mais, comme je crois pouvoir affirmer que l'esprit de ce livre est propre à lui assurer votre sympathie, je vous l'offre, afin que si vous ne le lisez pas, vous puissiez, au moins, si vous le jugez à propos, le faire lire à d'autres.

J'ai encore un autre but en vous écrivant. Je ne veux pas m'étendre en phrases générales sur la sympathie profonde que j'éprouve et dois éprouver pour l'œuvre de régénération sociale qui se poursuit maintenant en France. Il faudrait n'avoir aucun sentiment de l'avenir de l'humanité pour ne pas reconnaître que, grâce à la noble initiative prise par la France, ce qui se débat aujourd'hui sur son terrain est l'affaire du genre humain tout entier. Je voudrais ne pas me borner à une stérile admiration, je désirerais apporter à cette grande œuvre mon contingent d'idées et tout ce que j'ai d'utile dans l'intelligence, du moins, jusqu'à ce que mon propre pays, si arriéré à beaucoup d'égards comparé au vôtre, en ait besoin. Je sais que vous ne dirigez plus le *National*, mais votre in-

fluence y doit encore dominer; je vous demande, donc, s'il pourrait convenir à ce journal d'accepter de moi quelques articles que je ferais de temps en temps, soit sur l'état de choses en Angleterre, soit portant sur les questions de politique, générale et sociale. J'essaierais de faire en sorte qu'on pût se dispenser d'un traducteur si vous trouvez mon français assez supportable pour qu'après une révision préalable il puisse passer. Il me semble qu'en designant cette correspondance par une épigraphe particulière, comme par exemple, "Lettres d'un Anglais," on mettrait suffisamment à couvert la responsibilité du journal tant à l'égard du style qu'à celui des opinions. Au reste, la correspondance serait complètement dans le sens du *National*, en tant qu'il s'est prononcé, jusqu'ici; je ne puis donner trop d'éloges au bon sens dont le journal a fait preuve en toute occasion depuis février. En tout cas, que mes idées se trainassent en unisson ou en désaccord avec celles du journal, la rédaction resterait seul juge de leur opportunité. Si l'on accepte ma proposition, il va sans dire que cette collaboration sera gratuite, en ce que concerne la rétribution pécuniare.—Votre dévoué,

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J. S. MILL.

To Eugène Sue,

enclosing a presentation copy of the "Political Economy."

1848.

MONSIEUR,—J'ai pris la liberté de vous adresser un exemplaire d'un traité que je viens de publier sur l'économie politique et sur quelques unes de ses applications à la science sociale.

Ne vous effrayez pas du nom de cet ouvrage. Je vous l'offre pour deux motifs principaux, dont l'un me regarde plus particulièrement moi-même, tandis que l'autre se rapporte à mes sentiments envers vous.

Quant au premier, j'avoue que j'ai eu envie de vous prouver qu'on peut être économiste, et même professer un grand nombre des opinions de Malthus et de Ricardo,

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sans être pour cela un Duriveau, ou un flatteur des Duriveau. Je vous dirai en outre comme fait, que quant aux Duriveau de mon pays si toutefois il y en a, ceux qui se font tous instruments, non seulement, ne professent pas les opinions de ces économistes, mais en général les puent et les conspuent, presqu' autant que vous.

Mon second motif c'est le désir de vous témoigner la vive sympathie que j'éprouve pour le noble esprit de justice et de progrès dont vos derniers romans sont pénétrés, et pour quelques idées capables dont vous vous y êtes fait l'organe. Mon livre vous prouvera que sur la grande question de l'héritage je suis absolument de l'avis du docteur Just; tandis que sur le mariage et sur l'entière égalité de droits entre les hommes et les femmes les opinions de l'auteur de "Martin" et du "Juif Errant" sont non seulement les miennes mais j'ai la conviction profonde que la liberté, la démocratie, la fraternité, ne sont nulle part si ce n'est dans ces opinions, et que l'avenir du progrès social et moral ne se trouve que là.

To John Jay, of New York.

About November 1848.

Dear Sir,—Permit me to return you my best thanks for your handsome present of the American edition of my "Political Economy." . . .

I am obliged to you also for the *North American Review* containing an article on my book. The article is laudatory enough to satisfy an appetite for praise much stronger than mine. But the writer is one whose tone of thinking and feeling is extremely repugnant to me. He gives a totally false idea of the book and of its author when he makes me a participant in the derision with which he speaks of Socialists of all kinds and degrees. I have expressed temperately and argumentatively my objections to the particular plans proposed by Socialists for dispensing with private property; but on many other important points I agree with them, and on none do I feel towards them anything but respect, thinking, on the contrary, that

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they are the greatest element of improvement in the present state of mankind. If the chapter in which I mention them had been written after instead of before the late revolutions on the Continent I should have entered more fully into my opinions on Socialism and have done it much more justice.

On the population question my difference with the reviewer is fundamental, and in the incidental reference which he makes to my assertion of equality of political rights and of social position in behalf of women, the tone assumed by him is really below contempt. But I fear that a country where institutions profess to be founded on equality, and which yet maintains the slavery of black men and of all women, will be one of the last to relinquish that other servitude.

To Emile Littré,

in reply to a circular requesting financial assistance for Auguste Comte.

22nd December 1848.

Monsieur,—J'ai eu l'honneur de recevoir votre circulaire au sujet de M. Comte. Je vous envoie ci-joint un billet de 250 francs comme contribution mais non comme cotisation annuelle. Je vous prie de vouloir bien m'en accuser réception. Je regrette d'apprendre que la position pécuniaire de M. Comte vient d'être encore empirée. J'ai une très haute estime pour ses travaux en ce qui regarde la théorie de la méthode positive, mais je suis très éloigné de sa manière d'appliquer cette méthode aux questions sociales. La plupart de ses opinions sociologiques sont diamétralement opposées aux miennes.

To George Grote.

22nd December 1848.

Dear Mr. Grote,—A short time ago Comte, finding that his attempts to replace by private teaching the deficit in his income did not promise any immediate success,

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asked my opinion as to the possibility of a prolongation, for a short time, of the aid so generously afforded to him last year. I thereupon advised him to write me a letter containing an exact statement of the grounds of his expectations of a change for the better in his position, after which I would have a consultation with you on the subject. This letter, as you will probably be in London again before I shall, I enclose.

In Comte's position I think my conduct would have been different: in the first place, I should have endeavoured by saving to provide a fund for such emergencies, and if this failed I should have preferred living as I could upon my reduced income so long as it was physically possible. But it is to be said for him, on the first point, that he had every reason to believe his income a permanent one, and on the second, that it is harder to be advised to break up all his arrangements and to alter his confirmed habits from a cause which he firmly believes to be not only temporary, but of very short duration. If, therefore, you think that it would be possible and advisable to raise another subscription for him I should be happy, in case of need, to contribute my part towards it. At the same time, as he certainly does not mean to be understood as asking for such a favour, so, if the answer be negative, it need not have the character of a refusal.

To Dr. W. G. Ward,

touching on a variety of religious and other topics.

Spring of 1849.

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Dear Sir,—You have given me six months to answer all your questions. I think you ought to allow me six volumes too; for if the questions occupy so many pages, what must the answers? I could give no doubt some sort of replies to most of your queries in a few sentences, but they would not be such as could be satisfactory either to you or to myself. However, your letter is a sort of challenge which I am unwilling to refuse, though aware that

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what I say will give scarcely the faintest idea of how much there *is* to say, and though I do not undertake to carry on the discussion any further. If I did, each answer would suggest further questions, and these would require longer answers, till I should be led into writing a treatise on each point—which, though if I live I may probably do, at any rate I had rather defer until I can do it thoroughly and in a shape for permanent use.

1st. Your explanations do not at all clear up, to my apprehension, what I think the inconsistency of blending high moral praise with the strongest language of moral reprobation. You say that certain states of mind are sinful in the greatest degree, yet that for those states the individual may possibly be not at all responsible. I can understand that persons may hold false and pernicious opinions conscientiously, and may have defects or peculiarities of character which, both in themselves and in their consequences, are extremely undesirable, yet to which their own wishes or voluntary conduct having in no way contributed, they are not morally accountable for them. But to call anything a sin and yet say that the sinner is not accountable for it, seems to me, if the word sin means anything, a direct contradiction. It is you who appear to be chargeable with what my opinions are usually charged with, viz., confounding the distinction between moral badness and mere aberration in a person or thing from the ideal perfection of the kind of being it belongs to. I recognise two kinds of imperfections: those which come independently of our will, and which our will could not prevent, and for these we are not accountable; and those which our will has either positively or negatively assisted in producing, and for which we *are* accountable. The former may be very hurtful to ourselves and offensive to others, but in *us* they are not morally culpable. The latter *are*. You ride over this (as it seems to me) perfectly definite distinction by the ambiguous word *sin*, under which a third class of defects of character finds entrance which is supposed to unite both attributes—to be culpable and ultra-culpable, although the person thus morally guilty

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cannot help it. This seems to me to exemplify the unmeaningness of the word sin, which, if it is anything other than the theological synonym of "morally wrong," is a name for something which I do not admit to exist.

2nd. On the subject out of which this discussion grew, population, marriage, &c., we differ so utterly that there seems not even a chance of our doing ourselves or each other any good by discussing it. Our ideas of moral obligation on the subject are completely incompatible; the repugnancy goes down to the very root of the subject, and I entertain quite as uncomplimentary an opinion of your mode of regarding these questions as you can possibly do of mine. Two sentences will give some little notion of the wideness of our divergence. You think that the legality or illegality of an act makes a difference (not in its being right or wrong, socially speaking—but) in its purity or impurity, and you think that a man can, without forfeiting his title to respect, live in the habitual practice of that which he feels to be degrading to him. I, on the contrary, cannot conceive anything more gross and grovelling than the conception involved in the first supposition and the conduct described in the second. They appear to me the extreme of animalism and sensuality in the fullest sense of the bad meaning of those terms.

I will say no more on this subject except to correct a mistake you have made about my opinions on population. I do not know where you find that, on my showing, the evils of over-population are in some distant future. On the contrary, I hold with Malthus that they are, and have been throughout history, almost everywhere present, and often in great intensity.

3rd. You ask what are the natural instincts that civilisation has strikingly and memorably conquered. I answer, nearly all: *e.g.*, the instinct of taking a thing we very much wish for, wherever we find it—food, for instance, when we are hungry. The instinct of knocking down a person who offends us, if we are the strongest. As a rather different example, take the eminently artificial virtue of cleanliness; think what savages are, and what violence must be done to

the natural man to produce the feelings which civilised people have on this point; take again all the delicacies respecting bodily physicalities which savages have not a vestige of, but which, in the artificialised human being, often equal in intensity any human feelings, natural or artificial. 1849 — Aetat. 42.

4th. As to the opinion I expressed in the "Logic," that miracles are evidence of a revelation only to those who already believe in a God, or at least in supernatural beings; what I meant is this: we can never know that what is presented to us as a miracle is so. The proof can only be negative, viz., that we do not know any mode in which the thing can have been produced by natural means; and what is this worth when we are so ignorant of nature? Two years ago a man who, by passing a handkerchief across a person's face, could plunge him into a sort of ecstasy during which a limb could be cut off without pain, would have given apparent evidence of miraculous powers equal to any saint in the calendar. You ask, But what if the man himself, being morally trustworthy, affirms that it is a miracle? I answer, This would in many cases convince me that he himself *believed* it to be one; but that would weigh for absolutely nothing with me, as it is the easiest and commonest fact in the world, especially in an unscientific state of the human mind, that people should sincerely ascribe any peculiar and remarkable power in themselves to divine gift, and any unexpected prompting of their own minds to a divine communication. If the spectator did not previously believe in supernatural powers an apparent miracle will never give him, I conceive, any reason for believing in them, while he is aware that there are natural powers unknown to him; but if he does already believe in supernatural powers he has the choice between two agencies, both of which he feels assured really exist, and he therefore may and ought to consider which of the two is the most *probable* in the individual instance.

Next, as to Christianity. You need not have supposed any inclination in me to speak with irreverence of Jesus Christ. He is one of the very few historical characters for

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whom I have a real and high respect. But there is not, to me, the smallest proof of his having ever said that he worked miracles—nor, if he did, should I feel obliged either to believe the fact, or to disbelieve his veracity. Respecting St. Paul I have a very different feeling. I hold him to have been the first great corrupter of Christianity. He never saw Christ, never was under his personal influence, hardly even alludes to any of his deeds or sayings, seems to have kept aloof from all who had known him, and, in short, made up a religion which is Paulism, but not, *me judice*, Christianity. Even St. Paul, however, though I would by no means answer for *his* sincerity, never, that I know of, speaks of any *particular* miracle as having been wrought by him; he only speaks, generally, of signs and wonders which may mean anything. The author of the Acts does speak of particular miracles, and those, like the miracles of the Gospel, I no more believe than I do the miraculous cures mentioned by Tacitus as wrought by Vespasian. I regard them simply as part of the halo which popular enthusiasm throws round its heroes. The argument of the "Horæ Paulinæ" scarcely aims at proving more than that St. Paul really wrote the epistles ascribed to him, which, in respect to all but one or two of them, no competent inquirer, I believe, seriously doubts (the case is very different from that of the Gospels), and that the Acts are, in part, an authentic record of St. Paul's life, which I see no reason to disbelieve, any more than that Livy is in part a true history of Rome, and Herodotus of the countries of which he treats. Since I am on the subject I will add that I cannot conceive how, except from deep-rooted impressions of education, any reasonable person can attach value to any attestations of a miracle in an age when everybody was ready to believe miracles the moment they were attested, and even enemies, instead of denying the facts, ascribed them to diabolical agency. I would say to such a person, only read any book which gives a really living picture of, let us say, the Oriental mind of the present day. You there see hundreds of millions of people to whose habits of thought supernatural agency is of such everyday familiarity that if you tell them

any strange fact, and say it is miraculous, they believe you at once, but if you give them a physical explanation of it, they think you a juggler and an impostor. Add to this that until long after the time Christianity began you hardly find a trace, even in the best minds, of any regard for abstract veracity—any feeling which should prevent a teacher from deceiving the people for their good. Plato, the highest expression, probably, of the ethical philosophy of the ancient world, and the elevated nature of whose purposes it is impossible to doubt, thought it the duty of legislators to pretend a supernatural origin for their precepts, as all very early legislators seem to have done. 1849 — Aetat. 42.

These are, I think, the more important topics of your letter. As to the condition of the labouring people as compared with former times, I incline to think them worse off as to quantity, though not quality, of food than three centuries ago, and better off as to clothing and lodging—but there is a sad dearth of facts that can be relied on. You speak of Macaulay and D'Israeli as authorities—anything that Macaulay says is not matter of observation, but of inference and argument, of which one must judge for oneself. As for D'Israeli and his Sybil, I cannot imagine its being received as testimony, or supposed to be anything but a commonplace story.

I am afraid I cannot be of any use to you in recommending treatises on astronomy, as it is many years since I read any of the more deeply mathematical sort. The most recent that I have read is that of Biot, which is probably by this time superseded. I have never read Laplace's "Mécanique Céleste," but have understood that it is the most obscure, and by no means the best, of the treatises on the subject. Most probably Pontécoulant will answer your purpose. Nobody, I believe, ever hazarded a conjecture when the supposed condensation of the sun's atmosphere began, nor whether it is indefinitely progressive, or forms part of a cycle including periods of expansion as well as of contraction. I believe it is thought, though I know not on what grounds, that the throwing off of new planets has ceased. It is, I believe, mathematically demonstrable that

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the supposed change could not alter the centre of gravity of the solar system, and therefore (as it cannot alter the total mass of matter) would make no difference in the orbits of the planets, or in any of the other effects of gravitation.

The opinion that all axioms are provided in the evidence of experience, rests, to my own mind, on the most complete proof; but I always knew it would be very difficult to bring home that evidence to those trained in a different school of psychology from mine. Accordingly, I have failed to make you see (I do not mean *admit*) the main and characteristic points of my doctrine on the subject, viz., that our not being able to conceive a thing is no evidence of the thing being in itself impossible. You understand me correctly to say that the absence of any law of causation in some distant star, not only is, for anything we know, perfectly possible, but is even conceivable—but you ask, is it conceivable that in such a state two straight lines may inclose a space? I say, certainly it is *not* conceivable, but that does not prove to me that the thing is impossible, since the limitation may be in our faculties, and in the allpervadingness, to us, of a contrary experience. Again, "the possibility of proving geometrical first principles by merely mental experimentation" seems to me to arise from previous experience, that in this particular department what is true of our mental images is true also of their originals, which I illustrated in the "Logic" by the case of a daguerreotype.

I agree with you that ratiocinative logic may usefully be taught separately from inductive, and belongs, indeed, to an earlier stage in mental instruction.

It is so long since I read Butler, and I have so little faith in opinions which we are not constantly revising, that I will not venture to express an opinion of him. I know that my father thought the argument of the "Analogy" conclusive against *Deists*, with whom alone Butler professes to argue, and I have heard my father say that it kept him for some time a believer in Christianity. I was not prepared by what I had heard from him for so

contemptuous an opinion as is indicated in some passages of the "Fragment," though he never can have thought highly of Butler except by comparison with other writers of the same general tendency in opinion.

I am convinced that competent judges, who have sufficient experience of children, will not agree in the opinion you express, that they have a natural idea of right or duty. I am satisfied that all such ideas in children are the result of inculcation, and that were it not for inculcation they would not exist at all, except in a few persons of pre-eminent genius and feeling.

I have followed your example in expressing my meaning without polite circumlocutions, as I believe you really wish that I should, and any appearance of egotism or dogmatism in what I have said, you will, I hope, not attribute to my thinking my opinion important because it is mine, but will remember that what you asked me to do was to tell you, as a matter of fact, what *my* opinions are, and that, too, on subjects on which they are strong, and have been much and long considered.—I am, dear Sir, very truly yours,

J. S. MILL.

I should have answered your letter weeks ago had I not been out of town on account of health.

To WILLIAM CONNER,

in reply to a letter from him thanking Mill for a favourable allusion to his views on the Irish Land question, in the "Political Economy."

26th September 1849.

SIR,—Your letter, dated two months ago, has from various causes remained too long unanswered, and your present of the volume of your collected writings, unacknowledged. I was already acquainted with some, though not all, of your pamphlets, and had seen enough in them to convince me that you had found the true explanation of

1849 — Aetat. 43.

the poverty and non-improvement of the Irish tenantry. The letting of the land, by a virtual auction, to competitors much more numerous than the farms to be disposed of, whose numbers are constantly increasing, and who have no means of subsistence but by obtaining land on whatever terms, ensures their giving up to the landlord the whole produce of the land minus a bare subsistence, and putting themselves completely in his power by promising even more than that. And, as you have so well pointed out, it is impossible, while this system lasts, that the people can derive benefit from anything which would otherwise tend to improve their condition, the tenant being a mere channel through which the benefit, whatever it may be, is diverted into the pocket of the landlord. Your proposal of a valuation and a perpetuity is the only one that I am aware of that goes to the root of the mischief. When I published the treatise of which you make such flattering mention,[1] I thought that a perpetual tenure, either rent free, or at a fixed low rent, conferred on those who would occupy and reclaim waste lands, would be sufficient to meet the evil. I thought that distribution of the waste lands in permanent property among the class of small farmers would draft off so many of the competitors for the other lands as to render the competition innocuous, the rents moderate, the country tranquil, and, by removing the obstacle to the introduction of English capital, enable the peasantry to earn at least English wages. And I still believe that the plan might have produced these effects if tried before the enactment of the present Poor Law. That law, however, has commenced a train of events which must terminate, I think, in the adoption of something equivalent to your plan. Men who could not learn from reason, are learning from experiment, that neither English buyers nor English farmers will take land in Munster or Connaught subject to the liabilities of the Poor Law. If, therefore, the land is to be cultivated at all, it must be by the Irish peasantry; and as these, whether ejected or not, cannot now be starved while the landlord has anything to give them, he will

[1] [The "Political Economy."]

probably in the end be obliged to bribe them to work by giving them an interest in the land. 1849 — Aetat. 43.

I lament that exertions so promising as those in which you were engaged have been cut short by personal misfortunes. I trust there is yet a chance of your being one day in a condition to renew those exertions, in which I believe you would now find many more coadjutors than before. The progress of events and of opinion has left such political economists as those whose dicta you relate, very far behind, and their authority will soon stand as low as it deserves. My object in writing a treatise on Political Economy was to rescue from the hands of such people the truths they misapply, and by combining these with other truths to which they are strangers, to deduce conclusions capable of being of some use to the progress of mankind. The sympathy you express in this attempt induces me to request your acceptance of a copy of the book, which I hope will reach you shortly after you receive this letter.

To W. J. Fox,

on religious and moral instruction in schools.

End of 1849.

MY DEAR SIR,—I return the Resolutions with some notes on two or three of them. You will see that, with the exception of the eighth Resolution, which seems to me objectionable *in toto*, the fault I find with the plan is that it is a kind of compromise—since it admits as much religious instruction as is given in the Irish National Schools, and not admits, but demands, what is called moral instruction.

The stupid doctrines which alone the plan excludes, generally lie dead in the minds of children, having hardly any effect, good or bad—the real harm being done by the circulation of the common moralities. I know that compromises are often inevitable in practice, but I think they should be left to the enemy to propose—reformers should assert principles and only *accept* compromises.

1849 — Aetat. 43.

I am very glad to see you active, and on so important a subject. There is something like a stir beginning again among the Liberal members of Parliament, which will give a chance of a good following to whoever takes the lead in anything useful.

Notes appended to the above letter.

3rd Resolution.—I would omit the words *including moral instruction.* What the sort of people who will have the management of any such schools mean by moral instruction, is much the same thing as what they mean by religious instruction, only lowered to the world's practice. It means cramming the children *directly* with all the common *professions* about what is right and wrong, and about the worth of different objects in life, and filling them indirectly with the spirit of all the notions on such matters which vulgar-minded people are in the habit of acting on without consciously professing. I know it is impossible to prevent much of this from being done—but the less of it there is the better, and I would not set people upon doing more of it than they might otherwise do, by insisting expressly on *moral* instruction.

If it were possible to provide for giving *real* moral instruction it would be worth more than all else that schools can do. But no programme of moral instruction, which would be really good, would have a chance of being assented to or followed by the manager of a general scheme of public instruction in the present state of people's minds.

5th Resolution.—The National Schools of Ireland are, I believe, the best among *existing* models; but they are unsectarian only in a narrow sense. They are not unsectarian as between Christian and non-Christian. They are not purely for secular instruction. They use selections from the Bible, and therefore teach the general recognition of that book as containing the system and history of creation and the commands of an all-wise and good being. Any system of instruction, which does this, contains, I conceive, a great part of all the mischief done by a purely

Church or purely Dissenting education. Is it not better, even in policy, to make the omission altogether of religion from State schools the avowed object? 1849 — Aetat. 43.

8th Resolution.—This seems to be very objectionable. If any public body were empowered to prevent a person from practising as a teacher without a certificate of competency, no person believed to think or act in opposition to any of the ordinary standards, or who is supposed to be an "unbeliever," would ever be allowed to teach. No Socialist or even Chartist would have (especially in times of political alarm) the smallest chance. No such person could keep even a private school, much less be teacher in a public one. I have never seen the body that I would trust with the power of pronouncing persons incompetent for this or any other profession. Neither do I see what purpose this resolution is intended to answer. No doubt persons grossly incompetent do try to get a living as schoolmasters, but the remedy for this is to provide better ones, and the other resolutions ensure this in every district. Besides, this evil would soon take care of itself if the mass of people had even a little education.

To Edward Herford, Coroner of Manchester,

in reply to a letter from him, inviting Mill to join a society called the "Poor Law Reform Association."

January 1850.

Sir,—I have to acknowledge your communication of January 9th, inclosing a statement of the principles and objects of a proposed Association, which you do me the honour of wishing that I should join, and inviting me to communicate any observations which the paper suggests to me. 1850 — Aetat. 43.

In some of the objects of the address, and in some of the doctrines laid down in it, there is much that I agree with, but the question is, I think, more complicated than the writer seems to consider it. The present mode

1850 — Aetat. 43.

of legal relief to the destitute was not adopted on any such absurd ground as that "it is better that the unemployed should be idle than usefully employed," or better that the funds expended in supporting them should be consumed without a return than *with* a return. The "principle" acted on was, that by selecting employment for paupers with reference to its suitableness as a test for destitution, rather than to its productiveness, it was possible to make the conditions of relief sufficiently undesirable to prevent its acceptance by any who could find private employment. But if the State or the parish provides ordinary work, at ordinary wages, for all the unemployed, the work so provided cannot be made less desirable, and can scarcely be prevented from being more desirable than any other employment. It would therefore become necessary, either that the State should arbitrarily limit its operations (in which case no material advantage would arise from their having been commenced), or that it should be willing to take the whole productive industry of the country under the direction of its own officers.

You will perhaps say that these consequences could only arise if the work required in exchange for public pay were (as it usually has been) merely nominal; and that you rely, for preventing such a consummation, on the principle on which you justly lay so much stress, that of payment proportionate to the work done. It was tried, as I have understood, in the Irish Relief Works, and with the result which might be expected—viz., that if the rate of payment by the piece was sufficiently liberal not to overtask the feeble and unskilful, it enabled the strong and experienced workman to earn so much with perfect ease that all other employment was rapidly deserted for that held out by the public.

My own opinion is, that when productive employment can be claimed by every one from the public as a right, it can only be rendered undesirable by being made virtually slave labour; and I therefore deprecate the enforcement of such a right, until society is prepared to adopt the other side of the alternative, that of making the pro-

duction and distribution of wealth a public concern. I think it probable that to this, in some form (though I would not undertake to say in what), the world will come, but not without other great changes; certainly not in a society composed, like the present, of rich and poor, in which the direction of industry by a public authority would be only substituting a combination of rich men, armed with coercive power, for the competition of individual capitalists. 1850 — Aetat. 43.

At present I expect very little from any plans which aim at improving even the economical state of the people by purely economical or political means. We have come, I think, to a period, when progress even of a political kind is coming to a halt, by reason of the low intellectual and moral state of all classes, and of the rich as much as of the poorer classes only. Great improvements in education (among the first of which I reckon dissevering it from bad religion) is the only thing to which I should look for permanent good. For example, the objects of your Association, and those of the promoters of emigration, even if they could be successful in putting an end to indigence, would do no more than put off to another generation the necessity of adopting a sounder morality on the subject of over-population, which sounder morality, even if it were not necessary to prevent the evils of poverty, would equally be requisite in order to put an end to the slavery to which the existing state of things condemns women; a greater object, in my estimation, both in itself and in its tendencies, than the mere physical existence either of women or men. I am sorry to see in your circular the ignorant and immoral doctrine that the separation enforced in the workhouse is among the sources of "degradation" and diminished "self-respect" for the pauper. I consider it an essential part of the moral training which, in many ways (but in none more important), the reception of public relief affords an opportunity of administering, and the improvement of which would be a reform in Poor Law management better worth aiming at, I think, than that which you propose.

To Edward Herford;

a sequel to the preceding letter.

February 1850.

1850 — Aetat. 43.

Sir,—I am sensible of the compliment paid to me by the promoters of the "Poor Law Reform Association" in their willingness to make some modifications in the terms of their address if I shall thus be enabled to concur in it. But my differences from them are too wide to admit of co-operation. My objection is not founded on any mischief which I expect from the practical recommendations in the address, but on what seems to me the merely superficial character of everything that it proposes or contemplates. The plan will, I conceive, have no effect at all on the permanent and hereditary paupers, who form the great mass of the pauperism of the country. Manufacturing operatives are, as you say, often thrown out of employment in great numbers at once, by the vicissitudes of trade, and the means, during such intervals, of employing them so as to reproduce their subsistence would be a useful thing, doubtless, but I cannot think that it would amount to any social reform; it seems to me more the concern of the ratepayers than of any one else. Of course, I make no objection to considering and discussing the means of doing this, but it is not a thing in which I feel called upon to take a part.

It is not necessary that I should comment on the many things in your letter with which entirely I disagree; I will merely observe on a matter of fact, that, though I am aware that piecework was not the original principle either of the Irish relief works or of the *ateliers nationaux*, I have a most distinct recollection that in one or other, and I believe in both, it was had recourse to on failure of the original plans, and with the effects which I mentioned. —I am, Sir, yours truly,

J. S. Mill.

To Walter Coulson,

on reading an article by Charles Kingsley on Free Trade.

India House, *22nd November* 1850.

1850 — Aetat. 44.

Dear Coulson,—Since receiving your note I have read Mr. Kingsley's article. I think it an effective piece of controversial writing; and as against the Edinburgh Professor, whom he attacks, he has the best of the argument. I agree with him that if farmers cannot cultivate with a profit under free trade the fault is in their own ignorance and indolence or the greediness of their landlords—and also that if farmers cannot or will not do it, peasant proprietors or co-operative villages can. If I could really think that free trade would break up the present system of landlords, farmers, and labourers for hire, I should think the repeal of the Corn Laws a far greater and more beneficial event than I have hitherto believed it.

In the imaginary dialogue between Common Sense and a Protectionist, there are several propositions of political economy which I think erroneous; first, corn laws make food dearer, but I do not agree in the proposition that they make it less plentiful. If, notwithstanding the higher price, the consumers are willing to buy the same quantity, the same quantity will be produced. Second, I do not admit that cheap food makes other things cheap, since it does not diminish the cost of producing or importing other things. Third, neither do I think that the cheapening of food necessarily lowers wages. When it does so, it is only gradually, by giving a stimulus to population, unless there is already a surplus of unemployed labourers supported by charity. Fourth, when the fall of wages comes (if it does come) I agree with the writer, that wages do not fall in proportion to the fall in the price of food—for the reason he gives, viz., that wages are not wholly spent on food, but partly on things which have not fallen; and, for example, if half the labourer's expenditure con-

1850 — Aetat. 44.

sists of food, and food falls ten per cent., the utmost fall of wages which would ensue would be five per cent. But the writer seems to forget that by the hypothesis, a fall of five per cent. in wages would be sufficient to deprive the labourer of all advantage from the fall of ten per cent. in food; so that his argument proves nothing for his purpose.

On a subject which has been so much and so well discussed as the free trade question one has no right to require new ideas. There is an original idea in the article, but I am afraid it is an erroneous one. The writer says, that animals give back to the soil (when there is no waste of manure) all the materials which they take from it in nutriment, and he thinks this proves that however much population might increase, production would increase in the same ratio. I apprehend it only proves that the power of production would never be exhausted, but not that it admits of indefinite increase. To make out his point he must maintain that the soil will yield a double produce on the application of a double quantity of manure. So far from this, it is well known that manure beyond a certain point injures the crop.

The remainder of the political economy of the article I agreed with, to the best of my remembrance; but much of the incidental matter I totally dissent from. It is not Mr. Kingsley's socialism that stands in the way of our agreement; I am far more a socialist than he is. It is the old, not the new part of his opinions which forms the gulf between us. This very article talks of the "righteous judgments" of one who visits the sins of the fathers upon the children. To such a degree does religion, or what is so called, pervert morality. How can morality be anything but the chaos it now is when the ideas of right and wrong, just and unjust, must be wrenched into accordance either with the notions of a tribe of barbarians in a corner of Syria three thousand years ago, or with what is called the order of Providence—in other words, the course of nature, of which so great a part is tyranny, iniquity, and all the things which are punished as the

most atrocious crimes when done by human creatures, being the daily doings of nature through the whole range of organic life. 1850 — Aetat. 44.

Mr. Kingsley's notions must be little less vague about my political economy than about my socialism when he couples my name with that of a mere tyro like Harriet Martineau.

To the Editor of the *Weekly Dispatch.*

This letter appears not to have been printed.

1st February 1851.

SIR,—I cannot remain quite silent on the unjust and unfounded attacks made by the *Dispatch* on those whom it calls by the old-fashioned appellation of sceptics. In the first article of the number for January 26th there is a charge against all who hold merely negative opinions on religion of being "Epicureans," who "take the world as they find it"; of "believing in nothing," being "earnest in nothing," being "merely speculative, and inquisitive, logical thinking machines." Whoever wrote these accusations, believing them to be true, is as ignorant of life and the world, and of the opinions of instructed persons in the present age, as a Church of England parson. I affirm that nearly all the persons I have known who were, and are, eminently distinguished by a passion for the good of mankind hold the opinions respecting religion which your article stigmatises; that is, they think that nothing can be known on the subject. The very phrase, "believing nothing," as a synonym for believing no religious creed, as if nothing were true or false, right or wrong, except with reference to some theory of creation, is one of the calumnies of short-sighted and ignorant intolerance. But your writer, like other heretics, must have a scapegoat to whom to pass on the slanders thrown upon themselves, and be able to say to the bigots, "It is not I, it is my brother." According to him, those who pull down one positive reli- 1851 — Aetat. 44.

1851 — Aetat. 44.

gion, if it is to put up another, however slight and flimsy, are heroes; but if they see no sufficient evidence for any belief as to the origin and purpose of the world, and will not succumb to the vulgar by professing any, against them you indorse the accusations of the orthodox. The smallest ray of dogmatic religion is enough, in the opinion of its professors, to entitle them to call themselves infinitely higher and worthier than those who profess no dogmatic belief. But as all my own experience and observation lead me to an exactly opposite conclusion, I strenuously deny the accusation in the *Dispatch*, and charge the writer of it with bearing false witness against his neighbour.

The following is the statement signed by Mill on his marriage with Mrs. Taylor (see facsimile):—

6th March 1851.

Being about, if I am so happy as to obtain her consent, to enter into the marriage relation with the only woman I have ever known, with whom I would have entered into that state; and the whole character of the marriage relation as constituted by law being such as both she and I entirely and conscientiously disapprove, for this among other reasons, that it confers upon one of the parties to the contract, legal power and control over the person, property, and freedom of action of the other party, independent of her own wishes and will; I, having no means of legally divesting myself of these odious powers (as I most assuredly would do if an engagement to that effect could be made legally binding on me), feel it my duty to put on record a formal protest against the existing law of marriage, in so far as conferring such powers; and a solemn promise never in any case or under any circumstances to use them. And in the event of marriage between Mrs. Taylor and me I declare it to be my will and intention, and the condition of the engagement between us, that she retains in all

Being about, if I am so happy as to obtain her consent, to enter into the marriage relation with the only woman I have ever known, with whom I would have entered into that state; & the whole character of the marriage relation as constituted by law being such as both she and I entirely & conscientiously disapprove, for this among other reasons, that it confers upon one of the parties to the contract, legal power & control over the person, property, & freedom of action of the other party, independent of her own wishes and will; I, having no means of legally divesting myself of these odious powers (as I most assuredly would do if an engagement to that effect could be made legally binding on me) feel it my duty to put on record a

formal protest against the existing law of marriage, in so far as conferring such powers; and a solemn promise never in any case & under any circumstances to use them. And in the event of marriage between Mrs Taylor and me I declare it to be my will and intention, & the condition of the engagement between us, that she retains in all respects whatever the same absolute freedom of action, & freedom of disposal of herself and of all that does or may at any time belong to her, as if no such marriage had taken place; and I absolutely disclaim & repudiate all pretension to have acquired any rights whatever by virtue of such marriage.

J. S. Mill.

6th March 1851

respects whatever the same absolute freedom of action, and freedom of disposal of herself and of all that does or may at any time belong to her, as if no such marriage had taken place; and I absolutely disclaim and repudiate all pretence to have acquired any *rights* whatever by virtue of such marriage. J. S. MILL. 1851 — Aetat. 44.

To F. LUCAS,

in reply to an invitation to stand for Parliament for an Irish county.

INDIA HOUSE, 28*th March* 1851.

DEAR SIR,—I beg that you will make my respectful acknowledgments to the Council of the Tenant League for the great honour they have done me by their proposal, communicated through you and Mr. Duffy, and by the very flattering terms of their resolution. If it were in my power to go into Parliament at present, I should be highly gratified by being returned for a purpose so congenial to my principles and convictions as the reform of the pernicious system of land tenure which, more than any other cause, keeps the great body of the agricultural population of Ireland always on the verge of starvation. You are aware, however, that I hold an office under the East India Company, which, of necessity, occupies a large portion of my time, and I have reason to believe that the Court of Directors would consider a seat in Parliament as incompatible with it. Whatever, therefore, I might have done under other circumstances, I am compelled to decline the offered honour, and I feel it right to do so at once, rather than (as you suggest) to leave the question in any degree open, since I could not in fairness allow any trouble to be taken for a purpose which would merely give greater publicity to the honour intended me, while I could not hold out the prospect of its leading to any practical result. . . .

To Sir George Grey,

then Home Secretary in Lord John Russell's Government. Mill has recorded on this letter that it was "only officially acknowledged."

15th May 1851.

1851 — Aetat. 44.

Sir,—I hope I may be pardoned for addressing to you in this form rather than through the newspapers a remonstrance against the gross insult to every woman in the country which has found its way into the Government Bill now passing through the House of Commons for regulating the sale of arsenic. The clause, which did not form part of the Bill as it came from the hands of its framers, but was added in the House of Lords at the suggestion of some unknown person, is that which forbids arsenic to be sold in less quantity than ten pounds to any person "other than a male person of full age," all women, from the highest to the lowest, being declared unfit to have poison in their possession lest they shall commit murder. It is impossible to believe that so monstrous a proposition could have obtained the assent of Government except through inadvertence; and an individual, though personally unknown to you, may hope to be excused if, at the hazard of being thought intrusive, he takes such means as are in his power of soliciting from you that attention to the subject which, he is persuaded, cannot yet have been given to it.

If the Bill passes with this clause, it is a retrograde step in legislation, and a return to the ideas and practices of barbarous ages. One of the characteristics of the improved spirit of the present time is the growing tendency to the elevation of women, towards their relief from disabilities, their increased estimation, the assignment to them of a higher position, both social and domestic. But this clause is a blind step in the wrong direction. It singles out women for the purpose of degrading them. It establishes a special restriction, a peculiar disqualification against them alone. It assumes

that women are more addicted than men to committing murder! Does the criminal calendar, or the proceedings of the police courts, show a preponderance of women among the most atrocious criminals? Everybody knows that the direct contrary is the truth, and that men outnumber women in the records of crime in the ratio of four to one. On what supposition are men to be trusted with poisons and women not, unless that of their peculiar wickedness? While the spirit of the age and the tendency of all improvement is to make woman the equal of man, this Bill puts on them the stamp of the most degrading inferiority, precisely where the common voice of mankind proclaims them superior—in moral goodness. 1851 — Aetat. 44.

If all the restrictions imposed by this Bill were common to men and women, it would be giving up, *pro tanto*, the peculiar and one of the most valuable characteristics of English freedom; it would be treating all mankind, except the Government and its agents, as children; but it would be giving an equal measure of justice to all, and would be no insult and disparagement peculiarly to any. The Legislature will not declare that Englishmen cannot be trusted with poisons, but it is not ashamed to assert that Englishwomen cannot. A law which, if common to both, would be merely a specimen of timidity and over-caution, is, when limited to women, a legislative declaration that Englishwomen are poisoners—Englishwomen as a class, as distinguished from Englishmen. And for what reason, or under what incitement, is this insult passed upon them? Because among the last dozen murders there were two or three cases, which attracted some public attention, of poisoning by women. Is it the part of a legislature to shape its laws to the accidental peculiarities of the latest crime reported in the newspapers? If the last two or three murderers had been men with red hair, as well might Parliament have rushed to pass an Act restricting all red-haired men from buying or possessing deadly weapons.

The silence of all who, from their position, could have

1851 — Aetat. 45.

made their voices heard, will, I hope, be my excuse for addressing to you, even at so late a period, this appeal.—I have the honour to be, Sir, your obedient servant,

J. S. MILL.

To JOHN CHAPMAN,

on the first draft of the prospectus of the *Westminster Review*.

9th June 1851.

SIR,—I have read the prospectus on which you ask my opinion, and I now put down some of the remarks which occur to me on the subject. The prospectus is addressed to "the friends of philosophic reform"; I think this a bad phrase. "Philosophic reformers" is a worn-out and gone-by expression; it had a meaning twenty years ago; "philosophic reform" does not, to my mind, carry any meaning at all unless to signify a reform in philosophy.

The prospectus says that the *Review* is to be "distinctly characterised by certain definite but broad principles"; but instead of laying down any such principles it contains little else than details of the measures which the *Review* will advocate on the principal political questions just now discussed in the newspapers. The only sentence which seems intended for a declaration of principles is that forming the third paragraph, and this, so far from "distinctly characterising" any set of opinions or course of conduct, contains nothing to distinguish the *Review* from any Liberal or semi-Liberal newspaper or periodical, or from anybody who says he is for reform but not for revolution. The doctrine stated, such as it is, I do not agree in. Instead of thinking that "strength and durability are the result only of a slow and peaceful development," I think that changes effected rapidly and by force are often the only ones which in given circumstances would be permanent; and by the statement that "reforms, to be salutary, must be graduated to the average

moral and intellectual growth of society," I presume is meant (though I am by no means sure about the meaning, if any) that the measures of a Government ought never to be in advance of the average intellect and virtue of the people, according to which doctrine there would never have been the Reformation, the Commonwealth, or the Revolution of 1688; and the stupidity and habitual indifference of the mass of mankind would bear down by its dead weight all the efforts of the more intelligent and active-minded few. 1851 — Aetat. 45.

The prospectus says "the *Review* will not neglect that important range of subjects which are related to politics as an inner concentric circle, and which have been included under the term sociology." I understand by sociology not a particular *class* of subjects included *within* politics, but a vast field *including* it—the whole field of inquiry and speculation respecting human society and its arrangements, of which the forms of government and the principles of the conduct of governments are but a part. And it seems to me impossible that even the politics of the day can be discussed on principle or with a view to anything but the exigencies of the moment unless by setting out from definite opinions respecting social questions more fundamental than what is commonly called politics. I cannot therefore understand how a review making the professions which the prospectus does, can treat such questions as a particular "range of subjects" which will merely not be neglected, and on which "diverse theories" will be considered with a view chiefly to ascertain "how far our efforts after a more perfect social state must be *restrained*" by certain conditions mentioned. I confess it seems to me the only worthy object of a review of progress is to consider how far and in what manner such objects may be *promoted*, and how the obstacles, whether arising from the cause mentioned or from any other, may most effectually be overcome.

In conclusion, I think it right to say that if your wish to consult me respecting the *Westminster Review* arises

1851 — Aetat. 45.

from any belief that I am likely to be a contributor to it, I can hold out no prospect that the expectation will be realised. My willingness to contribute even occasionally to the *Westminster* under any new management would entirely depend on the opinion I form of it after seeing it in operation.

CHAPTER V

1852–1856

To the Rev. H. W. Carr, of South Shields, in reply to a letter from him.

7th January 1852.

1852 — Aetat. 45.

Sir,—Want of time has prevented me from returning an earlier answer to your letter of 31st December. The question you ask me is one of the most difficult which any one can put either to others or to himself, namely, how to teach social science to the uneducated, when those who are called the educated have not learnt it; and nearly all the teaching given from authority is opposed to genuine morality.

What the poor as well as the rich require is not to be indoctrinated, is not to be taught other people's opinions, but to be induced and enabled to think for themselves. It is not physical science that will do this, even if they could learn it much more thoroughly than they are able to do. After reading, writing, and arithmetic (the last a most important discipline in habits of accuracy and precision, in which they are extremely deficient), the desirable thing for them seems to be the most miscellaneous information, and the most varied exercise of their faculties. They cannot read too much. Quantity is of more importance than quality, especially all reading which relates to human life and the ways of mankind; geography, voyages and travels, manners and customs, and romances, which must tend to awaken their imagination and give them some of the meaning of self-devotion and heroism, in short, to unbrutalise them. By such reading they would become, to a certain extent, cultivated beings, which they would not become by following out, even to the greatest length,

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physical science. As for education in the best sense of the term, I fear they have a long time to wait for it. The higher and middle classes cannot educate the working classes unless they are first educated themselves. The miserable pretence of education, which those classes now receive, does not form minds fit to undertake the guidance of other minds, or to exercise a beneficent influence over them by personal contact. Still, any person who sincerely desires whatever is for the good of all, however it may affect himself or his own class, and who regards the great social questions as matters of reason and discussion and not as settled long ago, may, I believe, do a certain amount of good by merely saying to the working classes whatever he sincerely thinks on the subjects on which they are interested. Free discussion with them as equals, in speech and in writing, seems the best instruction that can be given them, specially on social subjects.

With regard to the social questions now before the public, and in which, as I gather from your letter, the working classes of your town have begun to take an interest, it seems to me chiefly important to impress on them—first, that they are quite right in aiming at a more equal distribution of wealth and social advantages; secondly, that this more equal distribution can only be permanently affected (for merely taking from Peter to give to Paul would leave things worse than even at present) by means of their own public spirit and self-devotion as regards others, and prudence and self-restraint in relation to themselves. At present their idea of social reform appears to be simply higher wages, and less work, for the sake of more sensual indulgence. To be independent of master manufacturers, to work for themselves and divide the whole produce of their labour is a worthy object of ambition, but it is only fit for, and can only succeed with people who can labour for the community of which they are a part with the same energy and zeal as if labouring for their own private and separate interest (the opposite is now the case), and who, instead of expecting immediately more pay and less work, are willing to submit to any

privation until they have effected their emancipation. The French working men and women contended for a principle, for an idea of justice, and they lived on bread and water till they gained their purpose. It was not more and costlier eating and drinking that was their object, as it seems to be the sole object of most of the well-paid English artisans. 1852 — Aetat. 45.

If in applying to me you hoped that I might be able to offer you any suggestions of more specific character, I hope you will attribute my not doing so to the difficulty of the subject and not to any want of will on my part.

To Dr. Adolph Soetbeer, of Hamburg,

on his translation of the "Political Economy" into German.

18th March 1852.

Dear Sir,—The pressure of my occupations has left me no leisure until now to answer your letter, and to thank you for the volume of your translation of my "Political Economy" which you were so good as to send me. As far as I have had time to examine it, the translation seems extremely well executed; the sense appears to be very faithfully and clearly rendered. I only regret that your time and pains were not bestowed on the edition which is now about to go to press, and which I have not only revised throughout, but have entirely recast several important chapters; in particular the two most important, those on "Property" and on the "Future of the Labouring Classes." The progress of discussion and of European events has entirely altered the aspect of the questions treated in those chapters: the present time admits of a much more free and full enunciation of my opinions on those subjects than would have had any chance of an impartial hearing when the book was first written; and some change has also taken place in the opinions themselves. I observe that, in your preface, you recommend the book to your readers as a refutation of Socialism: I

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certainly was far from intending that the statement it contained of the objections to the best-known Socialist extremes should be understood as a condemnation of Socialism regarded as an ultimate result of human improvement, and further consideration has led me to attach much less weight than I then did even to those objections, with one single exception—the unprepared state of the labouring classes, and their extreme moral unfitness at present for the rights which Socialism would confer and the duties it would impose. This is the only objection to which you will find any great importance attached in the new edition; and I am sorry that your translation should place before German readers, as a current statement of my opinions, what has ceased to be so. You propose to give in the second volume an account of the alterations in the new edition; as far as concerns the points which I have mentioned, nothing less than a retranslation of the two chapters, as they now stand, would enable your work to represent my opinions correctly. I shall be happy to send the sheets of the new edition in the manner pointed out by you, and the first parcel shall be made up as soon as I am able to include in it the chapter which contains the discussion of Socialism.

To Professor Carl D. Heinrich Rau, of Heidelberg.

East India House, *20th March* 1852.

Dear Sir,—My occupations have prevented me until now from acknowledging the letter with which you favoured me as long ago as the 6th of February. It is not wonderful that, staying but a short time in London, and occupied as you were during that stay, you had not time for the somewhat idle and generally very useless task of paying visits.

Though my references to your systematic work were confined to the Brussels translation, I am glad to say that I am able to read it in the original. Your writings, indeed, are the part with which I am best acquainted of the German writers on political economy, in which, as you justly sur-

mise, I am not by any means well read. What you say of MacCulloch [1] does not surprise me. He is both prejudiced and inaccurate. I never place any confidence in the first edition of any of his books; but as the plan of most of them is good, people generally supply him with information which enables him to improve them very much in the second. His "Literature of Political Economy" has, however, I should think, but a small chance of making a second edition. Your plan of separating the scientific inquiry into the production and distribution of wealth, as a branch of social service, from the consideration of the economic policy of governments appears to me both logically and didactically the best, and I have made the same separation in my own treatise. Of this I am just about to print a new edition, in which, among various other improvements, I have entirely rewritten the chapter which contains the discussion of Socialism, and the greater part of that on the future of the labouring classes. I regret that the German translation, of which one volume was lately published at Hamburg, was made from the previous edition, as it gives in many respects an erroneous idea of my opinions on Socialism. Even in the former editions, though I stated a number of objections to the best known Socialist theories, I never represented those objections as final and conclusive, and I think them of very little weight so far as regards the ultimate prospects of humanity. It is true that the low normal state of mankind, generally, and of the labouring classes in particular, renders them at present unfit for any order of things which would presuppose, as its necessary condition, a certain measure of conscience and of intellect. But it appears to me that the great end of social improvement should be to fit them by cultivation for a state of society combining the greatest personal freedom with that just distribution of the fruits of labour which the present laws of property do not even propose to aim at. To explain what I mean by a just distribution, and to what extent I think it could be approximated to a practice, would require more space than that of

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[1] [John Ramsay MacCulloch, the statistician and political economist.]

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a letter. I confess that I regard the purely abstract investigations of political economy (beyond those elementary ones which are necessary for the correction of mischievous prejudices), as of very minor importance compared with the great practical questions which the progress of democracy and the spread of Socialist opinions are pressing on, and for which both governing and the governed classes are very far from being in a fit state of preparation. It is to be decided whether Europe shall enter peacefully and prosperously into a better order of things, or whether the new ideas will be inaugurated by a century of war and violence like that which followed the Reformation of Luther; and this alternative probably depends on the moral and intellectual movement of the next ten or twenty years. There is therefore abundance of occupation for moral and political teachers such as we aspire to be.

To Professor GREEN, of Poona.

INDIA HOUSE, *8th April* 1852.

DEAR SIR,— . . . I am much interested by what I know, both from yourself and otherwise, of your exertions to instruct and improve the natives. Everything shows them to be eminently improvable, and your Society at Poona seems to be a striking example of the spirit which is abroad among a portion of them, and of the great effect which may be produced, even in a short time, by well-directed efforts for their improvement. I am glad that you have found my writings useful to your pupils. I have to thank you for the Bombay papers containing your series of articles on Newman's Political Economy lectures. It is but a poor book, as you appear to think, though you treat him very curtly. I agree in most of your remarks, as well as in your just appreciation of the great teachers of political economy, particularly Ricardo. Of what you say about my own book, I should be happy to think that it is not too complimentary. The edition which I have just begun to print will be, I hope, a great improvement on the first and second, the chapters on "Socialism" and the "Future

of the Labouring Classes" having been so much altered as to be almost entirely new. In your review of Newman the remarks on population are the part which I must express dissent from, for, though you agree in the main with Malthus, you appear to think that no one ought to be blamed for having an inordinately large family if he produces, and brings them up to produce, enough for their support: now this, with me, is only a part, and only a small part of the question; a much more important consideration still, is the perpetuation of the previous degradation of women, no alteration in which can be hoped for while their whole lives are devoted to the function of producing and rearing children. That degradation and slavery is, in itself, so enormous an evil, and contributes so much to the perpetuation of all other evils by keeping down the moral and intellectual condition of both men and women, that the limitation of the number of children would be, in my opinion, absolutely necessary to place human life on its proper footing, even if there were subsistence for any number which could be produced. I think if you had been alive to this aspect of the question you would not have used such expressions as "your wife has made you a happy father rather more frequently than you are pleased to remember." Such phrases are an attempt to laugh off the fact that the wife is, in every sense, the victim of the man's animal instinct, and not the less so because she is brought up to think that she has no right of refusal, or even of complaint.

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To Professor Rau,

in answer to a question concerning the position of Labour Co-partnership in England.

East India House, *7th July* 1852.

Dear Sir,—Your letter of 5th April has remained very long unanswered, but you are too well acquainted with the inevitable demands on time produced by the combination of literary and official employment to need any other ex-

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planation of my silence. I regret that I am not able to give you the information you desire respecting co-operative association in England. You appear, however, to be in communication with some of those who have taken part in the very insignificant attempts of the kind yet made in this country, and they can doubtless tell you all that is to be told. Much could not be done while the law of partnership remained what it was up to a few days ago. According to that absurd law, the managing members of an association, being joint owners of its funds, could not steal or embezzle what was partly their own, and could not be made criminally responsible for any malversation; and the only civil tribunal which could determine disputes among partners was the Court of Chancery. You doubtless know enough of England to understand that the word Chancery is a name for litigation without end and expense without limits. In the session of Parliament just closed, an Act has been passed, called the Industrial and Provident Partnerships Act, by which co-operative associations will in future be able to obtain a comparatively cheap and easy decision of differences, and this removes a great obstacle to their formation and success. It will now be seen whether any considerable number of the English working people have the intellect and the love of independence to desire to be their own masters, and the sense of justice and honour which will fit them for being so. I am sorry to say my expectations at present are not sanguine. I do not believe that England is nearly as ripe as most of the continental countries for this great improvement. The ownership of the instruments of labour by the labourer can only be introduced by people who will make great temporary sacrifices such as can only be inspired by a generous feeling for the public good, or a disinterested devotion to an idea, not by the mere desire of more pay and less work. And the English of all classes are far less accessible to any large idea or generous sentiment than either Germans, French, or Italians. They are so ignorant, too, as to pride themselves on their defect as if it were a virtue, and give it complimentary names, such as good sense, sobriety, practicalness,

which are common names for selfishness, shortsightedness, and contented acquiescence in commonplace. In France the success of the associations has been remarkable, and held out the brightest prospect for the emancipation of the working classes; but these societies are likely to share the fate of all other freedom and progress under the present military despotism. Many of the associations have already been suppressed, and the remainder, it is said, are prepared to emigrate. 1852 — Aetat. 46.

To Lord Monteagle,

the Whig statesman, in acknowledgment of his pamphlet on the Representation of Minorities.

20th March 1853.

Dear Lord Monteagle,—The suggestion in the paper you sent me is intended to meet a difficulty which has always appeared to me one of the chief stumbling-blocks of representative government. "Whoever could devise a means of preventing minorities from being, as they now are, swamped, and enabling them to obtain a share of the representation proportional to their numbers and not more than proportional, would render a great service." Whether the plan proposed would do this, and to what objections it may be liable, I should be sorry to be obliged to say without more consideration than I have yet given to it. One thing seems to me evident; that if this plan were adopted, no constituency ought to elect fewer than three members. For if the number be two, as the proposed plan would enable a minority to count for double its number, any minority exceeding one-third could ensure half the representation; which, unless the minority can be presumed to consist of wiser or better persons than the majority, would be contrary to all principle. 1853 — Aetat. 46.

One very strong recommendation of the plan of cumulative votes occurs to me, which is not mentioned in the Memorandum. If we suppose a voter to determine his vote by the personal merits of the candidates, and not solely by their being on the same side with himself in the common

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party divisions, it will frequently happen that he greatly prefers one of the candidates, and is comparatively indifferent to all the others, so that he would, if he could, give all his votes to that one. This wish is most likely to be felt by the best voters, and in favour of the best candidates, and it seems to me right that strength of preference should have some influence as well as the mere number of persons preferring. To allow the cumulative vote would be one of the best ways which occur to me of enabling quality of support to count as well as quantity. The candidates most likely to benefit by it would be those who were too good for the mass of the constituency; those, for example, whose election was endangered by some honest but unpopular vote or opinion, and who for that very reason would probably be supported with redoubled zeal by the better minority, and their election made the first object.

I do not see the force of your objection respecting bribery. No doubt if a candidate depended solely on bribed votes, he would find it easier to succeed if every bribed voter could give two or three votes for him instead of one. But to carry an election by bribing everybody is only possible with smaller constituencies than ought to exist. In large or even moderate constituencies, the bribed are only the two or three hundred who in a nearly balanced state of parties turn the scale. Now in this case the minority can get no corrupt advantage from the cumulative vote unless they limit their aim to a part of the representation; and if they do this, the cumulative vote may probably enable them to attain their object without bribing. Thus, if there are two members to be returned, and the minority will be content with returning one, a minority exceeding a third would have no inducement to bribe, but only a minority of less than a third. At present the reverse is the case: a minority of less than a third has no chance of succeeding by bribery, while a minority of more than a third has. The cumulative vote therefore displaces, but does not seem to me to increase, the inducement to bribe.

The point is well worth consideration in framing a new Reform Bill, which, to be any real improvement, ought not

to be a mere imitation and extension of the Reform Bill of 1832. There are, as it seems to me, three great and perfectly safe improvements, which could hardly be successfully resisted if a Government proposed them. One is to have no small constituencies: this might be done by grouping the small towns into districts. Another is to let in the principle of an educational qualification, by requiring from all voters, in addition to any property or ratepaying conditions that may be imposed, at least reading, writing, and arithmetic. The third is to open the franchise to women who fulfil the same conditions on which it is granted to men; in the same manner as they already vote for boards of guardians. They have as much interest in good laws as men have, and would vote at least as well. Electoral districts seem to me needless, and ballot would now be a step backward instead of forward. 1853 — Aetat. 46.

I beg to apologise for not having answered sooner, but I did not like to give an opinion without consideration, and being pressed for time I was not able before to give the subject even the degree of consideration which I have now done.—I am, dear Lord Monteagle, very truly yours,

J. S. Mill.

To Sir William Molesworth,

in reply to a letter asking Mill's opinion on the argument put forward by the opponents of a Succession Duty, that "it would lead to partition of the land, which was an evil."

India House, 15*th May* 1853.

Dear Molesworth,—My opinions on these subjects are very much the same with yours, except where they are mixed up with other subjects. I conceive that, in the present state of the distribution of wealth in this country, any additional land brought into the market is likely to be bought by rich people and not by poor. The present question, however, does not turn upon whether partition is an evil or a good—but upon whether, to save the owner from the necessity of selling part of it (in this case a very

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small part), he ought to be exempted from paying his fair share of the taxes. This is so impudent a pretension that it hardly admits of any more complete exposure than is made by the simplest statement. The reason would serve just as well for dispensing them from paying any taxes whatever, or from paying their debts, for they may be unable to do either of these without selling their land. If the inheritors of land wish to keep it entire let them save the tax out of their incomes. Gladstone allows them several years to do it in. No large proprietor ought to have any difficulty in this except those who are deeply mortgaged, and the sooner they can be induced to sell the better. That is a proposition which may be very safely assumed in these days.

I do not know any writers who have discussed taxes on succession at much length, except some of the French Socialists, and they (besides that they are bad political economists) derive their arguments from premisses not suited to the atmosphere of the House of Commons.

To Lord Hobart,

acknowledging his "Remarks on the Law of Partnership Liability."

Blackheath, *7th August* [1853?].

My Lord,—Allow me to thank you for a copy of your pamphlet on the Law of Partnership. Such subjects are not often discussed with so much closeness of reasoning and precision of expression; and it is still more rare to find the question of justice separated from that of expediency and made paramount to it. I prefer to say "justice" rather than, in your words, "natural justice," both because Nature is often grossly unjust, and because I do not think that the first spontaneous sentiment of justice always agrees with that which is the result of enlightened reflection.

As you do me the honour to ask my opinion of your argument, I think that much of it is sound, and conclusively stated. But you have not convinced me that

either justice or expediency requires the unlimited liability of all who take part in the management, or in other words, that there ought to be no *compagnies anonymes*. Justice, it appears to me, is fully satisfied if those who become creditors of the partnership know beforehand that they will have no claim beyond the amount of the subscribed capital. The points of additional information mentioned in pages 5 and 7, and which you say cannot be possessed by the public, do not seem to me required in justice even if they were in point of expediency. *Volenti non fit injuria:* if a person chooses to lend either to an individual or a company, knowing that the borrowers only pledge a certain sum and not their whole property for the debt, I cannot see that there is any injustice done merely because the lender cannot watch that certain sum and know at all times where it is and what is being done with it. I differ from you also, though with somewhat less confidence, on the question of expediency. I do not doubt that the unlimited liability of railway directors would be some additional security for prudent management, but the additional security would, I think, be too dearly purchased by the abrogation of all power in the shareholders to control the directors or to change them. The publicity afforded by the periodical meetings of shareholders, and by the necessity of laying before them the entire state of the concern and their power of verifying the statements, seems to me a far greater protection to the public as well as to shareholders than the liability of the directors to the full extent of their property, especially considering how imperfect a check to rash speculation this is in private transactions. 1853 — Aetat. 47.

To T. J. Furnivale,

in reply to a request for permission to reprint a chapter of the "Political Economy."

13th February 1854.

Dear Sir,—I owe an apology for not having given an earlier answer to a proposal which does me so much 1854 — Aetat. 47.

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honour as that made in your letter of the 3rd respecting the chapter of my "Political Economy" on "The Future of the Labouring Classes." I am glad you think its circulation among the working people likely to be useful, and I am sure that whatever helps to make them connect their hopes with co-operation, and with the moral qualities necessary to make co-operation succeed, rather than with strikes to impose bad restrictions on employers, or simply to extort more money, will do for them what they are greatly in need of; and I therefore, so far as depends upon me, give my full consent and approbation to your public-spirited project. But I should like first to make some little additions to the chapter, tending to increase its usefulness; and I must add also that the consent of Mr. Parker is necessary, the edition of the "Political Economy" now on sale being his property.

To Arthur Gore,

who had written to Mill, criticising his definition of "cause" in the "Logic."

February 1854.

Sir,—I am glad that my book should have afforded you any of the pleasure and benefit which you do me the honour to tell me you have derived from it.

I have received many letters which, like yours, ask me to explain or define particular passages of the "Logic." I am not sorry to receive them, as they are a sign that the book has been read in the manner which all thinkers must desire for their writings—that it has stirred up thought in the mind of the reader. But my occupations compel me to beg my correspondents to be satisfied with a more summary explanation of the opinions they dissent from, than I can generally venture to hope will remove their difficulties.

It seems to me that there is a fundamental difference between the case of the rust and that of the motion of a projectile. In the case of the rust, the original cause of

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its existence, even if a thousand years ago, may be said to be the proximate cause, since, as there has been no intermediate change of any sort, there is no cause more proximate than it. You may say, there is the existence of the rust itself during the intermediate time. I answer, the rust all through the thousand years is one and the same fact, therefore we do not say that it causes itself; but the motion (though, as you say, it may be the same, *qua* motion) is, taken in its ensemble, a different fact, since it is eventually constituted by a different phenomenon, viz., the body in one place instead of the same body in another place. The argument is still stronger when the motion is not even the same, *qua* motion; when, besides the difference in the fact itself, there has also intervened the action of a new cause, a deflecting force or a resisting medium. The concurrence of forces at each successive instant is then a cause evidently more proximate to the effect of the next instant than the original impulse, which, therefore, can only be called the remote cause.

Our difference is more one of expression than of fact. It seems to me that when there is a *change* of any sort at that precise point, we ought to say that a fresh causation commences. It is only when things remain exactly as the original cause left them, that the original can be also termed the proximate cause of their state.

To the Chairman of the Library Committees, South Carolina.

3rd March 1854.

GENTLEMEN,—A long absence from England has made me thus tardy in offering my acknowledgments to you and to the honourable bodies over which you preside for having included me among those to whom, under the resolution of the legislature of South Carolina, you have presented copies of the posthumous work of Mr. Calhoun.

Few things can be done by the legislature of any people more commendable than printing and circulating the writings of their eminent men, and the present is one of

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the many examples tending to show that the parsimony imputed to the republics of the American Union is aversion to useless, but not to useful, expense. I am one of those who believe that America is destined to give instruction to the world, not only practically, as she has long done, but in speculation also; and my opinion is confirmed by the treatise which I have had the honour of receiving from you, and which, though I am far from agreeing with it on all points, I consider to be a really valuable contribution to the science of government.

With the warmest good wishes for the continued progress of the United States, and hopes that they may lead the way to mental and moral, as they have already done to much political freedom, I have the honour to be, gentlemen, your most obedient servant, J. S. MILL.

To the Secretary of the Neophyte Writers' Society.

23rd April 1854.

SIR,—I have received your letter of 11th April, in which you do me the honour to request that I will become a member of the Honorary Council of an association termed the Neophyte Writers' Society.

So far as I am able to collect the objects of the society from the somewhat vague description given of them in the prospectus, I am led to believe that it is not established to promote any opinions in particular; that its members are bound together only by the fact of being writers, not by the purposes for which they write; that their publications will admit conflicting opinions with equal readiness; and that the mutual criticism which is invited will have for its object the improvement of the writers merely as writers, and not the promotion, by means of unity, of any valuable object.

Now, I set no value whatever on writing for its own sake, and have much less respect for the literary craftsman than for the manual labourer, except so far as he uses his powers in promoting what I consider true and just. I

have, on most of the subjects interesting to mankind, opinions to which I attach importance, and which I earnestly desire to diffuse, but I am not desirous of aiding the diffusion of opinions contrary to my own; and with respect to the mere faculty of expression, independently of what is to be expressed, it does not appear to me to require any encouragement. There is already an abundance, not to say superabundance, of writers who are able to express in an effective manner the mischievous commonplaces which they have got to say. I would gladly give any aid in my power towards improving their opinions, but I have no fear that any opinions they have will not be sufficiently well expressed, nor in any way should I be disposed to aid in sharpening weapons when I know not in what cause they will be used. 1854 — Aetat. 48.

For these reasons I cannot consent that my name should be added to the list of writers you send me.

To William Stigant,

who sought Mill's advice on a course of reading in Moral Philosophy.

East India House, *1st August* 1854.

Sir,—Having just returned from the Continent I find your note. I very much wish that it were in my power to refer you, or anyone, to a book, or set of books, fitted to form a course of instruction in Moral Philosophy. None such, to my knowledge, exist. In my opinion ethics, as a branch of philosophy, is still to be created. There are writings on the subject from which valuable thoughts may be gathered, and others (particularly Bentham), who have thrown some but not sufficient light on the mode of systematising it. But, on the whole, everyone's ideas of morals must result from the action of his own intellect upon the materials supplied by life, and by the writers in all languages who have understood life best. The part of psychology which corresponds to morals is one of the most imperfect parts of that most imperfect science. Its

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most important portion, the laws of the formation of character, have never yet been treated otherwise than superficially. Some idea of the little which has been done may be gathered from parts of Hartley on "Man," and from my father's article, "Education," in the supplement to the "Encyclopædia Britannica"; but I do not recommend even these for any other purpose than that of furnishing suggestions and stimulus to your own thoughts.

To Barbot de Chément,

a French captain of artillery.

East India House, *7th August* 1854.

Monsieur,—Votre lettre est arrivée à mon adresse pendant que j'étais en voyage et ce n'est qu'aujourd'hui que je suis à même d'y répondre.

Vous me demandez les noms des personnes connues, scientifiques ou politiques de ce pays-ci, qui adhèrent à la doctrine de M. Comte, et vous me faites l'honneur de me demander, en outre, mon propre jugement sur cette doctrine.

Il y a en effet en Angleterre un certain nombre d'individus qui ont connaissance des écrits de M. Comte et qui en font, à plusieurs égards, un grand cas. Mais je ne connais ici personne qui accepte l'ensemble de ses doctrines ni que l'on puisse regarder comme son disciple; à commencer par moi, qui ai suivi sa carrière dès ses premières publications, et qui ai plus fait peut-être que tous les autres pour répandre son nom et sa réputation.

J'admets en général la partie logique de ses doctrines, ou en d'autres mots, tout ce qui se rapporte à la méthode et à la philosophie des sciences.

Tout en y trouvant quelques lacunes que je m'efforce de remplir à ma manière je reconnais que personne, hors Aristote et Bacon, n'a autant fait pour perfectionner la théorie des procédés scientifiques.

J'admets en grande partie la critique de ses devanciers,

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et les bases générales de la théorie historique du développement humain, sauf les divergences de détail. Quant à la religion, qui, comme vous le savez sans doute, pour lui comme pour tout libre penseur est un grand obstacle auprès du commun de mes compatriotes, c'est là sans contredit que mes opinions sont le plus près de celles de M. Comte. Je suis parfaitement d'accord avec lui sur la partie negative de la question, et dans la partie affirmative, je soutiens comme lui que l'idée de l'ensemble de l'humanité, representée surtout par les esprits et les caractères d'élite, passés, présents, et à venir, peut devenir, non seulement pour des personnes exceptionnelles mais pour tout le monde, l'objet d'un sentiment capable de remplacer avec avantage toutes les religions actuelles, soit pour les besoins de cœur, soit pour ceux de la vie sociale. Cette vérité, d'autres l'ont sentie avant M. Comte, mais personne que je sache ne l'a si nettement pesée ni si puissamment soutenue.

Restent sa morale et sa politique, et là-dessus je dois avouer mon dissentiment presque total. En me donnant comme positiviste autant que personne au monde, je n'accepte en aucune façon la politique positive comme M. Comte se la représente, ni quant aux anciennes doctrines qu'il conserve ; ni quant à ce qu'il y ajouta du sien. Je ne conçois comme lui ni les conditions de l'ordre, ni par conséquent celles du progrès. Et ce que je dis pour moi, je pourrais le dire pour tous ses lecteurs anglais à moi connus. Je ne pense pas que les doctrines pratiques de M. Comte aient fait ici le moindre chemin. Il n'est connu, estimé, ni même combattu que comme philosophe. Dans les questions sociales il ne compte même pas. Lui-même il n'ignore pas ce fait, et se plaint que ses admirateurs anglais n'acceptent que sa philosophie et rejettent sa politique.

Il me parait, donc, peu probable, Monsieur, que vos sentiments envers la doctrine de M. Comte puissent rencontrer ici le genre de sympathie dont vous témoignez le désir. Toutefois M. Comte commence à être assez généralement connu comme chef d'école, et dans le

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nombre de ses lecteurs il peut y en avoir quelques uns qui acceptent ses doctrines plus intégralement qu'aucun de ceux qu'il m'est arrivé de connaître.

To Sir John M'Neill,

on James Ferrier's work "Institutes of Metaphysic."

Torquay, *5th December* 1854.

My dear Sir,—I have been unable to answer earlier your note of the 10th of last month, having only found time to read the book you were so kind as to send me during a few days passed at this place before going abroad for the winter.

Mr. Ferrier has the rare merit in a controversialist of complete fairness. He understands the opinions of all the opponents, whom he notices as fully, and states them as clearly and forcibly as his own. He has a very telling mode of discussion. His fabric of speculation is so effectively constructed, and imposing, that it almost ranks as a work of art. It is the romance of logic.

I should be very happy if I could add that I believed it had done what the author is firmly persuaded it has—solved the problem which all philosophers from the first origin of speculation have been vainly hammering at. On the contrary, it is depressing to me to see a man of so much capacity under what appears to me so deep a delusion. Truly the main hindrance of philosophy is not its intrinsic difficulties, great as they are, but the extreme rarity of men who can reason. It is enough to make one despair of speculation when a man of so much talent and knowledge as this book displays, and who piques himself peculiarly on his reasoning faculty, commits nearly every fallacy set down in books of logic, and this at all the most critical points of his argument. He says, that whoever admits his first proposition *must* admit all the rest. I do not admit his first proposition; but even if I did, his first great paralogism, as it seems to me, consists in thinking that his second proposition follows

from his first, and there is a similar, or a still greater logical blunder each time that he makes any really fresh advance in his argument. The whole system is one great specimen of reasoning in a circle. Unless each successive conclusion is presupposed, it is impossible to admit the premisses in the sense in which alone they can support it. All this I am satisfied I could prove to you, book in hand, in an hour's conversation. Before I had finished the book I understood his mode of proceeding so well that I could generally see beforehand in what manner he was going to beg the next question. The effect is most disheartening, for when a writer who can so well point out the fallacies of others builds an entire system of philosophy paralogising, what confidence is it possible to feel in avoiding them, and how vain seems all hope that one has done, or can do, anything to help these subjects forward. The only thing which alleviates this discouragement is the belief that the author was, from the first, on a wrong tack—as all metaphysicians in my opinion will be, until they leave off revolving in the eternal round of Descartes and Spinoza (of the former of whom this book continually reminds me), and cease to imagine that philosophy can be founded on "necessary truths of reason," or, indeed, that there are such things as necessary truths—any, at least, which can be known to be necessary in the metaphysical sense of the word. 1854 — Aetat. 48.

Pray excuse the seeming crudity with which I have expressed the opinion you asked from me—it has not been crudely formed.

To Wentworth Holworthy.

East India House, 11*th July* 1855.

Sir,—I beg to acknowledge the receipt of your pamphlet entitled "War Notes," and of a letter asking my opinion of certain parts of it. I entirely agree, as every rational person must, in the object of your pamphlet, viz., to get rid of the monopoly of all posts of power both civil and mili- 1855 — Aetat. 49.

1855 — Aetat. 49.

tary by a particular class, and to open the service of the State to merit wherever found. At the same time, I think the Administrative Reform Association (with whom in this point you seem to agree) entirely wrong in their assumption that the middle classes of this country possess the eminent qualities which are wanting in the higher. I am convinced that any public matter whatever, under the management of the middle classes, would be as grossly, if not more grossly, mismanaged than public affairs are now. As you ask my opinion more particularly of Fragment 2, I will just say that the distinction you draw between two kinds of martial qualities, the one grounded only in the pugnacious instinct, the other in the higher moral attributes, the former tending to decay as civilisation advances, and requiring to be replaced by the latter, appears to me perfectly just.

The following letter was addressed to a correspondent, after Sir William Molesworth's death in 1855:—

Dear Sir,—Almost the only biographical fact respecting Sir W. Molesworth which I am able to communicate beyond those which are known to the public is the history of his connection with the *Westminster Review*, which is both incompletely and incorrectly given in the newspaper notices. Early in 1834 some of those who had been writers in the original *Westminster*, and had not been connected with it under Colonel Perronet Thompson's proprietorship, had been forming projects for a new and better Radical review; which projects appeared to have come to nothing, when Molesworth of his own motion (and quite unexpectedly on my part) offered to me to start such a review at his own expense, if I would either be the editor, or would at least take the control and direction of it, with an editor to work under me. Accordingly, the *London Review* was established on the latter plan; Molesworth himself wrote in it some very able articles, but it is not true that he was his own editor. After four numbers had been published, Molesworth

bought the *Westminster Review* from Colonel Thompson, and united it with the *London*, under the title of the *London and Westminster Review*. He continued to support it for about a year and a half more, after which, it not paying its expenses, he, not being willing to lay out more money on it, gave it over to me as proprietor. 1855 — Aetat. 49.

The papers are mistaken in saying that Molesworth was acquainted with Bentham. Bentham died in the year in which Molesworth came of age, and I feel sure he never saw Bentham. These are the only particulars which I can think of likely to be useful to you.

Respecting the rights of *women* (not Woman) I need not say I wish you success. My opinion on Divorce is that, though any relaxation of the irrevocability of marriage would be an improvement, nothing ought to be ultimately rested in short of entire freedom on both sides to dissolve this like any other partnership. The only thing requiring legal regulation would be the maintenance of the children when the parents could not arrange it amicably—and in that I do not see any considerable difficulty.

Molesworth died a firm adherent of anti-religious opinions. On the day before his death he said to a friend: "You know my opinions on religion; they were adopted on conviction, and I have never concealed them. I rely on you for taking care that nothing whatever admitting of a religious interpretation shall be inscribed on my tomb."

On Sir William Molesworth's death, it was suggested to Mill that he should write an epitaph. In acceding to the request he wrote :—

BLACKHEATH, *5th November* 1855.

DEAR SIR,—As you requested, I have tried to put on paper something if possible at once short and characteristic of our friend, and the few lines I enclose are the best I have been able to do. It strikes me that yours has the appearance of connecting him too exclusively with the single question of colonial government, and gives the idea

1855 — Aetat. 49.

of him as a man who devoted his life to that one object, and sacrificed his life to it—which, besides not being a true notion of him, is in reality a notion inferior to the truth. You will judge whether I have gone into the opposite extreme. It seems to me that as the inscription will say that he died Secretary for the Colonies, it is implied in the other things said of him that he did or tried to do important things for the colonies.

The short line, which has a somewhat sententious air, is intended to imply, since it seems agreed not to express, that he held fast to other opinions than those mentioned. Is there not something monstrous in the fact that in the case of a man universally applauded both for his public and his private life, yet his conscientious opinions on what all think the most important of all subjects, being diametrically opposite to the common ones, are not even permitted to be alluded to in any memoir or notice of him? There is buried with him his testimony to his most important convictions because they differ from those of the mob.

I am afraid I have no letters, but I will look and see, and if I have will send them.—I am, dear sir, yours very truly,

J. S. MILL.

The epitaph ran as follows:—

A laborious and thoughtful student from an early age,
both of speculative truth and of the practical questions of political life,
His opinions were his own.
He lived to see some of them triumphant
partly through his own efforts,
and died as he had lived, faithful to them all.

To ARTHUR HARDY, of Adelaide.

29th September 1856.

1856 — Aetat. 50.

MY DEAR HARDY,— . . . I suppose Macaulay's third and fourth volumes are as popular at Adelaide as in London. They are, as you say, "pleasant reading but not exactly history." His object is to strike, and he attains it; but it is by scene-painting—he aims at

stronger effects than truth warrants, and so caricatures many of his personages as to leave it unaccountable how they can have done what they did. If Sarah, Duchess of Marlborough, had been nothing but a thoroughly unprincipled shrew, without talent or any one valuable or amiable quality (as he makes her), could she have been, by mere personal influence, for many years the most powerful person in England? This disregard of consistency and probability spoils the book even as a work of art. What a difference between it and Grote's "History of Greece," which is less brilliant, but far more interesting in its simple veracity, and because, instead of striving to astonish, he strives to comprehend and explain. . . .

1856 — Aetat. 50.

To the Secretary of the Sunday League.

November 1856.

SIR,—I beg to acknowledge your letter of the 3rd instant asking my objections to the address of the National Sunday League.

The passage to which I principally object, and which has hitherto made it impossible for me, consistently with my own convictions, to subscribe to the League, is the following: "They themselves would be the first to oppose the opening of any frivolous and vicious places of amusement."

That the committee should limit their own endeavours to the opening of institutions of a more or less scientific or literary character on Sundays may, possibly, be judicious; but it is not necessary for this purpose that they should join in stigmatising the broader principle, the recognition of which I think should be their ultimate aim. With regard to "vicious places of amusement," if there be any such, I would not desire that they should be open on any day of the week. Any place unfit to be open on Sunday is unfit to be open at all. But with regard to "frivolous" amusements I no more think myself justified in limiting the people to intellectual than to religious occupations on that day; and the committee cannot but feel that if their

1856 — Aetat. 50.

disclaimer does them any service with those whom it is intended to conciliate, it will be by being understood as a protest against permitting, for example, music, dancing, and the theatre, all of which I should wish to be as free on the seventh (or rather the first) as on any other day of the week.

I am also unable to give my adhesion to various expressions in the Declaration which partake of the nature of a compliance with cant; such as the "desecration of the Sunday, and the preservation of its original purpose of a day of devotion." The devotion which is not felt equally at all times does not deserve the name; and it is one thing to regard the observance of a holiday from ordinary work on one day in the week as a highly beneficial institution, and another to ascribe any sacredness to the day, a notion so forcibly repudiated in the quotations from great religious authorities on your fourth page, and which I hold to be as mere a superstition as any of the analogous prejudices which existed in times antecedent to Christianity.

To the author of "Currency Self-Regulating and Elastic."

EAST INDIA HOUSE, *24th November* 1856.

SIR,—I have to apologise for the delay in replying to your letter of the 7th November requesting my opinion on your plan for the regulation of the currency. I have received so many similar requests on this and other economical or philosophical subjects that my whole time would barely suffice for complying with them. I think I might fairly claim to be exempted from examining any more plans for an inconvertible currency, and if I had not seen on the first inspection of your book that it contained more knowledge of the subject and more ability than I have usually discovered in such projects, I certainly should not have spared time to read it to the end.

But though I recognise the great distinction between you and the Birmingham school, or the writers who are

now enlightening the world by their letters in the *Morning Post*, I do not think your scheme more defensible than theirs. To a writer who founds his practical suggestions on theoretic principles (as, in spite of your sarcasms on political economy, you do) it will probably be sufficient to say that I dispute the basis of your theory, viz., the proposition that in a community which makes large use of credit an increase of currency does not (unless by promoting speculation) influence prices. I grant that any increase of paper currency which can take place under a convertible system usually passes off without having influenced any other prices than those of securities; but only because the revulsion comes before the increased supply of money has reached the market for commodities. Monied capital is not for ever handed to and fro among money dealers; its ultimate destination is to be lent to producers, and when the increase reached them it would raise wages and money incomes, and must consequently raise the prices of all articles of consumption in the same manner as you allow it would do if it were issued by Government in payment of the public expenses. If you were right, the supplies of gold from California and Australia, to however many thousands of millions they might extend, could not raise general prices, except indeed during the continuance of a speculative mania to which they might give rise, a proposition on which you will find few to agree with you, and which I can scarcely think that you will yourself, on consideration, maintain. 1856 Aetat. 50.

If it were true that no increase of the quantity of money when taking place through the medium of bankers could lessen its value, the principal objection not only to your, but to every other system of inconvertible currency, would be annihilated. But, not admitting this, I need not further explain why I am not of opinion that your plan, which enjoins an issue of paper up to the whole amount of the National Debt (or of some definite portion of that Debt) on condition that the holder is willing to pay the current rate of interest for it, would offer any security against the kind of depreciation which you, as well as

1856 — Aetat. 50.

myself, regard as an evil. The provision which you make for a reflux (and which may possibly be, as you suppose it to be, new) depends for its efficacy on the truth of your theory of the non-effect of currency on prices; for if prices rise, the increased amount of currency being permanently wanted in the markets will be "absorbed in the circulation" and will not flow back.

I must add that I agree with most of your comments on the Act of 1844, and should think them calculated to be very useful if they were dissevered from so much that I conceive to be erroneous.

To Costantino Baer, attaché au Ministère de l'Intérieur à Naples.

East India House, 13*th December* 1856.

Monsieur,—Votre lettre du 12 mai ainsi que les articles et brochures que vous avez bien voulu m'envoyer ne me sont parvenus qu'en Septembre, à mon retour d'un voyage. Depuis lors, des occupations multipliées m'ont longtemps empêché, même de lire ces intéressants écrits et ensuite de vous offrir mes remerciements. Je suis heureux de voir non seulement par vos écrits, mais aussi par le recueil où quelques uns entre ceux ont paru, que l'Italie, et surtout sa partie méridionale, qui au dernier siècle s'est placée si haut dans les études économiques et législatives, maintient encore sa position honorable dans cet ordre de recherches. Votre brochure sur la question de l'or me paraît conforme aux plus sains principes et je compte profiter de celle sur le métayage dans une nouvelle édition de mon livre. Quant à votre appréciation de ce livre, quoique trop flatteuse, elle est d'un grand prix, attendu que parmi les notices auxquelles mon ouvrage a donné lieu, je n'en connais presque aucune qui porte autant l'empreinte d'une grande connaisance du sujet, et qui soit, scientifiquement parlant, aussi satisfaisante. Il me semble surtout que vos remarques sur la nature du rapport entre ce qu'on appelle

une science abstraite, et la science correspondante d'application, ne sauraient être ni mieux pensées ni mieux exprimées. Quoique partageant, à tout égard, vos idées à ce sujet, je ne m'étais pas étendu là-dessus dans mon ouvrage systématique, les ayant exposées dans un petit volume d'Essais, cité dans les "Principes" et dont je vous prie d'agréer un exemplaire que j'aurai l'honneur de vous envoyer par la première occasion. 1856 — Aetat. 50.

Pour ce qui regarde les applications de l'économie politique, je vois que, ainsi que la plupart des économistes, vous condamnez le socialisme d'une manière absolue. Vous avez vu par mon livre que je ne suis pas, à cet égard, de votre avis. Le socialisme selon la conception des socialistes les plus éclairés me paraît inattaquable en principes, et mon dissentiment d'avec eux ne porte que sur la possibilité d'exécution dans l'état présent de la culture intellectuelle et morale de l'humanité. Je ne pense pas que la propriété privée, telle qu'on l'entend aujourd'hui, soit le dernier mot de la société, ni que la nature humaine soit incapable de travailler pour un but plus généreux que celui d'interêt individuel et exclusif. Je crois pourtant que les habitudes d'égoisme sont tellement enracinées dans la grande majorité des peuples même les plus civilisés, qu'elles ne céderont que lentement à des influences meilleures, et qu'aucun socialisme n'est aujourd'hui praticable comme fait général, mais seulement dans la forme d'associations d'ouvriers d'élite.

CHAPTER VI

1857–1859

To Pasquale Villari.

East India House, *30th June* 1857.

1857 — Aetat. 51.

J'ai tardé trop longtemps, mon cher M. Villari, à répondre à votre lettre du 15 avril. Aujourd'hui j'ai encore des remerciements à vous faire de l'aimable accueil que vous avez donné à mon beau-fils Algernon Taylor et du service que vous lui avez rendu en lui donnant une lettre de recommandation à Monsieur votre père. Si, comme je le désire, votre projet de visite en Angleterre se réalise, ma femme et moi pourrons vous témoigner personnellement notre reconnaissance, et nous serions charmés d'avoir avec vous des causeries pareilles à celle qui a rempli si agréablement pour moi cette longue soirée à Florence. Nous pourrons alors vous donner plus pleinement l'explication de la conduite louche que le gouvernement anglais a tenue envers l'Italie et qui vous a justement indigné mais qui est à mes yeux très conforme à la nature de ce gouvernement. En général, les étrangers, même les plus éclairés, prêtent au gouvernement anglais une profondeur de politique et une suite dans les idées et dans les projets qui ne lui appartiennent nullement. Je ne crois pas que Palmerston ni aucun ministre anglais ait songé ni à soulever les patriotes italiens ni encore moins à les trahir. Sauf l'infâme conduite de Sir James Graham dans l'affaire des infortunés Bandiera, dont encore probablement lui-même n'a pas prévu le résultat tragique, je ne pense pas qu'aucun homme d'état anglais ait commis aucun crime d'intention contre la liberté italienne, mais le gouvernement anglais, comme tous les gouvernements, craint les révolutions et les soulèvements, et lors

même qu'il désapprouve réellement les oppresseurs des peuples, il ne veut ni n'ose faire pour les opprimés autre chose, que de provoquer bien timidement quelques concessions très graduelles de la part de leurs tyrans. Je crois que Palmerston a réellement espéré qu'en mettant pour ainsi dire le roi de Naples moralement au ban de l'Europe, il le forcerait à changer un peu de conduite. Il ne connaissait pas son homme, mais, règle générale, les hommes d'état anglais ne connaissent ni le monde ni la vie. Même les plus grands roués politiques sont parfois d'une innocence qu'un étranger a beaucoup de peine à comprendre et à croire. Quant à la garantie donnée au *status quo* en Italie, n'en croyez rien ; nos ministres n'ont fait que ce qu'ils ont avoué. Malheureusement ils avaient besoin de l'Autriche contre la Russie. C'était le plus grand mal de la situation. Alors afin que l'Autriche fût libre de les aider, les gouvernements de France et d'Angleterre lui ont dit, " Si vous envoyez votre armée en Crimée, nous ne permettons pas que *pendant ce temps seulement* on vous attaque par derrière." Heureusement l'Autriche n'a pas mordu, et on n'a pas donné suite à ce pacte qui en tout cas eût cessé avec la guerre. Mais tout en atténuant la culpabilité de notre gouvernement envers la cause de l'Italie je ne puis que dire avec douleur, ne bâtissez jamais d'espoir sur ce gouvernement. Il vous donnera des mots et des sentiments, jamais des actes. Je crois que son appui moral vaut quelque chose, momentanément au moins pour la Sardaigne. Mais c'était là justement ce qu'il fallait à l'opinion aristocratique d'ici—une révolution royale. Le gouvernement anglais n'aidera jamais un peuple à renverser son gouvernement quelque odieux qu'il puisse être même à ses propres yeux. Vous avez bien vu qu'il ne s'est pas opposé à l'intervention française à Rome, à l'intervention russe en Hongrie. Même en temps de guerre contre la Russie il n'a pas voulu soulever la Pologne. Cela ne dit-il pas tout ?

1857 — Aetat. 51.

J'ai appris avec beaucoup d'intérêt ce que vous m'écrivez sur les œuvres inédites de Machiavelli et Guicciardini. Des publications aussi importantes sous le

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rapport historique ne sauraient manquer de faire sensation en Europe. Je conviens avec vous qu'une revue qui a la prétention de rendre compte de tout ne devrait pas négliger le mouvement intellectuel de l'Italie. Mais je n'écris pas dans la *Westminster Revue* et n'y ai pas d'influence. Quand j'y écrivais—il y a vingt ans, j'y ai fait imprimer quelques bons articles de Mazzini sur les auteurs italiens. Je ne sais pas qui a pu vous dire que j'ai écrit quelque chose sur le socialisme. Je n'ai écrit lâ-dessus que ce qui a paru dans mes "Principes d'Economie Politique."

Dernièrement. J'ai fait un petit livre qui paraîtra l'hiver prochain et dont je me ferais un plaisir de vous offrir un exemplaire si toutefois son titre "De La Liberté" comporte son entrée en Toscane. Il ne s'agit pas cependant de liberté politique dans ce livre, autant que de liberté sociale, morale, et religieuse.

Vous avez vu par les élections de Paris qu'il y a encore de la vie en France—c'est ce qui est arrivé de mieux en Europe, à mon avis, depuis 1851.

Vous me feriez grand plaisir en m'écrivant quelquefois. Notre entrevue d'il y a deux ans m'a donné un souvenir si agréable que je regretterais beaucoup de laisser tomber ce commencement de relation entre nous.—Tout à vous,

J. S. MILL.

To HENRY CARLETON, of Philadelphia.

EAST INDIA HOUSE, 12*th October* 1857.

DEAR SIR,—The little volume which you did me the honour to send me, arrived safely, but not until several months after the date of your letter announcing its despatch. I read it as soon as I received it, which was about a fortnight ago, and I not only agree with you throughout on the main question (of Liberty and Necessity), but also have to thank you for a very useful exposition and illustration, in small compass, of the law of association as applied to the analysis of the principal mental phenomena. I could mention points on which I differ from you; but

on several of these the difference is possibly more verbal than real. For instance, when you say on page 130 that truth is to every man what it appears to him to be, I cannot suppose you to mean that if I think poison to be wholesome food, it really is so to me, but only that I cannot help viewing as truth what presents itself to my perceptions or judgment as such. So when you say that "sin and crime exist of necessity," I do not understand you to mean that it is necessary they should always exist; but only that when they exist, they are the necessary consequences of the causes which have produced them. I do not think you successful in the first attempt you make to reconcile your doctrine with the received notions of Divine perfection; but your theory is quite as consistent with those notions as the opposite theory. In truth, nothing can reconcile the order of nature as we know it with perfect wisdom and goodness, combined with infinite power. To make any consistent scheme, at least one of the three must be given up.

1857 — Aetat. 51.

There is something doing in this country also for the "Association Philosophy." Mr. Bain has published under the name of "The Senses and the Intellect," the first part of a treatise on the mind, which I think you would be much pleased with. He has not yet got to your special subject, but he will soon arrive at it. Mr. Herbert Spencer's "Principles of Psychology," though not so sound as a whole, contains many searching analyses of complex mental phenomena, and happy applications of the principle of association. He has unfortunately put at the head of it a dissertation under the title of the "Universal Postulate," which seems to me not only erroneous, but quite inconsistent with the philosophy of the work it is prefixed to.

I hope that like myself you have been successful in warding off your chest complaint, and that your eyesight, to which your preface alludes, is at least not getting worse.

To F. Sinnett, of Melbourne.

Blackheath, *22nd October* 1857.

1857 — Aetat. 51.

Dear Sir,—It is now some weeks since I received your letter of 23rd May, but I have not until now had time to answer your question.

In principle, I am quite in favour of considering all land as the property of the State, and its rent as a fund for defraying the public expenses. But there are two objections to the application of this maxim to a country in the circumstances of Australia. One of these you have mentioned, viz., that a large immigration is most effectually attracted by granting the land in absolute property, at a price to be only once paid. I agree with you that a time comes when a colony is so far advanced in population and importance that immigration ceases to be the first object, so far as the colony itself is concerned, and that, when this time comes, the advantage of the colony should take precedence over the interest which the mother country may have in getting rid of a surplus population. But I doubt if that time has yet come in the case of Australia. A great temporary immigration has been brought about by the gold discoveries, but I should think that for retaining the immigrants the colony depends very much on the facilities allowed of acquiring land; and Englishmen do not like to settle where they cannot get land in fee. In India we have the system you desire, but that is one great reason why few English settle there; and the English who do go, and the greater number who would like to go, are always clamouring to have the system changed to one of grants in fee; and so I should think would a large part of the resident population of Australia who have not yet got land.

There is a second objection which weighs with me as much as the first; the very great difficulty of levying a land tax, or any annual payment, from settlers scattered widely apart over a great wilderness. It is difficult enough, as the Americans find, to prevent squatting even when only *one*

payment is demanded, as a condition preliminary to occupancy. But if a payment has to be made annually I cannot but think that to collect and enforce it, if practicable at all, would require so costly an establishment as would absorb the chief part of the receipts, and be quite unsuitable to the finances of a country like Australia. In India the revenue establishments are one of the heaviest items of the public expenditure, although India in general is thickly peopled. I believe that attempts have been made formerly to collect taxes from outlying lands in the older Australian colonies, but that their failure was so complete that they were abandoned. 1857 — Aetat. 51.

The newly introduced Parliamentary government of the provinces seems to have some difficulty in getting into regular play, but this will be got over in time. We are glad to hear your favourable account of your own prospects.

The following letter was written in reply to a request to sign a Memorial demanding an Educational Franchise :—

EAST INDIA HOUSE, 11*th December* 1857.

DEAR SIR,—I am unable to put my name to the Memorial which I have just received from you, because I am, to say the least, very doubtful of the desirableness of the measure proposed in it.

I quite agree in the opinion that educated persons should count in a greater ratio than that of their mere numbers in the constituency of the country. But I have not seen any method proposed by which persons of educated minds can be sifted from the rest of the community. All that could well be done is to give votes to a limited number of what are called liberal professions, on the presumption (often a very false one) that every member of those professions must be an educated person. But nearly all the recognised professions have, as such, interests and partialities opposed to the public good, and the members of Parliament whom they would elect if

1857 — Aetat. 51. organised apart would, I apprehend, be much more likely to represent their sentiments and objects as professional, than as educated men.

The only provisions for increasing the influence of the educated class of voters, to which I see my way, are, 1st, an educational test for all electors, such as would exclude the wholly uneducated. The amount of expurgation of even the present constituencies, which they would effect, would be found, I believe, much greater than is supposed. 2nd, I regard it as an indispensable part of a just representative constitution, that minorities be not swamped, but that every considerable minority be represented in a fair proportion to its numbers. This would be secured by the simple plan proposed some years ago by Mr. Marshall, of allowing a voter, if he pleases, to give all his votes to the same individual: other modes of effecting the same object have been proposed, but they would necessarily be unpopular as they propose to operate by abridging the rights of the individual voter, while the plan in question would extend them, and it would, besides, allow weight to degree of preference as well as to number, a distinction highly desirable to the more eminent candidate.

I may add that I *should* be glad to see a representation given to the graduates of the University of London, such as is already possessed by Oxford, Cambridge, and Dublin.

To John Holmes, of Leeds,

on the Co-operative movement.

East India House, 19*th January* 1858.

1858 — Aetat. 51. Dear Sir,—I am very much obliged to you for sending me the paper which you read at the Birmingham meeting. I only knew enough of the Leeds experiment to be aware that it had been very successful; and of the Rochdale one, only a little more. I now know the particulars of the success, and some of the details of the plan, and I hope, as occasions arise, to make my knowledge useful. The

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only doubt which could reasonably be entertained about the success of co-operation in this country, was grounded on the low moral and intellectual condition of the masses. Your success and that of the Rochdale Association proves that there are at least two bodies of work-people to be found who are sufficiently free from short-sighted selfishness—for that is really all that is required—to be capable of succeeding in such an enterprise, and the results, economically considered, as exhibited in your paper, are so advantageous that they can hardly fail to call forth imitators. It is now shown that with honest and intelligent management, co-operative establishments can undersell individual dealers. But to do this, the management must *be* honest and intelligent. If the experience of co-operation teaches the working-classes the value of honesty and intelligence *to themselves*, it will work as great a moral revolution in society as it will, in that case, a physical. But it will never do the last without the first, and that you see this so clearly, gives me much confidence in the value of your influence, and hopes of the permanency of your success.

To Giuseppe Mazzini.

Blackheath Park, 21*st February* 1858.

Dear Sir,— . . . When I began writing to you I thought that this country was meanly allowing itself to be made an appendage to Louis Bonaparte's police for the purpose of hunting down all foreigners (and indeed English too) who have virtue enough to be his avowed enemies. But it appears we are to be spared this ignominy; and such is the state of the world ten years after 1848 that even this must be felt as a great victory.

I sympathise too strongly both with your taste for solitude and with the devotion of your time and activity to the great object of your life, to intrude on you with visits or invitations. We, like you, feel that those who would either make their lives useful to noble ends, or maintain any elevation of character within themselves,

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must in these days have little to do with what is called society. But if it can be any pleasure to you to exchange ideas with people who have many thoughts and feelings in common with you, my wife and I reckon you among the few persons to whom we can sincerely say that they may feel sure of being welcome.

To Pasquale Villari.

East India House, *le 9 mars*, 1858.

Mon cher Monsieur Villari,—Vos deux lettres dont la dernière porte la date du 10 janvier, mériteraient bien une réponse plus prompte. Je vous prie de ne pas voir dans le retard que j'y ai mis une preuve d'indifférence aux sentiments d'amitié que vous voulez bien me témoigner. Ce retard vient de la multiplicité de mes occupations et surtout de la lutte que la compagnie des Indes, dont je suis un des employés, soutient maintenant pour son existence. Le gouvernement anglais se propose d'arracher à la compagnie la part qu'elle conserve encore dans l'administration de l'Inde. L'ignorance du public ne permet pas d'espoir que la compagnie puisse s'en tirer ; mais il importe qu'elle succombe honorablement et que sa cause soit plaidée d'une manière digne d'un gouvernement qui a été, j'ose le dire, unique dans le monde par la pureté de ses intentions et par la bienfaisance de ses actes. Cette tâche étant dévolue surtout à moi, elle a dû être, depuis quelque temps, ma principale occupation.

Cependant depuis l'ouverture du parlement une question d'un intérêt presque plus vif est venue compliquer la situation. Je veux parler de la misérable tentative du ministère Palmerston de trainer la nation anglaise dans la boue, en faisant d'elle une succursale de la police française.[1] Nous sommes sauvés pour le moment de cet avilissement, par la chute du ministère qui, tout-puissant en apparence un mois auparavant, a été chassé du pouvoir par la combinaison de ses ennemis naturels

[1] [This refers to the Conspiracy to Murder Bill, introduced in view of Orsini's attempt on the life of Napoleon III.]

avec ceux qui lui ont retiré leur appui à cause de son indigne soumission à des exigences déshonorables au pays. Cet événement m'a comblé de joie; cependant je ne suis pas encore rassuré: les successeurs de Lord Palmerston ne valent pas mieux que lui, et il n'est rien moins que certain qu'ils ne soient pas au fond tout aussi obséquieux. S'ils ne font pas une nouvelle loi, ce qui est encore douteux, ils feront certainement tout le mal possible au moyen des lois existantes, et celles-là sont déjà bien assez odieuses; heureusement il nous reste le jury, et la presse indépendante exerce sur lui une certaine influence. Vous voyez par la part qu'il a pris dans cette affaire que Lord John Russell a du bon, quoique vous l'ayez parfaitement bien jugé être un homme très médiocre. Tel qu'il est, il vaut encore mieux que la plupart de nos soi-disants hommes d'état, qui s'ils savent quelque chose, ne savent que les traditions de la politique anglaise soit conservative, soit libérale, mais qui sont d'une ignorance profonde sur la politique générale et sur les idées et l'histoire des autres pays. 1858 — Aetat 51.

Ma femme me charge de vous faire ses compliments. Elle s'intéresse autant que moi à la cause de l'Italie et aux patriotes et philosophes italiens. Nous espérons bien vous voir avant peu, soit ici, soit peut-être à Florence. Algernon Taylor se rappelle à votre souvenir. Sa santé est toujours très faible; moi-même je me porte assez bien. Je serai charmé d'avoir de vous la longue lettre dont vous me parlez, et j'espère y répondre une autre fois moins tardivement.—Votre dévoué,

J. S. Mill.

J'espèrais vous offrir depuis longtemps mon petit livre sur la Liberté, mais plusieurs raisons m'ont décidé à ne pas le faire imprimer cet hiver. Au reste il n'a guère de valoir que pour l'Angleterre. Il traite de la liberté morale et intellectuelle, en quoi les nations du Continent sont autant au-dessus de l'Angleterre qu'elles lui sont inférieures quant à la liberté politique.

To William Newmarch.

East India House, *20th March* 1858.

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Dear Sir,—I have been turning over in my mind the proposal which was the subject of your note of the 17th, for founding a Professorship at King's College in the name of Mr. Tooke. In so far as its object is to pay honour to Mr. Tooke I entirely sympathise with it. Few persons have rendered greater services to political economy and its applications than Mr. Tooke, and the value of what he has done is likely to be rated more and more highly as the subject is better understood and as the ephemeral controversies of the present time die away. But I am not certain that the best mode of demonstrating respect to his memory is the one suggested. It does not seem to me that the persons, of more or less merit, in whose name professorships have been founded at the Universities, are remembered to any purpose through those endowments. I for one do not even know when most of them lived or who they were. The present plan has certainly the recommendation of aiming at public usefulness. But to endow a permanent professorship to an amount worth accepting by any eminent man, with the interest of subscriptions, would require a much larger sum than I should think it would be possible to raise. And would the lectures be attended? There is a Professorship of Political Economy at University College, but I believe there are hardly ever any pupils. This brings me to what is with me a decisive objection against the plan as connected with King's College, namely, that it is a distinctively Church institution. I have been fighting all my life for the principle of Schools and Colleges for all, not for Churchmen or any other class of religionists, and I believe Mr. Tooke's opinions on the subject were exactly the same, while King's College was founded in avowed opposition to religious equality, as the National schools were founded in opposition to the Lancastrian. I have always refused to support any kind of Church schools, and for the same reason I could not join

in giving any additional advantages to a Church college over those which are bound by their constitution to religious neutrality. 1858 — Aetat. 51.

To Giuseppe Mazzini,

on a proposal to form an International Society for political objects.

East India House, 15*th April* 1858.

. . . Your project is a very good one if it could be successful. But of this there seems little chance. Even supposing the indifference of the English to foreign affairs overcome, you would probably find that you had only substituted one obstacle in the place of another. The English, of all ranks and classes, are at bottom, in all their feelings, aristocrats. They have the conception of liberty, and set some value on it, but the very idea of equality is strange and offensive to them. They do not dislike to have many people above them as long as they have some below them, and therefore they have never sympathised and in their present state of mind never will sympathise with any really democratic or republican party in other countries. They keep what sympathy they have for those whom they look upon as imitators of English institutions—Continental Whigs who desire to introduce constitutional forms and some securities against personal oppression—leaving in other respects the old order of things with all its inequalities and social injustices; and any people who are not willing to content themselves with this, are thought unfit for liberty. There is here and there an Englishman who is an exception, but if all the exceptions were to unite I doubt their making much impression on English policy. Even Louis Napoleon was never really unpopular here until he was supposed to have insulted or threatened England.

Mill received a very large number of letters from unknown correspondents. These he usually took

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great pains to answer, explaining any points that were put to him. Occasionally, however, he would administer a sharp rebuke to an importunate correspondent.

To J. Britten.

East India House, 1*st July* 1858.

Sir,—I beg to acknowledge a letter from you dated 24th June.

You are not the first, nor the hundredth, person who has thought that he was able to prove "that a large majority of the principles or dogmas usually accepted by economists as being the settled principles of the science are wholly fallacious." I have read many such attempts; some of them more or less ingenious, others merely stupid, but all showing equal incapacity of seeing through the most obvious paralogisms; and not only did none of them, in my judgment, effect their object, but I have rarely found that anything was to be learnt from them, even incidentally. Having obtained no better fruits from a considerable course of such reading, I may claim to be excused from giving time which I can ill spare, to the examination of any new attempts of the kind, unless I have some special reason to expect that it will differ very much from its predecessors. And I certainly cannot accede to your proposal, that I should not merely study the book which is to refute me and all other political economists, but also assist you in writing it.

To Pasquale Villari.

East India House, *le* 8 *juillet* 1858.

Mon cher M. Villari,—Il y a bientôt trois mois que je dois une réponse à votre dernière lettre, mais vous savez comme je suis occupé et j'espère que vous m'excuserez. Celle de mes occupations qui est depuis quelque temps la plus pressante, tire maintenant à la fin: la Compagnie

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des Indes, comme gouvernement, va cesser d'exister, mais elle périt avec un certain éclat ; et on a suivi la plupart de ses conseils dans l'organisation du gouvernement qu'on va mettre à sa place. Ce résultat, contraire à l'attente générale est dû en grande partie aux divers écrits que la Compagnie a fait paraître, et auxquels je n'ai pas été étranger. Malgré ce succès, je suis peu disposé à accepter une place dans la nouvelle administration, et je profiterai probablement de l'occasion pour obtenir ma retraite. Dans ce cas nous ferons usage de notre liberté pour voyager ; mais la nouvelle loi donnant six mois pour effectuer le changement, je ne serai pas libre avant la fin de l'année, et dans le cas même où nous irions à Florence, ce ne pourrait être qu'à un temps très éloigné.

Vos observations sur l'Inde sont d'une grande justesse, vu le peu de documents qui sont à votre portée. Vous avez surtout très justement apprécié le genre d'hommes qu'on a souvent nommés gouverneurs de Bombay et de Madras. Les nominations à ces positions-là sont faites par le gouvernement, et non par la Compagnie, et le Général Adam dont vous parlez dans votre lettre en fut un des plus nuls. Il est vrai aussi que les Anglais, en général, ne se font pas aimer des races indigènes, ce qui, au reste, se peut dire également des autres peuples européens qui gouvernent des pays éloignés, habités par d'autres races. Cependant les populations de l'Inde reconnaissent généralement que l'administration Anglo-Indienne est juste. Elle ne les rançonne ni ne les tyrannise comme leurs propres chefs, et elle tâche de leur donner de bonnes lois et des tribunaux honnêtes et impartiaux, chose inconnue en Asie avant elle. Quant aux princes indigènes, et surtout à l'Oude, vous avez été mal informé, ce qui n'est pas étonnant. On n'a pas violé la foi des traités : au contraire, les traités exigeaient que les princes de l'Oude fissent une réforme complète de leur gouvernement atroce, et on les a par une fausse délicatesse laissé violer cet engagement pendant 50 ans, en se contentant de remontrances qui n'étaient jamais suivies d'effet. Enfin on s'est lassé de cette indulgence, et on a dépossédé une famille

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indigène de régner, qui sans notre appui eût été chassée depuis longtemps: en lui assurant toutefois une grande richesse. Cette histoire serait trop longue pour une lettre, mais je pourrai vous la raconter quelque jour si elle vous intéresse.

To Judge Chapman,

then Prime Minister of the colony of Victoria.

East India House, *8th July* 1858.

My dear Chapman,—You are a much better correspondent than I am, and I really do not know how many letters I have received from you since I wrote one. I am always busy and have been particularly so of late, but your last letter especially contains so many points of interest that I will not delay any longer replying to it.

The history it contains of the constitutional changes which have succeeded one another in your colony since what may be called its enfranchisement, has connected and made intelligible the scattered information I had picked up from the newspapers. You have certainly now obtained a very democratic constitution, and I am glad to see by the papers that you have yourself, since you wrote, had the forming of an administration to work it. No constitution, less democratic, would be either practicable or probably desirable in the long run, in a society composed like that of the Australian colonies. The only thing which seems wanting to make the suffrage really universal is to get rid of the Toryism of sex, by admitting women to vote, and it will be a great test how far the bulk of your population deserve to have the suffrage themselves, their being willing or not to extend it to women. I am sorry, by the way, that the vulgar and insulting expression "manhood suffrage" has found its way to Australia: whether so intended or not, it asserts the exclusion of women as a doctrine, which is worse than merely ignoring them, as was done by giving the name universal suffrage to a suffrage limited to men. The

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adoption of the ballot in Victoria has made some noise here, and has been a good deal appealed to by its advocates in Parliament. You have heard no doubt of the dinner given to Nicholson. It will perhaps surprise you that I am not now a supporter of the ballot, though I am far from thinking that I was wrong in supporting it formerly. You remember, I dare say, a passage which always seemed to me highly philosophical in my father's "History of India," when he discriminates between the cases in which the ballot is in his estimation desirable and those in which it is undesirable: now I think that the election of members of Parliament has passed, in the course of the last twenty-five years, out of the former class into the latter. In the early part of the century there was more probability of bad votes from the coercion of others than from the voter's own choice; but I hold that the case is now reversed, and that an elector gives a rascally vote incalculably oftener from his own personal or class interest, or some mean feeling of his own, the influence of which would be greater under secret suffrage, than from the prompting of some other person who has power over him. Coercive influences have vastly abated, and are abating every day: a landlord cannot now afford to part with a good tenant because he is not politically subservient; and even if there were universal suffrage, the idea of a manufacturer forcing his workpeople to vote against the general policy of their class, is almost out of the question; in this as in so many other things, *defendit numerus*. If these things are true in England, they must be still more true in Australia, where I cannot imagine that any artificial security can be required to ensure freedom of voting. But if there be even a doubt on the subject the doubt ought merely to turn the scale in favour of publicity. Nothing less than the most positive and powerful reasons of expediency would justify putting in abeyance a principle so important in forming the moral character either of an individual or a people, as the obligation on every one to be ready to avow and justify whatever he does affecting the interests of others. I have long

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thought that in this lies the main advantage of the public opinion sanction; not in compelling or inducing people to act as public opinion dictates, but in making it necessary for them if they do not, to have firm ground in their own conviction to stand on, and to be capable of maintaining it against attack. I shall probably at some time write and publish something about the ballot which will show the grounds of my present opinion more fully and perhaps more clearly than I have now done. There is another constitutional point which I must touch upon, because you say you have quoted me on the subject and my former opinion is, to say the least, very much shaken—the payment of members of Parliament. There is, no doubt, something to be said for it, especially where, as you remark, there is no unoccupied class; but I am afraid of its raising up just such a class, of men without any fixed occupation but that of being in Parliament, for the sake of the certain payment as members and the possible one as placemen. Certainly, by all accounts the American legislatures, both State and Federal, are very much composed of a low class of adventurers whose principal object is money, and some Americans have a decided opinion that the payment of members is one great cause of this. By the way, as you have quoted Bailey and me on this subject, I wish you would quote us on the subject of women's suffrage also. The representation of minorities seems to me not only a good but a highly democratic measure. The ideal of a democracy is not that a mere majority of the people should have all the representation, but that if possible every portion of the constituency should possess an influence in the election proportional to its numbers. This cannot be realised literally, but it seems to me a good arrangement that any portion of the constituency amounting to a third should be able to obtain a third of the representation by concerting to aim at no more. This should not be done by limiting each voter to fewer votes than there are members to be elected, which, curtailing the power of the individual voter, must always be unpopular. The plan I like is the cumulative method,

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which I am glad to see has been carried. This plan has also the advantage that when a voter can give all his votes to one person, intensity of preference carries weight as well as the mere fact of preference, an arrangement very favourable to candidates who stand on personal merit as compared with those who are voted for only because they belong to a party. I see you think that this plan will increase the influence of the Irish Catholics: notwithstanding my good opinion of Duffy, I should be sorry for this result, but the objection is only temporary and the advantage permanent. About education and the public lands, you seem to be in the right track, and with a good prospect of keeping in it.

There is probably little I could tell you about English politics that you do not already know. The East India Company has fought its last battle, and I have been in the thick of the fight. The Company is to be abolished, but we have succeeded in getting nearly all the principles that we contended for adopted in constituting the new government, and our original assailants feel themselves much more beaten than we do. The change—though not so bad as at first seemed probable—is still, in my opinion, much for the worse. The difficulty of governing India in any tolerable manner, already so much increased by the Mutiny and its consequences, will become an impossibility if a body so ignorant and incompetent on Indian (to say nothing of other) subjects as Parliament, comes to make a practice of interfering. In other respects politics are more satisfactory than usual; the defeat of all the attempts to make England instrumental in keeping Louis Napoleon where he is, and the conversion of the Tory chiefs into temporary Radicals for the purpose of remaining in place, are the best things that have happened in Europe for a long time. The complete disconcerting of the old place-hunters, and the failure of all their attempts to form a party, are very agreeable and amusing to all but themselves.

To Louis Blanc,

acknowledging his book, "1848: Historical Revelations."

Blackheath Park, *le 9 juillet* 1858.

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Mon cher Monsieur Louis Blanc,—Pardonnez moi de n'avoir pas encore reconnu réception de votre excellent livre. D'abord je voulais le lire avant de parler, et plus tard je fus si occupé que j'ai ajourné toute lettre qui pouvait souffrir un retard. Je vous aurais assurément témoigné mes remercîments la première fois que je vous eusse vu.

C'est presque une chose heureuse qu'un homme léger et sans autorité comme Lord Normanby, ait reproduit les calomnies ridicules et atroces de 1848, puisque cela vous a donné une occasion de les écraser comme vous avez fait. Lord Normanby, comme l'aristocratie et la bourgeoisie anglaise en général, a tout simplement cru ce que lui disaient les contre-révolutionnaires français qu'il voyait, et dont l'opinion anglaise vulgaire est devenue l'écho. Parmi les membres du gouvernement provisoire, Lamartine est le seul qu'il voyait aussi, et le seul, par conséquent, qu'il n'a pas injurié. S'il vous eût fréquenté, il aurait fait de vous aussi une exception. Ce n'est pas un malhonnête homme mais il a toutes les faiblesses de sa classe, et entre autres celle d'adopter sans examen sur les affaires des autres pays, tous les préjugés et tous les *on dits* de ceux qu'il regarde comme représentant l'opinion conforme à celle de son parti en Angleterre. Tous ces mensonges-là étaient oubliés, mais l'impression restait, et il fallait qu'on les rappelât de l'oubli pour qu'il fût possible en les répétant d'en atténuer l'effet. Il n'y a pas d'opinion à laquelle on tient aussi fortement qu'à celle dont on a oublié les fondements. Vous avez bien profité de l'occasion. Votre ouvrage sera historique et ceux qui désirent la vérité pourront désormais en juger par eux-mêmes en comparant l'accusation et la réponse. Aussi vous avez dû voir que la réfutation n'a pas été sans effet. Toutes les notices qu'on a faites sur votre ouvrage,

MRS. JOHN STUART MILL
From a Cameo

du moins, toutes celles que j'ai vues, malgré l'extrême ignorance propre aux écrivains anglais sur la politique étrangère, laissent voir que si vous n'avez pas beaucoup ébranlé les préventions contraires aux hommes et aux évènements de 1848, du moins on a ressenti l'effet de la loyauté et de la franchise de vos explications.

Vous n'êtes pas oublié ici. Ma femme vous cite souvent et me prie aussi de vous présenter ses compliments affectueux.—Tout à vous,

J. S. MILL.

To GEORGE GROTE,

in reply to a letter of sympathy on the death of Mrs. Mill.

BLACKHEATH, 28*th November* 1858.

MY DEAR GROTE,—I knew that you would feel with me and for me. Your letter has done as much good to me and to my fellow-sufferers as we are now capable of receiving.

If I were to attempt to express in the most moderate terms what she was, even you would hardly believe me. Without any personal tie, merely to have known her as I do would have been enough to make life a blank now that she has disappeared from it. I seem to have cared for things or persons, events, opinions on the future of the world, only because she cared for them: the sole motive that remains strong enough to give any interest to life is the desire to do what she would have wished; but will this give the strength or the energy to do any new thing? Perhaps not. I shall try, however. I can at least put in order for publication what had been already written in concert with her, and this is my occupation for the present.

Pray express to Mrs. Grote my gratitude for her kind sympathy. I will write again soon.

To James Lorimer,
on Plural Voting.

Blackheath, *3rd March* 1859.

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Dear Sir,—Allow me to thank you for your very interesting treatise,[1] which, having been absent, I have only just had an opportunity of reading. We agree to a considerable extent in our practical views, particularly in the important point (almost new, I think, in the theory of representation) that the proper safeguard against the undue preponderance of a class more numerous than all others taken together, is not the exclusion of anybody, but the *graduation* of influence proportionally to just claims. Between *some* influence and *more* influence the ratio is finite and appreciable, but between some and none at all it is mathematically infinite. No one could without voluntary degradation admit that he ought to be counted for nothing, though every reasonable person is eager to admit that there are persons entitled to be counted for more than himself.

But while we agree thus far, we differ very much on other points. I would not give any one a plurality of votes in consequence of any merely *social* superiority, and your general principle of making the representative assembly an exact reflection of existing inequalities of weight and position seems to me liable to very strong objections, with which, as I shall probably write something on the matter, I will not trouble you here.

I would also include women in the ultimate universal suffrage that you contemplate—which as far as I can collect from a note in your book you would not do. I think your principles break down altogether if you allow of any exceptions among persons *sui juris*.

To Thomas Hare,

acknowledging his book on Representation. In this book was described the scheme, to the propaganda of

[1] ["Equal Representation."]

which Mill afterwards devoted so much time and trouble. 1859 — Aetat. 52.

3rd March 1859.

DEAR SIR,—Having been absent from home, it is only within the last few days that I have had an opportunity of reading and studying your book—which I have done with no ordinary feelings. You appear to me to have exactly, and for the first time, solved the difficulty of popular representation—and by doing so, to have raised up the cloud of gloom and uncertainty which hung over the futurity of representative government and therefore of civilisation. That you are right in theory I never could have doubted, and as to practice, having begun with a great natural distrust of what seemed a very complicated set of arrangements, I ended by being convinced that the plan is workable, and effectually guarded or guardable against fraud. In the details I have as yet found only one point which, it seems to me, might be improved, and that is so minor a one as hardly to be worth mentioning. You propose that (assuming the quota to be 2000) the first 2000 votes a candidate obtains at the place for which he stands should be counted for his return, and his name struck out of all subsequent voting papers. Should it not be the *last* 2000 rather than the first? Otherwise there is a premium on hanging back from the poll; the later voters having more power than the earlier ones, inasmuch as after the attainment of their first object their second votes also are counted.

Excuse my offering this very small criticism on a scheme for which I shall henceforth be a zealous apostle. I am as sanguine as you are yourself respecting the moral and political effects of it, which would far transcend anything that is apparent at first sight. A thing so complete will not, however, be attained at one step, and it is therefore mortifying that the principle of representation of universities is not in some way recognised (however imperfectly it might be realised) by the ministerial Reform Bill.

Allow me to add that while I so entirely concur both in the principles of your book and in its practical proposals, I have also the good fortune to agree with most even of your

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incidental remarks on things in general.—I am, yours with great respect,

J. S. Mill.

To Pasquale Villari,

in reply to a letter of condolence on the death of Mrs. Mill.

le 6 mars 1859.

Mon cher M. Villari,—A mon retour d'une absence j'ai trouvé votre bonne et affectueuse lettre. J'y reconnais une sincérité de sympathie qui toujours soulage un peu le malheur dont elle ne console point. Je voudrais pouvoir, de quelque façon que ce soit, vous rendre ce bien. Si j'avais pu vous faire connaître celle qui n'est plus, il me semble que je vous aurais plus que payé de tout bienfait et de toute amitié qu'il eût été possible de recevoir. Elle était non seulement le cœur le plus aimant et l'âme la plus élevée, mais aussi l'esprit le plus profond et le jugement le plus infaillible qu'il m'a été donné de connaître. Tout ce qu'on trouve de meilleur dans mes écrits n'est que la plus pâle réflexion de ses lumières et de sa grande âme—et l'on s'en apercevra bien, je le crains, dans ce qui me reste à faire, malgré tous mes efforts pour me diriger toujours par son souvenir.

Vous me demandez comment cette catastrophe est arrivée. Nous étions en route pour le midi—nous voulions passer l'hiver à Hyères et le printemps en Italie, peut-être à Florence. Quoique délicate, elle se portait bien lors de notre départ, mais la fatigue du voyage ou quelque cause inconnue a déterminé à Avignon une attaque de poitrine qui, quoique sérieuse, ne sembla dangereuse que le jour même qui fut le dernier de sa vie. Ainsi l'affranchissement que j'avais désiré et dont je me promettais tant de bien pour nous deux, est devenu le malheur de ma vie, et c'est peu de chose ; car Dieu sait que j'aurais racheté de tout mon bonheur sa simple existence même eloignée de moi. Il me semble que j'aurais pu tout supporter excepté qu'elle cessât d'être.

J'ai acheté une petite maison près de son tombeau. . . .

To Alexander Bain.

Blackheath, 17*th March* 1859.

1859 — Aetat. 52.

Dear Bain,—I am glad that you like the "Liberty" so much and agree with so many of the heresies of the Reform pamphlet. With regard to the plural voting, one must not withhold one's opinion as to what is right in principle because one does not see one's way to getting it fully acted on. The right principle, put into a legislator's head, may decide his judgment on some important practical question involving the same principle. It is a great point also to meet the claims of mere numbers with something which appeals to the reason and sense of justice of the numbers themselves, which no other mode of inequality of political rights does. One must never suppose what is good in itself to be visionary because it may be far off. That this is not really visionary is illustrated by the fact that Mr. Holyoake has already taken it up warmly and in the most unqualified form. . . .

To Pasquale Villari,

in reply to a further letter on the death of Mrs. Mill.

Blackheath, 28*th March* 1859.

Mon cher M. Villari,—Votre belle et touchante lettre m'a fait du bien. Je vous honore d'avoir su voir, au moins en partie, dans mes écrits, ce que je dois à un enseignement et à une collaboration dont le bonheur n'existe plus maintenant qu'en souvenir. Cependant vous risquez toujours de lui attribuer trop peu de tout ce que vous louez en moi. Nous n'étions pas, comme on pouvait le croire, deux esprits différents mais égaux, dont l'un aurait apporté autant que l'autre au fonds commun, comme par exemple l'élévation des idées serait dû surtout à l'un, la justice des appréciations pratiques à l'autre. Il n'en était point ainsi—Elle me dépassait également aux deux égards. Sa hauteur atteignait le ciel tout en restant

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ferme sur la terre. Elle était complète sans moi, tandis que moi je suis très incomplet sans elle. Ce qui m'appartenait en propre dans l'œuvre commune n'était guère qu'un certain talent de rédaction et d'interprétation, qui ne vaut quelque chose que pour les lettrés et pour les savans, car elle trouvait toujours beaucoup mieux que moi le chemin de l'esprit et du cœur de la simple humanité.

Passons maintenant aux affaires de l'Italie. Je ne m'étonne point de l'illusion où semble être pour le moment chez vous l'esprit national. Je crains pourtant qu'elle ne puisse devenir très fatale. Soyez bien persuadé que le plus dangereux ennemi qu'ait en ce moment l'avenir de l'humanité, c'est celui dont vous invoquez l'appui.[1] Je comprendrais qu'à telle époque donnée on mît la nationalité avant la liberté, je pourrais même le pardonner, parceque la liberté a souvent besoin de la nationalité pour exister. Mais comment peut on croire que la nationalité italienne puisse exister avec cet homme ? A-t-elle existé sous son oncle ? Pense-t-on que ce soit par un sentiment généreux qu'il veut faire la guerre à l'Autriche sous prétexte de l'Italie ? Est-ce une nationalité que d'être dans la dépendance servile d'un despote étranger ? Sait-il même ce que c'est que la foi, que l'honneur, que le respect de la parole donnée ? La France, même libre, veut beaucoup trop imposer son joug aux autres peuples—et son maître actuel, en flattant ce défaut national, désire faire usage des Français pour asservir les Italiens, afin de les tenir tous deux subjugués les uns par les autres, tout comme en use l'Autriche à l'égard des divers peuples qu'elle domine. C'est navrant pour un ami de la liberté d'être forcé de souhaiter le succès même de l'Autriche contre une puissance plus rétrograde et plus malfaisante qu'elle. Je ne voudrais pourtant pas que l'Angleterre prêtât main forte à l'Autriche attaquée, à moins d'une renonciation préalable à l'Italie. Je ne voudrais jusque là qu'une médiation et une neutralité armée. Mais si la guerre a lieu je ne pense pas que l'Angleterre s'arrête longtemps à ce point. Un peuple n'a jamais qu'une idée à la fois, et le nôtre, je le

[1] [Napoleon III.]

crains, cesserait bientôt de sympathiser avec le patriotisme italien s'il se présentait comme l'appui du tyran perfide de la France. Ce que veut cet homme est par cela même mauvais car il ne veut que l'accroissement et l'affermissement de son pouvoir, et il n'y a pas de plus grand mal pour la terre. 1859 — Aetat. 52.

To Thomas Hare.

29th March 1859.

Dear Sir,—I have long ceased to regard speeches in Parliament as meaning anything except that the speaker has not made up his mind to vote next day for the thing he attacks. The position of a member of Parliament must be very corrupting, for it seems to divest people of all concern for the day after to-morrow. People are not afraid to *flétrir*, by a passing word, something that they have never once thought about—provided there does not seem to be at the time any strong party for it among their own friends. This is what is called being practical.

Your plan, if kept before the public, will be adopted as soon as any really large concession of the suffrage has to be made to the working classes—but all parties at present think they can get off this time without that, so they do not like to delay and encumber their measure with provisions which are not understood.

Does Gladstone know of your book? I should think him, of all prominent public men, the likeliest to appreciate it. . . .

To James Lorimer,

who was beginning to be known as an author.

7th April 1859.

Dear Sir,—Many thanks for your letter. I should think the difficulty you had in obtaining a publisher was owing to the same cause which you refer to in the case of Mr. Hare, the *scientific* apparatus of your treatise. Probably

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something of the same kind has stood in your way with Reeve.[1] The English public do not like to see even their own conclusions rested upon arguments which they are conscious that they themselves could never have used. You do not at all exaggerate the English dislike of theory, and of any particular suggestion which is at all out of the common way. But this dislike is always greatest at first, and though a Minister may be obliged to bow to it, it is a great mistake in any one else to humour it. Every repetition and inculcation of a really good doctrine or proposal does a little towards raising it from the class of impracticable into that of practicable things. The errors of the public owe half their mischievous power to people who do not participate in the errors, but who think it practical to summarily reject everything that is offered to them. Therefore when, as in the case of Hare's plan, there is really no obstacle to its adoption but the novelty of the idea, we should always, I think, talk and write about it as if that were no obstacle at all.

I hope you may yet find some channel for saying all you would wish to say in reply to me. If you do, you could not oblige me more than by telling me where it is to be found.

To Thomas Hare,

after Lord Derby's resignation, when Lord Granville was endeavouring to form a Cabinet.

St. Véran, *17th June* 1859.

Dear Sir,—I was very glad to hear from you again, and particularly so to hear that you are going to have the opportunity of a public discussion at the Social Science meeting. What is wanted is to get the subject much written about and talked of, previously to which the theory that two and two make four was no doubt regarded as a paradox, and such people as Disraeli got up in public

[1] [Editor of the *Edinburgh Review*.]

places and attacked their political opponents for maintaining it. How I should have liked to have been there to answer him on the spot. But there was nobody to do it. I like your idea of writing a paper and sending it to the members of the Association; but am doubtful about attaching signatures to it. That foolish memorial to Lord Palmerston has thrown a wet blanket on the idea. I suppose you will give brief and pungent answers to the popular objections against the plan, which are only expressions in varied phrase of the popular inability to understand it. When there is anything definite in the objections the truth is generally the reverse of what is asserted. For instance, it is supposed that the plan would enable minorities to govern, whereas the fact is that *now* a minority very often governs (by being the majority of a majority), while under your plan a minority never could by any possibility do so. It is the only plan which *ensures* government by the majority. 1859 — Aetat. 53.

I see no prospect of anything but mischief from the change of Ministry. Its effect on foreign affairs will be bad, and dangerously so, while reform will not be benefited. The new Cabinet will never be able to agree on anything but the well-worn useless shibboleths of Whig mitigated democracy, and besides, they will be unwilling to propose anything new from the certainty that the Tories would oppose it, would by misrepresentation rouse vulgar prejudices against it, and finally throw it out in the Lords. The Liberals by refusing to take the bill of the late Government as the foundation for theirs, have given redoubled force to the mischievous custom almost universal in Parliament that whatever one party brings forward the other is sure to oppose, whereby the enemies of change, even if very far from being a majority, are able to combine with the opponents and defeat the proposals of either. All parties seem to have joined in working the vices and weak points of popular representation for their miserably low selfish ends, instead of uniting to free representative institutions from the mischief and discredit of them.

To Pasquale Villari

St. Véran, 22 *juin* 1859.

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Mon cher Monsieur Villari,—Je ne vais pas renouveler notre discussion sur les affaires politiques. S'il dépendait de moi je ne voudrais pas maintenant vous décourager. Le sort est jeté et je souhaite ardemment que l'évènement réponde à vos désirs. Seulement tâchez de ne pas mal penser de l'Angleterre à cette occasion, et surtout gardez vous de croire qu'elle ne sympathise pas avec l'Italie. Cette sympathie est tellement forte qu'en ce moment elle suffit pour balancer non seulement la méfiance et la haine que doit inspirer une ambition criminelle, mais encore les motifs les plus graves de sûreté nationale. Songez que l'Autriche est la seule alliée sur laquelle nous aurions pu compter (car il n'y a pas de fonds à faire sur la Prusse et l'Allemagne sans l'Autriche) dans le cas très probable où nous aurions à lutter pour notre existence nationale contre la France et la Russie réunies. Dans cette lutte nous n'aurons plus l'Autriche avec nous, d'abord parcequ'elle sera probablement trop affaiblie, ensuite parcequ'elle sera trop offensée de notre neutralité actuelle. Nous aurons, hélas, l'Italie contre nous, car vous serez forcés de suivre dans toutes ses guerres votre prétendu libérateur. Ainsi l'ombre d'indépendence dont on vous flatte aura pour résultat que vous aiderez à abattre la seule liberté bien affermie qui existe dans l'ancien Continent. Vous nous pardonnerez, j'espère, de n'être pas très enthousiasmés de cette perspective. Si vous pensez sérieusement là-dessus vous verrez que ce danger doit être désormais la principale préoccupation de nos hommes d'état. Assurément tout le parti liberal aurait demandé la guerre contre la France, pendant que nous avons encore des alliés, n'étant la répugnance que lui inspire l'idée d'appuyer la domination de l'Autriche sur l'Italie. . . .

To Alexander Bain.

St. Véran, *6th August* 1859.

1859 — Aetat. 53.

Dear Bain,—Your letter of 11th July reached me in the Pyrenees, and I was pleased with all the news it contained, except what related to the weakness in your foot. I hope, however, that your Scotch excursion will cure what remains of that, and if not you have the resource of hydropathy, the benefits of which have been so strikingly exemplified in your case.

The "Liberty" has produced an effect on you which it was never intended to produce, if it has made you think that we ought not to attempt to convert the world. I meant nothing of the kind, and hold that we ought to convert all we can. We must be satisfied with keeping alive the sacred fire in a few minds when we are unable to do more—but the notion of an intellectual aristocracy of *lumières* while the rest of the world remains in darkness fulfils none of my aspirations—and the effort I aim at by the book is, on the contrary, to make the many more accessible to all truth by making them more open-minded. But perhaps you were only thinking of the question of religion. On that, certainly, I am not anxious to bring over any but really superior intellects and characters to the whole of my own opinions—in the case of all others I would much rather, as things now are, try to improve their religion than to destroy it. My review of you has been in Reeve's hands for several weeks, but I have yet heard nothing from him concerning it. I am expecting the proofs shortly. The testimonies and notices you tell me of seem to be of the right kind and of good promise for future ones. I hope the *National* will follow up its apparent intention of reviewing you. Its review of me I saw before I left England. I thought the writer's drift was plain enough, but he wrote from an erroneous point of thought. I have seen as yet no review of the "Dissertations," but that in the *Saturday Review*, which is so complimentary on the whole, and so very weak where it differs from me, that I think it

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is likely to do more good than harm to the opinions it attacks. I am sorry your former reviewer in the *Saturday* has left off reviewing. The Principal of the Owens College feels as many sincere Christians now do, and I hope the "Liberty" will make many more such. It is curious that the most enthusiastic adhesion I have received is from Kingsley, who seems to have been very strongly impressed by the book. When he had only seen it at Parker's he sent a message thanking me for the pages on Christian morality, and he has since written to me saying that it made him "a clearer-headed and braver-minded man upon the spot."

To Alexander Bain.

St. Véran, 15*th October* 1859.

. . . I am your debtor for an interesting letter, dated as long ago as 8th September. I am afraid I shall not be able to repay you in kind. You have probably seen before this time what I have written about your book.[1] I am glad to see by the advertisement that Reeve has put it at the head of the number. What you say of the notices in the *Athenæum* and press gave me pleasure. I saw accidentally part of another, apparently favourable, and likely to be useful, in the *Guardian*. The single paragraph in the *Westminster* was shabby, but I hope Grote persists in his intention of reviewing you there when he has finished with Plato—who seems to take him a length of time only to be warranted by using the opportunity to speak out very plainly on the great subjects—a thing I rather wish than expect he will be found to have done; though the perfect impunity of the bold things in the "Liberty" ought to give him the courage of one *qui bene est ausus vana contemnere*. Have you seen any of the recent reviews of the "Liberty"? That in the *Dublin University Magazine*, for instance, and the series of letters in the *English Churchman?* People are beginning to find out that the doctrines of the book are more opposed to their old opinions and feelings than

[1] [Mill's review of Bain's psychological works in the *Edinburgh*.]

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they at first saw, and are taking the alarm accordingly and rallying for a fight. But they have in general dealt candidly with me, and not too violently. As was to be expected, they claim for Christian morality all the things which I say are not in it, which is just what I wanted to provoke them to do. The article in the *National Review* on my writings generally is worth reading. It seems to be by Martineau, and I am obliged to him for it, since it is favourable to the utmost extent consistent with the writer's opinions, and decidedly tends to increase rather than diminish the influence which he says is already so great. I really had no idea of being so influential a person as my critics tell me I am. But being thought to have influence is the surest way of obtaining it really. The arguments of the reviewer on the contested points you will, I think, agree with me in considering to be very easily answerable. . . .

To Alexander Bain.

The *Edinburgh* article referred to in the following letter, was Mill's review of Bain's works, "The Senses and the Intellect" and "The Emotions and the Will."

St. Véran, 14*th November* 1859.

Dear Bain,—I am glad that you and Grote like the article in the *Edinburgh*. It is a considerable thing to have got the editor to say that the experience philosophy and the association psychology are getting up again, and to praise and recommend a book on that side of the question. I shall look with interest for Grote's article when he is able to write it. With regard to his Plato, one would be reconciled to the long time he spends over it if he were going to speak out his whole mind at last. But his timidity on the population subject is of bad augury. It would be easy enough to keep from any close contact with the physical part of the subject, and yet convey clearly enough all he means, or needs to say. But he seems to be

1859 — Aetat. 53. incurable. I have no doubt, however, that there will be much useful and improving matter in his book, and the longer he is in finishing it, the more thought there is likely to be in it when it is done. And with this I shall have to be contented, in default of better.

It is very pleasant to hear that you will be ready with the discussion of Phrenology and the science of character by next spring. It is an excellent plan to publish it in the first instance in *Fraser*, if Parker will take it. Besides being much earlier and more widely read, it will be an advertisement of the other volumes. I expect to learn a good deal from it, and to be helped by it in anything I may hereafter write on Ethology—a subject I have long wished to take up, at least in the form of Essays, but have never yet felt myself sufficiently prepared. I do not think of publishing my "Utilitarianism" till next winter at the earliest, though it is now finished, subject to any correction or enlargement which may suggest itself in the interval. It will be but a small book, about a fifth less than the "Liberty," if I make no addition to it. But small books are so much more read than large ones, that it is an advantage when one's matter will go into a small space. I have not written it in any hostile spirit towards Christianity, though undoubtedly both good ethics and good metaphysics will sap Christianity if it persists in allying itself with bad. The best thing to do in the present state of the human mind is to go on establishing positive truths (principles and rules of evidence of cause included) and leave Christianity to reconcile itself with them the best way it can. By that course, in so far as we have any success, we are at least doing something to improve Christianity.

I have just sent to Parker for next month's *Fraser* a paper on Non-Intervention, in which there are some severe things said of Lord Palmerston's conduct in opposing the Suez Canal. That affair is damaging the character of England on the Continent more than most people are aware of; it is so direct a confirmation of the old and false ideas respecting the selfish foreign policy of England.

To Dr. W. G. Ward.

St. Véran, *28th November* 1859.

1859 — Aetat. 53.

Dear Sir,—It gave me real pleasure to hear from you again after so long an interval, and I am much indebted to you for the opportunity of reading your first volume[1] while still unpublished. I have read it all with great interest, much of it with sincere admiration and sympathy, and (what you probably care more about) with no little admiration also for the eminent Catholic writers whom you quote. Many of them I was already disposed to think highly of, but my knowledge of them was chiefly at second hand. The questions you put to me I will with pleasure attempt to answer. A candid adversary has as great a claim as a supporter to one's best endeavour for making one's meaning clear to him, even if no change of opinion is likely to result. I never feel so sure of doing good as when I find that my writings have given matter for thought to those who differ from me—a service which your treatise is well calculated to render, if I may judge from its effect on myself.

With regard to the passages in which I am mentioned (with the same good feeling which you have always shown towards me), my answer is that both Mr. Herbert Spencer and you have misunderstood me. When I spoke of inferences as necessarily following from premisses, I was not using the word necessary in its metaphysical, but in its popular sense. I meant neither more nor less than that the reasoning process is to us conclusive evidence of what it proves; take the testimony of our senses, which neither you nor I nor any one considers to be necessary in the philosophical sense. As soon as I read Mr. Spencer's criticism, I saw that I had given ground for it by an incautious use of the word necessary, which I endeavoured to correct in revising the book for another edition. My mistake was not so much in using the term in a double sense as in not giving proper notice that I did so. For

[1] ["On Nature and Grace."]

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at that time I thought the word necessary a word worth retaining in philosophy; and I therefore, in conformity to my own rule (so to define words that their application may cover the same ground, and if possible even the same extent of ground, as before), used it as a designation for those properties of things which are deducible from the properties implied in their names. All mathematical truths, and truths analogous to mathematical, are in this sense necessary. As therefore I wished to keep the word necessary specifically for truths which are the results of reasoning, I was not unnaturally led into applying the term to the reasoning process itself. But (as I said before) I meant nothing in this case by necessity but conclusiveness.

I dare say you are not aware that in the last edition of the "Logic" I added a chapter in reply to Mr. Spencer, in which may be seen what I have to say against his own doctrine, but, if I remember right, I scarcely, if at all, touched upon his remarks on myself.

While I am on this part of the subject, I hope you will allow me to say that I do not think there is any ground for the distinction you draw between the evidence of present and that of past sensations, classing the one as experience and the other as intuition. If remembering were one act of the mind, trusting to memory another act, and judging that memory is to be trusted another, your distinction might be admissible. But they seem to me to be all three the same act, just as when I press my hand against an object feeling resistance, trusting the feeling, and judging that it is to be trusted, are all one. We cannot remember that which did not happen; no more than we can see or feel what *does* not happen. When I feel so and so, I cannot doubt that I *do* feel so and so, and when I remember to have felt so and so I cannot doubt that I *did* feel so and so. Memory I take to be the present consciousness of a past sensation. It is strange that such consciousness can exist, but the facts denoted by *was*, *is*, and *is to come*, are perhaps the most mysterious part of our mysterious existence, as is strikingly expressed in the well-known saying of St. Augustine. If I have made sufficiently clear what I

mean, I think you will see that it leaves in my apprehension nothing to be done by the intuitive act which your doctrine interposes. There indeed remains the act of generalisation which we perform when from remembering particular facts we ascend to the general proposition that memory may be trusted, in other words, that we have a faculty of memory; but this generalisation and classification of acts of our own mind has nothing in it contradictory to the experience doctrine, which always admits facts of internal consciousness as well as of external sensation, and considers the same logical processes as applicable to both. 1859 — Aetat. 53.

Now, as to the still more important subject of the meaning of *ought*. I will endeavour to explain the sense I attach to it, though this cannot be done in very few words. I believe that the word has in some respects a different meaning to different people. We must first distinguish between those who have themselves a moral feeling—a feeling of approving and condemning conscience—and those who have not, or in whom what they *may* have is dormant. I believe that those who have no *feeling* of right and wrong cannot possibly intue the rightness or wrongness of anything. They may assent to the proposition that a certain rule of conduct is right; but they really mean nothing except that such is the conduct which other people expect and require at their hands, with perhaps the addition that they have a strong motive for themselves requiring the same from other people. This you will probably agree with, and I will therefore pass to the case of those who have a true moral feeling, that is, a feeling of pain in the fact of violating a certain rule, quite independently of any expected consequences to themselves. It appears to me that to them the word *ought* means that if they act otherwise they shall be punished by this internal and perfectly disinterested feeling. Unless they would be so punished, or unless they think they would, any assertion they make to themselves that they ought so to act seems to me to lose its proper meaning, and to refer only to the sentiments of others, or of themselves at some other time or in some other case.

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If I am asked what is the nature of this feeling, and whence it comes, I do not think that it is exactly of the same nature or has exactly the same origin in all who have it. My father's theory of it, which you quote, seems to me a sufficient account of it as it exists in many minds. I certainly do not accept that theory as an exhaustive analysis of the phenomenon, yet I do not think your refutation, even of that theory, a sufficient one; inasmuch as the generation of a complex feeling from simple ones being a sort of chemical union, not a mechanical juxtaposition, it is quite to be expected that the compound will be to appearance unlike the elements it is formed from. The pains of conscience are certainly very different from those of dread of disapprobation; yet it might well be that the innumerable associations of pain with doing wrong which have been riveted by a long succession of pains undergone, or pains feared or imagined as the consequence of wrong things done, or of wrong things which we have been tempted to do (especially in early life), may produce a general and intense feeling of recoil from wrongdoing in which no conscious influence of other people's disapprobation may be perceptible.

However, I do not hold this to be the normal form of moral feeling. I conceive that feeling to be a natural outgrowth from the social nature of man; a state of society is so eminently natural to human beings that anything which is an obviously indispensable condition of social life easily comes to act upon their minds almost like a physical necessity. Now it is an indispensable condition of all society, except between master and slave, that each shall pay regard to the other's happiness. On this basis, combined with a human creature's capacity of fellow-feeling, the feelings of morality properly so called seem to me to be grounded, and their main constituent to be the idea of punishment. I feel conscious that, if I violate certain laws, other people must necessarily and naturally desire that I should be punished for the violation. I also feel that I should desire them to be punished if they violated the same laws towards me. From these feelings

and from my sociality of nature I place myself in their situation, and sympathise in their desire that I should be punished; and (even apart from benevolence) the painfulness of not being in union with them makes me shrink from pursuing a line of conduct which would make my ends, wishes, and purposes habitually conflict with theirs. To this fellow-feeling with man may of course be added (if I may so express myself) fellow-feeling with God, and recoil from the idea of not being in unison with Him. May I add that even to an unbeliever there may be a feeling similar in nature towards an *ideal* God? as there may be towards an ideally perfect man, or towards our friends who are no more, even if we do not feel assured of their immortality. All these feelings are immensely increased in strength by a reflected influence from other persons who feel the same. 1859 — Aetat. 53.

This is the nearest approach I am able to make to a theory of our moral feelings. I have written it out, much more fully, in a little manuscript treatise which I propose to publish when I have kept it by me for the length of time I think desirable and given it such further improvement as I am capable of. Perhaps the short statement I have now made will convey some notion of what my opinion is, though a very imperfect one of the manner in which I should support it.—I am, very sincerely yours,

J. S. MILL.

To Pasquale Villari,

who had been reviewing the "Political Economy" in an Italian Review.

ST. VÉRAN, *le 29 novembre* 1859.

MON CHER M. VILLARI,—Je vous remercie beaucoup de votre lettre et de l'envoi de la Revue où se trouve votre article. Je l'ai lu avec très grand plaisir. Abstraction faite des louanges dont vous me comblez, et dans lesquelles je vois un nouvel indice de l'amitié et de la sympathie que vous ressentez pour moi, je puis dire en toute sincerité que

1859 — Aetat. 53. vous avez donné une excellente analyse de l'ouvrage. Vous en avez mis en relief les idées dominantes, vous avez assez appuyé sur chacune pour la faire bien saisir, et cela de la manière non d'un copiste, mais d'un penseur dont les idées ne sont pas tirées de l'auteur dont il parle, mais se sont rencontrées avec lui. Grâce à vous, les lecteurs de la Revue doivent avoir aujourd'hui du livre et de moi une idée très avantageuse, ce qui, je l'avoue, me fait plaisir, car la vive sympathie que j'éprouve pour l'Italie fait que je me plais à l'idée d'être en rapport intellectuel avec les bons esprits du pays.

Comme vous, je crains que la position actuelle des affaires, empirée comme elle est par la démission de Garibaldi, n'ait des suites fâcheuses. Qu'il en résulte la dissolution des volontaires, ou des excès populaires, l'un ou l'autre résultat serait également nuisible à la cause de l'Italie. C'est sans doute ce que désire celui qui a mis les choses en cet état, et qui ne veut pas que les Italiens soient soustraits à leurs tyrans actuels par une autre main que par celle d'un nouveau maître. Ce n'est qu'en se tenant sous les armes, et en montrant la ferme volonté de se battre pour la liberté envers et contre tous, que l'Italie pourra obtenir du Congrès des conditions supportables. Je suis persuadé que l'Angleterre fera dans le Congrès, si elle y prend part, tout son possible pour vous. Mais, comme tout le monde sait qu'elle n'en fera pas un cas de guerre, son influence sera peu de chose. Les trois despotes sont probablement déjà d'accord pour lui ménager un affront.

Je félicite le gouvernement toscan de votre nomination à la chaire d'histoire à Pise. Je sens toutefois combien il vous sera difficile d'appliquer à ces paisibles travaux les forces de votre esprit, tant que les destinées de l'Italie restent suspendues sur le fil d'un rasoir.—Votre tout dévoué,

J. S. Mill.

To Edwin (afterwards Sir Edwin) Chadwick, the sanitary reformer.

20th December 1859.

1859 — Aetat. 53.

Dear Chadwick,—I quite agree with you in expecting no benefit whatever from any Reform Bill likely to be brought forward by the present Government.[1] Neither they nor the Tories wish to make elections unexpensive; they will not, therefore, take the only effective measure against bribery, by prohibiting and making penal *all* expenses whatever (the small amount of *necessary* expenses being defrayed by the locality). That is *mauvaise volonté* on their part, but *this* is chiefly stupidity; neither of them will adopt Hare's plan whereby any person of reputation for talent would be sure of being brought in by some set of electors or other, if he chose, without needing any local influence. If Hare's plan were acted on, you would be in Parliament directly; and anybody else whose adherents or admirers are scattered over the country generally. As this plan would be essentially, and in the best sense of the word, Conservative as well as, also in the best sense, Liberal and Democratic, it ought to unite both parties in supporting it; only such people as Bright, the mere demagogue and courtier of the majority, are its natural opponents. Notwithstanding this, we shall not have it until some government finds itself obliged to give a largely extended suffrage and has sense to see that this plan would diminish the danger of the concession, under cover of which they would contrive to pass it. I am strongly of opinion, however, that the way by which most good can be done on the Reform question, is by agitating on this point. . . .

[1] [Lord Palmerston's.]

CHAPTER VII

1860–1862

To Charles Dupont-White, on his book "La Centralisation."

St. Véran, *le* 6 *avril* 1860.

1860 — Aetat. 53.

Mon cher Monsieur,—Je vous remercie beaucoup de l'envoi de votre nouveau livre. C'est un ouvrage très remarquable et qui me paraît même supérieur à celui auquel il fait suite. Je pense qu'il fera époque dans la grande discussion de la Centralisation. Vous ne vous attendrez pas, à coup sûr, qu'il n'y ait pas une divergence considérable entre nos opinions. Cependant (comme vous avez dit à propos du livre "de la Liberté") je suis plus frappé des coincidences d'opinion que des différences : et je crois que vous auriez dit cela avec encore plus de raison si vous aviez connu certain manuscrit inédit que j'ai dans mon portefeuille. J'attends avec un vif intérêt l'introduction promise dans l'annonce de la Liberté. Je suis plus que curieux de voir de quelle manière vous concevrez la différence entre nos deux manières de penser. Il est au reste très convenable que le plus modéré et le moins fanatique des localistes soit présenté et commenté par le plus philosophe des centralistes.

Je n'entre pas dans les questions qui nous séparent et que j'espère discuter avec vous de vive voix. Vous êtes un de ceux avec lequel on ne peut que gagner à comparer ses idées. Je donnerai seulement un mot d'éclaircissement sur deux points.

L'un des deux me regarde personnellement. Je n'ai jamais entendu nier l'influence des races. Vous pouvez voir dans mon article sur Michelet que j'admets pleinement

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cette influence. Dans la phrase que vous avez citée, je voulais seulement blâmer une tendance qui existe dans tous les temps mais plus particulièrement dans celui-ci (par réaction du 19me siècle contre le 18me), c'est celle d'attribuer toutes les variétés dans le caractère des peuples et des individus à des différences indélébiles de nature, sans se demander si les influences d'éducation et du milieu social et politique n'en donnent pas une explication suffisante. Je ne puis comparer cette tendance qu'à l'habitude qu'avaient les peuples primitifs d'attribuer tout ce qu'on faisait, sans pouvoir dire de qui et comment on avait appris à le faire, à l'inspiration directe d'un dieu. Dans le cas dont il s'agit, savoir celui des différences de caractère entre les peuples celtiques et les peuples anglo-saxons, je crois avec vous que la race y entre pour beaucoup ; mais quant à leur goût pour ou contre la centralisation, je vous demanderai si la diversité dans le développement historique de la France et de l'Angleterre dont vous avez fait une esquisse si vraie et si instructive, ne suffisait pas à elle seule comme explication.

L'autre point sur lequel je veux dire un mot, c'est celui-ci. Je reconnais pleinement la tendance que vous signalez dans la législation anglaise vers une centralisation plus grande. Non seulement je reconnais cette tendance, j'y applaudis même. Mais notez bien que ce mouvement centralisateur est plus utile que nuisible chez nous, justement parce qu'il est en opposition tranchée avec l'esprit du pays. De là il arrive que les changements si grands en apparence, se réduisent dans la pratique à des proportions presque exiguës. Vous croyez peut-être que l'administration de la charité publique est réellement centralisée chez nous depuis la loi de 1834. Eh bien, il n'en est rien. L'immense abus qu'on avait fait du pouvoir local avait tellement effarouché le public qu'il est devenu possible de faire cette loi ; mais il n'a pas été possible de l'exécuter ; le pouvoir local a fini par regagner sa prédominance sur le pouvoir central ; et celui-ci n'a pu conserver ses attributions qu'en les exerçant avec une réserve si excessive qu'elles sont restées plutôt une ressource pour des cas extrêmes qu'un

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ressort régulier d'administration. Il en sera ainsi pour longtemps de tout ce qu'on tentera chez nous dans le sens de la centralisation. On admettra bien l'intervention du pouvoir central comme remède héroique et passager : on ne l'admettra pas comme régime. Maintenant c'est à réfléchir si ces dictatures momentanées du pouvoir central ne remplissent pas suffisamment les conditions de votre système.—Votre tout dévoué, J. S. MILL.

To Alexander Bain,

recording Mill's first impressions on reading "The Origin of Species."

11th April 1860.

. . . I have read since my return here several things which have interested me, above all Darwin's book. It far surpasses my expectation. Though he cannot be said to have proved the truth of his doctrine, he does seem to have proved that it *may* be true, which I take to be as great a triumph as knowledge and ingenuity could possibly achieve on such a question. Certainly nothing can be at first sight more entirely unplausible than his theory, and yet after beginning by thinking it impossible, one arrives at something like an actual belief in it, and one certainly does not relapse into complete disbelief.

Another book I have been reading is Baden Powell's last,[1] which, though much inferior to Darwin, is a wonderful book for a clergyman and an Oxford professor to write, and remarkable as an exemplification of one form of modern theism. It is curious to see natural theology reverting to the form in which it was conceived by Aristotle—that it is not what cannot be predicted, but what can, that proves an intelligent agency. There is in Powell's otherwise very consistent system an awkward gap at the point where this doctrine comes face to face with historical Christianity. What can he mean by holding that miracles are *impossible*, and yet that those of the

[1] ["Essays on the Order of Nature in Reference to the Claims of Revelation."]

New Testament may be received as matter of faith, though not of science? Is the last a mere saving clause, as when Voltaire said nearly the same thing? If so, he must intend it to be seen through, as Voltaire did. But the general tone of his mind, so unlike Voltaire's, makes this improbable. 1860 — Aetat. 54.

To Charles Dupont-White.

Ax (Ariège) *le* 10 *juin* 1860.

Mon cher Monsieur,—Votre bonne et intéressante lettre m'a suivi jusqu'à cet endroit charmant, digne d'une plus grande célébrité qu'il n'a encore acquise.

Il est vrai, comme vous dites, que l'Angleterre n'a plus à lutter contre la tyrannie ou la compression officielle, et en cela elle est sans doute plus avancée que la France—mais de même que beaucoup d'autres progrès, celui-ci promet plus qu'il ne tient. L'opinion a hérité de toutes les autres tyrannies. Son joug paraît léger, parce qu'on ne songe pas ordinairement à lutter contre lui. Il est entré dans les âmes. Tout se fait chez nous par contrainte morale. On trouve tant de petits obstacles à sortir de la voie commune en quoi que ce soit, que peu de monde le fait même en théorie, et il est presque impossible de le faire en pratique. Les classes supérieures, soit par leur position, soir par leur intelligence, n'y songent pas plus que les autres, et c'est ce qui fait que je ne fonde pas sur ces classes autant d'espérance que vous semblez le faire. Toutefois il y a en Angleterre beaucoup de choses qui semblent mortes, mais qui ne font que dormir, et qui sont capables de s'éveiller; témoin la renaissance de l'esprit militaire, qui peut-être ne contribuera pas peu à fausser les calculs de l'homme qui gouverne actuellement la France.

To T. Cliffe Leslie, the political economist.

Blackheath Park, 18*th August* 1860.

Dear Sir,—Your article has interested me very much and its main position is unshakeable, but I suspect we should differ greatly on a subject into which you do not

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enter, that of the *limitations*. Though you do not say so, the whole of your reasoning seems to converge to the conclusion that all Europe (if not the whole human race) will some time or other be brought under one government. That there may one day be a kind of loose federation among the countries of Europe, and a common tribunal to decide their differences, is likely enough. But as for actual incorporation, when there is not identity of language, literature, and historical antecedents, I see no spontaneous tendency to it, nor any likelihood of its being brought about by that which has produced it heretofore, viz. conquest, which of all tendencies we ought most to execrate.

. . . . . .

The generalities of Buckle's theory are very vulnerable, and I hardly think he could have held by them if any competent person had criticised them before publication. He could have afforded to part with most of them, for the premisses are much broader than was required to support his conclusions, and it is exactly in this unnecessary margin and overplus of premisses that, as it seems to me, the error lies.

To a Correspondent.

BLACKHEATH PARK, *23rd September* 1860.

DEAR MADAM,—I have read your treatise, or rather the portion of it which you did me the honour of sending to me. If any part of your object in sending it was to know my opinion as to the desirableness of its being published, I have no difficulty in giving it strongly in the affirmative. There is much in the work which is calculated to do great good to many persons besides the artisans to whom it is more especially addressed. In point of arrangement indeed, of condensation, and of giving, as it were, a keen edge to the argument, it would have been much benefited by the recasting which you have been prevented from giving to it by a cause on all other accounts so much to be lamented. This, however, applies

more to the general mode of laying out the argument, than to the details. 1860 — Aetat. 54.

With regard to the substance of the book, it is scarcely necessary to say that there is very much of it with which I am in entire agreement and strong sympathy; and when I am not, I neither have any desire to shake your own conviction, if I could suppose myself capable of doing so, nor should I regret the adoption of the same creed by any one to whose intellect or feelings it may be able to recommend itself. It would be a great moral improvement to most persons, be they Christians, Deists, or Atheists, if they firmly believed the world to be under the government of a Being who, willing only good, leaves evil in the world solely in order to stimulate human faculties by an unremitting struggle against every form of it.

In regard, however, to the effect on my own mind, will you forgive me for saying, that your mode of reconciling the world as we see it with the government of a Perfect Being, though less sophistical than the common modes, and not having, as they have, the immoral effect of consecrating any forms of avoidable evil as the purposes of God, does not, to my apprehension, at all help to remove the difficulty? I tried what I could do with that hypothesis many years ago; that a Perfect Being could do everything except make another perfect being, that the next thing to it was to make a perfectible one, and that perfection could only be achieved by a struggle against evil. But then, a Perfect Being, limited only by this condition, might be expected so to form the world that the struggle against evil should be the greatest possible in extent and intensity; and unhappily our world conforms as little to this character as to that of a world without evil. If the Divine intention in making man was Effort towards perfection, the Divine purpose is as much frustrated as if its sole aim were human happiness. There is a little of both, but the absence of both is the marked characteristic.

I confess that no religious theory seems to me consistent with the facts of the universe except (in some form or other) the old one of the two principles. There are

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many signs in the structure of the universe of an intelligent Power wishing well to man and other sentient creatures. I could, however, show, not so many perhaps, but quite as decided indications of an intelligent Power or Powers with the contrary propensity. But (not to insist on this) the will of the benevolent power must find, either in its own incompleteness or in some external circumstances, very decided obstacles to the fulfilment of the benevolent purpose. It may be that the world is a battlefield between a good and a bad power or powers, and that mankind may be capable by sufficiently strenuous co-operation with the good power of deciding or at least accelerating its final victory. I know one man of great intelligence and high moral principle, who finds satisfaction to his devotional feelings, and support under the evils of life, in the belief of this creed.

Another point on which I cannot agree with you is the opinion that Law, in the sense in which we predicate it of the arrangements of Nature, can only emanate from a Will. This doctrine seems to me to rest solely on the double meaning of the word Law, though that double meaning cannot be more completely and clearly stated than you have done. It is much more natural to the human mind to see a Divine will in those events in which it has not yet recognised inflexible constancy of sequence, than in those in which it has. No doubt this instinctive notion is erroneous; and Will is in its own nature as regular a phenomenon, as much a subject of law, as anything else; but it does seem rather odd that unchangeableness should be the one thing which, to account for its existence, must be refused to a will; will being, within the limits of our experience, the thing of all others most liable to change; and indeed it cannot be unchangeable unless combined with omnipotence or at all events with omniscience.

With all that you say in affirmation of the universality of Law, and in refutation of the objections on the subject of Free Will and Necessity, I need hardly say how heartily I agree.

I have made a few cursory remarks in the margin of your book, but what I have now said is the chief part of what I had to say. I do not yet return the volume, because, unless what I have said of it takes away your desire to show me any more of the book, I hope to see the remainder. If so, however, it should be soon, as I shall leave England for the Continent in about a week. 1860 — Aetat. 54.

To the same Correspondent.

BLACKHEATH PARK, *4th October* 1860.

DEAR MADAM,—I should have been very sorry to miss reading the sequel of your book. If when I had only read the first volume I was very desirous that it should be published I am much more so after reading the second, as the exhibition it contains of what life is in this country among the classes in easy circumstances, being so earnestly and feelingly and in many parts of it so forcibly done, and so evidently the result of personal observation, is at once a testimony that ought not to be lost, and an appeal of an unusually lofty kind on a subject which it is very difficult to induce people to open their eyes to. And though the things into which are put the best of one's heart and mind never do all the good which to one's own feelings seems to lie in them, few books have a better chance than this of doing some good, and that, too, in a variety of ways. . . .

I have seldom felt less inclined to criticise than in reading this book, and moreover I have said in my former letter the substance of nearly all the criticism I should have to make. There is, however, a new point of difference between us, sufficiently a matter of principle to be worth mentioning to you. In one, and only one, of your inferences from the doctrine (improperly called) of Necessity I do not agree: it is when you say that there ought to be no punishment (only reformatory discipline) and even no blame. It seems to me that on the principles of your treatise retaliation from others for injuries consciously and intentionally done to them is one of these

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natural consequences of ill-doing which you yourself hold to be the proper discipline both of the individual and of the race: with many minds, punishment is the only one of the natural consequences of guilt which is capable of making any impression on them. In such cases punishment is the sole means available for beginning the reformation of the criminal; and the fear of similar punishment is the only inducement which deters many, really no better than himself, from doing acts to others which would not only deprive them of their own happiness, but thwart all their attempts to do good to themselves and others. With regard to the legitimacy of resentment; a thoroughly evil will, though I well know that it does not come into existence without a cause, seems to me not the less on that account an object of aversion; and a strong indignation against wrong is so inseparable from any strong personal feeling on the subject of wrong and right that it does not seem to me possible, even if desirable, to get rid of the one without to a great extent losing the other. I write these things for your consideration, and not as pretending to lay down the law on the subject to any one, much less to you.

My address while abroad will be St. Véran, près Avignon, Vaucluse, France, and I am very far from wishing that you should do as Frederic's general said he would.

I have returned your treatise to-day by the book post.

To Pasquale Villari.

St. Véran, *le* 6 *novembre* 1860.

Mon cher M. Villari,—Voici bien longtemps que je n'ai pas reçu de vos nouvelles, quoique ce soit moi qui ai écrit la dernière lettre. Ce m'est toujours un grand plaisir d'avoir une lettre de vous et je le désire d'autant plus que, dans un temps comme celui-ci, on ne sait jamais à quel endroit un patriote italien peut s'etre porté ni dans quelle situation il est. Je voudrais aussi m'entretenir avec vous sur les grands événements de cette année. Vous avez bien prédit l'année passée que les Italiens feraient

aujourd'hui de plus grandes choses qu'en 1848, bien que celles-là suffisent assurément pour la gloire éternelle de ceux qui y ont pris part. Vous avez le droit d'être fier de votre pays : aussi est-il, comme vous voyez, admiré par l'Europe entière, et les Anglais même qui sont difficiles en cette matière le reconnaissent comme digne d'être libre. Il est vrai que ceux, qui ont tout préparé pendant dix ans, qui ont entretenu le feu sacré par les seuls moyens alors praticables, Mazzini et ses amis, n'éprouvent pas encore la justice qu'ils méritent. Cela était inévitable, et ils ont, je crois, assez de grandeur d'âme pour s'y résigner. Je sais par ma propre expérience, ayant toujours avoué sur bien des sujets des opinions qu'on appelle extrêmes, que ce sont ceux-là qui font accepter par les gens de la foule les opinions avancées immédiatement praticables, en leur donnant la satisfaction de se croire dans le juste milieu, et d'avoir d'autres sur qui se décharger du reproche d'être des exaltés ou des exagérés. Maintenant l'avenir est à vous, pourvu toutefois que vous ne provoquiez pas un conflit prématuré avec l'Autriche, dans des conditions où vous ne pourriez vaincre que par l'appui d'une puissance étrangère. Peut-être le prix que cette puissance a exigé de son intervention en 1859 a été presque vrai bonheur pour l'Italie, en la dégageant de tout lien de reconnaissance et en ôtant à un monarque absolu l'influence que, plus désintéressé en apparence, il eût obtenue sur l'esprit public de votre pays. C'est à l'œuvre d'organisation que je vous attends maintenant. Il y aura de grandes difficultés à la fusion de tant de peuples, tous Italiens, mais différents par leurs antécédents et par leurs mœurs ; et de plus grandes encore à la profonde rénovation morale dont la population de la moitié méridionale de l'Italie a besoin. Mais vous avez aussi de grandes ressources dans l'enthousiasme général, dans le prestige d'un grand homme, dans celui d'un roi fidèle à la liberté, et surtout dans le génie italien qui à aucune époque n'a manqué, quelque déplorable que fût d'ailleurs la situation. L'année prochaine sera pour ceux qui pensent, un chapitre de l'histoire tout aussi intéressant que celle

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qui vient de s'écouler. J'ai grande confiance dans le bon sens dont la partie la plus avancée de l'Italie a fait preuve dans les circonstances présentes, et dans la haute capacité gouvernementale qui a toujours été moins rare en Italie qu'ailleurs.

Si cette lettre vous parvient, donnez moi je vous prie de vos nouvelles et croyez toujours à mon devouement et à ma véritable sympathie.

To Gustave de Beaumont,

editor of "Œuvres et Correspondance inédites d'Alexis de Tocqueville."

St. Véran, *le* 15 *janvier* 1861.

1861 — Aetat. 54.

Mon cher Beaumont,—Je viens d'achever la lecture da la correspondance et des opuscules et fragments inédits de Tocqueville. J'y ai trouvé à chaque pas de nouvelles preuves de sa haute valeur comme homme et comme esprit, et de la perte irréparable que l'humanité a faite par sa mort prématurée. Si même il nous eût été épargné jusqu'à la complétion de son deuxième grand ouvrage! À ce propos vous me pardonnerez, j'espère, si j'exprime un regret qui, à ce que je crois sera général, de ce que vous avez poussé un scrupule, d'ailleurs très louable, jusqu'à ne vouloir rien imprimer qui n'eût absolument reçu la dernière touche de l'auteur. Je sais bien la conscience que mettait notre ami à ne donner au public l'expression de sa pensée qu'après qu'il l'eût amenée à la dernière perfection qu'il sentait capable d'y donner; mais autre chose est de reserver un écrit pour le rendre plus parfait, et autre de vouloir qu'il soit supprimé lorsque le sort a ordonné que le perfectionnement ne puisse plus avoir lieu. Les brouillards même d'un penseur et d'un observateur comme Tocqueville seraient d'un prix inappréciable pour les penseurs à venir, et, à moins qu'il ne s'y soit opposé de son vivant, il me semble qu'il n'y aurait pas d'inconvénient à publier ses manuscrits imparfaits en ne les donnant que pour ce qu'ils sont et en conservant

scrupuleusement toutes les indications d'une intention de revenir sur un morceau quelconque et d'en remettre les idées à une vérification ultérieure. 1861 — Aetat. 54.

Quant à la correspondance je me réjouis d'apprendre que la partie sans doute très considérable, qui ne pourrait être imprimée quant à présent, est toute prête à l'être en temps convenable. Ce que vous en avez pu donner est d'une grande valeur par lui-même, et encore plus en faisant connaître ce qu'a été l'homme. Quelle idée ne se fait-on pas de la face d'intelligence et de la haute vertu de celui qui a pu se maintenir comme penseur et comme écrivain dans une élévation si sereine et si impartial au-dessus de toutes les misères de notre temps, quand on vient à apprendre que cet esprit si calme n'était rien moins que calme par nature et par tempérament, qu'il était d'un type tout opposé et que cela même faisait la plus grande souffrance de sa vie? C'est une consolation pour ceux à qui sa mémoire est chère, qu'il fut heureux dans sa famille, qu'il eut des amis vrais, et qu'il fut apprécié de son vivant autant que cela puisse jamais arriver à un homme très au-dessus du vulgaire par l'esprit et par les sentiments.

To Edwin Chadwick.

Blackheath Park, *1st March* 1861.

Dear Chadwick,—It is long since I have read anything on the subject of education which impressed me so much as the facts and ideas contained in your letter to Senior, and I wish they were in the hands of every reading and thinking person in the country. Among several points of great practical importance which you have made out by an irresistible weight of evidence, two appear to me to stand in the very highest rank; the equality, if not superiority, in attainments and intelligence of the short-time pupils over the others, and the immense advantage, both in efficiency and economy, of large over small school districts. The results of experience, the first of which was so unexpected as to amount to a discovery, afford the means of overcoming the two principal obstacles to the

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efforts of the Government and of individuals for the improvement of popular education, namely, the early withdrawal of the children from school owing to the demand of parents for their labour, and the impossibility of obtaining, or, if obtained, of keeping schoolmasters of a high average of excellence. You have put it in the power of any Education Minister who avails himself of the results of your inquiries, to elevate the general standard of popular improvement to a height and with a rapidity which have hitherto seemed quite hopeless. Too much cannot be done to give publicity to matter so valuable.

To Sir Henry Taylor,

in reply to a letter from him criticising Mill's "Representative Government."

Blackheath Park, *5th July* 1861.

Dear Taylor,—Your letter of 28th May came while I was abroad, and I have not hitherto had time to make the acknowledgment which is due to the feelings you express, and to the considerate and sympathising view which you take of what I have been endeavouring to do. I am very glad that my treatment of the subject, as a general thesis, has obtained so much of your approbation. With regard to its applicability to this country, and immediately, I am quite alive to the force of many of the considerations which you bring forward. You only state them as misgivings, and as misgivings I share most of them, though probably in a considerably less degree than yourself. On one thing we are almost sure to be agreed; that whenever the movement for organic change recovers strength, which may happen at any time, and is sure to happen at some time, it will make a great practical difference what general theories of constitutional government are then in possession of the minds of cultivated persons. It is as a preparation for that time that my speculations, if they have as much truth in them as you seem to think they have, may be valuable. In the meantime, while they keep up the faith

in possibilities of improvement, they tend rather to moderate than to encourage eagerness for immediate and premature changes of a fundamental character. If the opinions make any way, they will influence, more or less, what is done from time to time in the way of partial improvement, and while changes in right directions will be facilitated, the barriers will, I hope, be strengthened against those of a bad tendency. It is not to you that anything need be said on the necessity of keeping a true ideal before one, however widely the state of facts may differ from it, and the extreme peril, both of having a false ideal and of having no ideal at all; between which states (with a tendency at present towards the latter) politicians both speculative and practical seem to be divided.

I am very sorry to hear that your health imposes on you so much confinement. I hope that is the worst of the inconveniences it causes you. I too am not likely to forget the old days you remind me of, nor any of those with whom I used to discuss and compare notes, so agreeably and usefully to myself. If I have ceased to frequent them it is not from estrangement, but because society even of a good kind does less and less for me, and I have so much to do in the few years of life and health I can look forward to (though my health is now on the whole good), that I really have no time to spare for anything but what is at once absolutely necessary to me, and the only thing besides reading which is a real relaxation, active outdoor exercise. I do not, however, give up the hope of again seeing you, and to do so will always be a pleasure.

To John Chapman,

with reference to a building strike, then in progress; concerning which Mr. Frederic Harrison had written a letter to the *Daily News*.

Blackheath Park, *4th August* 1861.

Dear Sir,—I have read Mr. Harrison's letter in the *Daily News*. But I do not agree with him to the extent or

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in the manner which he seems to suppose. I believe that I agree entirely with the views taken in Mr. Fawcett's article. But I do so specifically on the ground stated, I believe for the first time, by him, viz., that the power of striking tends to bring about something approximating to what I consider the only right organisation of labour, the association of workpeople with the employers by a participation of profits. I regard the payment of a fixed sum per day as essentially demoralising, and I disapprove of what the men are doing precisely because, as Mr. Harrison says, they are on the conservative side, standing up for the existing practice, a practice which is making workmen more and more fraudulent in the quality of their labour, just as dealers are in that of their goods. I see no hope of improvement but by altering this, and payment by the hour appears to be a step, though but a small one, towards making the pay proportional to the work done. At the same time, I think the men would be right in standing out for the recognition of a certain length of working day, beyond which the payment per hour should be higher, and that in this way it should be made the interest of the masters not to overwork the men.

To T. Cliffe Leslie,

on an article written by him on Income Tax Reform.

St. Véran, 20*th December* 1861.

Dear Sir,—I received the proof of your article only this morning. It is an able, and will be a useful paper, and puts some points in a new and forcible way, though I differ from it on several matters of detail and some of principle. The chief of these is the question of exempting savings, on which your arguments have not shaken my conviction. The strongest of them is that a tax on expenditure is unjust to those professional persons who are obliged to spend more than they gain in the early years of their career. It is impossible to answer this argument completely. But the force of it is much weakened by

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several considerations. In the first place, what the professional man is obliged to expend in maintaining himself before his earnings come in, is capital, and as such would, on my plan, have been *previously relieved* from the portion of income tax it now pays. The not taxing the capital when it was formed, is an equivalent for taxing it, when it is laid out. In the second place, the tax he pays on this outlay would, if savings were untaxed, be entirely refunded to him by the exemption he would enjoy in the process of replacing the outlay from his subsequent earnings. (This entirely refutes the last sentence of the first paragraph of page 114.) The inconvenience is thus limited to that of making an advance. That is doubtless a special disadvantage. But some inequalities are unavoidable in all modes of taxation; and even your plan would not relieve him from the whole of it, since taxing him on only two-thirds of his income would not come up to the requirements of the case of one whose income is less than half of his present expenditure.

. . . . . .

I think you overstate the case against taxes on articles of general consumption. You say that a duke's family does not consume very much more "of certain things" than an artisan's or a clerk's. Not nearly so much in proportion to their means; but much more absolutely, since they pay for all that is consumed by their servants and dependants. . . .

To George Grote.

St. Véran, 10*th January* 1862.

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. . . I do not see that the opinions you express in your letter on practical ethics constitute any difference between us. I agree in them entirely, and I consider them to follow conclusively from the conception of one's own happiness as a unit, neither more nor less valuable than that of another, or, in Christian language, the doctrine of loving one's neighbour as oneself, this being of course

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understood not of the feeling or sentiment of love, but of perfect ethical impartiality between the two. The general happiness, looked upon as composed of as many different units as there are persons all equal in value except as far as the amount of the happiness itself differs, leads to all the practical doctrines which you lay down. First, it requires that each shall consider it as his special business to take care of himself—the general good requiring that that one individual should be left, in all ordinary circumstances, to his own care, and not taken care of for him, further than by not impeding his own efforts nor allowing others to do so. The good of all can only be pursued with any success by each person's taking as his particular department the good of the only individual whose requirements he can thoroughly know, with due precautions to prevent these different persons, each cultivating a particular strip of the field, from hindering one another. Secondly, human happiness, even one's own, is in general more successfully pursued by acting on general rules than by measuring the consequences of each act; and this is still more the case with the general happiness since any other plan would not only leave everybody uncertain what to expect, but would involve perpetual quarrelling; and hence general rules must be laid down for people's conduct to one another; in other words, rights and obligations must, as you say, be recognised, and people must on the one hand not be required to sacrifice even their own less good to another's greater where no general rule has given the other a right to the sacrifice, while, when a right *has* been recognised, they must in most cases yield to that right, even at the sacrifice, in the particular case, of their own greater good to another's less. These rights and obligations are (it is of course implied) reciprocal. And thus what each person is held to do for the sake of others is more or less definite, corresponding to the less perfect knowledge he can have of their interests taken individually; and he is free to employ the indefinite residue of his exertions in benefiting the one person of whom he has the principal charge, and whose wants he has the means of

learning the most completely. These, I think, are exactly your conclusions. And they are consistent with recognising the merit though not the duty of making still greater sacrifices of one's own less good to the greater good of others, than the general conditions of human happiness render it expedient to prescribe. This last distinction, which I do not think inconsistent with the expressions about perfection attributed to Christ, the Catholic theologians have recognised; laying down a lower standard of disinterestedness for the world and a higher one for the "perfect" (the saints); but Protestants have in general considered this as Popish laxity, and have maintained that it is the *duty* of every one absolutely to annul his own separate existence. 1862 — Aetat. 55.

I am very glad that you like the papers on Utilitarianism so much. I am not more sanguine than you are about their converting opponents. The most that writing of that sort can be expected to do is to place the doctrine in a better light, and prevent the other side having everything their own way, and triumphing in their moral and metaphysical superiority, as they have done for the last half century, and as they do in France still more than in England. In Germany the tide seems to be turning, and there is a commencement of turning even here. It was only lately that M. Schérer, one of the heretical Protestant theologians of France (who gave up a theological professorship at Strassburg because he could not believe the doctrine of Biblical inspiration), declared in the *Revue des deux Mondes* that the inductive and utilitarian ethics were now showing that they could produce as good and noble fruits as the other doctrine.

. . . . . .

P.S.—As you truly say, the Protagorean Socrates lays down as the standard the happiness of the agent himself; but this standard is composed of pleasure and pain, which ranges him upon the whole on the utilitarian side of the controversy.

To Célestin de Blignières,

on his book "Exposition de la philosophie et de la religion positives."

St. Véran, *le 22 janvier* 1862.

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Monsieur,—Le livre que vous avez eu la bonté de m'envoyer s'est trouvé être en effet le même que j'avais reçu il y a trois ou quatre ans. Il ne m'est pas pour cela inutile; je suis en train de le relire et j'en ai déjà relu une grande partie. Ce livre me paraît très remarquable sous le rapport de l'exposition et de l'expression. Il résume les plus importantes doctrines de M. Comte avec une clarté que lui-même n'a pas surpassée, et de manière à offrir souvent, pour ainsi dire, de nouveaux reflets de lumière par la manière de présenter les ideés. Quant à la question qui fait, à ce qu'il paraît, votre principale différence avec M. Comte je suis assurément et pleinement de votre avis. Je crois, pourtant, que mon dissentiment va plus loin que le vôtre. On ne saurait faire mieux sentir que vous ne le faites la distinction fondamentale des pouvoirs temporel et spirituel, la nécessité de ce dernier, son existence universelle sous une forme ou sous une autre, et les suites funestes de sa réunion avec le pouvoir temporel. Voici maintenant en quoi je crois être en dissentiment avec vous. Je suis très porté à croire (sans vouloir décider positivement cette question pour l'avenir) que la nature même d'un pouvoir spirituel légitime ne comporte pas une organisation réelle. Tant qu'un accord essentiel de doctrines n'existe pas parmi les chefs spirituels, toute tentative d'organisation, en la supposant praticable, serait évidemment nuisible. Si au contraire, cet accord existait il me semble que l'organisation en corps ne serait pas nécessaire. L'autorité, qu'exerce dans les sciences positives l'opinion des savants, ne repose pas, ce me semble, sur leur réunion en Académies ou sous tout autre nom, mais sur le fait même de leur unanimité. D'ailleurs, leur organisation me donnerait des craintes sérieuses pour l'indépendence de la pensée. Tout corps scientifique organisé est toujours plus ou moins porté à

repousser les innovations scientifiques, qui, pourtant, ne laissent pas d'être quelquefois nécessaires même dans les sciences qui ont reçu définitivement leur constitution positive. J'incline à croire que, lorsque l'accord général des opinions de ceux qui ont fait les études nécessaires s'étendra aux questions morales et sociologiques, la classe spéculative pourra être la classe enseignante, et exercer une grande et salutaire autorité morale, sans être organisée en corps sous une autorité dirigeante qui me semble toujours dangereuse. Je sais que la morale positive repousse toute prétention à se servir de moyens coercitifs pour agir sur les rénovateurs; mais l'opinion générale, ralliée par une puissante autorité morale suffit toujours pour exercer une pression tyrannique sur la pensée; et je ne puis oublier que M. Comte lui-même est allé jusqu'à vouloir détruire, à la manière des premiers chrétiens, les documents historiques du passé. 1862 — Aetat. 55.

Cette manière de penser me conduit à admettre une certaine modification dans le principe de la non-participation des esprits spéculatifs au pouvoir temporel. Je conviens non seulement que la capacité philosophique ne doit nullement être un titre aux fonctions politiques, mais encore que les philosophes ne doivent pas, en règle générale, gouverner ni administrer, sauf les cas exceptionnels qui naissent des exigences d'une époque de transition, sauf aussi l'avantage que pourra retirer leur propre développement philosophique d'une certaine initiation dans les affaires pratiques de la vie, laquelle doit avoir lieu dans leur jeunesse et sous une autorité supérieure. Mais il me semble que les philosophes peuvent être très à leur places dans les assemblées politiques délibérantes; ce qui fait que je conçois la fonction de ces assemblées tout autrement que selon l'idée ordinaire. Je les crois très peu propres à faire des lois, mais très utiles comme organes de l'opinion, soit pour critiquer tant la législation que l'administration, soit pour y donner ou refuser, en dernier lieu, la sanction nationale. Vous voyez que c'est une sorte de pouvoir spirituel que je leur accède, au sein même du pouvoir temporel. J'ai développé cette idée dans un

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volume sur le gouvernement représentatif, dont une traduction française est à la veille de paraître. Dès qu'elle aura paru, je vous prierai d'en accepter un exemplaire. Je ne vous offre pas l'ouvrage anglais, ne sachant pas si vous avez l'habitude de la langue anglaise. Cet ouvrage, si vous lui faites l'honneur de le lire, vous mettra au courant de la plupart des différences qui me séparent de quelques opinions de M. Comte auxquelles vous semblez adhérer.

Je compte partir dans huit jours pour un voyage en Orient, et ne retourner ici qu'à la fin de l'été. Bien qu'une lettre adressée Poste Restante à Athènes avant le milieu de mai me trouverait probablement, je n'ose vous proposer de m'écrire pendant mon absence ; mais ce serait toujours pour moi un plaisir de comparer mes idées avec celles de l'auteur d'un livre si recommandable par les qualités morales et intellectuelles qu'on ne peut pas manquer d'y reconnaître dans le vôtre.

To Pasquale Villari,

on some characteristics of the Latin and Germanic races.

St. Véran, *le 26 janvier* 1862.

Mon cher M. Villari,—J'ai lu avec le plus vif intérêt votre brochure. Elle soulève à chaque page des sujets de discussions et d'entretiens dont l'occasion s'offrira, je l'espère, quelque jour. Je ne trouve pas que vous ayez fait la part trop belle aux peuples latins ; d'ailleurs ce n'est pas un mal que de donner aux nations renaissantes une haute idée de leur rôle et de la place qu'ils sont tenus d'occuper dignement dans l'avenir de l'humanité. Je trouve aussi que vous avez à plusieurs égards justement apprécié les qualités et les défauts des peuples germaniques. Après cela, j'aurais bien à vous faire quelques critiques—D'abord, il me semble que, comme presque tous les penseurs des pays latins, vous ne connaissez pas assez le protestantisme. Vous pensez qu'il n'a qu'une efficacité négative. Nul anglais ne pourrait en avoir cette opinion. Son côté négatif est presque accessoire, et a cessé de prédominer, une fois

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que la séparation d'avec le catholicisme s'est pleinement effectúe. C'est par son côté affirmatif qu'il s'est maintenu dans les pays protestants et surtout parmi les anglo-saxons. Si vous me demandez ce qu'il a produit dans l'ordre moral, je réponds, le sentiment du devoir, sentiment essentiellement religieux, qui est le trait le plus saillant de la moralité anglaise. L'esprit anglais est peu sympathique : il a très peu de point d'honneur national, mais il a, à un plus grand degré que tous les autres peuples, le principe du devoir, et cela lui est tellement particulier que jamais ni les hommes politiques ni les opinion des autres nations ne comprennent ce qui, dans sa civilisation et dans sa conduite, tient à ce principe. Ce qui vous fait croire au peu d'efficacité sociale et politique du protestantisme, c'est qu'en effet toutes les églises nationales protestantes, sauf celle d'Ecosse, ont joué politiquement un fort triste rôle : celle-là seule a été l'église du peuple ; toutes les autres ont été les églises des grands, c'est à dire, elles sont tombées, dès leur origine, dans les errements que l'église catholique n'a commis que dans sa décadence. Pour connaître le protestantisme il faut l'étudier dans l'histoire écossaise, et dans celle du puritanisme anglais et américain. Je suis très impartial en vous disant cela, puisque je n'aime ni le protestantisme écossais ni le puritanisme bien que la liberté politique leur doive beaucoup à tous deux.

Ensuite, vous dites des peuples germaniques, qu'ils oscillent entre un mysticisme tout abstrait et un matérialisme qui ne songe qu'aux choses de la terre. Cela pourrait être vrai, jusqu'à un certain point de l'Allemagne ; mais je pense qu'il y a en Angleterre un plus grand nombre que partout ailleurs de ceux qui, en théorie et en pratique se tiennent à une égale distance de ces deux extrêmes, et dont les sentiments religieux se montrent surtout dans la direction plus spirituelle qu'ils donnent à la conduite pratique de la vie. Que pensez vous à cet égard des quakers ? Ce sont eux qui ont commencé tous les grands mouvements philanthropiques modernes, l'affranchissement des nègres, l'instruction populaire, l'adoucissement des peines, la réforme des prisons, etc. Je vois qu'en nous accordant la

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poésie, vous nous refusez la philosophie; c'est que vous n'estimez guère ni l'école de Locke, ni la forme écossaise de la réaction contre elle. Mais nous avons la prétention d'avoir produit quelques uns des meilleurs penseurs philosophiques qui aient existé en temps modernes dans toutes les écoles.

Je pourrais remplir plusieurs feuilles des observations que vous avez bien voulu me demander sur votre brochure mais j'aime mieux réserver ces questions pour un temps où, soit en Italie, soit ici ou en Angleterre, nous pourrions discuter ensemble d'une manière plus satisfaisante les grandes questions philosophiques. En attendant je vous prie de me tenir au courant de tout ce que vous écrivez, car je tiens extrêmement à suivre vos idées. . . .

To W. T. Thornton,

in reply to a letter asking about peasant proprietors in the neighbourhood of Avignon.

St. Véran, *28th January* 1862.

Dear Thornton,—I have been very long in answering your letter of 25th December. The reason is that I waited for the return from Paris of the only person I know here, who has in any degree the same tastes, pursuits, and opinions with myself, and from whom I hoped to procure better information than any I have respecting the small landed proprietors here. He has not yet returned, and I am therefore less able than I hoped I should be to answer your questions. But I hope you will be here next autumn, when you can see him yourself and when we can investigate the matter together, so far as relates to this district, which, however, is in many respects unlike many other parts of France; as the south, also, is in many particulars unlike the north. One point of unlikeness here, to many other French provinces (but to how many I do not know) is that nearly all the working people have large families—that is, when the greater part of the children do not die; I fear that in many parts of France besides this, the popu-

lation is kept down more by death, and less by prudence, than I formerly believed. There seems to be hardly such a thing as prudence in pecuniary matters here, on the part of the men, though often a great deal in the women, to whom exclusively the well-doing and prosperity of any working family seems here to be attributable. In consequence probably of the large families the idea of all the children supporting themselves on the parental bit of land seems not to exist in this country. Most peasants, who have land, seem to farm other land with it, as metayers or as bailiffs, and the majority of the children go out as domestic servants or labourers or artisans; these (one may suppose, and what little I know confirms it) do not desire, when the parents die, to take their share of the land; as they say, what could they do with it? but take their portion in money. This payment in money, however, as I surmise, helps to encumber the little landed proprietors. Another mode in which the large families tend to prevent division is that when the parent dies there are usually children under age, and as the legal difficulties of dividing the inheritance are in that case considerable, it sometimes remains undivided in the first instance, and is managed by one of the family on the joint account. There is an example of this in the case of a woman servant of ours, one of a large family, the youngest of whom, a son, is not yet of age, and the land is managed for them by an uncle, who pays them nothing, but is *censé* to expend the proceeds, whatever they are, on the land itself. Her notion of what should be done is, that when the youngest brother comes of age, those of the family who are well off, among whom she reckons herself, should give up their share to the rest, that of the remainder one brother should retain the land, and the others receive their shares in money. Then, she says, "when we are old we can go sometimes to see the home of our childhood." This does not throw any light on the question of indebtedness as regards the land generally. But in this aspect Lavergne's book, which I have read and which is on the whole very favourable to peasant proprietors, is extremely *rassurant*. I have never

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seen the burthens of the small proprietors estimated at so low an amount by anybody as they are by this most careful and well-informed authority. He says that the average indebtedness of the whole landed property of France does not exceed a tenth of the value, and in the case of rural property, a twentieth. The burthen of interest he estimates up to a late period at 10 per cent., but thinks that it must now be considerably less; but the previous amount of mortgage debts, you see, is not at all consistent with Louis Blanc's impressions.

About Lord Canning's measure[1] I entirely agree with you. I have always thought that a general redemption of even the permanently settled revenues must be a bad bargain to the Government, for the simple reason that it cannot answer to the proprietor to give as much for it as it would answer to the Government to take. We know that in all countries in which the good faith of the Government is relied on, the Government can borrow at lower interest than an individual can do even on good landed security. Suppose that the difference is no greater than that between 4 and 5 per cent., the Government makes a losing bargain unless it can get twenty-five years' purchase while the proprietor cannot afford to give more than twenty, since he must pay 5 per cent. for the money if borrowed, and if he has it of his own, can get that or still better interest for it in any other ways. The effect on agriculture of the redemption must be wholly injurious. If the proprietor has capital or can borrow it, he would do much better by expending it in cultivating and improving the land than in freeing himself from an annual payment, which being fixed, in no way diminishes the profits of improvement. I observe that Lord Canning does not mean to sell at less than twenty years' purchase; this can only answer if Government will never be able hereafter to borrow under 5 per cent. . . .

[1] [The redemption of the Indian Land Revenue.]

To W. T. Thornton,

indicating Mill's attitude towards Spiritualism.

Athens, 11*th June* 1862.

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. . . I confess I am surprised that you attach any importance to Forster's or any other exhibitions of what they call spiritualism. Since in all that relates to the communications with spirits, the men are manifestly impostors, why should one feel any difficulty in believing them to be so altogether, and their apparent marvels to be juggling or other tricks? Their exploits certainly would never do anything to shake my total disbelief in clairvoyance, of which, apart from its extreme antecedent improbability, I have never read any case the evidence of which did not leave the most obvious loopholes for fraud. That so many people should have believed in it is to me one of the many proofs that honest people do not in general at all appreciate either the facility of being cheated or the frequency of the disposition to cheat.

To E. R. Edger,

in acknowledgment of a work entitled "Social Freedom."

St. Véran, 13*th September* 1862.

Sir,—On returning a few days ago from a distant journey I found your note dated June last, and I have read attentively the MS. which accompanied it.

I should have much to say against several of your positions, and especially against your definition of liberty; but I do not understand that you wish to discuss the subject with me, for which in any case I have not time. I understand you as wishing me to tell you whether, as far as I can judge from your MS., I consider you competent in point of ability to pursue inquiries of this nature with a useful result. And I need not hesitate to answer that I do think you competent. But what I seem to myself to see in your paper is promise rather than per-

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formance. It gives signs of several of the qualities which go towards making a genuine thinker; a real desire to go to the bottom of a subject, and not merely to skim its surface; a certain faculty of laying out a large subject and looking at it as a whole; finally, whatever you see, you see clearly, and are able to express clearly to others. I would therefore exhort you by all means not only to continue thinking, but to continue writing—not, however, I would recommend, with a view to early publication. The way to cultivate a really philosophical intellect is to go on long thinking out subjects for one's own instruction, with a view to understand them as thoroughly as possible oneself; reading in the meanwhile whatever is best worth reading on the subject one is studying, collating one's own thoughts with those of the books one reads, and gathering from them new materials for thinking. Those who do this patiently and unambitiously, without looking much to any ulterior object, are the most likely to be able, sooner or later, to teach something valuable to others. They may never discover any great new truths; to do this is a good fortune which happens to few persons in a century, and the less we think of it as likely to happen to ourselves the better for us. But originality does not consist solely in making great discoveries; whoever thinks out a subject with his own mind, not accepting the phrases of his predecessors instead of facts, is original, and it is hardly possible for any one to do this even on the most hackneyed subject without turning up some new or neglected aspects of truths, or making some unexpected and perhaps fruitful application of them.

I would recommend to you, then, by all means to persevere in your speculations; but, were you a Plato, a Locke, or a Bentham, I could not advise you, unless you had a pecuniary independence, to give your time to such pursuits to the neglect of other modes of gaining a subsistence. I believe that to do anything in philosophy tranquillity of mind, and especially freedom from anxiety as to the means of livelihood, are almost indispensable. To *live* by philosophy, unless as a public teacher in a

university, is wholly impossible; and if your daily occupation leaves you even a little leisure, you will very probably do quite as much in that little in a favourite pursuit as you would be likely to do by devoting all your time to it. The mind, if strained too long on one subject, works less pleasurably, and for that reason, even were there no other, less vigorously; while contrasting two occupations makes each of them, as I have found in my own experience, a rest from the other.

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From W. T. Thornton to Henry Fawcett, describing Mill's mode of life at Avignon.

St. Véran, Avignon, *October* 1862.

My dear Fawcett,—You will, I feel sure, be interested by a letter from this place, where I have been staying for a week, domiciled with our friend Mill. It seems to be the custom in the south of France for all inhabitants of towns who can afford it to have a little country box, called in different places *bastide*, *campagne*, or *pavillon*, and consisting of one, two, three, or four rooms, to which they walk or drive on Sundays and holidays to pass a few hours, locking it up and leaving it empty on their return home in the evening. One of these *campagnes* Mill has bought and enlarged. It stands about a mile[1] from Avignon, or at least from that part of it in which the hotel and shops are situated. You walk to it by the side, first of the beautiful Rhône, and then of an irrigation canal, through green meadows, where the third crop of hay is now being cut, and through vineyards and plantations of mulberries. In front of the house is an oblong garden with an avenue of sycamores and mulberry trees down the middle, and at the end a trellis-work supporting a vine which serves as a verandah to the dwelling. This is a small square building, whitewashed,[2] with a tiled roof and green Venetian blinds without, and within, three small rooms on the ground floor and two on the floor above, all fitted up very simply, but with English comfort and neatness and a mixture of

[1] [Two miles.]

[2] [Of white stone.]

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French and English taste. Two of the lower rooms are the drawing-room[1] and sitting-room, the third is my bedroom, at the window of which, looking into the garden, I am now writing. Above are the bedrooms of Mill and Miss Taylor, opening upon a terrace, from which is a view of green fields, backed by ranges of mountains of most graceful forms and constantly changing colours.

At eight o'clock we breakfast; then, if there is no special plan for the day, Mill reads or writes till twelve or one, when we set out for a walk which lasts till dinner-time. In the evening Mill commonly reads some light book aloud for part of the time. This, I fancy, is his ordinary mode of life while here, but he is now laying himself out to entertain me, and almost every other day we make a long carriage excursion, starting directly after breakfast, and driving twenty or thirty miles on end and not returning till sunset or later. We have already visited in this way Petrarch's valley of Vaucluse, the Roman monuments at St. Remy, and the curious feudal remains of Les Baux, and to-morrow we are to go to the famous Pont du Gard. Mill tells me that they seldom let a week pass without making some such excursion, but that this year they have postponed all until my arrival. You may imagine how much I am enjoying myself, and no small part of my pleasure consists in seeing how cheerfully and contentedly, if I may not say how happily, Mill is living. I feel convinced that he will never be persuaded permanently to abandon this retreat, for here, besides the seclusion, in which he takes an almost morbid delight, and a neighbourhood both very interesting and in its own peculiar way very beautiful, he has also close at hand the resting-place of his wife, which he visits daily, while in his stepdaughter he has a companion in all respects worthy of him.

I hope you will not find these details tedious. At any rate, having filled my paper with them, I must bid you good-bye, begging you to remember me to Mr. Stephen and to Clark, and to believe me ever faithfully yours,

W. T. THORNTON.

[1] [Dining-room.]

To John Lothrop Motley,

then American ambassador to Austria, on the American civil war.

St. Véran, 31*st October* 1862.

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My dear Sir,—Allow me to thank you most warmly for your long and interesting letter, which if it had been twice as long as it was would only have pleased me more. There are few persons that I have seen only once with whom I so much desire to keep up a communication as with you; and the importance of what I learn from you respecting matters so full of momentous consequences to the world would make such communication most valuable to me even if I did not wish for it on personal grounds. The state of affairs in America has naturally improved since you wrote, by the defeat of the enemy in Maryland and their expulsion from it, and still more by Mr. Lincoln's Anti-Slavery Proclamation, which no American, I think, can have received with more exultation than I did. It is of the highest importance, and more so because the manifest reluctance with which the President made up his mind to that decided step indicates that the progress of opinion in the country had reached the point of seeing its necessity for the effectual prosecution of the war. The adhesion of so many Governors of States, some of them originally Democrats, is a very favourable sign, and thus far the measure does not seem to have materially weakened your hold upon the border Slave States. The natural tendency will be, if the war goes on successfully, to reconcile those States to emancipating their own slaves, availing themselves of the pecuniary offers made by the Federal Government. I still feel some anxiety about the reception which will be given to the measure by Congress when it meets, and I should much like to know what are your expectations on the point. In England the proclamation has only increased the venom of those who, after taunting you so long with caring nothing for abolition, now reproach you for your abolitionism as the worst of your

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crimes. But you will find that, whenever any name is attached to these wretched effusions, it is always that of some deeply-dyed Tory—generally the kind of Tory to whom slavery is rather agreeable than not, or who so hate your democratic institutions that they would be sure to inveigh against you whatever you did, and are enraged at being no longer able to taunt you with being false to your own principles. It is from there also that we are now beginning to hear, what disgusts me more than all the rest, the base doctrine that it is for the interest of England that the American Republic should be broken up. Think of us as ill as you may (and we have given you abundant cause), but do not, I entreat you, think that the general English public is so base as this. Our national faults are not now of that kind, and I firmly believe that the feeling of almost all English Liberals, even those whose language has been the most objectionable, is one of sincere respect for the disruption which they think inevitable. As long as there is a Tory party in England it will rejoice at everything which injures or discredits American institutions, but the Liberal party, who are now, and are likely to remain much the strongest, are naturally your friends and allies, and will return to that position when once they see that you are not engaged in a hopeless, and therefore, as they think, an irrational and unjustifiable contest. There are writers enough here to keep up the fight and meet the malevolent comments on all your proceedings by right ones. Besides Cairns, and Dicey, and H. Martineau, and Ludlow, and Hughes, besides the *Daily News*, and *Macmillan*, and the *Star*, there is now the *Westminster* and the *London Review*, to which several of the best writers of the *Saturday* have gone over; there is Ellison of Liverpool, the author of "Slavery and Secession," and editor of a monthly economical journal, the *Exchange;* and there are other writers less known who, if events go on favourably, will rapidly multiply. Here in France the state of opinion on the subject is most gratifying. All Liberal Frenchmen seem to have been with you from the first. They did not know more about the subject than the English, but their

instincts were truer. By the way, what did you think of the narrative of the campaign on the Potomac in the *Revue des Deux Mondes* of 15th October by the Comte de Paris? It looks veracious, and is certainly intelligent, and in the general effect likely, I should think, to be very useful to the cause. 1862 — Aetat. 56.

I still think you take too severe a view of the conduct of our Government. I grant that the extra-official *dicta* of some of the Ministry have been very unfortunate, especially that celebrated one of Lord Russell, on which I have commented not sparingly in the *Westminster Review*. Gladstone, too, a man of a much nobler character than Lord Russell, has said things lately which I very much regret, though they were accompanied by other things showing that he had no bad feelings towards you, and regretted their existence in others. But as a Government I do not see that their conduct is objectionable. The port of Nassau may be all that you say it is, but the United States also have the power, and have used it largely, of supplying themselves with munitions of war from our ports. If the principle of neutrality is accepted, our markets must be open to both sides alike, and the general opinion in England is (I do not say whether rightly or wrongly) that, if the course adopted is favourable to either side, it is to the United States, since the Confederates, owing to the blockade of their ports, have so much less power to take advantage of the facilities extended equally to both. What you mention about a seizure of arms by our Government must, I feel confident, have taken place during the *Trent* difficulty, at which time alone (and neither before nor after) has the export of arms to America been interdicted.

It is very possible that too much may have been made of Butler's proclamation, and that he was more wrong in form and phraseology than in substance. But with regard to the watchword said to have been given out by Pakenham at New Orleans, I have always hitherto taken it for a mere legend, like the exactly parallel ones which grew up under our own eyes at Paris in 1848 respecting

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the Socialist insurrections of June. What authority there may be for it I do not know, but, if it is true, nothing can mark more strongly the change which has taken place in the European standard of belligerent rights since the wars of the beginning of the century, for if any English commander at the present time were to do the like he never could show his face again in English society, even if he escaped being broken by a court-martial; and I think we are entitled to blame in others what none of us, of the present generation at least, would be capable of perpetrating. You are perhaps hardly aware how little the English of the present day feel of *solidarité* with past generations. We do not feel ourselves at all concerned to justify our predecessors. Foreigners reproach us with having been the great enemies of neutral rights so long as we were belligerents, and with turning round and stickling for them now when we are neutrals; but the real fact is we are convinced, and have no hesitation in saying (what our Liberal party said even at the time), that our policy in that matter in the great Continental war was totally wrong.

But while I am anxious that liberal and friendly Americans should not think worse of us than we really deserve, I am deeply conscious and profoundly grieved and mortified that we deserve so ill; and are making, in consequence, so pitiful a figure before the world, with which, if we are not daily and insultingly taxed by all Europe, it is only because our enemies are glad to see us doing exactly what they expected, justifying their opinion of us, and acting in a way which they think perfectly natural, because they think it perfectly selfish.

To Nikolai Ogareff,

on his book "Essai sur la situation russe."

St. Véran, *le 7 novembre* 1862.

Monsieur,—Je vous remercie très sincèrement de votre lettre et de l'envoi de votre livre. Loin de voir avec ndifférence l'immense révolution morale, politique et

sociale qui s'avance à pas croissants en Russie, je la regarde comme un des phénomènes les plus importants d'un siècle déjà si riche en grands événements. J'en observe toutes les péripéties avec le plus vif intérêt, quelque difficulté que j'éprouve à apprécier leur portée autrement que sous un point de vue général. Vous pouvez donc juger de la part que je puis tirer de votre Essai pour préciser mes idées et pour donner plus de détermination à mes espérances. 1862 — Aetat. 56.

Quant à vos conclusions dont vous pensez que quelques unes pourraient me sembler douteuses il faudrait que je fusse bien présomptueux pour avoir des opinions décidées sur la manière dont les principes généraux de science sociale doivent être appliqués à un état de choses si éloigné de tous ceux dont j'ai une vraie connaissance. Mais je n'ai aucune répugnance doctrinaire envers l'administration communale des terres, et je ne suis pas éloigné de penser avec vous que la réorganisation sociale de la Russie doit respecter une institution si profondément historique et si enracinée dans les mœurs populaires. Cela admis, la plupart de vos conclusions en découlent naturellement. Quoiqu'il en soit, il me semble impossible de ne pas accepter l'idée qui fait l'esprit de tout votre livre—savoir que le fonctionarisme est le véritable fléau de la Russie et qu'une réforme quelconque ne peut réussir qu'autant qu'elle émancipe les personnes et les choses de ce joug insupportable, et fasse décider les intérêts tant communs que particuliers par les intéressés. Ceci est dans ma conviction plus important que le système représentatif même le mieux ordonné, bien qu'en Russie les deux choses paraissent devoir aller pas à pas et être nécessaires l'une à l'autre.

To George Finlay,

on taxation of land in Greece.

Blackheath Park, 24*th December* 1862.

. . . I have learned very much from the paper, and as far as I can judge there is only one point in it on which I have any doubt, viz., the preference you give to the abolition of

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the land tax over any change in the mode of levying it. The rent of land is in itself so fit an object of taxation that if there is any possible mode of rendering such a tax unoppressive it seems desirable to retain it. No doubt the money and valuation necessary for a great assessment would take too long, and could not be trusted to the present race of officials; but would it not be possible to take a low average of what each landed property has actually paid for the last five or less years, and lay this as a fixed annual charge on the estate? I do not see that this would create any insuperable difficulties in the event of mutations. If the mutation takes place under the law of inheritance, the law, when it decides the share of the estate due to each claimant, would enforce on him the same share of the tax. If the case were one of bequest, sale, or gift, the owner might be allowed to charge the whole, or any part, or no part, of the tax on the alienated portion as he pleased, provided always that if either the portion alienated or the portion retained were burthened beyond its total value, the remaining portion should be liable for the excess. . . .

To Max Kyllman, of Manchester,

in reply to a letter informing Mill of the change of opinion taking place in Lancashire on the American civil war; and of a great meeting of operatives organised for the purpose of sending an address to Abraham Lincoln.

24th December 1862.

Dear Sir,—I thank you very sincerely for your two letters, and for the important and most gratifying intelligence which they contain. Hardly anything could do more good at present than such a demonstration from the suffering operatives of Lancashire; while there is in the fact itself, and in the state of mind which prompts it, a moral greatness which is at once a just rebuke to the mean feeling of so great a portion of the public on this momentous

subject, and a source of unqualified happiness to those whose hopes and fears for the great interest of humanity are, as mine are, inseparably bound up in the intellectual and moral prospects of the working classes. 1862 — Aetat. 56.

I am very well pleased with the Resolutions and Address. I applaud your endeavour to get the passage about the "rights of husbands" struck out, but taken with the context it does not necessarily bear the objectionable meaning, though the phrase would not have been used by any writer who had a just feeling respecting the equal rights of the two sexes.

On the subject of the query you put to me, I perfectly agree in your opinion as far as you have stated it. The improvement in the condition of the working classes through the success of co-operation could not be used up in increase of numbers in less than a generation, and in that time the moral and intellectual influences of co-operation, which are of still greater value than the physical, will have had a considerable period in which to operate. If co-operation were universal the necessity of regulating population would be palpable to every one. And even a partial application contains lessons of the same kind.

To the Right Hon. Joseph Napier,

who afterwards became Lord Chancellor of Ireland, and received a baronetcy. This is in reply to a letter on the subject of Mill's criticism of Butler's "Analogy" in his "Logic."

Blackheath Park, *24th December* 1862.

Dear Sir,—I have had the honour of receiving your letter of 22nd December.

I have not seen Bishop Fitzgerald's publication,[1] but you are quite right in supposing that what I wrote about miracles had not the smallest reference to Butler, but only to the writers who professed to reply to Hume, and especially Campbell. It is many years since I read

[1] [His edition of Butler's "Analogy."]

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or looked into the "Analogy," and I cannot at present remember whether my remarks apply even partially to anything said by Butler. That in their main scope they are inapplicable to him is evident, since it appears from your letter that he fully recognised the distinction between improbability on the doctrine of chances and improbability in the only sense which constitutes incredulity.

My view of the general question is briefly this: that a miracle, considered merely as an extraordinary fact, is as susceptible of proof as other extraordinary facts: that, *as a miracle*, it cannot in the strict sense be proved, because there never can be conclusive proofs of its miraculous nature; but that to any one who already believes in an intelligent creator and ruler of the universe the moral probability that a given extraordinary event (supposed to be fully proved) is a miracle, may greatly outweigh the probability of its being the result of some unknown natural cause.

CHAPTER VIII

1863

To Alexander Bain.

Blackheath Park, *7th January* 1863.

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Dear Bain,—I have been here now for about a month, and as it is a long time since I either wrote to you or heard from you, I think it is time to send you a bulletin from myself and to ask for one from you.

I have done a good deal of work on Hamilton at Avignon and some here, though in both places I have had, and shall have for some time longer, exceptional occupation which makes me rather slow in getting on! My plan has been to go deliberately through the whole writings of Hamilton, writing down in the form of notes the substance of what I as yet find to say on each point. This will make it comparatively easy to write the book when I have finished the preparatory work. The only point which I have yet developed at any length is the formation of the idea of externality, and consequently of matter, and this, I think, I have brought out more fully and clearly than had ever been done before, though my theory does not differ essentially from yours or from Grote's, as indeed from our premisses there can be but one theory. But I have grappled with the details of the subject in a manner which I have nowhere yet seen. I mean in this book to do what the nature and scope of the "Logic" forbade me to do there, to face the ultimate metaphysical difficulties of every question on which I touch.

By the way, is it not surprising that Hamilton should have believed, and made the world believe, that he held the doctrine of the relativity of human knowledge? As told

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by him the doctrine is little better than a play upon the word knowledge, since he maintains that a great mass of Belief, differing from Knowledge in the mode, but not in the certainty of conviction, may philosophically and ought morally to be entertained respecting the attributes of the Unknowable. Nor is even this all, for he does not hold to the doctrine of unknowability even in his own book; but thinks that the primary qualities of matter are given in Consciousness as attributes of Things in Themselves. I used to wonder at the catena of authorities he brought to prove that almost all philosophers have thought as he did; but I ought to have known that he was more likely to be right in his erudition than in his philosophy, and I now find him so, for his own doctrine amounts to no more than what *was* thought by the writers whom he quotes. His speculations on the point seem to me of no philosophic value except as refutations of Schelling and Hegel, while the use they can be practically put to is shown in Mansel's detestable, to me absolutely loathsome book. We are taught there, from Hamilton's premisses, that as we cannot know what God is in himself, nothing that we are told concerning him is in the smallest degree incredible because it is monstrous to the human reason or conscience; and that because we cannot know what Absolute Goodness is, we are at liberty, and in some cases are bound, to believe that it is not the perfection of human goodness, but the direct contrary of it. It is true that these conclusions are very illogically drawn from Hamilton's and Mansel's own premisses, these being, that we do not know God as he is in himself, but know him as we do other things, in his relation to us—in other words, phenomenally; which places him in exactly the same category, as an object of thought, with our human fellow-creatures, and with Matter; which also we do not know as they are in themselves. God, in part, is a subject of knowledge in so far as thinkable at all, namely as a subject of phenomenal experience, and as such is amenable to the canons of phenomenal credibility; and if any proposition concerning Man and Matter may and ought to be rejected because it

violates those canons, so for the same reason may any proposition concerning God. 1863 — Aetat. 56.

Having been so much disappointed by Hamilton's conception of the relativity of human knowledge, I should like to look again at Ferrier to see if his is any better. I think you have my copy of the "Institutes of Metaphysic"; if so, and if you are not at present reading it, I should be obliged by your sending it, but this need not be done for the next two or three weeks, for I have enough in hand to occupy me during that time.

In Herbert Spencer's "First Principles" I do find a much better conception of the doctrine of relativity, though if he holds to it in its proper sense he must give up much which he has said in his "Principles of Psychology." The book is a remarkable one in many respects, and its wide-reaching systematisation of so many heterogeneous elements is very imposing. But was there ever so strange a notion (for a man who sees so much) as that the doctrine of the Conservation of Force is *à priori* and a law of Consciousness? He expresses himself almost as if he thought that there is no objective standard of truth at all, which is in one sense true, but not in the obvious sense; inasmuch as each person's phenomenal experience is to have a standard relatively objective, and the correction of error consists to each mind in bringing its ideas and their relations into clearer accordance with what are, or would be in the given circumstances, its sensations or impressions and their relations. Of course Grote meant nothing at variance with all this, but the omission to state it explicitly seems to me both an imperfection in the theory and a great stumbling-block to its reception; and, on my pointing it out, he at once said that he would supply the defect.

We have just returned from a visit to Grote, during which I had an opportunity of reading some of his MS. I chose the "Theœtetus" as falling in with the subject of my present thoughts, and I was delighted to find how good it is. He has triumphed wonderfully over the difficulty of rendering the thoughts or semi-thoughts of Plato, and of

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those on whom Plato commented, with the language of modern philosophy; the view of Plato himself which goes through it will, I think, be recognised as original and striking; and his own thoughts on the matters discussed are good and well stated. I find, however, an oversight which you also must have perceived in reading it, viz., that his mode of defending the Protagorean maxim is very open to misconception.

To Samuel Bailey,

on his books, "On the Received Text of Shakespeare," and "Letters on the Philosophy of the Mind."

Blackheath Park, 21*st January* 1863.

Dear Sir,—Allow me to thank you very sincerely for the gift of your last two works. The one on Shakespeare was very pleasant reading, and many of the conjectural emendations seemed to me happy, while in other cases I fancied that a good deal might be said for the received text. But it is almost an impertinence in me to make any observations on a subject on which my opinion is so little worth consideration.

The new volume of your Letters is, I think, at least equal to either of its predecessors. Like everything I have read of yours, it is both instructive and interesting; and if, as might be expected on such a subject, I sometimes differ from you, it is always as from a thinker, and from one whose canons of thought are not fundamentally different from my own. You may probably anticipate what are our principal points of difference. I am not able to see how it is possible that the mind should directly perceive that one event *produces* another, or how the idea of producing could be suggested without repeated experience of the sequence of one event upon the other. Neither can I see how a fact can be known to be *necessary* by direct perception, or how necessity can be in any way a direct subject of human apprehension. Apart from these points, and minor ones connected with them, I agree with you in essentials on

almost all the topics discussed. In several instances you have done, and done well, what I have been long wishing to see done. This is particularly true of your remarks on Comte's depreciation of psychology; and on the improper assimilation, by Comte and others, of physical to moral laws, an assimilation dictated by their desire to attach the idea of religious obligation to the prudential regard for the warnings of physical science. 1863 — Aetat. 56.

In the discussion on Personal Identity you have (I think for the very first time) chosen the right starting-point for the inquiry by considering *first* what makes me the same person to the apprehension of *others*, while psychologists have usually started from the far more complex question, what makes me the same person to my own apprehension. You have, in fact, commenced the examination of personal identity by considering what it is which constitutes identity in the other and simpler cases in which it is predicated; and by thus for the first time applying to the question the only philosophical method of investigation, you have, as might be expected, arrived at much better results.

On the subject of Language I of course agree in your principal thesis. The origin and history of a word are not the appropriate evidence of its present meaning. But have you not a little underrated the worth of this kind of knowledge in its bearing on the great questions of metaphysics? The most keenly contested questions in psychology are those which relate to the *origin* of certain of our mental notions; is not light often thrown on this by the *origin* of the corresponding words? A certain school of psychologists are always contending that such and such notions must be part of the original furniture of the mind, on the ground that there have always been names for them; and we know how strong is the tendency to suppose that whatever has got a name, has a real existence, not as a particular mode of contemplating things which when looked at for other purposes are known by other names, but as an independent entity. It seems to me very pertinent, in opposition to this notion, to show (if it can be shown) that, for instance, all abstract names were originally

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concrete, and that all the more general words of relation were once nouns or verbs.

The part of your book which treats of Moral Sentiments I value even more than all the rest. Several important points of what we agree in holding as the true theory I have not seen so well brought out anywhere else. I am the more interested by what you have done because I have myself been led into a very similar vein of thought, and have published it in a series of three papers which, unless you are a habitual reader of *Fraser's Magazine*, you are not likely to have heard of. If I reprint them separately, as I am thinking of doing, I will beg your acceptance of a copy. In the last of these papers (December 1861) I derive most of the peculiar characters of the moral sentiment from the element of vindictiveness which enters into it. Our modes of developing the idea are different but not conflicting.

To John Lothrop Motley,

on the American civil war.

Blackheath Park, *26th January* 1863.

. . . Concerning the *Alabama*, most people of sense in this country are reserving their opinion till they hear what the Government has to say for itself. My own first impression was, that the Government was not bound, nor even permitted by international rules, to prevent the equipment of such a vessel, provided it allows exactly similar liberty to the other combatant. But it is plain this notion was wrong, since the Government has shown, by issuing an order which arrived too late, that it considered itself bound to stop the *Alabama*. What explanation it can give of the delay will be known when Parliament meets, and what it ought to do now, in consequence of its previous default, a person must be better acquainted than I am with international law to be able to judge. But I expect to have a tolerably decided opinion on the subject after it has been discussed.

I write to you in much better spirits than I have been

in since I saw you. In the first place, things are now going on in an encouraging manner in the west. Murfreesborough is an important as well as glorious achievement, and from the general aspects of things I feel great confidence that you will take Vicksburg and cut off Arkansas and Texas, which then, by your naval superiority, will soon be yours. Then I exult in—what from observation of the politics of that State I was quite prepared for, though not for the unanimity with which it seems to have been done—the passing over of Missouri from slavery to freedom; a fact which ought to cover with shame, if they are capable of it, the wretched creatures who treated Mr. Lincoln's second proclamation as waste paper, and who described the son of John Quincy Adams as laughing in his sleeve when he professed to care for the freedom of the negro! But I am now in very good heart about the progress of opinion here. When I returned I already found things better than I expected. Friends of mine who are heartily with your cause, who are much in society, and who speak in the gloomiest terms of what the general feeling was a twelvemonth ago, already thought that a change had commenced. And I heard every now and then that some person of intellect and influence whom I did not know before to be with you was with you very decidedly. You must have read one of the most powerful and most thorough pieces of writing in your defence that has yet appeared, under the signature of "Anglo-Saxon" in the *Daily News*. That letter is by Goldwin Smith, and though it is not signed with his name he is willing (as I am authorised to say) that it should be known. Again, Dr. Whewell, from whom I should not have expected so much, feels, so I am told, so strongly on your side that people complain of his being rude to them on the subject, and he will not suffer the *Times* to be in his house. These, you may say, are but individual cases. But a decided movement in your favour has begun among the public since it has been evident that your Government is really in earnest about getting rid of slavery. I have always said that it was ignorance, not ill-will, which made the majority of the

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English public go wrong about this great matter. Difficult as it may well be for you to comprehend it, the English public were so ignorant of all the antecedents of the quarrel that they really believed what they were told, that slavery was not the ground, scarcely even the pretext, of the war. But now, when the public acts of your Government have shown that now at least it aims at entire slave emancipation, that your victory means that, and your failure means the extinction of all present hope of it, many feel very differently. When you entered decidedly into this course, your detractors abused you more violently for doing it than they had before for not doing it, and the *Times* and *Saturday Review* began favouring us with the very arguments, and almost in the very language, which we used to hear from the West Indian slaveholders to prove slavery perfectly consistent with the Bible and with Christianity. This was too much : it overshot the mark. The Anti-Slavery feeling is now thoroughly rousing itself. Liverpool has led the way by a splendid meeting, of which the *Times* suppressed all mention, thus adding, according to its custom, to the political dishonesty a pecuniary fraud upon its subscribers. But you must have seen a report of this meeting; you must have seen how Spence did his utmost, and how he was met; and that the object was not merely a high demonstration, but the appointment of a committee to organise an action on the public mind. There are none like the Liverpool people for making an organisation of that sort succeed if once they put their hands to it. The day when I read this I read in the same day's newspaper two speeches by Cabinet Ministers : one by Milner-Gibson, as thoroughly and openly with you as was consistent with the position of a Cabinet Minister; the other by the Duke of Argyll, a simple Anti-Slavery speech, denouncing the pro-slavery declaration of the southern bishops, but his delivering such a speech at that time and place has but one meaning. I do not know if you have seen Cairnes's Lecture, or whether you are aware that it has been taken up and largely circulated by religious societies, and is at its fourth edition. A new and enlarged edition of

his great book is on the point of publication, and will, I have no doubt, be very widely read and powerfully influential. 1863 — Aetat. 56.

Foreigners ought not to regard the *Times* as representing the British nation. Of course a paper which is so largely read and bought and so much thought of as the *Times* is, must have a certain amount of suitability to the people that buy it. But the line it takes on any particular question is much more a mere matter of accident than is supposed. It is sometimes better than the public and sometimes worse. It was better on the Competitive Examinations and the revised Educational Code, in each case owing to the accidental position of a particular man who happened to write in it, both which men I could name to you. I am just as fully persuaded as if I could name the man, that the attitude it has long held respecting slavery, and now on the American question, is equally owing to the accidental interests and sympathies of some one person connected with the paper. The *Saturday Review*, again, is understood to be the property of the bitterest Tory enemy America has, Beresford Hope. Unfortunately these papers, through the influence they obtain in other ways, and in the case of the *Times* very much in consequence of the prevailing notion that it speaks the opinions of all England, are able to exercise great power in perverting the opinion of all England wherever the public are sufficiently ignorant of facts to be misled. That when once engaged in a wrong tone writers like those of the *Times* go from worse to worse, and at last stick at nothing in the way of perverse and even dishonest misrepresentation, is but natural to party writers everywhere; natural to those who go on day after day working themselves up to write strongly in a matter to which they have committed themselves, and breathing an atmosphere inflamed by themselves; natural, moreover, to demagogism both here and in America, and natural above all to anonymous demagogism, which, risking no personal infamy by any amount of tergiversation, never minds to what lengths it goes, because it can always creep out in time, and turn round at the very moment when the tide turns.

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Among the many lessons which have been impressed on me by what is now going on, one is, a strong sense of the *solidarité* (to borrow a phrase for which our language has no short equivalent) of the whole of a nation with every one of its members; for it is painfully apparent that your country and mine habitually judge of one another from their worst specimens. You say that, if England were like Cairnes and me, there would be no alienation; and neither would there if America were like you. But (I need not use soft words to you, who I am sure detest these things as much as I do) the low tricks and fulsome mob-flattery of your public men, and the bullying tone and pettifogging practice of your different cabinets (Southern men chiefly, I am aware) towards foreign nations, have deeply disgusted a great number of our very best people, and all the more so because it is the likeness of what may be coming to ourselves. You must admit that the present crisis, while it has called forth a heroism and constancy in your people which cannot be too much admired and to which even your enemies in this country do justice, has also exhibited on the same scale of magnitude all the defects of your state of society—the incompetency and mismanagement arising from the fatal belief of your public that anybody is fit for anything, and the gigantic pecuniary corruption which seems universally acknowledged to have taken place, and indeed without it one cannot conceive how you can have got through the enormous sums you have spent. All this, and what seems to most of us entire financial recklessness (though for myself I do not pretend to see how you could have done anything else in the way of finance), are telling against you here, you can hardly imagine how much. But all this may be, and I have great hope that it will be, wiped out by the conduct which you have it in your power to adopt as a nation. If you persevere until you have subdued the South, or at all events all west of the Mississippi; if having done this you set free the slaves, with compensation to loyal owners, and (according to the advice of Mr. Paterson in his admirable speech at Liverpool) settle the freed slaves as free proprietors on the unoccupied land;

if you pay honestly the interest on your vast national debt, and take measures for reducing it, including the debt without interest which is constituted by your inconvertible paper currency; if you do these things, the United States will stand very far higher in the general opinion of England than they have stood at any time since the War of Independence. If, in addition to this, you have men among you of a calibre to use the high spirit which this struggle has raised, and the grave reflections to which it gives rise, as means of moving public opinion in favour of correcting what is bad and strengthening what is weak in your institutions and modes of feeling and thought, the war will prove to have been a permanent blessing to your country such as we never dared hope for, and a source of inestimable improvement to the prospects of the human race in other ways besides the great one of extinguishing slavery. 1863 — Aetat. 56.

If you are really going to do these things, you need not mind being misunderstood. You can afford to wait.

To the Right Hon. Joseph Napier, on Miracles.

Blackheath Park, *27th January* 1863.

Dear Sir,—I have at your suggestion re-read the second chapter of the second part of the "Analogy," and the result is somewhat different from what you seemed to expect. I am afraid I must admit that Butler's authority is against me, and that he rather overlooked, or did not admit, the distinction which I endeavoured to draw between two kinds of improbability, improbability before the fact and improbability of an alleged fact. For though, as you say, he does not deny that there is a certain small antecedent presumption against a miracle, he looks upon this as being exactly the same sort of presumption which there is against any common event (of the conditions of which we have no special antecedent knowledge) before it has happened. Now, in my view it is a totally different sort of presumption —one which constitutes, as far as it goes, a ground of dis-

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belief, which the other and universal presumption does not even in the smallest degree. In proof of this, let there be a million of tickets in some repository, numbered and placed indiscriminately. Of these I take out one; the antecedent presumption against its being No. 72 is a million to one; but when I *have* selected a ticket and it is affirmed to be No. 72, the antecedent presumption does not render this in the smallest degree incredible, because, instead of its being unlikely that an event with a million to one against it would happen it was certain that such an event would happen, and it is certain that such an event did happen when I took out the ticket, whether it was No. 72 or not.

Now (without further purpose distinguishing miracles from any other kind of extraordinary event) it seems to me clear that against any extraordinary event there exists not a slight addition to this entirely unimportant kind of probability, but an improbability generically different from it, and Butler surely must have thought so. . . .

To George Finlay, the Greek historian, who was then living at Athens.

Blackheath Park, *2nd February* 1863.

My dear Mr. Finlay,—Many thanks for your letter, which was both interesting and encouraging. I now write in high spirits on the subject of Greece, as to-day's newspapers for the first time state positively and authentically that the Duke of Saxe-Coburg consents to be a candidate. I earnestly hope that the Greeks will not throw away the opportunity of getting a king who would bring them every possible advantage they could have had from Prince Alfred, with the addition of being a man of mature age and *tried* principles. It seems to me that they have drawn the one solitary prize in the lottery, and that his election and acceptance would be the very happiest event which the chances of politics could have turned up for Greece. I had never ventured to hope for anything so good as a prince who is more liberal and constitutional than his

German subjects understand or care for, and who is looked to by the Liberals in Germany at large as a possible head of the future German Empire. If he is elected, it will be his object to make Greece a great country by making her a free and prosperous one to begin with, and all the best European thought will have a greater chance of access to her than to any crowned head in Europe, except his uncle Leopold. 1863 — Aetat. 56.

I was very happy to learn from you that there is a real desire in the Assembly for moderate establishments and a great retrenchment of expenditure. This is good not only in itself, but because it implies putting a restriction on the evils of centralisation and functionarism. But the land tax, or rather *a* land tax, will be wanted nevertheless, for a time at least, if they intend to be honest to their creditors. . . .

To R. C. Wyllie,

Foreign Minister at the Sandwich Islands.

Blackheath Park, *3rd February* 1863.

Sir,—I have had the honour of receiving your letter and the printed slips which you have been kind enough to send. These I have read with the attention due to any work of Dr. Rae, and they appear to me quite worthy of his intellect and acquirements. The picture that he draws of the dangers which menace the interesting community of which you are one of the rulers is most formidable. Of the remedies which he proposes I cannot be a competent judge; but, as far as my means of judgment extend, he seems to be right in much, perhaps even in all, that he proposes.

The other paper will, I think, place Dr. Rae very high among ethnologists and philologists. After having reached by independent investigation the highest generalisation previously made, viz., that all languages have grown by developments from a few hundred words, Dr. Rae seems to have supplied the first probable explanation of the manner in which their primitive words may themselves have originated. If his hypothesis is made out, it is the

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keystone of the science of philology; it is *à priori* extremely probable, and the facts he brings forward establish a strong case of verification *à posteriori*. I hope that Dr. Max Müller has been put in possession of this important speculation.

It must be of great value to your country to have such a man as Dr. Rae settled among you.

It is very gratifying to me that you are disposed to carry the principle of representation of minorities into practical operation. That such should be the questions agitated in a country which three-quarters of a century ago was in a savage state is surely one of the most remarkable signs of the very hopeful times in which we live.

To Alexander Bain,

on James Ferrier's "Institutes of Metaphysic."

Blackheath Park, 13*th February* 1863.

Dear Bain,—I thought Ferrier's book quite *sui generis* when I first read it, and I think so more than ever after reading it again. His system is one of pure scepticism very skilfully clothed in dogmatic language. To find the meaning of any of his propositions one is obliged to invert it—to turn it, as it were, bottom upwards, and discover the purely negative underside, of which the side turned towards the spectator is but the superficial outcome, and which negative underside contains all the reality there is in the proposition. For example, matter, according to him, is the only variable element in cognition. But he avers that neither the world at large nor thinkers, when they discussed the subject of matter, ever imagined that they were affirming or denying the existence of a variable element in cognition. Consequently the entire purport of Ferrier's proposition is, that if matter is not this, "there is nothing else for it to be" (to use an expression of his own). Again, the whole of his doctrine of the Absolute may be thus expressed: Unless the Absolute is what I say it is, that is, unless a toothache, regarded as my toothache, is the Absolute there *is* no Absolute. This

strikes me as very cool in a thinker whose doctrines are of this character, to class other people as sceptics and present his own system as the first and only real safeguard against scepticism. The truth is, it outdoes in scepticism almost all the systems so called, inasmuch as it abolishes *noumena*. According to it there are no "things in themselves"; they have no *locus standi* anywhere, not even in Herbert Spencer's region of the Unknowable. To this doctrine I have little to object, but I do object *in toto* to the mode in which it is arrived at. For the only legitimate mode of arriving at it is by the psychology of which he thinks he can never speak too scornfully—viz., by pointing out the genesis, through ascertained laws of the mind, of the belief that people have that they do perceive, or have evidence of things in themselves. Until this is done this next to universal belief is *primâ facie* evidence of its own truth, just as the impressions of the senses are. All such attempts, however, he repudiates, rebuking philosophers in general for commencing their study of the mind with the *origin* of an idea, and not seeing the very obvious truth (which it will be one of the purposes of what I write on Hamilton to enforce) that since we cannot observe the first moments of human consciousness, a theory of the genesis of our notions is an indispensable condition of ascertaining what those are which we possess originally. Despising this instrument of investigation which he does not know how to use, he arrives at all his conclusions, without one single exception that I remember—certainly at all those which he declares to be of primary importance—either by deduction from arbitrary definitions or by reasoning in a circle. How, for example, does he prove the doctrine which he considers it his greatest feat to have established, the principal proposition of the Agnoiology?[1] By arguing that, as ignorance is a defect, there can be no ignorance but of things which might possibly be known. He erects the accidental dyslogistic connotation of a word into the chief constituent of its meaning, and from this definition of his own concludes

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[1] [Theory of ignorance.]

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that there are no other things to be ignorant of, and not (which is the only valid conclusion) that if there are we may be ignorant of them without blame. His general mode of settling the questions which divide philosophers is to transfer the names of the things, real or unreal, which they contend about to things the reality of which nobody ever thought of contesting; after which, as there are no names left for the things which people do contest, the conclusion is quietly slid into that there are no such things. I do not in the least dispute that if this negative conclusion be true, there is much to be said for transferring the existing words with all their associations from nonentities to the realities which are the proper objects for those associations; and what makes me to a certain extent tolerant of the book is that I think philosophy will most likely ultimately use the words in something like his sense of them, so that his system serves as a mode of stating a connected set of opinions grounded in truth, which connected statement he mistakes for deducing them from one another. But the fact that there is anything else for the words to mean has to be proved first, which cannot be done by begging it in the definitions of the terms. What, again, can be a more glaring paralogism than that by which he establishes his grand proposition that certain supposed laws of our cognitions are necessary laws of all cognition existing, possible or imaginary, finite or infinite? It all rests upon a double meaning of the word contradictory. He lays down as a principle that what is contradictory cannot be known, not merely by our intelligence but by any intelligence. He gets this admitted by presenting it as if it meant that our intelligence cannot believe that a thing is and also that it is not. So presented, the reader is not unwilling to admit that the impossibility does not arise from the limitation of *our* intelligence, but is a law of all intelligence. But when the time comes for drawing the consequences of the admission, the Contradictory is found to be that which contradicts not itself, but "the necessary laws of cognition," and from that time forward anything

which we cannot, as the author expresses it, "conceive to be conceivable" is placed on that ground among things unknowable by any, even infinite, intelligence, though it may not involve any self-contradiction at all. Thus the proposition that the human capacities of conception (in their second power at least) are a measure of the possibilities of universal intelligence steals in as a demonstrated truth without having been once faced. 1863 — Aetat. 56.

Then how strangely absurd are his representations of other writers, above all his romance about Plato. There has been plenty of nonsense written about Plato's Ideas, but I did not expect to be told that what Plato means by them (though he failed to express his meaning distinctly) was the Ego! This wonderful conclusion seems to be reached by the following syllogism. The Ego is (according to my system) the universal element in cognition—Plato's Ideas were the universal element in cognition; therefore Plato's Ideas were the Ego. How Plato would have stared at this interpretation of what he conceived as the very opposite pole, the point furthest removed from (and raised above) the Ego, of all the elements which enter into the generation of Knowledge!

In spite of all this, however, and of the flourishing of trumpets which accompanies every fresh paralogism or disguised assumption, one cannot help being struck in almost every page with the ability of the writer, though I cannot think that it lies in the direction of metaphysical speculation. And the book, like all books by persons of talent on difficult subjects of thought, helps to clear up one's own ideas. . . .

To Max Kyllman,

on various propaganda which he was carrying on in Manchester.

Blackheath Park, 15*th February* 1863.

Dear Sir,—I wish there were somebody like you in every great town in the country, for as soon as you see that anything is true and important you exert yourself to get it

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acknowledged. The beginning you have made with the operatives on the subject of Mr. Hare's plan is most valuable. They are more open to conviction than any other class, being the only class not prejudiced in favour of existing institutions in general. And they have the strongest interest in adopting this plan, since, while it gives more complete expression and fuller effect than anything else can do to the democratic principle, it also completely removes the strongest and best-founded of the objections which are sincerely felt to that principle, considered as a practical one. When difficulties can be removed not by compromising a principle but by carrying it still more completely out, the advantage is well worth gaining.

I should strongly advise keeping the demonstration respecting the grievances of the working classes as distinct as possible from the movement relating to America. It is good generalship in politics, as it is in war, not to bring all your enemies upon you at once, but to divide them, and pull upon each division apart from the rest. Bad principles are but too ready to league with each other as it is, without being provoked to it by each receiving a slap in the face from the same hands. And you cannot well afford to alienate those who would agree with you as to one of the two objects proposed but not on the other. For the same reason it seems to me desirable that the question of the suffrage should be kept apart from the other things complained of, and should be made the subject of a distinct demonstration by itself. The changes in the law that have made co-operation possible would not have been attained so soon if the demand for them had usually been coupled with the question of the suffrage.

Thanks for your information about the Haslingden movement. Before I received your letter one of the circulars had found its way to me, and I shall, the first time I go to town, pay a subscription in the manner directed. I will also send a subscription to Mr. Bradlaugh.

The Anthropological Society I hear of for the first time from your letter. I should suppose, from the publications it announces, that its objects must be very much the same

as those of the Ethnological Society which already existed. The names mentioned are all new to me except two—Captain Burton, whom I know as other people do from his books more as an enterprising traveller than as a man of science, and Mr. Luke Burke, who I should think answers to your requisition of willingness to carry out premisses to all their consequences; but the little I have seen of his speculations does not give me any confidence in his soundness as a scientific thinker. It is possible that some of the others may be distinguished names, for I am very little acquainted with the present state of this class of studies. 1863 — Aetat. 56.

Mr. Lincoln's answer is excellent—quite beyond my expectations.

To C. A. Cummings, of Boston (U.S.)

Blackheath Park, 23*rd February* 1863.

Dear Sir,—I duly received your letter of 2nd February, and I thank you for the favour you have done me by sending me the *Christian Examiner* of January.

My object in writing is not solely to make my warm acknowledgments of your kindly and generous estimate of my writings, but also to set my country right with you on one point, and myself on another. You are under some misapprehension in thinking that the writings which you honour with such high praise, have been neglected in England in comparison with my longer treatises. They have been much more widely read than ever those were, and have given me, what I had not before, popular influence. I was regarded till then as a writer on special scientific subjects, and had been little heard of by the miscellaneous public. I am in a very different position now.

For the other misapprehension I am probably myself accountable, and I only advert to it because, if it were well founded, there would be less sympathy between my feelings and yours than there really is. I do not, as you seem to think, take a gloomy view of human prospects. Few persons look forward to the future career of humanity with more brilliant hopes than I do. I see, however, many perils ahead, which

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unless successfully avoided would blast these prospects, and I am more specially in a position to give warning of them, since, being in strong sympathy with the general tendencies of which we are all feeling the effects, I am more likely to be listened to than those who may be suspected of disliking them. You think from American experience that I have overrated the magnitude of some of the dangers. I am, perhaps, of all Englishmen, the one who would most rejoice at finding that I had done so, and who most warmly welcomes every indication which favours such a conclusion. But whatever may be their amount, the dangers are real, and unless constantly kept in view, will tend to increase; and neither human nature nor experience justify the belief that mankind will be sufficiently on their guard against evils arising from their own shortcomings shared by those around them. In order that political principles, requiring the occasional sacrifice of immediate inclinations, should be habitually present to the minds of a whole people, it is generally indispensable that these principles should be embodied in institutions. I think it therefore essential that the principle that superior education is entitled to superior political might, should be in some way constitutionally recognised. I suggested plural voting as a mode of doing this: if there be any better mode I am ready to transfer my advocacy to that. But I attach far more importance to Mr. Hare's system of election, which it gives me the greatest pleasure to see you appreciate as I do. It would be worthy of America to inaugurate an improvement which is at once a more complete application than has ever been made of the democratic principle, and at the same time its greatest safeguard. With the system of representation of all instead of majorities only, and of the whole people instead of only the male sex, America would afford to the world the first example in history of true democratic equality.

I omitted to say that I was not the founder of the *Westminster Review*, though I was one of its writers from the commencement. At a much later period of my life I was for several years its proprietor and chief conductor.

To Henry Solly,

of the Working Men's Club and Institute Union, on working men's clubs.

St. Véran, *6th April* 1863.

Dear Sir,—I am obliged to you for your letter, and am glad of the information it gives respecting the Working Men's Club and Institute Union, of which I previously knew very little. I have no doubt that, in so far as these clubs take the place of the public-house, they will be very useful, but I confess to some uncertainty whether they are a movement sufficiently in advance to meet the demands of the present time. I am doubtful whether an organised movement and subscriptions for the purpose of making the men of the working classes more comfortable away from the homes and children, is the thing wanted now, so much as an effort on a large scale to improve their dwellings, and bring co-operative arrangements for comfort and mental improvement home to all of them without distinction of sex or age. I do not say this to discourage you, nor with any fear of its doing so, but to account for my not taking so warm an interest in the scheme as you seem to expect that I should do. I think your plan likely to do good, but that there are others likely to be still more useful. 1863 — Aetat. 56.

To W. T. Thornton,

in reply to a criticism of his on the "Utilitarianism."

St. Véran, *17th April* 1863.

Dear Thornton,— . . . It was pleasant to receive a letter from you dated Marlow. I know not only the country but the house, and remember well its view over that beautiful valley. I am glad that I have carried you with me to so great an extent on the subject of Utilitarianism. What you say respecting the supposed case of Iphigenia does not at all contradict my opinion, as I never contended that the *feeling* of justice originates in a consideration of general

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utility, though I think it is that consideration which gives it its binding and properly moral character, and you yourself seem to think that in such a case as the one you suppose, the feeling of justice ought to yield to general utility. More than this no utilitarian can possibly ask. But I am inclined to think that such a case cannot possibly arise, and that the feeling of justice (except where, being divided against itself, it can be appealed to on both sides) never need come into conflict with the dictates of utility. The case of Iphigenia was one of supposed religious duty, which, where it intervenes, takes away the conflict, by removing the sense of moral wrong from the sacrifice. The nearest approach to it that occurs to me within the purely social or political sphere is the case of a people required by a powerful enemy under penalty of extermination to surrender some distinguished citizen, say the Carthaginians in the case of Hannibal. Now, in such a case as this I think there can be no doubt that the morality of utility requires that the people should fight to the last rather than comply with the demand; not only because of the special tie between the community and each of its members, and between the community and a benefactor, who, in the case supposed, is demanded as a victim precisely because of the greatness of his services, but also for a more general reason—namely, the reason which makes it right that a people inferior in strength should fight to the death against the attempt of a foreign despot to reduce it to slavery. For such iniquitous attempts, even by powers strong enough to succeed in them, are very much discouraged by the prospects of meeting with a desperate though unsuccessful resistance. The weak may not be able finally to withstand the strong if these persist in their tyranny, but they can make the tyranny cost the tyrant something, and that is much better than letting him indulge it gratis.

I think such a case as that of Hannibal comes within these reasons, and indeed is a mere case of the same principle.

To Theodor Gomperz (Mill's German translator).

Gomperz, who was an enthusiastic admirer of Mill, had suggested coming to see him at Avignon. Mill's reply, here printed, was unintentionally worded so coldly that it caused Gomperz a severe nervous breakdown, from which he never fully recovered.

St. Véran, 23*rd April* 1863.

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Dear Sir,—Your letter of the 18th only reached me yesterday evening, on my return from an absence of nearly a week.

Come by all means if you like, though I should not for an instant have thought of proposing it to you. I do not invite my friends to this place, unless in very rare cases, when I happen to have an interval of leisure, because it is impossible for me when here to give them the time I should wish to give, or show them the attention to which they are entitled. The greater part of all my intellectual work is done in the virtual solitude in which we live here, and the time which is not taken up in writing (in which at present both of us are occupied) we spend in wandering alone about the mountains and wilds of this part of France, gathering the health and spirits which are necessary to render life in England endurable to us. If, knowing this, you still like to come, I can only say that I shall be glad to see what I can of you; and I should not have said so much if you had not expressed yourself as if your motive for coming to Avignon was chiefly to see us; and I should very much regret that you should either be disappointed or think us unfriendly in case you should see less of us than you expect. . . .

To T. Cliffe Leslie, on labour co-partnership.

St. Véran, 4*th May* 1863.

. . . It does not seem to me that task-work, even if it could be made universal, would destroy the partial opposi-

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tion of interests between employers and employed. There would still remain the question of the rate of payment, and the employers and workmen, supposing them both to be entirely selfish, could not have the same wishes as to that point. Nothing that I can imagine except co-operation would entirely take away the antagonism. But in order to do so it is not necessary that co-operation should be universal. If it was only very frequent, a labourer who remained in the employment of an individual, and who received from him as much (for labour of the same efficiency) as he could earn under co-operation, would see that he had no reason to complain. The employer's profits would then be a mere consequence of increased efficiency in the instruments of production occasioned by private ownership of them. The capitalist would only take from the workmen what he first gave them. Not to mention that co-operation in the form of participation of the labourers in the profits would be perfectly compatible with individual ownership, and would go much nearer to producing identity of interest than task-work would.

To Theodor Gomperz.

Blackheath Park, *5th July* 1863.

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Dear Sir,—I have been intending to write to you almost from the time when you left, but delayed, partly because I thought I might hear from you, and partly because I was expecting an opportunity of seeing Mr. Grote, who would certainly have wished to send you a friendly message. I have been disappointed, however, and shall not be able to see him for more than a week, and I will therefore no longer delay writing to you, though I have nothing particular to say, except to express our earnest hope that your health is by this time completely restored, and our unalterable feelings of friendship and regard.

Our life, which has been more than usually broken in upon during the last month, owing to the presence of several persons in London whom I highly value, or to

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whom attentions were due from me which I have few opportunities of paying, is now about to relapse into its usual wholesome tranquillity, and I have been enabled to have a few days' work at my book on Hamilton, with which I now mean to persevere steadily. I have always found that real intellectual work is to me all that Cicero in his oration "Pro Archia" says of literature—when one wants healthy excitement, an outlet for energy, active pleasure, or consolation, nothing else affords it in the same degree. It would give me great comfort to see you reaping the same benefits from the same cause. Your clear, firm intellect and your great store of acquired knowledge qualify you to take a high position not only as a scholar but as a writer and thinker, and I know nothing to prevent your doing so unless you allow yourself to be dismayed by too great dissatisfaction with what you produce. That you must be dissatisfied is inevitable, for nobody ever does anything of much value unless his standard of excellence is much above his present powers of execution; but, if one gives way to discouragement, this disparity is always increasing, for self-culture raises one's standard always higher and higher, so that unless one keeps one's powers of execution in such full exercise as makes them also grow *pari passu*, one is driven to absolute despair. Ever since I have had eight or ten years of intellectual activity to look back upon I have often said to myself, if my judgment were what it is now, and my powers of execution only what they were a few years ago, I should perhaps never have had the heart to do anything. I have gone on chiefly because my standard, though always far above myself, never seemed at an absolutely unattainable distance, and I have generally found that, however discontented I might be with the best that I could do, others, who had not by dwelling on the subject formed the same high idea of what there was to be done, did not perceive a tenth part of the shortcomings which I myself saw, and that what was not good enough for me was often sufficient to be very useful to them. And I feel certain that you will find exactly the same. . . .

To J. G. Palfrey, of Boston,

acknowledging his "History of New England," and "Papers on the Slave Power."

Blackheath Park, 18*th July* 1863.

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Dear Sir,—Want of time has prevented me from sooner acknowledging the present of your two works; as it still obliges me to postpone the pleasure I expect to derive from your "History of New England." But I will not any longer defer expressing to you my sincere thanks for your having given me the opportunity of reading your two series of papers on the "Slave Power." Had but such a book as yours been in the hands of our people at the commencement of the present contest, I think that it would have saved many from disgracing themselves and their country, by sympathising with the atrocious slave-holding conspiracy. They had a slight though wholly insufficient excuse in their total ignorance of all the antecedents of the question. But now they have contracted the habit of siding with tyrants, and the most complete proof that could be laid before them of the character of the tyranny would now make comparatively little impression on them. I feel the utmost sympathy with the tone and spirit of your book, and the highest admiration for the band of men, of whom you are one, who founded and led the Anti-Slavery party in the United States in still worse times than these, and I have found myself often exclaiming, as I read your book, that the noble Commonwealth of Massachusetts will yet redeem America and the world.

To J. Stuart Glennie.

Blackheath Park, 23*rd July* 1863.

Dear Sir,—Dr. Tyndall's answer to your question must be considered, I should think, to set at rest all doubt respecting the complete establishment of the law of Conservation of Force so far as regards the mutual convertibility of heat and mechanical motion. Though the law is not

yet similarly established in any other of its sub-divisions, there is good reason to expect that it will be so, and I am quite willing to accept it hypothetically as established. 1863 — Aetat. 57.

Supposing this mutual convertibility to be a universal law it will necessarily modify, at least in the mode of expression, much of the received physical and metaphysical philosophy; and in endeavouring, even in the present state of the subject, to discover what these modifications ought to be, you are engaged not only in a useful undertaking, but in one for which the letter you have written to me shows that you have a considerable qualification. I would therefore encourage you to go on, and as the best help I can give you is to offer such remarks as occur to me on any part of your speculations which you may communicate to me, I will begin doing so with your letter.

With regard to Matter, there has long been a growing tendency in thinkers to regard its particles as mere centres of force — even as local centres arbitrarily assumed to facilitate calculation and not implying the hypothesis of an absolute minimum. I think also that philosophers have long since given up the conception of inertia in the sense in which you contend against it. No one any longer speaks of a *vis inertiæ*, sufficient of itself to neutralise part of an impelling force. It is quite understood that as much force as is lost by the impinging body is always transferred to the impinged, at least in the form of pressure, and that if this is often imperceptible to the senses it is because a small amount of force is distributed over so great a bulk that the effect on the whole is that of an inappreciable fraction. We may now add, as the complement and correction of this, that force which is lost as motion, reappears in some other shape. With respect to Cause, I confess that I cannot see that the philosophical conception of it is at all altered by the new principle. The existence of force, no doubt, must now be placed as the existence of matter was before, among those facts which, having in their nature no beginning, are not dependent on any cause. The existence of a certain quantity of force, as of a certain quantity of matter, becomes itself one of the primeval causes. But

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every change of state, from one manifestation of force to another (as from locomotion to heat and conversely), remains an *event*, dependent on a certain combination of previous conditions, and our conception of Causation is still, in regard to such events, exactly what it was before. Not to mention that the ultimate effects which follow from these different manifestations—*e.g.*, the locomotion which we see, and the heat which we feel—remain essentially and irrevocably different as they were before. They are shown indeed to be consequences of the same Primeval Cause, under different acts of collateral conditions: but neither this, nor anything else, can make them identical in themselves ; the sensations are different, and do not co-exist as the causes do ; they are effects dependent, as they have always been considered to be, upon a law of sequence.

The mutuality of action, of which the range is so greatly extended by the discovery of the Conservation of Force, does not, as it seems to me, affect the idea of Cause. Even if established as the universal law of all action, it would only show that all, instead of merely some, Causes are reacted upon by their effects ; that there is reciprocal succession between the different links of two series. This phenomenon is always allowed for in the inductive theory of Cause. It is always recognised, for example, in the phenomena of gravitation. The present position of every body in the solar system is the joint effect of the position of all the other bodies of the system, and it also itself exerts an influence on the position of each of them. But this is still a case of succession, not of co-existence, for only one of these relative positions of all the bodies can exist at a time, and the change from one position to another is effected by motion which is successive. If the position of each body were merely a fact in co-relation with the position of every other, all the different positions mutually determining one another, the system would be in equilibrium and all motion would cease. That it does not cease proves that the present position of each body is determining not the present position of every other, but a change in that position. So that even in this example

(the most favourable of all to you because gravitation has not been proved to require time for its transmission) you need the old idea of Causation to account for the facts. 1863 — Aetat. 57.

I may add that if a different definition is now wanted of Cause and Effect it would be necessary to look out for clearer expressions than "a *relation*" and the "*realisation*" of that relation: terms which, as it seems to me, require explanation still more than Cause and Effect do.

I shall always be happy to discuss these matters further with you either by word of mouth or in writing.

To T. Cliffe Leslie.

St. Véran, 15*th September* 1863.

Dear Sir,—You wished to be informed of anything worth reading which came out on the gold question. If you have not yet returned to England you may not be aware of Fawcett's paper read at the British Association, and the newspaper discussion which has followed it, at the rate of two or more long letters in the *Times* every day—Cairnes, among others, taking part. If you have not yet done so, you will find it worth while to look through a file of the *Times*, as well as to read Fawcett's paper, which I doubt not he will gladly communicate to you. The *Daily Mail* had a fuller report of it than the *Times*. It seems to me that three important ideas have emerged from the discussion, all tending to explain in their several degrees why the apparent depreciation has been so much less than might have been expected from so great an addition to the quantity of gold in the world. The first is, that the increase must be compared, not with the gold alone which existed before, but with the gold plus the silver, which last is said to be double the value of the gold. This was brought forward by Cairnes. Second: one writer has urged that railways and free trade are rapidly producing an approach to equality of prices all over the world, in place of the great inequality that existed before, England being the place where they were, as a rule, highest. This change, if there had been no gold

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discovery, would have taken place by a fall in some places and a rise in others; consequently the operation of the new gold for such time in such places as England, would chiefly consist in preventing a fall; and its only manifest effect might for some time be that of raising prices in the cheap countries to nearly the level of the dear ones. This, which is an original and I think a just remark, Cairnes notices but rejects, having I think been set against it by a stupid metaphorical way of putting it in a leading article of the *Times*. The third idea is one I have myself for some time entertained, and it has been taken up by one writer in a newspaper letter. It is this: we are already suffering a much greater depreciation than appears on the surface, because the diminished purchasing power of money is experienced in the form of deteriorated quality rather than of higher price. It is the interest of dealers thus to disguise the progressive rise of prices. There are always things to be had at the prices or something like the prices one has been accustomed to pay, but they are no longer of the same quality. The same purpose is also often effected by giving smaller and smaller measure without change of name.

Of course all these circumstances affect only the rapidity of the depreciation, and have nothing to do with what it will ultimately amount to, which is a question of permanent cost of production, and as the business gets out of the hands of private diggers into those of quartz-crushing companies conducting it on ordinary mercantile principles, gold will ultimately be of the value which will yield to such companies the ordinary rate of companies' profit.

To Judge Appleton.

St. Véran, *24th September* 1863.

Dear Sir,—Though I did not immediately answer your letter of 18th July it was by no means for want of being greatly interested by it. But it so exactly coincides with my own interpretation of passing events as to leave me hardly anything to say. I have just been reading it

again for the third or fourth time since I received it, and I find we think alike on every point which you touch upon. This cannot but confirm me very much in my way of thinking. But indeed the true nature of all that is going on in America just now is so simple and obvious that, to see it as it is, requires only that one shall not be totally ignorant of American affairs during a few years before the secession. As almost everybody here, from the Prime Minister down to the smallest newspaper writer, is thus ignorant, they naturally see, in what is now going on, only what their wishes or their prejudices prepare them to look for. 1863 — Aetat. 57.

The general direction of the sympathies of nearly all classes here except the working, and the better part of the literary class, is disgraceful enough to this country. But things are mending a little. The worst enemies of America are becoming convinced that it will not do to let any more *Alabamas* go out from these islands. It is curious to see the *Times* daily arguing, in total opposition to its former doctrines, that to allow vessels of war to be in substance, even if not literally, fitted out in this country for a belligerent is wrong as well as inexpedient. The Government, as a Government, has always been better than the public in all that relates to this contest; and I am persuaded that this country will not give you any cause of complaint against its conduct, but only against its inclinations. Some members of the Cabinet, too, have been all along warm friends of the cause. The Duke of Argyll and Milner-Gibson have not disguised it in their speeches, and my opinion is that even Lord Russell is more with the North than against it. The sentiments of the others will, I doubt not, be very greatly modified by your success, of which there can now be little doubt, from the gradual but constant progress of the Northern army and the increasing exhaustion of the South, and the dogged pertinacity, for which no one originally ventured to give the people of the Free States credit for as much as they have shown. Complete victory may not yet be very near at hand, but it is a consolation to think that, provided

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the success is complete at last, the longer the war continues the less possibility there is of a compromise preserving slavery, and the more thoroughly the war will have become one of principle, tending to elevate the national character.

The thing I most wish to hear from you now is what you, and men like you, are thinking about the mode of settling Southern affairs after the war. I cannot look forward with satisfaction to any settlement but complete emancipation—land given to every negro family either separately or in organised communities under such rules as may be found temporarily necessary—the schoolmaster set to work in every village, and the tide of free immigration turned on in those fertile regions from which slavery has hitherto excluded it. If this be done, the gentle and docile character which seems to distinguish the negroes will prevent any mischief on their side, while the proofs they are giving of fighting powers will do more in a year than all other things in a century to make the whites respect them and consent to their being politically and socially equals. Such benefits are more than an equivalent for a far longer and more destructive war than this is likely to prove.

I am in hopes too that this great trial of American institutions, which has necessarily brought all that is defective in them to the surface, will have done the work of a whole age in stimulating thought on the most important topics among the people of the Free States. I have long thought that the real ultimate danger of democracy was intellectual stagnation, and there is a very good side to anything which has made *that* impossible for at least a generation to come.

Many thanks for the documents you kindly sent. I have received so many from various quarters in the United States that I have not yet had time to read half of them. All that I have read are extremely interesting and valuable.

To W. T. Thornton.

St. Véran, 23*rd October* 1863.

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. . . Have you considered the subject of the taxation of charities? If not, perhaps when you do, you may not agree with Gladstone. I have not hitherto agreed with him, though a little shaken, not by any of Gladstone's arguments, but by some of Hare's. Hare is, I suspect, the teacher if not prompter of Gladstone on this subject. My counter arguments are: 1st. That the charities which are not useful, as the majority are not, should be reformed altogether instead of being merely taxed, &c. That anything, really useful to the public or a part of the public, which an individual has thought worth giving a part of his fortune for, deserves, so long as its usefulness continues, as much encouragement from the State as is involved in not taxing the income so appropriated. 2nd. That of those among whom the funds are distributed, all whose income from that and other sources together exceeds £100 pay their proper quota to the tax already, and those whose income is below £100 have, on the general principle of the tax, the same claim as all other such people to be exempted from it. 3rd. You are aware that I would, if I could, exempt savings from income tax, and make the tax on income virtually a tax on expenditure. By this rule any portion of income should be only taxed if spent on private uses, but should be free from taxation (at least at its origin) when devoted to public ends.

. . . . . .

As for the American question, if you had time to read one or two books I could recommend to you, and if you were reading the *Daily News* every day (as I am whenever the Post-Office lets it pass, which it does nearly four times in every week), I think you would soon come over to my opinion. In the pro-Southern English papers which I see the facts favourable to the Northern side of the question are *always* suppressed; . . . the *Daily News* is the only daily paper of which I can say (though the *Star*, which I know

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less of, may deserve the same praise) that what I think the just view is supported with adequate knowledge, and without prejudice, and the facts favourable to it fairly presented. The American correspondent of that paper is an intelligent man, not like that poor gobemouche Mackay, in the *Times*, who simply retails the stuff he hears from a disreputable clique at New York, almost all of them personally interested in slavery either through commerce or politics, who used to be held up to contempt in the English papers as the worst section of the democracy. Their following consists chiefly of the mob of Irish emigrants. It is with these and their clients in the press and the town council that our journals have allied themselves. Everything high or intellectual, or noble-hearted, or that used to be friendly to England in the North, is heart and soul with the war. But you will soon hear all this from Leslie Stephen better than from me.

To Henry Chenevix, on Miracles.

St. Véran, *4th November* 1863.

Dear Sir,—Your communication raises a great many more points than can be properly discussed in a letter, and more than I have time to discuss at all. You have seen in my "Logic" my opinion on the subject of miracles generally, viz., that no event, however extraordinary, can be proved to be miraculous, and therefore that no such event can prove the existence of a supernatural power; but that to one who already believes in such a power, any miracle, consistent with his theory of the character and purposes of the power he recognises, is no more incredible than any other extraordinary fact. I cannot say I ever saw any advantage in the theory which supposes miracles to be manifestations of unknown general laws, or, in other words, feats of knowledge and skill, not of power. If any one has been endowed by God for the special purpose of working wonders to serve as credentials for a divine message, I see no antecedent reason for supposing that this power would

have been given in the form of a knowledge of laws yet undiscovered rather than in that of a power of superseding all laws, while in the former case to work the wonder and keep the knowledge secret, implies a charlatanism which one would not willingly impute to a person divinely inspired, and which is not implied in the other case.

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Unless I could pretend to know either that there is no supernatural power or that such power never works but in one way, I cannot presume to say that Christ may not have worked miracles: and I confess if I could be convinced that he ever *said* he had done so, it would weigh a great deal with me in favour of the belief. But in my opinion there is not a single miracle in either the Old or New Testament, the particular evidence of which is worth a farthing. Those of Christ seem to me exactly on a level with the wonderful stories current about every remarkable man, and repeated in good faith in times when the scientific spirit scarcely existed. We know that in the time and place he lived in, no one thought miracles in the smallest degree incredible; those who rejected his mission did not trouble themselves to dispute his miraculous powers, but preferred ascribing them to evil beings. With regard to prophecies, in the sense attached to the word by modern theologians, I do not believe that any such ever were made. The splendid religious and patriotic poetry of Isaiah, Jeremiah, and others, so far as it contains any predictions of future events, contains only such as are made by Carlyle or anybody who argues that moral degeneracy in a people must lead to a catastrophe. The catastrophe they specially looked forward to was that which everything showed to be then imminent, a Babylonian conquest. This again they as Hebrews naturally believed not to be permanent, inasmuch as the Babylonians, being wicked and idolatrous, could only be suffered to prevail temporarily over God's people as instruments for their punishment. The only exception I am aware of is the character of the prophetic writings in the book of Daniel, which predicts events in such minute detail down to the time of Antiochus Epiphanes, and with such extreme

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vagueness afterwards, that I firmly believe (with Coleridge) that it predicted only what had already happened.

I do not suppose that what I have said will help you much in your difficulties, but it will show you that I judge of the credibility of alleged miracles from the probabilities of each particular case and the value of the evidence adduced in it; and no other principle of judgment seems to me tenable.

To Professor Antoine Elisée Cherbuliez, of Zurich, acknowledging his book, "Précis de la Science Economique."

St. Véran, *le* 6 *novembre* 1863.

Monsieur,—Si j'ai tant tardé à vous remercier de l'envoi de votre important traité d'Economie Politique, c'est que j'ai dû attendre le moment où un loisir suffisant me permettrait de le lire attentivement et d'en parler avec connaissance de cause. C'est seulement depuis hier que j'ai pu en achever la lecture, et je ne remplis qu'un devoir en vous disant que vous avez fait, à mon sens, l'un des meilleurs ouvrages qui aient encore paru sur l'Economie Politique. Vous en avez saisi toutes les lois générales, même celles qui sont loin d'être encore reconnues par la plupart des économistes, et vous les avez exposées et groupées d'une façon qui en démontrant une vraie originalité d'esprit met souvent ces lois sous plusieurs rapports dans un jour plus ou moins nouveau. Dans la science abstraite je ne me suis jamais trouvé en désaccord avec vous, si ce n'est dans quelques détails peu importants; encore ces divergences apparentes disparaîtraient probablement devant des explications aisées. S'il n'y a pas tout à fait la même unanimité en ce qui se rapporte aux applications, cela est dans l'ordre des choses humaines. De même les dissentiments ne tiennent pas à des différences de principes. Le plus saillant d'entre eux se rapporte à la question de l'assistance légale. Les économistes anglais, dont la plupart étaient autrefois très opposés à la taxe des pauvres y sont en général devenus favorables depuis

l'enquête qui a amené la réforme de 1834. Ils ont cru connaître que l'assistance bornée au strict nécessaire, et assujettie à des conditions plus désagréables que le travail libre, ne produit plus l'imprévoyance et la démoralisation que vous signalez, à si juste titre, comme effets de l'aumône mal ordonnée : tandis que la charité publique et privée telle qu'elle existe en France, n'étant pas susceptible d'une organisation aussi vigoureuse, me paraît produire tous les mauvais effets qui résultèrent du système anglais lors de sa plus mauvaise administration. J'ajoute qu'il me semble que la haine des pauvres contres les riches est un mal presque inévitable là où les lois ne garantissent pas les pauvres contre l'extrémité du besoin. Le pauvre, en France, malgré l'assistance qu'il reçoit, a toujours devant les yeux la possibilité de mourir de faim, tandis qu'en Angleterre il sait qu'en dernier ressort il est créancier de la propriété jusqu'à concurrence d'une simple subsistance, que tout prolétaire qu'il soit il n'est pas absolument déshérité de sa place au soleil, à quoi j'attribue que malgré la constitution aristocratique de la propriété et de la vie sociale en Angleterre, la classe prolétaire y est rarement ennemie soit de l'institution de la propriété soit même des classes qui en jouissent. 1863 — Aetat. 57.

En me félicitant, Monsieur, que la chaire d'Economie Politique dans une des institutions les plus importantes de la Suisse soit remplie par une intelligence aussi forte et aussi éclairée que la vôtre, je vous prie d'agréer l'expression sincère de ma considération la plus distinguée.

To T. Cliffe Leslie.

St. Véran, 14*th November* 1863.

Dear Sir,—I have read the papers you sent, and I think there is a great deal of valuable matter in them, and I would encourage you on every account to go on with your project. There is very little in them that I at all disagree with—only a sentence here and there. Wherever this is the case I have made a pencil note, or will do so, for I will venture to keep the MS. a day or two days

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longer for the purpose of reading it again. I am not sure that I rightly understand a sentence in one of your letters in which you seemed to speak of sending the paper for the editor's consideration before completing it. You know the editor and all the elements of the case much better than I can do, but I should think they would very much diminish the chance of the article's being accepted. If I were you I would give it the very utmost finish of execution in my power before letting him see it. There are very few editors who would not, on such a subject, care very much more about what an article *seems* than about what it *is*. Your paper will be judged by its composition, its mode of laying out the subject, and the degree in which it makes its theory plausible. As to whether the theory is true or not, the editor probably is not political economist enough to think himself able to judge, and most likely cares very little.

At present the MS. is little more than material for an article. The reader has to make out for himself what you are trying to prove, and what you do prove.

I have read Cairnes's article a second time, and I only think him materially wrong in two things—first, in overlooking and even rejecting the point of view which is the prominent one in your article—the altered distribution of the precious metals which is in progress, and the tendency of prices to rise earliest and most in the more backward and remote countries. This is the great point of originality in your paper. The second mistake which I perceive in him is a much smaller one—it is one of terms only: he says that if prices did not rise at all, but were only prevented from falling, this would still be *depreciation* of the precious metals. I should not call this depreciation. It is exactly the absorption without depreciation, which is affirmed by some of those whom he attacks.

With respect to the question whether *credit* in any of its shapes is to be counted on either side in addition to the metals; is not the real state of the case, that the increase of gold would not produce any increase of credit until prices had risen? As soon as they had risen from the

action of the gold alone, larger sums would be required for all purchasers, and as the ordinary object of credit is to make purchases, the nominal amount of credit called into operation would (all other things remaining the same) increase exactly in the ratio in which prices had risen. So that the difference in the credit employed before and after would not be a cause but an effect of the different state of prices before and after, and might be struck out of the account on both sides, so far as the consequences of the increase of gold are concerned—only taking care to remember that every fluctuation of credit from other causes would act as a disturbing agency and vitiate the comparison.

If the new gold has, as you suppose, anywhere taken the place of credit—which, if a fact, is to me a surprising one—it must be, I think, from some local cause tending to a substitution of money for credit, which would equally have acted if the new gold had never been discovered, and must be classed with hoarding and the other things which cause more gold to be used without lowering its value.

I believe your interpretation of the state of things in India to be perfectly correct. But I do not see that it conflicts with Cairnes's.

I do not like Courcelle-Seneuil's Etudes, though his treatise on Political Economy seemed to me very sound and sensible. But I agree with him more than I believe I do with you about the influence of race—which (it is pretty certain) is only the influence of external circumstances transmitted by inheritance, and capable of being modified *ad libitum* or actually reversed by change of circumstances. Those of your remarks which bear on the possibility of a science of society do not seem to me to have the degree of weight you seem to attach to them. But the subject is too long for the end of a letter, or indeed for a letter at all.

If the second reading of your paper suggests any additional remarks worth sending I will write again. If not I will merely post the MS.

To Alexander Bain.

St. Véran, *22nd November* 1863.

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Dear Bain,— . . . I will read again Spencer's "Psychology." I remember thinking his account of Extension very good; and I shall be glad not only to profit by it, but to have an opportunity of quoting from him something with which I agree. I sometimes regret (considering that he is, and deems himself, unsuccessful) that when I have had occasion to speak of him in print it has almost always been to criticise him. He is a considerable thinker, though anything but a safe one—and is on the whole an ally, in spite of his Universal Postulate. His speculations on mathematical axioms I do not now remember, but when I read them I did not attach any importance to them. His notion that we cannot think the annihilation or diminution of force I remember well—and I thought it out-Whewelled Whewell. The conservation of force has hardly yet got to be believed, and already its negation is declared inconceivable. But this is Spencer all over; he throws himself with a certain deliberate impetuosity into the last new theory that chimes with his general way of thinking, and treats it as proved as soon as he is able to found a connected exposition of phenomena upon it. This is the way with his doctrine of "Heredity," which, however, will very likely prove true.

At present my table of contents [1] is as follows [2]: . . . On all these heads I have written chapters which are not unfit to print even now, but I hope to improve all of them very much before I do print them. I am now covering the blank pages with notes for additions and improvements, grounded on a third consecutive reading of Hamilton's philosophical writings from beginning to end. You see if I fail to give a true character of them, it will not be for want of being well acquainted with them. I was not prepared for the degree in which this complete acquaintance

[1] [Of his "Examination of Hamilton."]

[2] [It is omitted in the letter.]

lowers my estimate of the man and of his speculations. I did not expect to find them a mass of contradictions. There is scarcely a point of importance on which he does not hold conflicting theories, or profess doctrines which suppose one thing while he himself holds another. I think the book will make it very difficult to hold him up as an authority on philosophy hereafter. It almost goes against me to write so complete a demolition of a brother-philosopher after he is dead, not having done it while he was alive, and the more when I consider what a furious retort I should infallibly have brought upon myself, if he had lived to make it. 1863 — Aetat. 57.

Before the re-writing I mean to read or re-read as many books as I have time for, from which I can hope to get suggestions for enriching the book. What is the title of the work of the younger Fichte which you advised me to read? Do you know the psycho-physiological writings of Vogt and Mohlschott, said to be the heads of the new materialist school in Germany?

I have been reading, I may say studying, Tyndall's lectures on Heat. The equivalence of a certain quantity of heat and a certain quantity of mechanical power seems to be very completely established. But the theory is still very imperfect, and Tyndall is hardly the man to perfect it. There is a terrible phrase, "potential energy," which covers a great dark spot in the subject. How do they resolve such questions as this? By the trifling mechanical motion of applying a match I light a great heap of coal and disengage an enormous force in the form of heat. Where was the previous equivalent of this? No equivalent amount of mechanical motion existed just before, to be converted into it. Must we look for the equivalent at a distinct geological period when the force was, as they say, *stored up* in the coal? That is conservation of force with a vengeance, in one sense of the term: but not in the sense in which it is taken in the theory, if I understand it rightly; nor according to the philosophical meaning of force: for in that meaning there is a force where there is no activity, and the conservation of force can only mean that one of

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the modes of activity only ceases when another takes its place. I say nothing of the purely hypothetical machinery, the interstellar and interatomic ether. I should like to know your opinion on the whole subject, and how far you consider the new doctrine authorises a new attitude towards the undulatory theory. Indeed, I should be much obliged if in the two or three years which will elapse before a new edition of the "Logic" is called for, you would make a note of such alterations in any part of it as may be required by the progress of science.

. . . . . .

I only remarked your name once in Littré's citations from Comte's letters, and the mention, I think, was very harmless. At the time when he lost his Polytechnic appointment, and had to consider what he should do for an income, it seems I suggested that he could perhaps write articles for English reviews, and offered to translate them for him, adding that probably both you and Lewes would be willing to help him in the same way. In his answer he desired me to thank you and Lewes for the offer, in case either of you had made it. That is all I find on the subject. . . .

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